Brown v. Dart et al

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, Defendants' motion to dismiss 14 is granted. The case is dismissed with prejudice. A separate AO-450 judgment shall be entered. Status hearing of 12/14/2016 is vacated. Emailed and mailed notice(slb, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MILAN JAMES BROWN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
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THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK
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COUNTY, and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS )
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Defendants.
)

No. 15 C 11835
Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Milan James Brown, a former inmate at Cook County Jail, brings this civilrights lawsuit against Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, as well as the County
itself.1 See R. 8, First Am. Compl.2 In his complaint, Brown generally alleges that
the Defendants unlawfully imprisoned him in the Jail beyond the term of his
sentence and subjected him to inhumane prison conditions. Id. Brown asserts that
the Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution and falsely imprisoned him in violation of Illinois
state law. Id. The Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on the grounds that all of Brown’s claims are
time-barred. See R. 14, Mot. J. Pleadings.

1This

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Section 1983 claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367.
2Citations to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket entry.

I. Background
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations
in Brown’s First Amended Complaint. Hayes v. City of Chi., 670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th
Cir. 2012). On July 19, 2013, Brown was sentenced to 300 days’ imprisonment after
he violated parole. First Am. Compl. ¶ 13. With 221 days of good-time credit as of
that date, Brown had about 79 days of his sentence left to serve. Id. After
accounting for his good-time credit, the sentencing judge set Brown’s release date
for September 12, 2013. Id. ¶ 14; see also R. 8-1, 07/19/13 Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at
8:19-20. Despite this, Cook County Jail employees told Brown in August 2013 that
he would not be released until March 4, 2014. First Am. Compl. ¶ 3. (They had
failed to record Brown’s release date as September 12, 2013. Id.) In response to this
news, Brown filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in state court on September
10, 2013. Id. The hearing on his petition was initially set for October 10, 2013, but
had to be rescheduled three times because Cook County Jail employees allegedly
refused to take Brown to court.3 Id. ¶¶ 16-19. Finally, on December 16, 2013, more
than three months past his original release date, Brown appeared before the
sentencing judge to present his petition. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.
At the hearing, the sentencing judge recalled that at the July 19, 2013
hearing, everyone—Brown, the prosecutor, and the judge—agreed that Brown
would be released around September 12, 2013. First Am. Compl. ¶ 22; R. 8-3,
12/16/13 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Tr. at 4:22-5:2. After observing that
3The

state court also rescheduled Brown’s hearing one time: on November 4, 2013,
Cook County Jail staff took Brown to court to present his petition, but the court continued
the hearing to December 16, 2013. Id. ¶ 20.

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“right now [Brown] is in jail three months longer than I thought he would be,” the
sentencing judge released Brown on a $50,000 “I-bond” and scheduled a resentencing hearing for January 17, 2014. 12/16/13 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Tr. at 6:11-15; see also First Am. Compl. ¶ 23. On January 17, the
sentencing judge reaffirmed that Brown should have been released on September
12, 2013 and ordered his bond discharged. First Am. Compl. ¶ 24.
Based on these allegations, Brown asserts five counts against the
Defendants. See First Am. Compl. In Counts One and Two, Brown brings a Section
1983 claim against Dart and Cook County respectively, alleging that the
Defendants violated the Fourth and Eighth Amendments when they failed to
account for his good-time credit. Id. ¶¶ 30-43. Count Three is an Illinois state-law
false imprisonment claim against the Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 44-47. And in Counts Four
and Five, Brown brings a Section 1983 claim against Dart and Cook County
respectively, alleging that the conditions of confinement at Cook County Jail
violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment.4 Id.
¶¶ 48-59. The Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to all of Brown’s
claims, asserting that the claims were brought too late under the applicable
statutes of limitations.

4In

addition to his over-incarceration allegations, Brown also alleges that the
Defendants “disregard[ed] the health and safety of inmates” by failing to tend to mold and
mildew outbreaks, cockroach and rat infestations, and water leaks at Cook County Jail.
First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-28.

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II. Standard of Review
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are
closed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the
same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Hayes, 670 F.3d at 813.
In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must accept all wellpled allegations as true and view the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Id. Judgment on the pleadings is proper if it appears beyond
doubt that the non-moving party cannot prove any set of facts sufficient to support
his claim for relief. Id. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
Court considers the pleadings alone, which consist of the complaint, the answer,
and any documents attached as exhibits. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City
of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998).
III. Analysis
The Defendants’ motion boils down to one issue: when did Brown’s Section
1983 claims and his Illinois false-imprisonment claim accrue? Brown’s Section 1983
claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, see Williams v. Lampe, 399
F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A two-year statute of limitations generally applies to
personal injury actions in Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/13–202; thus, § 1983 claims in Illinois
are also governed by a two-year limitations period[.]” (citation omitted)), and his
state-law false imprisonment claim is subject to a one-year statute of limitations,
see 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (“No civil action … may be commenced in any court against a
local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one

