Johnson v. Chicago Stamping Plant
Filing
78
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated herein, Ford's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 1/11/2019: Mailed notice (maf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SAMUEL JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 15 C 11540
v.
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Ford Motor Company moves for summary judgment
(Dkt. No. 60) against Plaintiff Samuel Johnson on all of his
claims.
For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is granted.
I.
The
following
facts
BACKGROUND
are
undisputed
unless
designated
otherwise. Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) is a Michigan corporation
that maintains the Chicago Stamping Plant (the “Plant”), which
makes automotive parts for assembly plants and is located in
Chicago, Illinois. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. of Material Facts
(“SOF”) ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 70.) Plaintiff Samuel Johnson (“Johnson”),
an
African-American,
worked
at
the
Plant
September 2012 to May 6, 2014. (SOF ¶ 2.)
from
sometime
in
During that time,
Johnson experienced several personal setbacks, including the
deaths of his grandparents and cousin. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Stmt. of Additional Material Facts (“SOAF”) ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 74.)
These setbacks, along with what Johnson alleges were various
forms of harassment and discrimination by Ford employees, caused
him to suffer panic attacks, stress, and anxiety.
On at least two occasions, Johnson visited the Plant’s onsite Medical Department, complaining of chest pain, stress, and
anxiety, as well as requesting and eventually taking an ambulance
to the hospital. (SOF ¶¶ 9-10, 17-19; SOAF ¶¶ 6, 9-11.) During
Johnson’s first visit to the hospital, a doctor informed him
that he was experiencing anxiety. (SOF ¶ 10.) Sometime soon
afterward, his personal doctor requested Johnson be permitted
leave from work due to his “adjustment disorder with anxiety,”
which
made
Johnson
“unable
to
perform
any
kind
of
work
activities.” (SOF ¶ 12.) Johnson’s doctor also referred him to
a psychiatrist for treatment. (Id.) In accordance with his
personal doctor’s orders, he was also subsequently placed on
one-month medical leave, pending clearance by a psychiatrist to
return to work. (SOF ¶ 13.) Johnson later received that clearance
from psychiatrist Dr. Kirk Hopkins, who diagnosed him with “Major
Depression.” (SOF ¶ 15-16.) He returned to work on March 28,
2014. (Id.)
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The bulk of Johnson’s claims arise out of one other occasion
when Johnson visited the Medical Department, which took place on
April 4, 2014. As this point, the parties’ stories diverge as to
what exactly happened that day. Johnson met with the resident
nurse, Ms. Denise Bombagetti, complaining of chest pain. (SOF
¶ 19.) He requested an ambulance, but Ms. Bombagetti denied him
that service, so he called for one himself. (SOAF ¶ 9-11.) Ford
does not dispute these facts but offers additional controverted
facts:
in
complained
Johnson’s
about
his
meeting
with
anxiety
and
Ms.
Bombagetti,
about
other
he
also
individuals
bothering him while working. (SOF ¶ 20.) He allegedly informed
the nurse that he did not want to discuss the situation with his
United Auto Workers’ Union Employee Support Services Program
representative, Leroy Washington. (SOF ¶¶ 6, 21.)
took
Johnson’s
blood
pressure
and
pulse,
and
The nurse
checked
his
respiration and pupils, which she claimed all looked normal.
(SOF ¶ 22.) She determined that an ambulance was not warranted
and instead suggested that Johnson speak with the resident
doctor. (SOF ¶ 23, 27.) Johnson refused and in an agitated manner
left the Medical Department, which led Ms. Bombagetti to believe
Johnson posed a threat of violence. (SOF ¶ 26.) Ms. Bombagetti
then
discussed
the
incident
with
Mr.
Washington
and
other
officials and submitted a recommendation that Johnson not be
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allowed to return to work until he completed a fit for duty
examination. (SOF ¶ 30-32.)
