Washington v. Boudreau et al
Filing
467
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable John F. Kness on 1/13/2023. Mailed notice(ef, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
WAYNE WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
KENNETH BOUDREAU, JOHN
HALLORAN, BERNARD RYAN,
ROBERT LENIHAN, JOHN
POLUSZNY, MICHAEL CLANCY,
JOHN BALL, JAMES O’BRIEN,
GERALD CARROLL, ELIZABETH
SHINN, JOHN STOUT, UNKNOWN
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER(S), and
CITY OF CHICAGO,
No. 16-cv-01893
Judge John F. Kness
Defendants.
TYRONE HOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, KENNETH
BOUDREAU, JOHN HALLORAN,
BERNARD RYAN, ROBERT
LENIHAN, JAMES O’BRIEN,
GERALD CARROLL, and UNKNOWN
EMPLOYEES OF THE CITY OF
CHICAGO,
Defendants.
No. 16-cv-01970
Judge John F. Kness
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case arises out of the 1993 murder of Marshall Morgan Jr. and the ensuing
prosecution of Plaintiffs Tyrone Hood and Wayne Washington for that murder. Hood
and Washington spent 22 years and 12 years, respectively, incarcerated for Morgan
Jr.’s murder, but both convictions were eventually vacated. Each of the individual
Defendants in this case—Chicago Police Department officers Kenneth Boudreau,
John Halloran, Bernard Ryan, Robert Lenihan, James O’Brien, and Gerald Carroll
(the “Defendant Officers”)—played a role in the investigation that led to Hood and
Washington’s convictions. After Hood and Washington were released from prison,
they brought the present suits1 against the Defendant Officers and the City of
Chicago alleging that the investigation and municipal policies that led to their
wrongful convictions were unconstitutionally flawed and justify a significant
damages award.
Presently before the Court are Defendants’ collective motions to bifurcate for
trial Plaintiffs’ claims against the Defendant Officers from their Monell claims
against Defendant the City of Chicago (Dkt. 578; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 362), as well as
Defendants’ collective motions to consolidate for trial the Hood and Washington cases
(Dkt. 593; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 375). For the reasons that follow:
Plaintiff Washington filed suit on February 2, 2016. (See Washington v. Boudreau, No.
16-cv-01893, Dkt. 1.) Plaintiff Hood filed suit on February 5, 2016. (See Hood v. City of
Chicago, No. 16-cv-01970, Dkt. 1.) Although not consolidated, the cases were deemed related
on August 30, 2017. (See Washington, No. 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 98.) Unless otherwise noted, all
docket citations in this opinion are to Hood v. City of Chicago, No. 16-cv-01970.
1
2
I.
Defendants’ motions to bifurcate for trial Plaintiffs’ claims against the
Defendant Officers from their Monell claims against the City of Chicago (Dkt.
578; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 362) are granted.
Defendants’ motions to consolidate for trial the Hood and Washington cases
(Dkt. 593; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 375) are granted.
BACKGROUND
As the Court explained in its September 30, 2022 opinion (Dkt. 589) that
resolved various substantive motions, Hood and Washington spent years in prison
after being convicted of murdering Marshall Morgan Jr. Those convictions were
vacated after the State of Illinois moved successfully to dismiss both cases; Hood was
later granted a Certificate of Innocence (“COI”). (Dkt. 589 at 4–13.) Of relevance to
this Opinion, Defendants first moved to bifurcate for trial Hood and Washington’s
claims against the Defendant Officers from their Monell claims against Defendant
City of Chicago. (Dkt. 578; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 362.) Both Hood and Washington oppose
Defendants’ motion to bifurcate. (Dkt. 587; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 370.) Defendants then
moved to consolidate for trial the Hood and Washington cases—which are separate
actions even though the subject matter of both cases is closely related. (Dkt. 593; 16cv-01893, Dkt. 375.) Hood filed a written opposition (Dkt. 595); Washington did not.
On November 18, 2022, the Court held oral argument on both motions. (Dkt. 619.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs both consolidation of
cases and bifurcation of claims. First, “[i]f actions before the court involve a common
question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
42(a)(2). Courts have “broad discretion” to consolidate these types of cases. See Am.
