Hendricks v. City of Chicago et al
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 10/24/2017. The Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the second amended Complaint 39 . Mailed notice(lk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TYRONE L. HENDRICKS (N-21303),
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Case No. 16 C 0627
Judge Virginia M. Kendall
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Tyrone L. Hendricks brings six counts 1 against Defendants Officer Paul H
Lauber, Detective Jacquelin Mok, Officer Michael A Rodriguez, and Detective M. Fuller, for
Hendricks’ arrests and detainment without probable cause. Defendants move to dismiss Count
IV of the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) arguing
that Hendricks fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated
below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IV .
On September 5, 2014, Defendants Lauber and Rodriguez arrested Plaintiff, absent
probable cause, for urinating on the public way and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Second
Amended Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶¶ 8-13, 22-32.)
Defendants Lauber and Rodriguez
subsequently detained Hendricks until September 8, 2014 at the District 11 lockup of the
Hendricks brings the following counts: Count I under the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment
against Defendants Lauber and Rodriguez; Count II under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for False /
Unlawful Arrest; Count III for State Law Malicious Prosecution against all Defendants; Count IV under § 1983 for
Malicious Prosecution against all Defendants; Count V for Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Count VI for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Chicago Police Department. Id. at ¶ 13. Defendants Lauber and Rodriguez did not provide
Hendricks a phone call, and did not inform him of the charges against him. Id. On September 8,
2014, Officers Lauber and Rodriguez swore out complaints for Hendricks’ public urination and
possession of a crack pipe, even though the charges were untrue. Id. at ¶ 17. Detective Mok
then swore out a complaint against Hendricks for failing to register as a sex offender, even
though Plaintiff registered after he was released from custody.2 Id. ¶ 16. Then, on September
14, 2014, Detective Fuller testified that Plaintiff failed to register as a sex offender in front of the
Grand Jury. Id. ¶ 18. On September 18, 2014, a true bill was delivered. Plaintiff was detained
without presentment to a magistrate until October 2, 2014. Id. ¶ 19. Although Plaintiff never
appeared in front of a judge on bond, bond was set at $400,000. Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff was
eventually acquitted on all three counts. Defendants now move to dismiss Count IV under §
1983 for Malicious Prosecution against all Defendants.
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). In the complaint, a plaintiff must include “enough detail to give the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, and, through his allegations,
show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief.” Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lang v. TCF Nat’l Bank, 249
F.App’x. 464, 466 (7th Cir. 2007)). A plaintiff is required to allege “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal,
It is unclear whether Plaintiff means that he registered upon release from custody on September 8,2 014, or upon
his release from custody for the underlying charge stemming from his sex offender status.
556 U.S. at 678 (quotations omitted). On a 12(b)(6) motion, “[C]ourts must accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the
complaining party.” Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
Defendants argue that Count IV of Hendricks’ complaint, a Section 1983 malicious
prosecution claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should thus be
dismissed with prejudice.
Hendricks’ Second Amended Complaint contains a claim that
Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights both times they arrested him
without probable cause.
“Federal courts are rarely the appropriate forum for malicious
prosecution claims.” Ray v. City of Chicago, et al., 629 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
An individual does not have a “federal right not to be
summoned into court and prosecuted without probable cause, under either the Fourth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Procedural Due Process Clause.” Id. (citing Tully
v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010).) While the Seventh Circuit permits § 1983
malicious prosecution suits when the relevant state’s law does not provide an avenue to pursue
such claims, Illinois recognizes tort claims for malicious prosecution. Id. (citing Swick v.
Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (1996).) Indeed, in Count III, Hendricks charges Defendants
with malicious prosecution under Illinois State Law. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 46-53.)
The appropriate venue for Hendricks’ malicious prosecution claims, then, is Illinois state court.
While Plaintiff concedes that Defendants correctly articulate the current law, he asserts
that a change in the law may be imminent. (Dkt. 45 at p. 2). There is a circuit split on whether a
Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim is cognizable, and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on
the issue on October 5, 2016. Manuel v. City of Joliet, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 890, 193
L.Ed.2d 783 (2016). Because th Supreme Court is set to decide w
whether there can be a fe
malicious prosecutio claim that stems from a Fourth A
A possible “imminent change in la
aw” is not a sufficient basis to d
motion, and Hendric does not cite to any case law s
suggesting th would b an approp
action. When faced with this ex issue in White v. Ci of Chicag 149 F. Supp. 3d 974 976
(N.D. Ill. 2016), appe dismissed (July 25, 2016), the di
istrict court d
dismissed th complaint with
prejudice and noted that “unless and until the Supre
eme Court s
wise,” Fourth and
ment maliciou prosecutio claims ar not cognizable becau Illinois allows
an avenu to pursue such a cla in tort. A district court withi the Fifth Circuit rec
followed the same ap
pproach. Se Joseph v. City of Ceda Hill Polic Dep't, No 3:15-CV-2
2443K-BK, 20 WL 155
54270, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 20
016) (The co held tha the recent grant
orari by the United Sta
ates Suprem Court in Manuel ha no impac in the co
malicious prosecution analysis unless or unti the Fifth C
Circuit or the Supreme C
Court hands d
milarly, this Court will decide in accordance wi binding p
or until th Supreme Court says otherwise.
For the reaso stated ab
bove, the Co grants D
Motion to D
Dismiss Cou IV
of the Second Amend Complaint.
Virginia M. Kendall
United State District C
Northern D istrict of Illi
ctober 24, 20
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