Both parties agree that Johnson went to the hospital on
April 4, 2014, and doctors there informed Johnson that he was
again experiencing anxiety. (SOF ¶ 34.) However, upon his return
to the Plant, the parties’ stories once again diverge. Johnson
contends that the Plant’s security guards stopped him from
entering, frisked him, and requested his medical paperwork.
(SOAF ¶ 14.) Ford disagrees that the security guard laid a finger
on Johnson. (Id.) Although the minute details are disputed, both
parties agree that Ms. Bombagetti required that Johnson see a
counselor or his psychiatrist to determine whether he was fit
for
duty
before
returning.
(SOAF
¶ 15-17.)
Ms.
Bombagetti
provided Johnson with a so-called “Unicare Disability” form,
which Ford contends is a standard procedure for employees leaving
work for a medical issue and then possibly requesting medical
leave. (SOAF ¶ 19.) As a result, Johnson saw his psychiatrist,
who declared him “totally disabled” and unable to work at the
time. (SOAF ¶ 24.)
Around April 10, 2014, Johnson filed his first Charge of
Discrimination (“First Charge”) against Ford with the Illinois
Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”). (SOF ¶ 47.) That Charge
addressed solely the events that occurred on April 4, 2014. (SOF
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¶ 48.) He later filed a second Charge of Discrimination (“Second
Charge”) on May 12, 2014, which concerned his return to and
subsequent resignation from work.
Johnson’s psychiatrist later cleared him to return to work
on May 1, 2014. (SOAF ¶ 24.) He worked for approximately one
week before resigning. (SOF ¶ 61.) The Court notes that the facts
underlying Johnson’s resignation are somewhat inconsistent and
even
confusing,
but
to
provide
context:
Johnson’s
union
representative Matt Kolinowski and the Plant’s Labor Relations
Representative
James
Pipkins
allegedly
threatened
him
to
withdraw his First Charge or risk retaliation. (SOAF ¶ 26.) Ford
disputes this, stating that Mr. Pipkins did not threaten Johnson
and instead, as both parties agree, informed him that he did not
have to resign. (SOF ¶ 64-64.) Regardless of what was said and
done, Johnson ultimately resigned and allegedly believed he had
no other option but to resign. (SOAF ¶ 26.)
In his Second
Charge, Johnson raised a retaliation claim based on the events
that occurred after returning to work on May 1, 2014 and leading
up to his resignation. (SOF ¶ 68.) Around this time, he also
applied for and received Social Security disability benefits,
claiming that he was unable to work due to a disability. (SOF
¶ 61.)
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As a final matter, Johnson brings an additional claim
separate from the events described in the First and Second
Charge.
Leading
up
to
the
April
4,
2014
incident,
Johnson
contends that he also experienced a hostile work environment.
Three of Johnson’s supervisors—Rich Murry, Henry Snorek, and
Brad Vis (all white males)—allegedly told Johnson that he was
not performing well at his job, accused him of being on drugs,
and questioned his frequent use of the bathroom. (SOAF ¶¶ 2-4.)
Moreover, a co-worker called him a monkey. (SOAF ¶ 5.) Ford
controverts the supervisors’ alleged conduct and asserts that
there is no proof that Johnson’s co-worker called him such a
name. (SOAF ¶ 5.)
The foregoing events led Johnson to bring this suit, which
includes
claims
for
race
discrimination,
a
hostile
work
environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and a claim for perceived
disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Ford now moves for summary
judgment on all claims.
II.
ANALYSIS
In considering Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to Johnson. See Harney v. Speedway SuperAmerica,
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LLC, 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2008). But the Court does not
extend this favor to inferences “that are supported by only
speculation or conjecture.” Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725,
730 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the admissible
evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” McGreal v. Vill. of Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308,
312 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hanover Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co.,
751 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2014)); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
A.
Counts I and III: Title VII Claims
The Court turns first to Johnson’s Title VII claims, which
include
race
discrimination,
a
racially
hostile
work
environment, and retaliation. Each will be discussed in turn.
1.