3
Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Fair (Inc.), 35 F.R.D. 236, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (citing United
States v. Knauer, 149 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1945), aff’d 328 U.S. 654 (1946)). But it
is an abuse of discretion to consolidate cases which, although they concern the same
type of claims, nevertheless have different allegations and time periods. See King v.
General Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 1992).
Second, “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize,
the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims,
crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). As the
Seventh Circuit has held, if even “one of these criteria is met, the district court may
order bifurcation as long as doing so will not prejudice the non-moving party or violate
the Seventh Amendment.” Chlopek v. Federal Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir.
2007); see also Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1121 (7th
Cir. 1999) (courts “must be satisfied that the decision to bifurcate does not unfairly
prejudice the non-moving party.”). Whether to bifurcate claims is “committed to the
discretion of the district court” and “made on a case by case basis.” Real v. Bunn-OMatic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 620 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion to Consolidate Cases for Trial
1.
The Parties’ Arguments
Defendants—jointly—contend that the trials in Hood and Washington should
be consolidated, even if (as they separately contend) the claims against the City of
Chicago should be tried separately after trial of the claims against the individual
Defendants is completed. Defendants start by referring to “the nearly identical
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Complaints [that were] filed within one day of each other.” (Dkt. 593 at 6.) Defendants
emphasize that both lawsuits named the same Chicago police officers and the City of
Chicago, and many sections of the complaints are virtually identical. (Id.) Both cases
saw much overlap in discovery, and Hood and Washington responded jointly to
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (Id. at 7–8; see Dkt. 535.) Defendants
cite the “efficiency advantages of joint proceedings,” including “consistent rulings on
Daubert and summary judgment motions; calling the common witnesses to testify
only once; impaneling one jury; consistent jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and
trial conditions; no arguments regarding issue preclusion; and no need to schedule
two or more multi-week civil trials.” (Dkt. 593 at 10 (citing Gonzalez v. City of
Chicago, 2014 WL 8272288, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2014).)
Defendants also argue that “securing deposition testimony from witnesses
about a crime that occurred over 25 years ago was challenging. Calling these
witnesses at one trial will likely be just as challenging. Calling them to testify at more
than one trial to present duplicative evidence is simply impractical” and burdensome.
(Dkt. 593 at 11.) Defendants contend that separate trials are not required merely
because Hood received a COI while Washington did not. (Id.) Along with noting that
“there is no guarantee the COI will be admitted into evidence,” id., Defendants also
quote Gonzalez to refute Hood’s argument that the juxtaposition of Hood’s COI
against Washington’s lack of one will cause harm to Hood. Defendants note that the
judge in Gonzalez explained that jury instructions would “make clear that the jury is
required to consider each claim separately, and the jury will be further instructed on
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the limitations on use of evidence of prior crimes, to the extent any such evidence is
elucidated at trial.” Gonzalez, 2014 WL 8272288, at *1. Defendants argue finally that,
because “Hood and Washington each played significant and overlapping roles in the
underlying events, and each is a necessary witness in the other’s case,” a single jury
would be in “the best position to sort out the facts and get to the truth.” (Dkt. 593 at
12.)
Hood opposes consolidation, but Washington has taken no position on the
issue. Hood contends that he “may be unfairly prejudiced if a single jury considers
this evidence [regarding a COI] in evaluating Mr. Washington’s Fifth Amendment
claim alongside Mr. Hood’s claims because Mr. Hood never gave an inculpatory
statement despite Defendants’ attempts to do so.” (Dkt. 595 at 1.) Hood concedes that
“there are undoubtedly efficiency-related reasons to try the claims together” (id. at
2), but he argues that Defendants “should not be permitted to orchestrate their
perfect world by having it both ways” by also bifurcating Hood and Washington’s
Officer claims from their Monell claims. (Id. at 2–3.) Hood contends that Defendants,
in seeking the bifurcation of claims, advocate for “duplication and inefficiency that
create much more net trial length than would be the case if the claims were tried
together.” (Id. at 3.)
