Shaw et al v. Williams et al
Filing
203
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Robert Blakey on 8/7/2018. Mailed notice(gel, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TELVIN SHAW,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-cv-1065
v.
TARRY WILLIAMS, et al.,
Judge John Robert Blakey
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Telvin Shaw sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and
various IDOC employees for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12203 (Counts I and VII); Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Count II); and the Eighth Amendment (Counts
III, IV, V, and VI). [68]. Defendants moved for summary judgment. [170]. For the
reasons explained below, this Court grants Defendants’ motion.
I.
Background
A.
Local Rule 56.1 and Evidentiary Rules
The facts in this discussion come primarily from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1
statement of material facts [171] and Plaintiff’s statement of additional facts [174].
Defendants ask this Court to admit all of their fact statements due to Plaintiff’s
inadequate denials of those facts. See, e.g., [189] at 4.
This Court has broad discretion to enforce the local rules governing summary
judgment. See, e.g., Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014);
1
Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 647 F.3d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2011). Under the local
rules, a party’s responses to the other party’s statements of fact must contain “specific
references” to record evidence to justify any denial. Local R. 56.1(b)(3); see also Malec
v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Thus, purely argumentative denials,
legal conclusions, and unsupported general denials do not belong in Local Rule 56.1
statements. See Phillips v. Quality Terminal Servs., LLC, 855 F. Supp. 2d 764, 771
(N.D. Ill. 2012); Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 584. District courts may disregard any improper
denials and deem the opponent’s corresponding fact statements admitted.
See
Aberman v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 242 F. Supp. 3d 672, 677 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
District courts may also disregard supplemental affidavits that “contradict
prior depositions or sworn testimony.” Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d. 899, 910 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citing Buckner v. Sam’s Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Generally, a party may not create issues of fact by introducing affidavits that
contradict prior testimony unless the affidavit explains any discrepancies, mistakes,
or ambiguous testimony in earlier depositions. Id. at 910–11.
Accordingly, this Court disregards Plaintiff’s denials to the following
paragraphs of Defendants’ statement of facts: 18, 19, 22, 23, 29, 30, 32, 33, 38, 41,
and 43. Those denials fail to cite record evidence that refutes Defendants’ statements,
and merely denying a fact that has evidentiary support “does not transform it into a
disputed issue of fact sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Roberts
v. Advocate Health Care, 119 F. Supp. 3d 852, 854 (N.D. Ill. 2015). This Court also
disregards Plaintiff’s denials of paragraphs 35, 37, and 39, which cite portions of the
2
record that fail to refute the statements of fact.
This Court deems admitted
Defendants’ corresponding statements of fact. See Aberman, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 677.
This Court also disregards the portions of the following paragraphs of
Plaintiff’s statement of facts that rely upon Plaintiff’s affidavit: 1, 2, 10, 21, and 24.
The cited sections of the affidavit impermissibly attempt to “create issues of fact” by
contradicting Plaintiff’s prior testimony without providing any explanation for the
discrepancy. See Dunn, 880 F.3d. at 910–11. Thus, this Court strikes the improper
sections of the affidavit and the statements of fact that rely upon those sections.
B.
Stateville Facilities
Plaintiff is an inmate in IDOC’s custody. [171] ¶ 1. At all times relevant to
his claims, IDOC held Plaintiff at Stateville Correctional Center. Id. ¶ 16. At
Stateville, inmates live in several cell houses, with cells organized into multiple
levels, or “galleries.” [174] ¶¶ 9–10. Stateville does not have elevators for inmates
to travel between levels, so all inmates must use the stairs. Id. ¶ 9. The cell houses
share a few common features, such as a guard house and showers. Id. ¶ 10. The
Healthcare Unit, dining hall, facilities for religious services, commissary, and visitor
meeting areas are on the ground level, in a central area separate from the cell houses.
Id. In 2014, Plaintiff initially resided in a cell on the third floor of the “F” cell house.
[171] ¶ 16.
C.
Plaintiff’s First Injury
On March 11, 2014, Plaintiff injured his right ankle playing basketball. Id. ¶
17. A nurse in the Healthcare Unit examined Plaintiff and noted that he expressed
some “movement pain.” Id. ¶ 18. The nurse also observed that Plaintiff’s ankle
3
showed “no redness or bruising,” but exhibited “slight” swelling, tenderness, and a
limited range of motion.
Id.
The nurse gave Plaintiff crutches and prescribed
acetaminophen, ice, and a “lay in” permit, which let Plaintiff eat meals in his cell. Id.
Plaintiff used crutches from March 11, 2014 until July 13, 2014. Id. ¶ 19. When
Stateville failed to provide Plaintiff with lay-in meals, he ate food he previously
bought from the commissary to avoid walking down the stairs to the dining hall. Id.
¶ 21. But Plaintiff used his crutches to walk down several flights of stairs to the
visiting room, worship area, and other ground-floor facilities. Id. ¶ 19.
While he remained on crutches, Plaintiff wrote weekly request slips to
Defendants
Tarry
Williams—Stateville’s
Warden—and
Karen
Rabideau—
Stateville’s Placement Officer—asking for a transfer to a cell in the lower gallery. Id.
¶ 20. Plaintiff never received a response. Id. In his deposition, Williams did not
recall speaking to Plaintiff or having any written communication with Plaintiff. Id.
¶ 23. Williams further testified that he did not review any mail or letters sent to him
in his capacity as Warden; instead, his secretary would review the letters he received
and direct them to the relevant individuals for review. [171-7] at 37–38.