Race Discrimination Claim
Johnson argues that Ford discriminated against him on the
basis of his race. When considering employment discrimination,
courts in this Circuit ask “whether the evidence would permit a
reasonable
factfinder
race . . . caused
the
to
conclude
discharge
or
that
other
the
adverse
plaintiff’s
employment
action.” Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d
887, 895 (7th Cir. 2018). Courts use the familiar McDonnellDouglas burden-shifting framework to evaluate the evidence in
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the record. See David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmt. Coll. Dist. No. 508,
846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017). To establish prima facie
discrimination, Johnson must show that (1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he performed reasonably on the job in accord
with Ford’s legitimate expectations; (3) he was subjected to an
adverse employment action despite his reasonable performance;
and (4) similarly situated employees outside of the protected
class were treated more favorably by Ford. Johnson, 892 F.3d at
895. If Johnson satisfies that burden, then Ford must “articulate
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
the
adverse
employment action,” at which point the burden shifts back to
Johnson
to
submit
evidence
that
Ford’s
explanation
is
“pretextual.” David, 846 F.3d at 225 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Johnson admits that he cannot prove all of the elements to
succeed on his race discrimination claim. Though unquestionably
a member of a protected class, Johnson acknowledges that “he
cannot identify any similarly situated individuals outside his
protected class (white) that were treated more favorably than he
was[.]” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 6, Dkt. No. 72.)
Because he concedes as much, and the record provides no evidence
to demonstrate otherwise, Johnson cannot prove the fourth and
final element of his race discrimination claim. See Nichols v.
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Mich. City Plant Planning Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 605 (7th Cir.
2014) (finding that the plaintiff’s “claim fails because he
cannot show that similarly situated employees that are not
African-American received more favorable treatment”). His claim
thus fails as a matter of law.
2.
Racially Hostile Work Environment Claim
To survive summary judgment on his hostile work environment
claim, Johnson must show that “(1) the work environment was both
objectively and subjectively offensive; (2) the harassment was
based on membership in a protected class or in retaliation for
protected behavior; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive; and
(4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Boss v. Castro,
816 F.3d 910, 920 (7th Cir. 2016).
Johnson points to a handful of incidents which he contends
created a hostile work environment. As recited in his First and
Second
Charges,
Johnson
cites
the
events
that
occurred
April 4, 2014, and the circumstances of his resignation.
on
Beyond
that, Johnson contends that his supervisors’ conduct—namely,
questioning
his
frequent
bathroom
use,
telling
him
he
was
performing poorly, and accusing him of drug use—as well as one
coworker
calling
him
a
monkey
contributed
toward
such
a
hostility. As a preliminary matter, Ford argues that because
Johnson’s
Charges
never
mentioned
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these
latter
events
they
cannot be considered. Still, Ford maintains that whether or not
the Court considers them, Johnson cannot establish all of the
elements of a hostile work environment claim. These two arguments
will be considered separately.
a.
Allegations Outside the First and Second Charges
It is clearly established that filing a charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is “a necessary
precondition to filing civil claims under Title VII.” Huri v.
Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804
F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2015). Filing a charge with IDHR suffices
as the charge is subsequently cross-filed with the EEOC as a
matter of course. See Watkins v. City of Chicago, No. 17 C 2028,
2018 WL 2689537, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2018). Ford correctly
points out that Title VII claims not included in the charge are
generally barred. See Jones v. Res-Care, 613 F.3d 665, 670 (7th
Cir. 2010). But there is an exception. Id. Johnson may proceed
on claims that share a “reasonable relationship between the
allegations in the charge and the claims in the complaint” and
that
can
“reasonably
be
expected
to
grow
out
of
an
EEOC
investigation of the allegations in the charge.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Johnson’s allegations in the First and Second Charges
include
race-discrimination
and
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retaliation,
as
well
as
instances
where
a
supervisor
or
Ms.
