Hitz Entertainment Corporation v. Mosley et al
OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 2/1/2017. Mailed notice(rj, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HITZ ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, )
an Illinois corporation,
SHANE MOSLEY, an individual,
and GOBOX PROMOTIONS, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
No. 16 C 1199
Judge Sara L. Ellis
OPINION AND ORDER
The bout before the Court stems from a bout in a boxing ring. In the Plaintiff’s corner is
Hitz Entertainment Corporation (“HEC”), an Illinois-based boxing promotion company owned
by Bobby Hitz, which is seeking to challenge a former three-weight world champion and former
best pound-for-pound fighter in the world, “Sugar” Shane Mosley. Mosley is joined in his
corner by his promotion company GoBox Promotions, Inc. (“GoBox”), an independent boxing
promotion outfit that Mosley uses as a vehicle for staging and promoting boxing matches. HEC
brings two claims under Illinois state law against Mosley and GoBox (collectively,
“Defendants”), one for tortious interference with a contract and one for tortious interference with
prospective economic relations. Defendants move to dismiss  HEC’s complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
HEC also brings a separate motion for a declaration and order regarding the agreed
confidentiality order , seeking an order from the Court declaring certain documents
improperly designated as confidential and for attorneys’ eyes only (“AEO”).
Because HEC has failed to present facts establishing sufficient contacts between the
Defendants and Illinois to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants in
Illinois, the Court grants the motion to dismiss. And because Defendants have not presented a
basis for designating the deposition transcripts as confidential and one of the documents the
Defendants designated AEO is currently publicly available, the Court grants HEC’s motion for a
declaration with respect to those documents. However, because the remaining documents
contain confidential information and Defendants have demonstrated that good cause exists to
designate them AEO, the Court denies the motion with respect to those documents.
HEC is an Illinois-based boxing promotion company, solely owned by Bobby Hitz, a
former heavyweight boxing contender. In December 2012, HEC entered into a promotional
agreement (the “Agreement”) with a professional boxer named Dimar Ortuz. Under the
Agreement, HEC had exclusive rights to secure and promote all boxing matches for Ortuz during
the term of the contract, which would extend for a minimum of three years.
At some point in 2015, Mosley offered Ortuz a bout (the “Bout”) against Victor Barragan
during an event Mosley and GoBox were promoting in California on August 29, 2015 (the
“Event”). At the time Mosley made this offer to Ortuz, Ortuz was living and training in
California. Neither Mosley nor GoBox contacted Ortuz while he was in Illinois.
Prior to the Bout, on August 11, 2015, Bobby Hitz contacted Trista Pisani, GoBox’s Vice
President of Operations, and informed her of HEC’s agreement with Ortuz. Pisani told Hitz that
The facts in the background section necessary to ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(2) are taken from the Complaint and other documents and affidavits submitted by the parties.
The Court draws all reasonable inference in favor of the HEC and resolves all factual disputes in favor of
HEC. Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi–Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2003).
she would get back to him, but she never did. On August 19, Hitz texted Pisani regarding the
Bout and stated that if Defendants went forward with it he would sue them in Illinois. Again,
Pisani did not respond. On August 25, Hitz sent a text message to Mosley asking that Mosley
call him regarding Ortuz and noting that he has an exclusive promotion contract with Ortuz.
Mosley did not respond to this message. The Bout took place, as scheduled, on August 29, 2015.
GoBox entered into several distribution agreements with Pay-per-view (“PPV”)
distributors to distribute and market the Event nationwide, including in Illinois. Each of the PPV
distributors made sales in Illinois and at least one sent nationwide marketing emails that were
received by individuals in Illinois. Additionally, GoBox distributed the Event through a closed
circuit television (“CCTV”) distributor who provided the Bout to venues nationwide, including
eight venues in Illinois.
As a result of Ortuz participating in the Bout, HEC filed the present suit in January 2016.
During discovery, Defendants produced the agreements with the PPV distributors as well as a
report on the CCTV distribution. Pursuant to the agreed protective order in this case, Defendants
designated those documents as AEO. Subsequently, during the depositions of Mosley and
Pisani, HEC’s counsel asked Mosley and Pisani about those documents. Defendants did not
designate the depositions as confidential, as required by the protective order, during the
On September 6, 2016, GoBox filed an unrelated complaint in the Central District of
California against one of the PPV distributors and attached to that complaint the agreement with
that distributor as well as the CCTV report, both of which Defendants previously designated as
AEO. In early November 2016, GoBox filed a motion to seal the distributor agreement filed in
that case but did not move to seal the CCTV report. The court in the California case granted the
motion, and resealed the agreement, but the CCTV report remains on the publicly available
docket in that case.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) challenges whether the Court has jurisdiction
over a party. The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proof. See Tamburo v. Dworkin,
601 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court may consider affidavits and other competent
evidence submitted by the parties. Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi–Synthelabo, S.A., 338
F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). If the Court rules on the motion without a hearing, the plaintiff
need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. GCIU–Emp’r Ret. Fund v.
Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court will “read the complaint
liberally, in its entirety, and with every inference drawn in favor of” the plaintiff. Cent. States,
Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Phencorp Reinsurance Co., 440 F.3d 870, 878 (7th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Textor v. Bd. of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir. 1993)). “[O]nce
the defendant has submitted affidavits or other evidence in opposition to the exercise of
jurisdiction,” however, “the plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and submit affirmative
evidence supporting the exercise of jurisdiction.” Purdue, 338 F.3d at 783. Any dispute
concerning relevant facts is resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 782–83. The Court must
consider each defendant’s contacts with the state individually. Id. at 784.
The Court may, “for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c)(1). But the Court is required to make a good-cause determination before shielding
relevant information from public disclosure. Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 1999). The party seeking a protective order must provide
specific facts establishing good cause to support the entry of a protective order. Culinary Foods,
Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297, 300, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1993). The party seeking to protect
documents under a protective order “must continue to show good cause for confidentiality when
challenged.” In re: Bank One Sec. Litig. First Chicago S’holder Claims, 222 F.R.D. 582, 586
(N.D. Ill. 2004). The designating party must show that disclosure will result in a “clearly defined
and serious injury,” by pointing to “specific demonstrations of fact.” In re: Aqua Dots Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 08 CV 2364, 2009 WL 1766776, at *1, 4 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2009) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The party cannot make this showing through
conclusory statements about potential harms. Chicago Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Tech. Research
Grp., LLC, 276 F.R.D. 237, 241 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Culinary Foods, 151 F.R.D. at 303. And “[i]f
there is any doubt as to whether the material should be sealed, it is resolved in favor of
disclosure.” In re: Bank One, 222 F.R.D. at 586.
Motion to Dismiss
Defendants argue that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them. HEC
brings two state-law claims against Defendants, one for tortious interference with a contract and
one for tortious interference with prospective economic relations. These claims are in federal
court under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. A federal court sitting in diversity may exercise
personal jurisdiction to the extent authorized by the constitution and the law of the state in which
it sits. Nucor v. Aceros Y Maquilas de Occidente, S.A. de C.V., 28 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 1994);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (federal court sitting in diversity can exercise personal jurisdiction only so
far as allowed by the law of the state in which it sits). The Illinois long-arm statute authorizes
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis permitted by the Illinois and United States
constitutions. be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 735 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/2-209(c)). This standard effectively merges the federal constitutional and state statutory
inquiries. N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2014). Depending on the
extent of a defendant’s contact with Illinois, personal jurisdiction may be either general or
specific. uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). General
personal jurisdiction means that a defendant may be subject to suit in Illinois for any cause of
action arising in any place. Id. Specific personal jurisdiction is more limited and only exposes
the defendant to claims that arise out of the defendant’s contacts with Illinois. Id. In either case,
the Court may only exercise jurisdiction if the contacts establishing that jurisdiction are “such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed.
95 (1945)). HEC contends that Defendants have sufficient contacts with Illinois to support both
specific and general personal jurisdiction. While HEC does not specify in its response which
contacts are relevant to establishing each type of jurisdiction, the Court addresses the two types
of jurisdiction separately below and evaluates the alleged contacts in the manner it deems most
General Personal Jurisdiction
HEC contends that both Mosley and GoBox have sufficient contacts with Illinois to
support general personal jurisdiction in Illinois. A defendant is subject to general personal
jurisdiction if it has “continuous and systemic general business contacts with the forum state.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). This is a high standard, and it is only met if the
Defendant has “such extensive contacts with the state that it can be treated as present in the state
for essentially all purposes.” Id. at 426. The Court evaluates Mosley’s and GoBox’s contacts
GoBox’s Contacts with Illinois
HEC’s argument that GoBox is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Illinois boils
down to essentially one point: GoBox produced the Bout and then contracted with several third
parties to market and distribute the Bout nationwide, including in Illinois, and that in doing so it
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of Illinois (and presumably every other jurisdiction where the
fight was shown). The Court will not recap the details of each distribution agreement here, but
suffice it to say that GoBox had distribution agreements with several companies, each of which
distributed the Bout, for a fee, to customers in Illinois. HEC alleges that as part of one of these
distribution agreements, the distributor sent “blast” emails to people nationwide, some of whom
were in Illinois, and aired commercials for the Bout nationwide, including in Illinois. These
distribution agreements differed from typical boxing match distribution agreements in that
GoBox maintained ownership of the copyright of the telecast, whereas in a typical arrangement
the telecast of a boxing match is produced by a distributor or other third party, who pays the
promoter a fixed licensing fee but the distributor owns the copyright for the telecast.