2.
Analysis: Consolidation Is Warranted
A district court possesses “broad discretion” in deciding whether to consolidate
cases for trial. See Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 35 F.R.D. at 237. But the exercise of
that discretion must, of course, bear in mind both the factors for and against
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consolidation. Considering those factors here, the Court first finds that Hood and
Washington “involve a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2). Both
cases are rooted in the murder of Marshall Morgan Jr. in May 1993. (Dkt. 558 ¶ 8.)
Both Hood and Washington were taken to the same police detention facilities for
questioning. (Id. ¶¶ 51–54, 68–70.) Both Hood and Washington claim allege they were
subjected to the same types of police misconduct that led to their indictments. (See
Dkt. 589 at 5–12.) Both Hood and Washington were sentenced in 1996 for the murder
of Mr. Morgan,2 but the State of Illinois successfully moved to vacate their convictions
in February 2015. (Id. ¶ 244.) Both Hood and Washington sued the City of Chicago
and the Officers in February 2016, filing their separate suits only three days apart.
(Dkt. 1; No. 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 1.) Both Hood and Washington alleged that the City of
Chicago is liable because “the actions of all the individual Defendant Officers were
undertaken pursuant to policies and practices” and that those policies and practices
“were ratified by policymakers for the City of Chicago with final policymaking
authority.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 112; No. 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 1 ¶ 118.) Hood and Washington thus
possess such similarities as to have common questions of both law and fact, rendering
the actions eligible for consolidation under Rule 42. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2).
Eligibility for consolidation, however, does not mean that consolidation is
required. Balancing the relevant factors, the Court finds that consolidation of both
Hood was found guilty in May 1996 and sentenced to 75 years in prison. (Dkt. 558 ¶
238.) Washington’s first trial resulted in a hung jury. (Id. ¶ 240.) But between Washington’s
first trial and the commencement of his second, Hood was sentenced. (Id. ¶ 241.) After seeing
the 75-year sentence that Hood received, Washington “was scared and decided to plead to
first degree murder” rather than risk a conviction in his second trial. (Id.) Washington was
sentenced to 25 years in prison. (Id.)
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cases for trial is warranted.3 Efficiency interests provide the first, and strongest, basis
for consolidation and outweigh any possible prejudice to Hood. These efficiency
benefits including “calling the common witnesses to testify only once; impaneling one
jury; consistent jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and trial conditions; [and] no
arguments regarding issue preclusion[.]” Gonzalez, 2014 WL 8272288, at *1. Given
the considerable overlap in facts between Hood and Washington, there are significant
benefits to be gained by scheduling one trial4 to address Hood and Washington’s
claims against the Defendant Officers (who overlap both cases).
Hood’s concerns over the potential prejudice of a joint trial with Washington
are not trivial, but neither do they compel the Court to hold separate trials and lose
the efficiency gains outlined above. It is true that Hood has received a COI and
Washington has not (Dkt. 595 at 1), but given that their complaints are virtually
identical and are brought against the same Defendants, jury instructions can
effectively limit that potential prejudice. See Gonzalez, 2014 WL 8272288, at *1 (“jury
instructions will make clear that the jury is required to consider each claim
separately, and the jury will be further instructed on the limitations on use of
Consolidating Hood and Washington does not create the problem that the Seventh
Circuit identified in King v. General Elec. Co. In that case, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that the district court “abused its discretion” when ordering consolidation because of the
“different allegations and time frames” between plaintiffs. 960 F.2d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 1992).
But Hood and Washington’s factual and legal backgrounds are much more similar than the
circumstances in King. Unlike the King plaintiffs who, when suing for wrongful termination,
differed in whether to allege a company-wide discriminatory policy or practice and in which
time periods they alleged the wrongful conduct occurred, id., Hood and Washington pleaded
virtually identical complaints seeking relief from the same police conduct and wrongful
convictions.
3
Bifurcation of claims (as opposed to consolidation of trials) is addressed in Section III.B.2
below.