On March 18, 2014, Plaintiff visited the Healthcare Center for a follow up
appointment. [171] ¶ 24. The nurse renewed his lay-in permit and his prescriptions
for ice, crutches, and pain medicine. Id. On March 26, an X-ray of Plaintiff’s right
ankle showed no signs of a fracture. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff returned to the Healthcare
Unit the next day, however, because his right ankle felt “swollen all the time”; the
nurse again extended his lay-in permit and prescribed him pain medication, ice, and
4
crutches. Id. ¶ 26. In early April, Plaintiff saw Dr. Saleh Obaisi for an evaluation.
Id. ¶ 27. Obaisi determined that Plaintiff had sprained his right ankle and prescribed
an anti-inflammatory. Id.
As Stateville’s Placement Officer, Rabideau controlled inmate cell transfers.
[171-5] at 5. On June 19, 2014, Rabideau transferred Plaintiff from his cell in the “F”
cell house to a cell in “E” house three flights above the ground floor. [171] ¶ 28.
Rabideau testified—and Stateville records indicate—that this transfer was a routine
matter. [171-5] at 12, 55. In her deposition, Rabideau explained that a “routine
transfer” means any move not based upon a “medical reason.” Id. at 12.
On July 11, Plaintiff visited Obaisi again; Obaisi determined that Plaintiff’s
ankle “had no swelling” and “no heat” and that Plaintiff could move his ankle “within
normal limits.” [171] ¶ 29. Plaintiff still complained of pain and asked for crutches.
[171-3] at 59.
Obaisi prescribed Plaintiff a single crutch for one week, pain
medication, and a permit for Plaintiff to move to a low bunk in the lower gallery for
30 days. [171] ¶ 29.
Obaisi testified that he provided Plaintiff with a lower cell and bunk permit
for Plaintiff’s comfort rather than for medical reasons. Id. ¶ 30. Obaisi stated that
“he never felt [Plaintiff] was disabled,” and that no medical reason required Plaintiff
to reside in a lower-level gallery because “if he is walking and carrying his weight
everywhere, he can carry his weight on the stairway.” Id. ¶ 31; [171-3] at 19, 58–59.
Plaintiff disagreed with Obaisi and said that as of July 11 he was not “walking and
carrying his weight everywhere.” [173] ¶ 31.
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Following the July 11 appointment, Plaintiff gave his low gallery and bunk
permit to Defendant Jackson, a correctional officer. [171] ¶ 33. Rabideau stated that
the lower galleries throughout the facility were overcrowded that month and “very
few beds were open.” Id. ¶ 34; [171-5] at 9–10. Before Plaintiff’s second fall on July
13, 2014—discussed below—Rabideau testified that she had not received Plaintiff’s
low gallery and bunk permit. [171-5] at 20. Plaintiff contends that he wrote notes to
Rabideau and Williams before July 13 asking to move to a lower gallery cell. [175-3]
¶ 10.
IDOC must adjust an inmate’s housing or provide medical assistive devices
when a physician or nurse completes a permit or referral for the move or device. [174]
¶ 11. As of July 2014, when an inmate received a low gallery and bunk permit from
a physician, a copy of the permit was given to the inmate and a second copy went to
the correctional officers in the inmate’s cell house. [171-5] at 21–22. After officers
received the permit from either the inmate or the Healthcare Unit they would inform
Stateville’s Placement Officer—Rabideau, in this case—who was responsible for
arranging the transfer. Id. Defendant Sykes, a lieutenant, testified that correctional
officers did not have the authority to grant transfer requests. [171-8] at 24, 29, 30.
Cell-house sergeants maintain a log of all permits received from inmates who
have been approved for cell accommodations, and they update the log every 30 days.
Id. at 31. Sykes testified that he did not remember seeing Plaintiff’s medical permit.
Id. at 51–53. Plaintiff, however, contends that on two occasions between July 11,
2014 and July 13, 2014, he spoke with Sykes, Jackson, and Defendant Officer Parker
6
about honoring his medical permit. [171] ¶ 40. According to Plaintiff, the officers
told him that if he did not return to his cell, they would send him to segregation. Id.
D.
Plaintiff’s Second Injury
On July 13, 2014, while using one crutch to walk down a flight of stairs from
his cell to the yard, Plaintiff felt a sharp pain in his leg and fell. Id. ¶ 41. Plaintiff
testified that he lost consciousness for a minute and suffered injuries to his neck,
back, ankle, and head. Id.
Plaintiff testified that Defendant Kimberly Aye, a Correctional Medical
Technician (CMT), directed inmates to place Plaintiff on a stretcher without safety
straps, causing Plaintiff to twist and turn and suffer more pain. [175-3] ¶ 12. Aye
completed an incident report, in which she noted that she found Plaintiff between
galleries seven and five and transported him in a stretcher to the Healthcare Unit.
[171] ¶ 43.
Aye contradicted Plaintiff’s statement that she had inmates help
transport him, testifying that she had no authority as a CMT to direct inmates or to
permit them to move from one cell house to another. Id. ¶ 44.
At the Healthcare Unit, a nurse evaluated Plaintiff and determined that he
suffered possible injuries to his neck, back, and right ankle. Id. ¶ 45. The nurse gave
Plaintiff painkillers and, with Obaisi’s approval, Plaintiff traveled via ambulance to
an outside hospital. Id. At the hospital, a doctor evaluated Plaintiff, gave him pain
medication, and ordered X-rays of Plaintiff’s neck, back, and ankles. Id. ¶ 46. The
X-rays indicated that Plaintiff had no broken bones.
Id.