These contacts with Illinois are not sufficient to support general personal jurisdiction.
General personal jurisdiction is found where a party has engaged in systemic and continuous
activity in the forum state such that it approximates physical presence. Tamburo, 601 F.3d at
701. The threshold is high. Id. The fact that GoBox contracted with a number of distributors
who distributed and marketed the Bout in Illinois does not establish continuous nor systemic
activity in the state. Quite the opposite, it demonstrates discrete and limited contact.
HEC bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction and in support HEC cites just
one case, Tamburo, 601 F.3d 693.2 In Tamburo, the court found that blast emails could provide
a basis for a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction where the blast emails were the
means through which the defendant committed the alleged tort. Id. at 704–09. However, the
court also found that blast emails are not sufficient to support the exercise of general personal
jurisdiction because they are too “sporadic” to “approach the level of continuous and systematic
contacts necessary to establish general personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 701–02 (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). HEC cites no other case law that supports a finding that this
Court has general personal jurisdiction over GoBox. Therefore, HEC has failed to carry its
burden and the Court finds GoBox is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Illinois.
Mosley’s Contacts with Illinois
HEC argues that Mosley’s ownership of GoBox alone is sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over him. Even if GoBox were subject to general personal jurisdiction, the Court
could not impute the contacts of GoBox to Mosley. Ownership or affiliation with a corporation
is not a sufficient minimum contact to support jurisdiction. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas
Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 943 (7th Cir. 2000). Where the
owner-defendant observes corporate formalities, unless there is some basis for piercing the
corporate veil, the Court will not impute the contacts of the corporation-defendant to the owner2
HEC also includes one additional case cite, to a Florida appellate court, in a footnote in support of its
somewhat confusing argument that because Illinois could impose taxes on the revenue that distributors
and promoters derive from sales in Illinois, the promoters would be subject to personal jurisdiction for
actions related to the collection of those taxes. This is no doubt true, but it is irrelevant here. Such a
collection action would be an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, because the collection action
would arise out of sales in Illinois. As noted below, HEC’s claims do not arise out of the distribution of
the Bout, therefore this argument is inapposite.
defendant. Interlease Aviation Inv’rs II (Aloha) L.L.C. v. Vanguard Airlines, Inc., 262 F. Supp.
2d 898, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2003). HEC has not made any such allegation here; therefore, the Court
does not impute GoBox’s contacts to Mosley.
HEC also argues that Mosley “has a long history both as a boxer and as a promoter of
benefiting from Illinois’ system of laws, infrastructure and business climate.” Doc. 37 at 6.
Specifically, HEC alleges that Mosley, through an entity called Pound For Pound Promotions,
Inc., owns a 5% interest in a company called Golden Boy Promotions, Inc. (“Golden Boy”), and
that Golden Boy organized 13 events in Illinois between 2005 and 2010. HEC also alleges that
as part of his relationship with Golden Boy, Mosley attended promotional activities “all over the
U.S. and across the world.” Doc. 37 at 7. With regard to the work of Golden Boy, the Court
again declines to impute the actions of a corporation to Mosley where there is no alleged basis
for piercing the corporate veil. With regard to Mosley’s alleged promotional activities, granting
HEC the reasonable inference that Mosley attended at least some of the events in Illinois, the
Court finds that given that the most recent event in Illinois occurred on December 12, 2009, see
Doc. 37, Ex. 1-F, even if Mosley participated in that event, it is far too remote in time to support
a conclusion that he has continuous or systemic business contacts in Illinois either at the present
time or at the time the alleged cause of action in this case accrued.
HEC next argues that Mosley was licensed to box in Illinois between October 1, 1995
and October 1, 1997, and that during this time he fought at least once in Illinois, on April 9,
1997. Again, this singular instance, nearly 20 years ago, is neither systemic nor continuous and
does not support a finding of general personal jurisdiction.
Therefore, HEC fails to establish that the Court has general personal jurisdiction over
HEC also argues that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants. To
establish specific personal jurisdiction, HEC must show that its claims against Defendants arise
out of Defendants’ constitutionally sufficient contacts with the state. uBID, 623 F.3d at 425.
