Chatman v. Stellar Recovery, Inc.

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 3/10/2017:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TAMMIE CHATMAN,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16 C 833
v.
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
STELLAR RECOVERY, INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Tammie Chatman’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [ECF No. 21].

For the reasons stated

herein, the Motion is granted in part.

Attorneys’ fees are

awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of $6,478.42 and costs in the
amount of $465.00.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff
Stellar

Tammie

Recovery,

Chatman

Inc.

(“Plaintiff”)

(“Stellar”),

an

sued

Illinois

Defendant
collection

agency, for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(the

“FDCPA”),

15

U.S.C.

§

1692,

et

seq.,

Collection Agency Act, 225 ILCS 425/9(a)(33).

and

the

Illinois

As the assignee

of debt Plaintiff owed on a Comcast account, Stellar allegedly
issued a letter to Plaintiff requesting payment but claiming
that certain payment methods would require a convenience and
processing fee.

Plaintiff sued on the theory that Stellar had

no contractual or statutory right to this fee, and thus had used
false and deceptive representations in an attempt to collect the
debt.

After filing an Amended Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint,

Stellar tendered an offer of judgment in the amount of $1,001.00

plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to be determined by
the Court.

Plaintiff accepted and now seeks attorneys’ fees in

the amount of $12,015.60 and costs in the amount of $465.00.
Plaintiff’s
billing

Motion

records

claimed -

plus

$352.00

for

fees

is

supported

evidence

supporting

attorney

Michael

for

by

the

Wood

itemized

hourly

and

rates

$315.00

for

another attorney named, as coincidence would have it, Celetha
Chatman.

The Court first notes that both hourly rates fall well

above the 50th percentile for Midwest consumer law attorneys,
meaning that these fees are not necessarily consistent with what
those

of

“reasonably

reputation” charge.
School

Dist.

No.

comparable

skill,

experience,

and

People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ.,
205,

90

F.3d

1307,

1310

(7th

Cir.

1996)

(quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892, 895 n.11 (1984)).
Under

Hensley

lodestar

on,

difficulty

v.

Eckerhart,

the

Court

inter

alia,

the

the

legal

questions,

of

time

is

and

labor

the

attorneys, and awards in similar cases.

to

base

the

fee

required,

the

experience

of

the

Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (1983).
With respect to Mr. Wood, the Court is not willing to find
that

an

hourly

performed.

In

reasonableness

rate
one
of

of
of

the

$352.00
the

is

cases

claimed

reasonable
submitted

fees,

to

Holloway

for

all

support
v.

work
the

Portfolio

Recovery Asscs., LLC, No. 15 C 11568, Dkt. 31 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 7,
2016), Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer reduced Mr. Wood’s hourly rate
to

$327.00

for

all

FDCPA

through February 18, 2016.

work

he

performed

on

that

case

-

Yet Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a

bill charging $352.00 for work he performed in this comparable
case during that same time frame.

Thus, counsel’s own evidence

does not support awarding fees based on a $352.00 hourly rate
for work Mr. Wood performed prior to February 18, 2016.

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The

Court awards attorneys’ fees for such work in the amount of
$2,419.80

(7.4

hours

@

$327.00).

For

the

remainder

of

Mr.

Wood’s work, which was all performed after the time frame at
issue

in

Holloway,

the

Court

requested rate of $352.00.

awards

attorneys’

fees

at

his

That amounts to $1,724.80 (4.9 hours

@ $352.00).
Similarly for Ms. Chatman, the evidence does not support a
finding that her asserted $315.00 fee is reasonable for all work
performed in this case.

In Holloway, Ms. Chatman billed work

she performed from October 15, 2015 through March 28, 2016 at an
hourly rate of $295.00 (she was admitted to the Illinois bar on
November 5, 2015).

Judge Pallmeyer found that rate reasonable.

It is a mystery how Plaintiff’s counsel could in good faith bill
$315.00

per

hour

for

work

Ms.