Plaintiff returned to
Stateville’s Healthcare Unit in the evening and reported that he felt better. Id. ¶ 47.
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A Stateville nurse prescribed Plaintiff pain medication, a lay-in permit, crutches, and
ice. Id. Plaintiff testified that when the medication from the hospital wore off, he
again experienced severe pain. [175-3] ¶ 16.
Around July 13 or14, Rabideau transferred Plaintiff from his cell on gallery
seven to a cell on the ground floor. [171] ¶ 48. On July 30, Plaintiff saw a nurse who
extended his lay-in permit for another two weeks. Id. ¶ 49. On August 4, Obaisi
evaluated Plaintiff and confirmed that he had suffered a sprained neck and back after
his fall on July 13. Id. ¶ 50. Obaisi noted that Plaintiffs’ X-rays were normal, referred
him to physical therapy, and provided Plaintiff with crutches and a low gallery and
bunk permit for 30 days. Id.
E.
Plaintiff’s Third Injury
On September 9, 2014, Plaintiff slipped and fell again while walking down a
flight of wet stairs with the assistance of a crutch, injuring his ankle and head. Id. ¶
51.
Plaintiff saw Obaisi and another doctor, Martija, on September 10; they
diagnosed Plaintiff with a back injury. Id. ¶ 52. Obaisi and Martija noted that
Plaintiff’s ankle was not swollen or warm and that he could bear weight on it. Id.
The doctors prescribed pain medication and discontinued Plaintiff’s use of crutches.
Id. Obaisi concluded that Plaintiff was “too uncoordinated to use” crutches on steps
“in slippery conditions,” so the crutches could cause “greater injury.” Id.
About a week later, Plaintiff borrowed another inmate’s crutch to walk to the
prison’s visiting room. Id. ¶ 53. On his way back, a correctional officer took Plaintiff
to see Chanel Barnett in the Healthcare Unit; Barnett told Plaintiff that he was not
8
allowed to use a crutch and had him return to his cell without it. Id.
F.
Administrative Remedies
IDOC has a formal grievance process set out in the Illinois Administrative
Code. [171] ¶ 54; see also Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, §§ 504.800–70. Pursuant to Part
504F, the initial step in the grievance process requires inmates to attempt to resolve
grievances through their counselor. [171] ¶ 55. If the grievance remains unresolved
after 60 days, an inmate may file a written grievance with the prison’s designated
Grievance Officer. Id. This officer investigates the merits of the inmate’s grievance
and generates a report with the findings of the investigation, a conclusion, and any
recommendation for relief. Id. The inmate’s grievance and the Grievance Officer’s
report are then forwarded to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) or their designee
for review and signature. Id. The final decision goes back to the inmate. Id.
As the final step in the grievance process, the inmate may appeal the CAO’s
decision in writing to the IDOC Director by submitting the Grievance Officer’s report
and the CAO’s decision to the Administrative Review Board (ARB). Id. ¶ 56. The
ARB, as the Director’s representative, reviews the appeal and determines whether
the inmate’s grievance can be handled without a hearing. Id. If so, the ARB notifies
the inmate of this determination. Id. Otherwise, the ARB schedules a hearing to
interview the inmate, examine relevant documents, and call witnesses. Id. The ARB
submits a written report of its findings and recommendations to the Director or the
Director’s designee, who reviews the report and makes a final determination on the
grievance. Id. The inmate then receives a copy of the report and the Director’s final
9
decision. Id. The ARB maintains the original documents in its files pursuant to
Department Rule 504F: Grievance Procedures for Committed Persons. Id. IDOC’s
grievance process provides for no further review or appeal beyond this step. Id.
Part 504F also provides that an inmate can request expedited review by
submitting a grievance marked “emergency” directly to the CAO rather than to the
inmate’s counselor or the Grievance Officer. Id. ¶ 57. If the CAO determines that
the complaint reveals a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious
harm to the inmate, IDOC may handle the grievance on an emergency basis. Id. If
the CAO determines that the grievance does not warrant emergency review, the
inmate must resubmit the grievance in accordance with the regular grievance process
described above. Id.
According to Defendants, Stateville informs all inmates of the proper process
for submitting and appealing grievances within IDOC and specifically at Stateville;
inmates can also access grievance policies and procedures at any time through their
counselor or at the law library. Id. ¶ 59. Plaintiff contends that he did not receive a
copy of the documents explaining the grievance mechanisms and did not know that
the grievance process required him to take any steps if he received no response from
an IDOC official. [173] ¶ 59.
On July 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance about his July 13 fall
and the pain he experienced while being transported to the Healthcare Unit. [171] ¶
60. Plaintiff claimed that on July 11 he had received a low gallery and bunk permit
to move cells immediately, but Jackson, Sykes, and an IDOC sergeant refused to
10
honor the permit. Id. Plaintiff asked to see a specialist immediately to assess his
medical issues and requested that the Healthcare Unit stop denying him adequate
healthcare. Id.; [171-11] at 19.
On August 20, the CAO determined that Plaintiff’s grievance did not constitute
an emergency. [171] ¶ 61. The ARB instructed Plaintiff to resubmit his grievance
through the normal process. Id. Plaintiff subsequently sent his grievance to the ARB,
which responded on October 9, 2014, and told Plaintiff to provide a copy of the original
grievance with the written responses from his correctional counselor, the Grievance
Officer, and the CAO. Id. ¶ 62. After receiving the ARB’s response to his July 28
grievance, Plaintiff submitted the grievance to his counselor but never received a
response and took no further action. Id. ¶ 63. Plaintiff says that he did not know
IDOC’s grievance requirements and that he attempted to follow the proper procedure
by resubmitting his grievance to his counselor. [173] ¶ 64.