4
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evidence of prior crimes, to the extent any such evidence is elucidated at trial”); see
also Serrano v. Guevara, No. 17 CV 2869, Montanez v. Guevara, No. 17 CV 4560 (N.D.
Ill. June 23, 2021) (order granting consolidation in cases with similar facts to Hood
and Washington). Accordingly, consolidating Hood and Washington for trial will not
prejudice Hood to the point of outweighing the clear efficiency benefits that
consolidation brings.
For these reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motions (Dkt. 593; 16-cv01893, Dkt. 375) to consolidate Hood and Washington for trial.
B.
Motion to Bifurcate Claims
1.
The Parties’ Arguments
Defendants—again acting jointly—ask the Court to bifurcate for trial Hood
and Washington’s claims against the Defendant Officers from their Monell claims
against Defendant City of Chicago. (Dkt. 578; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 362.) Defendants
make three main arguments: (1) bifurcation prevents prejudice to all Defendants
(Dkt. 578 at 3–9); (2) the City of Chicago’s liability depends on the Officers’ liability
(Id. at 9–12); and (3) bifurcation promotes judicial efficiency (Id. at 12–15).
Defendants first contend that a joint trial that includes Hood and Washington’s
Monell claims would prejudice the Defendant Officers because it might include
evidence of police conduct from the “Jon Burge era” that “is entirely unrelated to the
conduct of Defendant Officers or the period of time relevant to the case against them.”
(Id. at 4.) Defendants contend that Hood and Washington, through their proposed
expert, Timothy Longo, will “seek to use Monell to raise the specter of Burge so that
Defendant Officers will be found liable by association.” (Id. at 5); see Dollard v.
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Whisenand, 946 F.3d 342, 359 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he concept of guilt by association
is repugnant to our notion of elemental justice and fair play.”). Defendants also argue
that bifurcating Hood and Washington’s Monell claims is necessary to avoid prejudice
against the City of Chicago, in that, if all claims are tried together, jurors might
“misunderstand Monell liability and [impermissibly] treat it as nothing more than
vicarious liability.” (Dkt. 578 at 9.)
Defendants also argue that bifurcation is appropriate because the City of
Chicago’s liability depends on (i.e., is derivative of) the liability of the Defendant
Officers. (Dkt. 578 at 9–10.) Defendants assert that, under City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, if Hood and Washington “are unsuccessful in their claims against the
individual defendants, they will no longer have a cause of action against the city.”
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); see also First Midwest Bank v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978
(7th Cir. 2021) (“A Monell plaintiff must establish that he suffered a deprivation of a
federal right before municipal fault, deliberate indifference, and causation come into
play.”). Applying that principle here, Defendants argue that Hood and Washington
must prove the Defendant Officers violated their constitutional rights before
proceeding against Defendant City of Chicago under Monell. (Dkt. 578 at 10.)
Defendants also note that, if the Defendant Officers are found liable, “the City will
consent to the entry of a judgment against it for any compensatory damages a jury
awards against the Defendant Officers, plus reasonable attorney fees, without
requiring” Hood and Washington to prove Monell liability. (Id. at 10–11.) As a result,
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“the City’s Limited Consent eliminates any concern that bifurcation will affect
Plaintiff’s recovery of compensatory damages.” (Id. at 12.)
Defendants finally argue that bifurcating Hood and Washington’s Monell
claims “will also further judicial economy” because “the significant costs and burdens
of trial and the factual and legal complexity of the Monell case against the
City . . . militate against a single trial of all claims against all defendants.” (Id.)
Defendants are concerned that “a single trial of all claims against all Defendants will
require the parties to simultaneously put on separate cases based on categorically
different facts and legal theories,” for which a jury will need to sort through the
“massive amount of evidence.” (Id. at 13.) Defendants assert that it would be more
efficient to have the claims against the Defendant Officers tried first, and then, only
if necessary, to try the Monell claims against the City of Chicago. (Id. at 13–15.)
Hood and Washington oppose bifurcation of the Monell claims. They first argue
that Heller does not compel bifurcation; rather, an exception to the general rule that
municipal liability is contingent upon officer liability—arising out of the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Department—should govern.