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year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.”); see
also Long v. Williams, 155 F. Supp. 2d 938, 943-44 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (applying oneyear statute of limitations to common-law false imprisonment claim). The
Defendants maintain that all of Brown’s claims accrued—so the statute of
limitations began to run—on September 12, 2013, as soon as Brown was held past
his release date. R. 15, Defs.’ Br. at 3-5. Alternatively, they assert that his claims
accrued on December 16, 2013, when the sentencing judge released Brown on a
bond. Id. Because Brown did not file the complaint until December 30, 2015, the
Defendants argue that even if Brown’s claims did not accrue until December 16,
2013, all of his claims are nonetheless time-barred. Id. Brown disagrees. He
contends that his claims accrued on January 17, 2014, when the state court judge
finally resentenced him and ordered his bond discharged. R. 23, Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 35. The Court addresses the date of accrual for Brown’s Section 1983 claims and his
state-law claim in turn.5
A. Brown’s Section 1983 Claims
Although Illinois state law is borrowed and sets the limitations period for the
Section 1983 claims, federal law governs the date of accrual. Kelly v. City of Chi., 4
F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1993). “Accrual is the date on which the statute of
limitations begins to run.” Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th
Cir. 1990). Typically, a cause of action accrues when “the wrong that injures the
plaintiff occurs.” Id. In instances where the plaintiff does not discover his injuries
5A

statute of limitations defense may be raised in a Rule 12(c) motion so long as “the
relevant dates are set forth unambiguously in the complaint,” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
579 (7th Cir. 2009), which is the case here.

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until after the alleged wrong occurs, however, the “discovery rule” kicksin to
“postpone[] the beginning of the limitations period from the date when the plaintiff
is wronged to the date when he discovers he has been injured ... .” Id. Applying the
discovery rule in the civil-rights context means that a Section 1983 claim accrues
“‘when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have
been violated.’” Hileman v. Maze, 367 F.3d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kelly, 4
F.3d at 511).
Here, Brown asserts that he was over-incarcerated in violation of his Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3, 29, 31, 40, 54.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, Brown knew he had suffered those
constitutional injuries as soon as he was held past his September 12, 2013 release
date. Id. ¶ 3. In fact, sometime in August 2013, Cook County Jail gave Brown a
heads-up that his release date would be March 4, 2014, not September 12, 2013. Id.
This unwelcome surprise prompted Brown to file a habeas petition on September
10, 2013 to correct the error. Id. So, as of September 12, 2013, Brown had
everything he needed—namely, notice that his constitutional rights had been
violated when Cook County Jail refused to release him that day—to bring this civilrights action. See Hileman, 367 F.3d at 696 (“[T]he date on which the plaintiff could
have sued for [her] injury … should coincide with the date the plaintiff ‘knows or
should know’ that her rights were violated.” (quoting Kelly, 4 F.3d at 511)). Because

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Brown did not file his complaint until December 30, 2015, his Section 1983 false
imprisonment claims are time-barred.6
To push out the accrual date, Brown asserts that his false imprisonment
ended on January 17, 2014, when the sentencing judge discharged the $50,000 Ibond.7 See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 3-5. The idea here is that being on bail is something
akin to imprisonment, so the accrual of the claim would not begin until Brown was
discharged from bail and completely free of the criminal justice system. Id. But
being placed on bond alone does not amount to false imprisonment. See Albright v.
Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 346 (7th Cir. 1992) (concluding that releasing an arrestee on
bond but confining him to the state of Illinois “would not be a sufficient deprivation
of liberty to actuate constitutional remedies” where arrestee could leave the state by
obtaining leave of court), aff’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); Williams v.
City of Chi., 2014 WL 3787422, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2014) (holding that the
statute of limitations for a false imprisonment claim began to run on the date the
plaintiff was placed on an I-bond and released from custody).8 So, at the very latest,

6Brown

also asserts that he was subject to inhumane prison conditions in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-27, 29, 48-59. But even
assuming that the alleged conditions lasted through the very last day of Brown’s
imprisonment, the latest that the prison-conditions claims accrued was December 16, 2013,
which is the day that he was released on bond. So those claims are also time-barred under
the two-year statute of limitations.
7A $50,000 I-bond is a personal recognizance bond—the individual who signs the
bond pays nothing, but the Sheriff can collect the full bail amount if the individual fails to
appear in court while out on release. See People v. Stewart, 406 N.E.2d 53, 55 & n.1 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980).
8In Hernandez v. Sheahan, the plaintiff asserted that his false imprisonment claim
accrued when he was released from electronic monitoring custody, not the date he was
released on bond. 1993 WL 257486, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1993). The district court agreed,
reasoning that “[the plaintiff’s] freedom of movement or liberty was restrained from March
3, 1992 to March 19, 1992 by his having to wear at all times an electronic monitoring device