Bombagetti
allegedly
mistreated him. These allegations, by themselves, could serve as
the basis for a hostile work environment claim. The additional
facts and allegations Johnson sets forth regarding his other
supervisors and co-worker bear a reasonable relationship with
Johnson’s allegations in the two Charges. Moreover, such claims
can reasonably be expected to grow out of an investigation of
said
Charges.
The
Court
will
thus
consider
the
additional
allegations in its analysis.
b.
The Claim
Ford argues that Johnson’s claim nevertheless fails as a
matter of law because he cannot show that (1) the environment
was
both
subjectively
and
objectively
offensive,
(2)
any
harassment he experienced was based on his race, and (3) the
conduct was severe or pervasive. On this point, the Court agrees.
Notably, the law “does not prohibit all verbal or physical
harassment
in
the
workplace.”
Oncale
v.
Sundowner
Offshore
Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). As such, “[s]imple teasing,
offhand
comments,
and
isolated
incidents
(unless
extremely
serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms
and conditions of employment.” Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d
788, 803 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A workplace rises to the level of an objectively
- 11 -
hostile
work
discriminatory
environment
only
intimidation,
if
it
ridicule,
is
and
“permeated
insult,
with
that
is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”
Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir.
2014). “[T]he threshold for plaintiffs is high, as the workplace
that is actionable is one that is hellish.” Whittaker v. N. Ill.
Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Johnson,
the Court finds the alleged harassment against Johnson was
neither objectively offensive nor pervasive. The harassment was
infrequent and mostly confined to two separate days: April 4,
2014, and the day he resigned. In addition to those two dates
were a few somewhat isolated incidents where some supervisors
accused Johnson of drug use and questioned his frequent bathroom
use, as well as where a co-worker called him a name. Looking at
the totality of the circumstances, Johnson has shown at best a
handful of insensitive and passive aggressive peers, not conduct
that is truly outrageous. See Kelly v. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
No. 13-cv-03701, 2018 WL 5994930, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15,
2018).
- 12 -
Moreover,
Johnson
has
failed
to
show
that
any
of
the
harassment he experienced was based on his race. The fact that
Johnson is black, and his supervisors and Ms. Bombagetti are
white does not suffice to establish that he was harassed because
of his race. See Collins v. Buechel Stone Corp., 390 F. Supp.2d
810, 815 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (“The mere fact that most of the
harassment was committed by persons of a race other than [the
plaintiff’s]
does
not
mean
that
race
was
the
motivating
factor.”); see also Orton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 775
(7th Cir. 2014) (“[The plaintiff’s] supervisors’ insensitive and
inattentive responses were callous mismanagement; but absent
evidence
that
this
inaction
was
based
on
her
[protected
characteristic], it did not violate Title VII.”); Jajeh v. Cnty.
of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 569 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Title VII does not
prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it
is directed only at discrimination because of [a protected
characteristic].”).
The
only
incident
Johnson
describes
as
having a connection to his race is when one coworker allegedly
called him a monkey.
The remark, however, while gross was not
“an incessant part of the workplace environment.” Jackson v.
Cnty of Racine, 474 F.3d 493, 499 (7th Cir. 2007); see also
Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 859 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding
that “three arguably race-tinged remarks [(including “get the
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monkeys off the backs of management”)] did not rise to the level
of severe or pervasive conduct”). As such, and in sum, it follows
that there is no triable issue of fact as to Johnson’s hostile
work environment claim. The claim thus fails as a matter of law.
3.
Retaliation Claim
To prevail on his retaliation claim, Johnson must prove
that (1) he engaged in a statutorily-protected activity; (2) he
suffered
an
adverse
employment
action;
and
(3)
there
was
causation (the former caused the latter). Greengrass v. Int’l
Monetary Sys. Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2015).
Johnson engaged in a protected activity when he filed his
First IDHR Charge. But Ford contends that Johnson has not offered
evidence of a materially adverse action. For retaliation, the
challenged adverse action “must be one that a reasonable employee
would find to be materially adverse such that the employee would
be dissuaded from engaging in the protected activity.” Roney v.