Defendants must have purposefully directed their activities at Illinois or purposefully availed
themselves of the privilege of doing business in Illinois and the alleged injury must have arisen
out of those forum-related actions. See N. Grain Mktg., LLC, 743 F.3d at 492. The Supreme
Court has not elaborated what constitutes “arising out of,” but several circuits have addressed the
issue and are split on how strict the standard is. Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 676 (7th Cir.
2012). Some circuits require that the forum related contacts must be the but-for cause of the
plaintiff’s injury, while other circuits have espoused a higher standard, requiring that the forumrelated contacts be the but-for and proximate cause of the injury. Id. The Seventh Circuit has
yet to definitively resolve the issue, but has indicated that “a mere ‘but for’ causal relationship is
insufficient to establish the required nexus between a defendant’s contacts and the underlying
cause of action.” Id. at 676–77 (citing GCIU–Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d
1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 2009)). However, because HEC fails to satisfy even the lower, but-for
standard, this Court need not determine where to draw the line in this case.
HEC brings two claims, one for tortious interference with a contract and one for tortious
interference with prospective economic relations. The elements of tortious interference with a
contract are (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and
another; (2) the defendant’s awareness of this contractual relation; (3) the defendant’s intentional
and unjustified inducement of a breach of the contract; (4) a subsequent breach by the other
caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct; and (5) damages. HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v.
Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 672, 676, 131 Ill.2d 145, 137 Ill. Dec. 19 (1989). The
elements of tortious interference with prospective economic relations are (1) the plaintiff’s
reasonable expectation of entering into a valid business relationship; (2) the defendants’
knowledge of the plaintiff’s expectancy; (3) purposeful interference by the defendants that
prevents the plaintiff’s legitimate expectancy from being fulfilled; and (4) damages to the
plaintiff resulting from such interference. Burrell v. City of Mattoon, 378 F.3d 642, 652 (7th
HEC states that Mosley’s and GoBox’s conduct satisfies the requirements of specific
personal jurisdiction, but it is unclear upon what basis HEC is asserting this claim. HEC’s
failure to articulate the basis for his argument alone is sufficient to defeat his claim that the Court
has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 700 (plaintiff has
burden of making a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction). However, even doing its best job
to determine which of Defendants’ forum related activities may have given rise to HEC’s claims,
the Court comes up empty; therefore, so does HEC.
HEC alleges that GoBox and Mosley interfered with HEC’s contract and prospective
economic relationship with Ortuz by inviting Ortuz to participate in the Bout in California. HEC
does not argue that any of the actions that lead to this interference occurred in Illinois or were
directed at Illinois. Defendants state that at the time they invited Ortuz to participate in the Bout,
he was living in California. Defendants state that they did not send any emails or otherwise
contact Ortuz while he was in Illinois. HEC does not dispute these assertions, and at one point
even appears to concede that its claims arose out of Ortuz’s participation in the Bout, not any
acts taken by Defendants in Illinois. Doc. 37 at 9 (“While Plaintiff agrees that the inclusion of
the Ortuz Bout as part of the Event gave rise to this lawsuit. . .”.). The Defendants made no
contacts with Illinois that in any way caused the alleged torts, and without some nexus between
Defendants’ forum related activities and the claims in question, the Court has no basis upon
which to exercise specific personal jurisdiction. Felland, 682 F.3d at 676 (specific personal
jurisdiction requires some nexus between the forum related conduct and the underlying cause of
Even applying the lower, but-for only standard, Defendants’ contacts are insufficient to
support specific personal jurisdiction. Defendants’ only forum-related actions that have some
relationship to the Bout—marketing and distribution of the Bout—are not but-for causes of
HEC’s injury. HEC’s tortious interference claims are not predicated upon the distribution and
marketing of the Bout. Therefore, the Court may not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over
either Defendant regardless of the standard the Court applies to the contacts.
Because HEC has failed to meet its burden to establish either general or specific personal
jurisdiction over either Defendant, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint
for lack for personal jurisdiction.
HEC seeks a declaration from the Court that Defendants waived their right to designate
the deposition testimony of Mosley and Pisani confidential under the joint protective order in this
case because Defendants did not designate the depositions as confidential on the record at the
time the depositions were taken. HEC also seeks an order declaring that Defendants waived
confidentiality with respect to the four contracts with PPV distributors and the CCTV report,
which Defendants previously designated as AEO, because Defendants did not designate the
depositions as confidential. Alternatively, HEC argues that the contracts and the CCTV report
are not truly sensitive enough to warrant the AEO designation.