Plaintiff filed another emergency grievance on September 11, 2014. [171] ¶ 65.
The Grievance Officer reviewed that grievance on September 29, and the CAO
ultimately denied it on October 9, 2014. Id. ¶¶ 65–66. Plaintiff admits that the
grievance was denied but states that at the time he never received a response. [173]
¶ 66. Thus, Plaintiff says, he never attempted to appeal the September 11 grievance
by submitting it to the ARB and as a result, the ARB never had an opportunity to
make a final determination on the grievance. [171] ¶ 67.
Plaintiff sued Defendants in January 2016. [1]. He amended his complaint in
July 2016, [26], and again in October 2016, [68]. In April 2018, Plaintiff dismissed
11
his claims against Obaisi, since deceased, and the parties agreed to substitute
Obaisi’s employer, Wexford, as a defendant. See [167, 168, 169]. Defendants then
moved for summary judgment on all remaining counts. [170].
II.
Legal Standard
Courts should grant summary judgment when the moving party shows that no
genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and the evidence weighs so heavily in
the moving party’s favor that the moving party “must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists when, based upon the evidence, a
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To
show a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the non-moving party must point to
“particular materials in the record,” and cannot rely upon the pleadings or
speculation. Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2014).
At summary judgment, courts must evaluate evidence in the light most
favorable
to
the
non-moving
party
and
refrain
from
making
credibility
determinations or weighing evidence. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir.
2017) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). The moving party bears the burden of
establishing the lack of genuine disputes as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
III.
Analysis
A.
Failure to Exhaust
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.,
prisoners cannot file suit challenging prison conditions unless they first exhaust all
12
available administrative remedies. See § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85
(2006) (under the PLRA, “a prisoner must now exhaust administrative remedies even
where
the
relief
sought—monetary
damages—cannot
be
granted
by
the
administrative process”). Defendants bear the burden of proof when they assert
failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 655
(7th Cir. 2004).
Proper exhaustion requires prisoners to comply with agency deadlines “and
other critical procedural rules.”
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90; see also Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002) (“a prisoner must file complaints
and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require”).
Thus, filing an untimely appeal or failing to appeal constitutes a failure to exhaust,
meaning a court must dismiss the claim. See Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 285
(7th Cir. 2005).
A prisoner’s subjective beliefs about or misunderstanding of administrative
grievance procedures do not excuse compliance. See King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889,
893 (7th Cir. 2015) (a prisoner must exhaust all available remedies “even if he expects
the process will ultimately be futile”); Twitty v. McCoskey, 226 F. App’x 594, 596 (7th
Cir. 2007) (noting that § 1997e(a) says nothing about a prisoner’s subjective beliefs
about available administrative remedies). That said, the Seventh Circuit recognizes
an exception to the exhaustion requirement that applies when prison officials make
the grievance process “impossible to comply with,” effectively making the process
unavailable to the inmate. King, 781 F.3d at 893. This exception applies when prison
13
officials fail to respond properly to inmate grievances. See Brengettcy v. Horton, 423
F.3d 674, 682 (7th Cir. 2005); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2002).
Similarly, if a prison requires inmates to file grievances in a specific manner, but fails
to make instructions about that process available to inmates, then “no available”
remedy exists. Dale, 376 F.3d at 656.
Here, Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims arising before
July 28, 2014, and on any claims related to his crutches being taken away in
September 2014, on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. [172] at 13–14.
1.
First Emergency Grievance: July 28, 2014
Plaintiff filed his first emergency grievance on July 28, 2014, in which he
complained about his July 13 fall and the pain he experienced while being
transported to the Healthcare Unit. [171] ¶ 60. On August 20, the CAO determined
that Plaintiff’s grievance did not constitute an emergency and instructed Plaintiff to
resubmit the grievance through the normal process. Id. ¶ 61. Plaintiff then sent his
grievance to the ARB (rather than his Correctional Counselor), which asked Plaintiff
to provide a copy of his original grievance with written responses from his
Correctional Counselor, the Grievance Officer, and the CAO. Id. ¶ 62; [171-11] at 18.
After receiving the ARB’s response, Plaintiff then submitted the grievance to his
counselor but never got a response and took no further action. Id. ¶ 63. Plaintiff
argues that Stateville failed to inform him of the necessary steps to exhaust his
administrative remedies. [175] at 15.
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According to the ARB’s Return of Grievance record, the ARB instructed
Plaintiff to “provide a copy” of his written grievance, “including the counselor’s
response” and “the Grievance Officer’s and Chief Administrative Officer’s response,
to appeal.” [171-11] at 18. Plaintiff denies that he received a guidebook explaining
the grievance procedures, [173] ¶¶ 54–59, but admits that the ARB gave him the
instructions outlined above, id. ¶ 62.
Whether Plaintiff personally received a guidebook containing Stateville’s
grievance procedures remains disputed.
But Plaintiff does not dispute that all
inmates can access the grievance policies and procedures “at any time” through their
counselor or the law library. See id. ¶ 59. Thus, under the Seventh Circuit’s objective
standard, Stateville made its process available to Plaintiff. See Dole v. Chandler, 438
F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006); Twitty, 226 F. App’x at 596. Indeed, here the ARB
specifically told Plaintiff how to submit his grievance properly. See [171] ¶ 62.