Ill. Dep’t of Trans., 474 F.3d 455, 461 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
Here, Johnson contends that Mr. Pipkins and Mr. Kolinowski
retaliated against him by harassing him to withdraw his First
Charge.
Moreover, Mr. Pipkins allegedly informed Johnson that
if he did not withdraw the Charge, his superiors would also
harass him and even terminate him. The Seventh Circuit has made
- 14 -
clear
that
statements
pressuring
an
employee
to
drop
discrimination charges do not constitute a materially adverse
employment action. Burton v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis.,
851 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that “the pressure to
drop the suit could not have amounted to a materially adverse
action because the statements did not cause any injury” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). So, the sole issue
becomes whether a threat to terminate Johnson rises to the level
of an adverse action.
The
Seventh
Circuit
recognizes
that
while
“unfulfilled
threats of discipline” are not actionable, id. (citing Poullard,
829 F.3d at 856-57), claims may lie for constructive discharge.
Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, 621 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2010).
Constructive discharge occurs “when the plaintiff shows that he
was forced to resign because his working conditions, from the
standpoint of the reasonable employee, had become unbearable.”
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004). This
Circuit has recognized two types of constructive discharge: (1)
when
an
employee
resigns
due
to
allegedly
discriminatory
harassment and (2) when an employer’s conduct communicates to a
reasonable employee that he will be terminated. Chapin, 621 F.3d
at 679.
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Here, Johnson alleges the latter, namely that Mr. Pipkins
and Mr. Kolinowski threatened him with termination if he did not
withdraw
his
First
Charge.
To
prevail
on
this
type
of
constructive discharge, Johnson must “show that his working
conditions had become intolerable.” Id. But, to qualify, such a
condition “does not become intolerable or unbearable merely
because a prospect of discharge lurks in the background.” Id.
(citing Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 333
(7th Cir. 2004)).
The facts of Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673
(7th Cir. 2010), are very similar to the instant case. In Chapin,
the plaintiff’s manager threatened to fire him unless he withdrew
his EEOC charge. Id. at 680. The plaintiff believed he was
automatically terminated and felt he could not return to work.
Id. at 678. The employer, however, explained to the plaintiff
that he was not terminated and that the company wanted him to
remain working. Id. at 680. That court ultimately held that the
plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law, reasoning:
If [the plaintiff] had returned to work, without
having withdrawn the EEOC charge, perhaps [the
manager] would have fired him. Or, his supervisors or
coworkers may have constantly harassed him to the
point where his safety was at risk. [The manager] may
also have done nothing. Any of these possibilities
would require speculation on our part, as would a
finding
that
the workplace
would
have
become
intolerable if [the plaintiff] had resumed his
- 16 -
position, because [the plaintiff] unilaterally gave up
his position.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, construing all the facts in Johnson’s favor, no
reasonable employee standing in Johnson’s shoes would believe
that had he not resigned, he would have been immediately fired.
As was the case in Chapin, there is no certainty that if Johnson
continued to work his manager would have ultimately terminated
him. Johnson returned to work for several days after he filed
the
First
Charge
and
no
disciplinary
or
other
procedures
commenced against him in an effort to terminate him. Even in
response to Johnson’s resignation, Mr. Pipkins asked Johnson if
he was sure he wanted to resign and informed him that he did not
have to do so. All the above aside, even if such termination had
occurred, it is unclear whether the termination would have
resulted for some reason other than the filing of his First
Charge—for example, poor work performance. The Court would have
to speculate on “what ifs,” which it lacks the position to do
here. Cigan, 388 F.3d at 333-34. As such, this “is not a case
where the handwriting was on the wall and the plaintiff quit
just ahead of fall of the axe.” Chapin, 621 F.3d at 680 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Johnson’s
retaliation claim fails.
- 17 -
In sum, Ford is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
all of Johnson’s Title VII claims.
B.