The party seeking to subject documents to a protective order bears the burden of
establishing that such a designation is appropriate. Culinary Foods, Inc., 151 F.R.D. at 300. The
party seeking to protect documents under a protective order “must continue to show good cause
for confidentiality when challenged.” In re: Bank One, 222 F.R.D. at 586. The party must
establish that the information is confidential information and that there is good cause to protect
HEC first challenges the confidential designation of the depositions of Mosley and
Pisani. Defendants make no argument as to the continued designation of the depositions as
confidential. Therefore, Defendants do not carry their burden and the Court grants the motion
with respect to the depositions.
HEC argues that if the Court grants the motion with respect to the depositions, then this
results in a waiver of confidentiality with respect to the other documents because the other
documents are discussed in the depositions. HEC states that the depositions include “testimony
regarding the critical provisions of Defendant’s four PPV distribution agreements and the CCTV
report, render[ing] meaningless any need to further maintain confidentiality.” Doc. 35 at 4.
However, HEC does not provide any citation to the depositions and related citation to the
contracts to provide the Court with an appropriate basis to evaluate the level of the confidential
disclosure. It is not the Court’s job to read through hundreds of pages of deposition testimony
and contracts to determine where confidential information may have been disclosed. Therefore,
while it may be possible that the depositions disclose so much confidential material as to render
continued protection of the documents meaningless, the Court declines to do the legwork for
HEC to make this determination.
This does not settle the inquiry, however. Because HEC has challenged the
confidentiality of the contracts and CCTV report, Defendants must show that they are in fact
confidential and that there is good cause to protect them. With respect to the PPV contracts,
Defendants argue that the contracts contain confidential pricing and strategic information that is
unique to these agreements and does not appear in typical PPV distributor contracts. This type
of information is commonly designated as AEO. See, e.g., Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v.
Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (AEO designation
appropriate for emails that reveal price proposals, pricing formulas, and product specifications);
Inter-Med Inc. v. ASI Med. Inc., No. 09-CV-383, 2010 WL 2679992, at *3 (E.D. Wis. July 1,
2010) (pricing and profit information is properly designated AEO where parties are competitors).
Additionally, there is good cause to protect such information from disclosure to a competitor
where the competitor could use that information to obtain a competitive advantage. See InterMed, 2010 WL 2679992, at *2. Here, HEC is a boxing promoter and access to the details of
distributor contracts, which HEC admits are “fundamentally different” than typical PPV
contracts, Doc. 37 at 8, may undermine Defendants’ ability to negotiate similar terms in the
future or to utilize their understanding of the unique terms of these contracts to negotiate similar
deals on behalf of other promoters. Therefore, the information is appropriately designated AEO
and there is good cause to protect it from disclosure to HEC or the public.
With respect to the CCTV report, the Court does not need to reach whether or not it
satisfies the test for protectable information; Defendants have already disclosed this document
publicly and have not made an effort to remedy that disclosure. In an unrelated litigation, GoBox
Promotions, Inc. v. Innovative Sports Management., Inc., Case No. 16-cv-6689 (C.D. Cal.),
Defendants filed the CCTV report and one of the PPV contracts as exhibits to their complaint.
Id. Doc. 1-1, 1-8. Subsequently, Defendants filed a motion to seal with respect to the PPV
contract and several other documents, but not the CCTV report. Id. Doc. 19. The court granted
the motion, sealing the PPV contract. Doc. 27. Because Defendants have voluntarily disclosed
the CCTV report to the public, it remains publicly available, and they have not made any effort
to seal it in the California action, the Court finds that the CCTV report is not confidential and
therefore not properly designated as AEO in this case.
Finally, HEC argues that because these documents were designated AEO, HEC’s
attorneys were not able to show the documents to HEC or Hitz to obtain their input for purposes
of their response to the motion to dismiss. HEC does not explain what additional information
Hitz or anyone else at HEC could have provided about the documents that would have been
relevant to the Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis. The Court finds that the designation of
these documents as AEO did not harm HEC for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the depositions of Mosley and Pisani as
well as the CCTV report are not confidential documents and therefore orders that HEC not file
these documents under seal. The Court finds that the PPV contracts are confidential and
properly designated as AEO, therefore, the Court does not order the documents unsealed.
For the foregoing reasons the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction  without prejudice. And the Court grants in part and denies in part
Plaintiff’s motion for a declaration and order regarding the agreed confidentiality order .
The Court orders the CCTV report and the deposition transcripts unsealed and denies the motion
to order the PPV contracts unsealed.
Dated: February 1, 2017
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge
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