According to Plaintiff, however, he followed the instructions he received (both
the CAO’s instruction to submit the non-emergency grievance “in the normal manner”
and the ARB’s instruction to “provide a copy” of the counselor’s response) when
Plaintiff eventually submitted the grievance to his counselor, who never responded.
[173] ¶ 64; [175-3] ¶¶ 18–19; [171-11] at 18-19. Under Plaintiff’s version of events,
the counselor’s subsequent failure to respond to his grievance prevented Plaintiff
from moving forward with his grievance and “effectively rendered” the process
unavailable. Brengettcy, 423 F.3d at 682; see also Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (“a remedy
becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed
15
grievance”). Accordingly, this Court cannot grant summary judgment to Defendants
for failure to exhaust because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether
Plaintiff meets the unavailability exception.
2.
Second Emergency Grievance: September 11, 2014
Plaintiff filed a second emergency grievance on September 11, 2014, regarding
his fall and resulting injuries from September 9. [171] ¶ 65. The Grievance Officer
reviewed the grievance on September 29 and the CAO denied it on October 9. Id. ¶¶
65–66.
Plaintiff contends that he never received a response to this emergency
grievance and thus never attempted to appeal the denial by submitting the grievance
to the ARB. [173] ¶ 67.
The record does not establish when or whether prison officials notified Plaintiff
of this denial, so Defendants have not met their burden to establish Plaintiff’s failure
to exhaust. See Dale, 376 F.3d at 655. Accordingly, this Court cannot grant summary
judgment to Defendants for failure to exhaust.
B.
Qualifying Disability
This Court addresses Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim together with his
ADA claims because the same analysis governs both claims. See Foley v. City of
Lafayette, Ind., 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004). Under both statutes, Plaintiff must
show that: (1) he is a qualified person; (2) with a disability; and (3) IDOC denied him
access to a program or activity because of his disability. Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.,
684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The ADA defines a disability as either “a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities”; “a
record of such an impairment”; or “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42
16
U.S.C. § 12102(1); see also 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(b) (Rehabilitation Act’s definition of
disability refers to the ADA). Major life activities include walking, standing, bending,
and caring for oneself. Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672.
Before Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAA),
“substantially limits” meant that an individual could not perform a major life function
or was “significantly restricted” in “condition, manner or duration” from performing
“a particular major life function, as compared to the average person in the general
population.” Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i–j)). But the ADAA broadened the definition of
disability. Cloutier v. GoJet Airlines, LLC, No. 16-C-1146, 2018 WL 2220289, at *6
(N.D. Ill. May 15, 2018) (discussing amended text of the statute and subsequent
regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). After
the 2008 amendments, an “impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely
restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered
substantially limiting.” Id.; see also Hirmiz v. New Harrison Hotel Corp., 865 F.3d.
475, 476 (7th Cir. 2017).
Now, courts assess whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity without regard to the “ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, except
ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses.” 28 C.F.R § 35.108(d)(1)(viii). Relevant factors
include “the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected duration
of
the
impairment,
and
the
permanent
or
long-term
impact
of
impairment.” Smith v. Concentra, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 778, 786 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
17
the
Plaintiff experienced recurring back pain. [175-3] ¶ 7; [175-17] at 17. But
Plaintiff does not assert any claim arising from his back pain or contend that it
qualifies as a disability. See generally [68, 175]. Nor does Plaintiff claim that his
back pain comprised part of an underlying disability or related to his ankle injuries
(aside from the fact that he experienced back pain at the same time he experienced
ankle pain). See [175-3] ¶ 1. Thus, this Court examines only whether Plaintiff’s ankle
injury constitutes a disability under the ADA, as amended by the ADAA.
The ADA does not categorically exclude temporary impairments from its
definition of a disability. See Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 333 (2d
Cir. 2014)). That said, the “duration of an impairment” may help determine “whether
the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.” Id. at 329. Impairments
that last only for a short period of time are typically not covered under the ADA unless
they are sufficiently severe. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (app.). Examples of
temporary, non-disabling impairments include “broken limbs, sprained joints,
concussions, and influenza”—in other words, “non-chronic impairments” with “little
or no long term or permanent impact.” Id.
Thus, many district courts have found that run-of-the-mill short-term injuries
do not qualify as disabilities under the ADA. See Clark v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., No. 3:14cv-00204, 2016 WL 853529, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2016) (broken foot that took two
months to heal did not qualify as a disability under the ADA); Martinez v. N.Y. State
Div. of Human Rights, No. 1:13-cv-1252-GHW, 2015 WL 437399, at *7–10 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 2, 2015) (temporary injuries from fall did not constitute a disability); Mastrio v.
18
Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-564, 2014 WL 840229, at *4–5 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014)
(short-term pain from kidney stones did not qualify as a disability); Budhun v.
Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 10-6921, 2011 WL 2746009, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. July
14, 2011) (broken finger did not qualify as a disability); see also Idell M. v. Vilsack,
E.E.O.C. Doc. 0120140792, 2016 WL 4426506, at *2 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 4, 2016)
(affirming finding that ordinary, temporary recovery from foot surgery did not qualify
as a disability).
According to Plaintiff, the ankle injury he sustained in March 2014 affected his
ability to walk and limited his access to religious services, family visits, and the
commissary. See [175-3] ¶ 8. The record shows that Plaintiff’s March 2014 fall
resulted in a painful ankle sprain for which he was prescribed pain medicine,
crutches, and ice. [173] ¶ 18. Evaluating the facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, this Court accepts that Plaintiff’s ankle injury impaired his ability to walk
unassisted by crutches, which demonstrates some impairment of a major life activity.