Chatman

comparable case during that same time.

performed

in

this

By contrast, Ms. Chatman

charged an hourly rate of $315.00 in Ackles v. Contract Callers,
Inc., No. 16 C 2101 (N.D. Ill.), for work performed in April and
May

of

2016.

In

that

case,

$4,632.60 in attorneys’ fees.

Judge

John

W.

Darrah

awarded

However, Ms. Chatman’s affidavit

indicates that Judge Darrah only approved her hourly rate of
$295.00 in that case.

(ECF No. 21 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), Ex. C ¶ 10.)

While this evidence supports the inference that Ms. Chatman’s
hourly rate for FDCPA work had indeed increased to $315.00 by
April

2016,

it

still

does

not

support

finding

that

rate

reasonable for work performed then.
Therefore, the Court finds no justification for awarding
attorneys’ fees based on Ms. Chatman’s claimed hourly rate of
$315.00 for work performed during and prior to May 2016.

For

such work, only a $295.00 hourly rate is reasonable, and so the
Court
fees.

awards

$3,864.50

(13.1

hours

@

$295.00)

in

attorneys’

For the remainder of Ms. Chatman’s work, all performed

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after the time frames at issue in Holloway and Ackles, the Court
awards attorneys’ fees at the requested rate of $315.00.

This

is in part because Stellar does not contest the asserted fee and
in part because a $20 hourly rate hike approximately six months
after a young attorney is admitted to the bar strikes the Court
as

reasonable.

$315.00).

This

Thus,

the

amounts

to

provisional

$3,559.50
lodestar

in

(11.3
this

hours
case

@
is

$11,568.60 ($2,419.80 + $1,724.80 + $3,864.50 + $3,559.50).
In response to an argument raised by Plaintiff’s counsel,
the

Court

notes

that

the

fact

that

both

attorneys’

asserted

billing rates were approved in another FDCPA case, Serrano v.
Alliant Capital Mgmt., LLC et al., No. 16 C 8602, Dkt. 14 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 27, 2016), does not change the outcome.

Judge John Z.

Lee in that case did not issue a statement explaining the fee
award, which was imposed after a default judgment, and in any
event all the legal work there occurred after September 1, 2016.
Therefore, Serrano does not conflict with this Court’s ruling
entitling Plaintiff’s counsel to their asserted fees for work
performed after the periods at issue in Holloway and Ackles.
The final issue remaining is whether this newly calculated
lodestar of $11,568.60 in fees should be offset.

First, Stellar

argues that many time entries were excessive in light of the
straightforward

nature

of

the

case

and

the

similar

form

pleadings Plaintiff’s counsel uses across all their FDCPA cases.
Second, Stellar contends that some of the work performed by Mr.
Wood

and

nature.

Ms.

Chatman

was

administrative

or

secretarial

in

There is precedent in this Court for an offset based on

such billing practices.

See, e.g., Vaughn v. Account Recovery

Service, Inc., No. 14 C 8179, Dkt. 24 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2015).
In Vaughn, the plaintiff’s counsel (Community Law Group and, in
particular, Mr. Wood) “billed for calendaring hearings, drafting

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a

civil

cover

sheet,

sending

preparing exhibits.” Id. at 1.

materials

for

service,

and

This Court reduced the proposed

lodestar by 30 percent as a result.

It appears that Plaintiff’s

counsel has hewed to the same practices in this case.

Further,

in Vaughn, this Court reduced the newly calculated lodestar by
20

percent

because

that

case

“did

not

present

particularly

complex issues and proceeded quickly to settlement.”

Id. at 2.

The Court considers such an approach adequate to salve Stellar’s
overbilling concerns.
Consonant
calculated

with

lodestar

administrative

and

Vaughn,
by

30

the

Court

percent

secretarial

tasks,

will

reduce

the

newly

based

on

billing

for

and

then

reduce

that

amount by 20 percent to account for the (lack of) complexity of
this case.
$6,478.42

This yields an award of attorneys’ fees equal to
(($11,568.60

x

0.7)

x

0.8).

Costs,

which

are

unopposed, are set in the amount of $465.00.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: March 10, 2017

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