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Brown’s claims accrued when the sentencing judge released Brown on bond on
December 16, 2013, see Williams, 2014 WL 3787422, at *3, not later in January
2014 when his bond was discharged.
Next, Brown invokes the holding of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487
(1994), as another reason why the false-imprisonment claim did not accrue until he
was discharged from bond in January 2014. In recognition of the fact that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 is the exclusive means to challenge a state conviction or state sentence, Heck
holds that a plaintiff cannot bring a Section 1983 claim if victory on that claim
would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence. 512 U.S. at 487
(“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already
been invalidated.”). A corollary of that holding is that a claim could accrue after a
court sets aside the conviction or sentence. Put another way, the Heck rule for
deferred accrual “delays what would otherwise be the accrual date of a tort action
until the setting aside of an extant conviction [or sentence] which success in that
tort action would impugn.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393; see also Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Here, Brown argues that Heck deferred the accrual of his false imprisonment claim
until the date he was discharged from bond: “Any ruling by a civil court prior to
January 17, 2014 would necessarily implicate the validity of [Brown’s] continued
that prohibited him from leaving his home.” Id. Hernandez is inapplicable here, however,
because there is no suggestion that Brown was subject to any similar conditions of release
while he was out on bond.

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incarceration. … In this case, the alleged deprivation of liberty was [not] valid until
the criminal court ruled on January 17, 2014 and released the bond and resentenced Brown to time served.” Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 3-4.
The problem with Brown’s deferred-accrual argument is that the bar in Heck
would not have barred him from bringing his false imprisonment claim the moment
he stayed too long in jail, that is, the day after September 12, 2013. Victory on the
false-imprisonment claim in federal court would not have implied the invalidity of
the state-court sentence; to the contrary, Brown was trying to enforce the proper
sentence, not invalidate it. The entire point of Brown’s false-imprisonment claim is
that Jail officials misapplied the sentence. Because a judgment in Brown’s favor on
his constitutional claims would not have implied the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence, the deferred accrual in Heck does not apply. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; cf.
Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 767 (7th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “a claim for
false arrest, because it does not by its nature call into question the validity of a
conviction, may go forward immediately, without nullification of the underlying
criminal conviction”).
Brown has two more arguments on timeliness.9 First, he asserts that the
continuing violations doctrine postpones the date of accrual for all of his claims
until January 17, 2014. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5. The continuing violations doctrine
postpones the start of the limitations period where the defendant inflicts continuing
and accumulating harm, and then allows the plaintiff to recover for all harm caused
9The

Court thanks Brown’s recruited pro bono counsel for his extensive efforts in
representing his indigent client; although ultimately not successful, counsel is commended
for creatively presenting arguments on his client’s behalf.

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by the continuing violation, even harm that occurred outside what would otherwise
be the limitations period. See Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001).
But here, even if the continuing violations doctrine applied, the doctrine would at
best postpone the accrual to December 16, 2013, the date that Brown was released
from the Jail. As explained earlier, the discharge from bond is not the relevant date
for starting the limitations clock, because being on bail without restrictions is not
the equivalent of imprisonment.
Brown’s final argument is that equitable tolling applies to save his claims.
Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5-6. That doctrine applies “if despite all due diligence [the
plaintiff] is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim.”
Cada, 920 F.2d at 451. But, as already discussed above, Brown had all the
information he needed to bring his claims as of September 12, 2013. See supra
Section III.A. at 6. Equitable tolling simply does not apply.
B. Brown’s State-Law False Imprisonment Claim
Brown concedes that his state-law claim for false imprisonment is timebarred under Illinois’ one-year statute of limitations, see Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 1 n.1
(“Defendants are correct in their argument applying a one-year statute of
limitations to Count III and Plaintiff makes no argument that the Complaint was
filed within one year of the alleged acts and omissions.”), so this claim is also
dismissed. It is worth pointing out, however, that the latest possible date on which
Brown’s common-law false imprisonment claim accrued is December 16, 2013—
when Brown was released on bond. See Harrell v. Sheahan, 937 F. Supp. 754, 758

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(N.D. Ill. 1996) (concluding that the plaintiff’s state-law claim for false
imprisonment could have accrued on the date that the plaintiff was released from
prison). And it could be that the limitations period began to run on that claim as
early as September 12, 2013. See Kitchen v. Burge, 781 F. Supp. 2d 721, 738 (N.D.
Ill. 2011) (plaintiff’s state-law false imprisonment claim accrued as soon as “[he]
knew that he had been falsely imprisoned”—that is, “when he was first
imprisoned”); Pierce v. Pawelski, 2000 WL 1847778, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2000)
(under Illinois law, “Pierce knew, or reasonably should have known, of the facts
underlying his false arrest and false imprisonment claims at the time he was
arrested. Because he did not file his complaint until May 28, 1998, the court finds
that the claims are time-barred.”). In any event, whether September 12 or
December 16 is the accrual date, Brown failed to file his action within the one-year
limit under Illinois law, so his state-law claim is also dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, the Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings, R. 14, is granted. Brown has already amended the complaint, and his

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response brief does not suggest need to allow a further amendment, so the dismissal
is with prejudice. A separate AO-450 judgment shall be entered, and the status
hearing of December 14, 2016 is vacated.

ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: November 28, 2016

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