See, e.g., Clark, 2016 WL 853529, at *4; [173] ¶ 17. That said, considering the nature
and severity of Plaintiffs’ ankle injury, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s ankle injury
did not substantially limit his major life activities as required to establish a claim
under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
First, nothing in the record suggests that Plaintiff’s injury was severe or
presented anything beyond an ordinary sprain. According to medical documentation,
Plaintiff did not break any bones. [173] ¶ 25. Instead, the undisputed facts show
that Plaintiff merely sprained his ankle and received ordinary treatment for such an
19
injury, including ice, crutches, and over-the-counter pain medication. See [171-9] at
227; [173] ¶ 31. As of July 2014, Plaintiff’s ankle was no longer swollen, he had
recovered his full range of motion, and “it was not medically necessary for Plaintiff to
use crutches.” [171] ¶¶ 30–31. Although this Court accepts Plaintiff’s statements
that he continued experiencing some pain, Plaintiff offers no evidence to contradict
Obaisi’s medical findings as to the nature or progress of his condition. Ordinary,
temporary injuries that neither cause nor relate to longer-term impairments
generally do not demonstrate a disability under the ADA, so those circumstances
militate against finding that Plaintiff had a qualifying disability. See Clark, 2016
WL 853529, at *4 (collecting cases).
Second, Plaintiff fails to identify any precedent establishing that a sequence of
unrelated injuries may be linked together to demonstrate a substantial limitation on
a major life activity. Even construing all of Plaintiff’s injuries as one injury—despite
a total lack of evidence connecting them—Plaintiff’s own timeline of events begins on
March 11, 2014, and ends on September 9, 2014, a period just shy of six months. [68]
¶¶ 15, 36. As noted above, such a short-term impairment may qualify as a disability,
but only if “sufficiently severe.” See Summers, 740 F.3d at 329.
Here, Plaintiff fails to show such severity: the record shows that Plaintiff
experienced ordinary recovery time between his injuries and suffered no lasting
consequences from any of them. Cf. id. (finding that plaintiff had a qualifying
disability where he remained wholly unable to walk for seven months and, absent
surgery, medication, and physical therapy, likely would not have walked for an even
20
longer period). Obaisi testified that Plaintiff could put weight on his foot by July
2014, indicating that Plaintiff’s initial injury healed normally. [171-3] at 19, 58–59.
Plaintiff denies this statement in his affidavit, stating that at the time he was not
“walking and carrying his weight everywhere.” [173] ¶ 31. But Plaintiff’s prior
deposition testimony shows that, at a minimum, he could place some weight on the
injured ankle because he walked from his cell down the stairs using only one crutch
in July. See [175-17] at 55–57, 129.
In any event, Plaintiff’s medical records show that by September 9, 2014,
Plaintiff could walk unassisted by crutches. [171] ¶ 52. Thus, the entire period of
Plaintiff’s impairment lasted no more than six months, and for portions within that
period, Plaintiff demonstrated significant improvement and increased mobility. The
record contains no evidence of any lasting consequence or impairment past that
period. These circumstances—brief, temporary periods of impairment which did not
require surgery or other non-routine treatments—weigh against finding that Plaintiff
suffered a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See Clark, 2016 WL 853529, at
*6 (finding that a broken foot that affected the plaintiff’s ability to walk for up to five
months, but did not create any complications or long-term impact, did not qualify as
a disability); cf. Summers, 740 F.3d at 329–33 (finding that the plaintiff presented a
qualifying disability where an accident impaired his ability to walk for seven months
and required surgery and therapy).
Overall, this Court finds no support in the law to conclude that Plaintiff’s
sprained ankle qualifies as a disability under the ADA. See, e.g., Guary v. Upstate
21
Nat’l Bank, 618 F. Supp. 2d 272, 275 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the “plaintiff’s
broken ankle, resulting in twelve-week disability leave,” did not qualify as a
disability); Street v. Maverick Tube Corp., No. 4:15-cv-02736, 2016 WL 8711338, at *6
(S.D. Tex. June 17, 2016) (noting that “a temporary injury, such as a broken foot, is
not considered a ‘disability’ under the ADA.”).
Because Plaintiff did not suffer a qualifying disability, this Court grants
summary judgment to Defendants on Counts I, II, and VII.
C.
Failure to Accommodate
This Court’s finding that Plaintiff did not suffer a qualifying disability under
the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act disposes of his claims arising from his alleged
disability.
Even if Plaintiff had a qualifying disability, however, his failure to
accommodate claims would still fail.
To establish a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must
prove that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) a public entity denied
him the benefits of its services, programs, or activities or otherwise subjected him to
discrimination; and (3) the denial or discrimination occurred because of his
disability. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jaros, 684
F.3d at 672); see also Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). The analysis for the Rehabilitation Act remains
functionally identical, with the additional requirement that the agency that denied
the plaintiff services must accept federal funds, which IDOC does. See Wagoner, 778
F.3d at 592 (citing Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672).
22
Under either statute, a reasonable accommodation does not require a perfect
cure for the problem. See Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 112 (7th Cir.
1996); see also Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 593 (holding that restricted access to facilities
which resulted in longer wait times for a disabled prisoner did not establish a denial
of services under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act). In defining a reasonable
accommodation in correctional facilities, courts consider the accommodation “in light
of the overall institutional requirements,” including security and safety concerns and
“administrative exigencies.” Love, 103 F.3d at 561. This determination remains
“highly fact-specific” and requires a case-by-case analysis.
Dadian v. Village of
Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2001).
