Johnson v. Dart et al

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 10/27/2016. Mailed notice (eaa, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARILYN JOHNSON, individually and
as Administrator of the Estate of
NORMAN JOHNSON, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16-cv-144
Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 7, 2016, Plaintiff, Marilyn Johnson, individually and as the Administrator of
the Estate of Norman Johnson, filed her First Amended Complaint against Defendant Olufemi
Ajala and twenty-four other Defendants, alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Ajala has filed a Motion to Dismiss [51] claims against him pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. For
the reasons discussed below, the Motion to Dismiss [51] is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by
Plaintiff, Marilyn Johnson, and are accepted as true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss. See
Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of Norman Johnson (“Johnson”). On
January 3, 2014, Johnson was arrested and charged with the possession of a controlled substance.
(FAC ¶ 12.) Johnson was admitted to the Cook County Jail; and, on January 5, 2014, he
underwent a medical intake screening conducted by a team of medical professionals that

included Defendant Olufemi Ajala (“Ajala”). (Id. ¶ 15-16, 19, 21.) Ajala was an employee or an
agent of Cermak Health Services or of Cook County. (Id. ¶ 11.)
During the intake medical screening process, Johnson provided his history of having been
enrolled in a daily methadone treatment program for nine years, that his last dose of methadone
had been administered two days previously, and that he was experiencing symptoms of
methadone withdrawal. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that each of the members of the screening
team, including Ajala, knew or should have known that without continuation of his methadone
treatment regimen, Johnson was at high risk of cardiac arrest, respiratory depression and/or death
due to the effects of abrupt methadone withdrawal. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that Ajala failed
to provide Johnson with medication or treatment to avoid serious health risks caused by abrupt
methadone withdrawal. (Id. ¶ 23.)
Johnson was assigned to housing in Division 2, Dorm 1 at the Cook County Jail, which
houses inmates with special medical or other needs and provides constant visual surveillance by
correctional officers. (Id. ¶ 26). On January 7, 2014, a Cook County Jail Officer found Johnson
having a seizure, a faint pulse, and agonal respiration. (Id. ¶ 30.) After CPR was begun and
emergency services notified, Johnson was taken by an ambulance and was pronounced dead on
arrival at St. Anthony Hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 36.) Johnson’s autopsy determined that the cause of
death was related to methadone toxicity. (Id. ¶ 36.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the

2

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). However,
plaintiffs are not required to “plead the elements of a cause of action along with facts supporting
each element.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786
F.3d 510, 517 (7th Cir. 2015). Rather, the complaint must provide a defendant “with ‘fair
notice’ of the claim and its basis.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). When evaluating a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and
draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56.
ANALYSIS
Count I of the FAC alleges that Ajala violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights
for deliberate indifference to Johnson’s medical condition. 1 (FAC ¶¶ 42-45.) Ajala has moved
to dismiss Count I of the FAC on the basis that the FAC, as pleaded, does not plausibly show
that Ajala caused Plaintiff’s alleged injury through deliberate indifference.
“To establish deliberate indifference to a medical condition, a prisoner must show a
condition that is sufficiently serious (objective component) and that an official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind in failing to address the condition (subjective component).”
Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104-06 (1976); Smith v. Coe, 2016 WL 4540908, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2016). “[T]he
standard for deliberate indifference is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Walker, 293 F.3d at

1

In the FAC, Count II (Monell claim against Cook County Sheriff), Count III (Monell
claim against Cook County), and Count IV (supplemental state claim for indemnification by
Cook County) are not brought against Ajala personally.
3

1037. Plaintiff, by claiming deliberate indifference, does not need to prove that the prison
officials intended, hoped for, or desired the harm that occurred. Id. It is enough for Plaintiff to
show that the Defendant actually knew of a substantial risk of harm to the prisoner and acted or
failed to act in disregard of that risk. Id.
Ajala concedes that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the objective element of deliberate
indifference. (Def.’s Reply at 3.) With respect to the subjective element of the deliberateindifference claim, however, Ajala argues that the FAC fails to state a claim for deliberate
indifference.
As to the subjective component of deliberate indifference, an official “must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Smith, 2016 WL 4540908, at *2-3 (citations
omitted). In the case when an official reasonably responds to a risk, even if harm was not
avoided, deliberate indifference does not exist. Id.
Here, Ajala is alleged to have been involved in Johnson’s medical intake screening
process. (FAC ¶¶ 21, 43). Thus, Plaintiff alleges, Ajala knew or should have known that
Johnson was in serious need of medical care because Johnson notified the medical intake team of
his condition and provided a history of having been enrolled in a daily methadone treatment. (Id.
¶¶ 20, 22, 43). Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on Ajala for his failure to deliver methadone to
Johnson.
However, Plaintiff fails to allege that Ajala, who Defendant identified as a pharmacist, 2
had acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind in failing to address Johnson’s condition. In

2

Defendant’s Reply Brief identifies Ajala as a pharmacist. (Reply at pp. 5, 6.) In
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts may consider evidence incorporated by reference in
the complaint. See, e.g., 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002).
4

other words, Plaintiff failed to allege the requisite state of mind needed to demonstrate
“deliberate indifference.” Plaintiff does not provide any facts that indicate that Ajala refused to
fill a prescription, disregarded a course of treatment, or actually caused a delay in dispensing
medication. See Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369-70, 1374 (7th Cir. 1997); Salazar v.
City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1991) (defendant has to be personally aware of the
serious risk of harm and deliberately imposed a risk); Wolf-Lille v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869
(7th Cir. 1983) (an affirmative link between the misconduct complained of and the official sued
is necessary); see also, Majors v. Baldwin, 456 F. App’x 616, 617 (8th Cir. 2012) (“We . . .
conclude . . . that [the inmate] did state a deliberate-indifference claim . . . by alleging that [the
defendants] withheld prescribed pain medication and did not provide adequate post-operative
treatment.”); Johnson v. Hay, 931 F.2d 456, 462 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding prisoner sufficiently
stated a claim against a prison pharmacist for deliberate indifference, noting that the pharmacist
“deliberately disregarded the very course of treatment prescribed by [the prisoner’s]
physicians”). While it is possible that Plaintiff may be able to state a claim against Ajala, she has
failed to do so in the FAC. Accordingly, Ajala’s Motion to Dismiss [51] is granted. However,
Plaintiff may file an amended pleading as set forth below.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [51] is granted. Within
45 days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint, if she can do so
pursuant to Rule 11.

Date: 10/27/16
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge

5