Count II: ADA
Johnson also brings a claim under the ADA. “The ADA imposes
liability
on
employers
who
discriminate
in
the
terms
and
conditions of a qualified individual’s employment on the basis
of a disability and requires that employers make reasonable
accommodations for qualified individuals disabilities.” Harris
v. Allen Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 890 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2018)
(citing
42
U.S.C.
§ 12112(a),
(b)(5)(A)).
“The
ADA
also
prohibits retaliating against individuals (qualified or not) who
have engaged in activities protected by the ADA, such as filing
a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC or requesting reasonable
accommodations.” Rowlands v. United Parcel Serv.-Ft. Wayne, 901
F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2018).
Johnson
claims
that
Ford
discriminated
against
him
in
violation of the ADA by preventing him from returning to work on
April 4, 2014, and by requiring him to undergo a fitness-forduty examination based on a perceived disability. Under the ADA,
the term “disability” includes “being regarded as having such an
impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). “An individual meets the
requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if
the individual establishes that he or she has been subject to an
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action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or
perceived
physical
mental
impairment
whether
or
not
the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major activity.”
Id. § 12102(3)(A).
The Seventh Circuit has determined that “where inquiries
into the psychiatric health of an employee are job related and
reflect a concern with the safety of employees, the employer
may, depending on the circumstances of the particular case,
require specific medical information from the employee and may
require
that
the
employee
undergo
a
physical
examination
designed to determine his ability to work.” Krocka v. City of
Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Taylor v. General Motors,
LLC, No. 15-10529, 2016 WL 1223358, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29,
2016)
(finding
that
“numerous
courts
have
recognized
that
employers do not run afoul of the disability discrimination laws
merely
by
asking
an
employee
to
undergo
a
mental
health
evaluation in response to observed behaviors”). Given Johnson’s
repeated visits to the Medical Department and then the hospital,
as well as his subsequent diagnosis and medical leave of absence,
the
nurse’s
request
for
a
fitness-for-duty
examination
was
reasonable. See Koszuta v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 16 C 2679,
2018 WL 1769368, at *12 (N.D. Ill. April 12, 2018) (granting
- 19 -
summary
judgment
against
perceived
disability
claim
where
employer had legitimate basis for requiring fitness-for-duty
examination after, inter alia, the plaintiff took “an extended
leave of absence” and his co-workers “reported witnessing him
engage in unusual or aggressive behavior”). The undisputed facts
“paint a consistent picture of genuine concern that [Johnson’s]
behavior
was
uncharacteristic
and
adversely
impacting
[his]
ability to perform [his] job.” Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire
Dept., 578 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2018). As such, Johnson has
failed to show that he was “regarded as” having a disability
under the ADA.
Even assuming that Ford perceived Johnson as having a
disability, Johnson nevertheless fails to show that he was
qualified
to
perform
the
essential
functions
of
his
job.
Johnson’s own psychiatrist labeled him unable to work and placed
him on one-month medical leave. As made clear, “the ADA applies
only to those who can do the Job[.]” Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc.,
328
F.3d
379,
381
(7th
Cir.
2003).
Moreover,
upon
his
resignation, Johnson immediately filed for and received Social
Security Disability benefits, claiming to be unable to work or
maintain employment. The Seventh Circuit has recognized that “a
claimant’s sworn statement in an application for disability
benefits that he is unable to work would negate an essential
- 20 -
element
of
the
claimant’s
ADA
case—that
he
is
a
qualified
individual with a disability.” Devine v. Bd. of Com’rs of Elkhart
Cnty., 49 Fed. Appx. 57, 61 (7th Cir. 2002). Johnson asserts,
however, that he filed for Social Security benefits one month
after the alleged incident on April 4, 2014, and that at that
time of the incident he was fit to work. But again, on April 4,
2014, his own doctor told him otherwise and rendered him unable
to work. He has thus failed to reconcile his medical leave of
absence and his subsequent filing of Social Security benefits
with the ADA claim he now brings. The evidence viewed in the
light
most
favorable
to
Johnson
demonstrates
that
Ford
is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the ADA claim.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Ford’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: 1/11/2019
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