Although Plaintiff offers evidence that his location on a higher gallery made it
difficult for him to access the commissary, religious activities, and family visits, that
evidence alone does not prove that IDOC failed to accommodate him. Plaintiff admits
that, from the date of his initial injury in March 2014 until Stateville moved him to
a lower gallery cell on July 13, 2014, he could “go from place to place at Stateville”
when using crutches—albeit at a slower pace than normal—including down the
stairs. [175-3] ¶¶ 4, 19. IDOC also provided Plaintiff with accommodations including
lay-in permits for meals and crutches. Plaintiff testified, however, that Stateville
sometimes failed to provide his lay-in meals, in which case he ate food he purchased
from the commissary. Id. ¶ 21. Overall, like the Wagoner plaintiff, Plaintiff had
access to prison services but experienced inconveniences in the form of using crutches,
walking more slowly, and occasionally relying on the food he purchased for himself.
23
Those minor, short-term inconveniences do not amount to a failure to accommodate
under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
See Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 593 (holding
that IDOC’s failure to repair an inmate’s wheelchair did not result in a denial of
services even though it “impeded” the inmate’s access to some facilities). Moreover,
delays of weeks (or even months) in organizing an accommodation do not
automatically constitute a failure to accommodate; here, Plaintiff received a lower
gallery assignment within four months of his initial injury, which remains reasonable
under the requisite standard. See Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1177–
78 (7th Cir. 2013) (four-month delay in securing accessible parking was not failure to
accommodate), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d
760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016); Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc., 233 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir.
2000) (20-month delay did not render accommodation unreasonable).
Plaintiff claims that IDOC violated his rights by refusing his continued
requests to move to a lower gallery. Plaintiff says that between his initial injury in
March 2014 and his second fall in July 2014, he wrote to Rabideau and Williams
multiple times requesting to move to a cell in a lower gallery; Defendants deny ever
receiving the letters. See [173] ¶ 20.
Here, however, that factual dispute is immaterial: even if this Court found that
Defendants delayed Plaintiff’s accommodation through July 13—the day Plaintiff
suffered his second fall and Defendants honored his permit from Obaisi—the ADA
excuses some bureaucratic delay in providing reasonable accommodations.
As
discussed above, such delays may extend over several months and remain reasonable,
24
absent a showing of bad faith (which Plaintiff has not made here). See Jay, 233 F.3d
at 1017.
Lastly,
Plaintiff
alleges
that
Defendants
denied
him
a
reasonable
accommodation after his second fall on July 13, 2014, when he was moved on a
stretcher without safety straps and carried by medical technicians and other inmates
to the Healthcare Unit. [68] ¶ 26. IDOC’s rules prohibit the use of inmates to assist
or transport other inmates during a medical emergency, and Defendants deny that
other inmates moved Plaintiff onto the stretcher. [188] ¶¶ 8, 29. Even crediting
Plaintiff’s account, it remains unclear how improper transportation to the Healthcare
Unit constitutes a failure to accommodate under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
Plaintiff does not support this claim or even address it in his response to Defendants’
motion, see generally [175], and therefore waives that argument, see Crespo v. Colvin,
824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016). Besides, a reasonable accommodation “is a process,
not a one-off event,” so this single episode does not suffice to sustain a failure to
accommodate claim. Cloe, 712 F.3d at 1178. Thus, this Court grants summary
judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claims.
D.
ADA Interference
A plaintiff bringing an ADA interference claim must prove that: (1) he engaged
in protected activity; (2) he exercised or enjoyed ADA protected rights; (3) the
defendants coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered on account of his protected
activity; and (4) the defendants were motivated by an intent to discriminate. Frakes
v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2017). Protected activities
under the ADA include opposing or complaining about disability discrimination, such
25
as by filing formal complaints of discrimination. Id. Interference requires “more than
a quarrel among neighbors or an isolated act of discrimination”; instead, plaintiffs
must demonstrate a “pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated.”
Bloch v.
Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
That is, to demonstrate the requisite intent, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s actions reveal a discriminatory pattern of harassment and an intent to
discriminate based upon the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class—those with
disabilities. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388
F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004)
Plaintiff claims that he engaged in protected activity when he requested
accommodations between March and July 2014. [175] at 9. Plaintiff alleges that
IDOC interfered with his ADA rights when they transferred him to cell on a higher
gallery floor and did not immediately grant his requests for accommodation. Id. In
addition, Plaintiff testified that between July 11, 2014 and his fall on July 13, 2014,
he had two conversations with Sykes and Jackson about honoring his low gallery and
low bunk permits and they threatened Plaintiff with segregation if he did not return
to his cell. [173] ¶ 40. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that IDOC interfered with his ADA
rights when they confiscated his crutch after his third fall in September 2014. [175]
at 10.
Overall, this Court must determine whether Defendants interfered with
Plaintiff’s protected activity and, if so, whether that interference arose from an intent
to discriminate. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330.
26
The record shows that Plaintiff moved from his cell in F House to a cell on a
higher gallery on June 19, 2014. [171] ¶ 28. Stateville’s records, corroborating
Rabideau’s statement, show that Plaintiff moved to a higher gallery as a matter of
routine. [171-5] at 54–55. Plaintiff disputes Rabideau’s explanation for his transfer
and speculatively interprets the Stateville records to mean that the transfer was for
“medical reasons.” [173] ¶ 28. 1 But Defendants’ unrebutted evidence—including
Rabideau's statement and Stateville’s transfer records—shows that Plaintiff’s
transfer resulted from “routine procedures within Stateville.” [171-5] at 12.
In September 2014, Plaintiff fell while walking down a flight of wet stairs.
[173] ¶ 52. After this fall, Obaisi revoked Plaintiff’s crutches because he feared
Plaintiff would injure himself further if he continued using them. Id. Nothing in the
record suggests that these incidents formed part of a continued pattern of
discriminatory practices against Plaintiff. See Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783. Instead,
Obaisi’s uncontested testimony shows that IDOC confiscated Plaintiff’s crutches out
of concern for his safety. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that wardens and other prison bureaucrats may properly “relegate to the
prison’s medical staff the provision of good medical care”).
On July 11, Obaisi provided Plaintiff with a medical permit allowing him to
move to a lower gallery. [171] ¶ 29. As to Plaintiff’s interactions with Sykes and
1
During her deposition, Rabideau explained the transfer records in detail. [171-5] at 12–19. Her testimony and the
transfer records categorize the June 19 move as “routine.” [171-5] at 55. Presumably, Plaintiff believes the move
occurred for a medical reason because the row above the row for the June 19 move lists “medical reason” as the
explanation. Id. But that row actually reflects that Plaintiff’s July 13 move to a ground-floor cell after he returned
from the outside hospital occurred for a medical reason. [171-5] at 55. Plaintiff’s speculation to the contrary cannot
create a genuine issue of material fact here. See Consolino v. Towne, 872 F.3d 825, 830 (7th Cir. 2017).
27
Jackson about the permit, the nature of their conversation remains disputed, and
may constitute an act of discrimination. Even accepting that as true, however,
Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a “pattern of harassment” based upon that isolated
episode alone. See Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783. Viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, this Court finds that Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants
engaged in a pattern of harassment motivated by discriminatory intent. As noted
above, Plaintiff offers no evidence showing that his first transfer to a higher gallery
resulted from discriminatory intent and he fails to rebut Defendants’ evidence that
the transfer was a matter of routine within a crowded prison. See [171-5] at 18–19.
Overall, Plaintiff’s claim fails because he lacks evidence of either a pattern of
discrimination or any intent to discriminate. Here, Plaintiff merely identifies a
number of different actors involved in isolated episodes, which does not suffice to
show a “pattern of harassment.” Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783; see also DiCenso v. Cisneros,
96 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (7th Cir. 1996).
Crucially, Plaintiff offers none of the circumstantial evidence that typically
supports finding discriminatory intent, such as discriminatory comments, different
treatment for inmates outside of the protected class, or repeated expressions of
animus. See, e.g., Bloch, 587 F.3d at 786; Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d
1521, 1529 (7th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s entire theory of discriminatory intent appears
to be that Defendants took various actions (removing his crutch, failing to
immediately honor his low bunk permit, and so on) while knowing of his impairment.
See [175] at 10.
But—absent a disparate impact theory that Plaintiff does not
28
advance—discriminatory intent requires showing that Defendants acted “because of”
and not merely “in spite of” a prohibited factor. Bloch, 587 F.3d at 785. Plaintiff
offers no evidence and makes no argument showing that Defendants acted “because
of” his alleged disability. Thus, this Court grants summary judgment to Defendants
on Plaintiff’s ADA interference claim.
D.
Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment entitles prisoners to adequate medical care. Johnson
v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment
claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference
towards his serious medical needs.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);
Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 301 (7th Cir. 2010).
Even
assuming (without deciding) that Plaintiff establishes the requisite elements under
the Eighth Amendment, his claims fail because he cannot overcome the qualifiedimmunity defense that Defendants raised in their opening brief. [172] at 14–15.
The doctrine of qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the
need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and
the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
Thus, qualified immunity protects officers who make “mere mistakes” of law, fact, or
a mix of the two. Id. When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show two things: (1) that the defendant violated a statutory
or constitutional right; and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of
the challenged conduct. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). A court
29
may address the prongs in whichever order it prefers. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The
defendant merits qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to meet his burden on either
prong. Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017).
“Clearly established” means that existing precedent “placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate” at the time of the alleged violation.
Id.
Plaintiff must show that “every reasonable official would understand” that his actions
violated a given right. Id. Finally, a plaintiff cannot succeed by identifying clearly
established law “at a high level of generality” not “particularized” to the facts of his
case. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017).
Here, contrary to well-settled precedent, Plaintiff fails to address his burden
of overcoming Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity.
See [175] at 15
(“Defendants are incorrect in their assertion that they are entitled to qualified
immunity unless Shaw can point to an analogous case that establishes that he had a
right to be free from the conduct he challenges in his Section 1983 claim.”). Instead,
Plaintiff offers a one-paragraph response on qualified immunity and argues that
Defendants do not merit qualified immunity simply because the Seventh Circuit “has
long been clear that deliberate indifference to an inmates [sic] serious medical needs
violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 15–16 (citing Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556,
566 (7th Cir. 2017)). That general legal proposition holds true in the abstract, but it
lacks any connection to the facts of this case and thus does not help Plaintiff. See
White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (a plaintiff cannot defeat qualified immunity by defining
clearly established law “at a high level of generality”). Plaintiff’s failure to meet (or
30
even attempt to meet) his burden on the second prong of the qualified-immunity
analysis entitles Defendants to qualified immunity. See Green, 868 F.3d at 633.
Thus, this Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Counts III, IV, V, and
VI.
IV.
Conclusion
This Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment [170]. The Clerk
shall enter judgment for Defendants and against Plaintiff. All dates and deadlines
are stricken. Civil case terminated.
Dated: August 7, 2018
Entered:
____________________________
John Robert Blakey
United States District Judge
31
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