(Dkt. 587 at 1.) In Thomas, the Seventh Circuit held that “a municipality can be held
liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such a finding would create
an inconsistent verdict.” 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Swanigan v. City
of Chicago, 775 F.3d 953, 962 (7th Cir. 2015) (“a verdict in favor of individual
defendants would not necessarily be inconsistent with a plaintiff’s verdict on a
factually distinct Monell claim”). Applying Thomas, Hood and Washington argue that
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“it is entirely possible for a jury to reach consistent verdicts finding Individual
Defendants are not liable for a Brady violation but nevertheless holds the City’s filekeeping policies and practices responsible for the failure to disclose exculpatory
and/or impeachment to Plaintiffs.” (Dkt. 587 at 1.) According to Hood and
Washington, Heller can be distinguished because that decision involved facts where
“municipal liability [wa]s premised on a particular officer’s use of force,” where Hood
and Washington involve facts that could show a municipal policy caused a
constitutional deprivation independent of any need also to establish “misconduct by
a particular officer.” (Id. at 9.)
Hood and Washington further argue that “any potential risk” of prejudice
against Defendants from “Jon Burge era” evidence can be “adequately addressed
through limiting instructions and stipulations.” (Id. at 2.) Hood and Washington
contend that omitting Commander Burge’s name would suffice to prevent unfair
prejudice to Defendants. (Id. at 6–7 (quoting McLaughlin v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
30 F.3d 861, 870–71 (7th Cir. 1994) (“limiting instructions are taken very seriously
in this Circuit as a tool for reducing or eliminating prejudice, and it has long been the
law that juries are presumed to follow them.”).) They assert that the Court “can
fashion limiting instructions to ensure that the jury considers the proper evidence for
the proper purpose.” (Dkt. 587 at 7.) And to the extent Defendants Officers allege
potential prejudice from “prior bad acts,” Hood and Washington contend that the
admissibility of such evidence—which they insist is not unfairly prejudicial in any
12
event—is “not uniquely a Monell issue” and “should not be factored in favor of
bifurcation.” (Id. at 8.)
Hood and Washington finally contend that bifurcation will prejudice them “as
the non-moving part[ies].” Chlopek, 499 F.3d at 700; Houseman, 171 F.3d at 1121.
Their Monell claims involve “important social issues” that they should be allowed to
try before a jury. (Id. at 10–11.) Hood and Washington also argue that they will suffer
prejudice “if they have to expend additional resources to conduct two separate trials”
when much of the evidence and the witnesses for their Monell claim “overlaps with
evidence relevant to his underlying claim.” (Id. at 12.)
2.
Analysis: Bifurcation Is Warranted
A district court has broad discretion to bifurcate claims for trial. Real, 195
F.R.D. at 620 (whether to bifurcate claims is “committed to the discretion of the
district court” and “made on a case by case basis”). For several reasons, the Court
finds that bifurcating Hood and Washington’s Monell claims is appropriate.
As a threshold matter, the Court rejects Hood’s argument that Defendants
“should not be permitted to orchestrate their perfect world by having it both ways”
by simultaneously seeking consolidation of both cases yet also seeking bifurcation of
claims. (Dkt. 595 at 2–3.) To be sure, there is a loss of judicial efficiency inherent in
bifurcating the Monell claims because it requires a separate trial; that fact at least
facially cuts against allowing consolidation while bifurcating claims. Consolidation
and bifurcation, however, present distinct concerns and require separate analyses.
Put another way, that consolidation of cases may be warranted does not necessarily
13
mean, ipso facto, that the bifurcation of claims presented in those consolidated cases
is necessarily precluded; Hood’s goose-and-gander contention fails fully to appreciate
that distinction. Accordingly, the Court does not consider itself bound to deny
Defendants’ bifurcation request merely to ensure superficial consistency with its
ruling on consolidation.
On the merits, the risk of unfair prejudice to Defendants justifies bifurcation
of Hood and Washington’s Monell claims. Hood and Washington seek to admit
decades of evidence concerning the established misconduct of Burge and his
associates. It is possible, perhaps probable, that a jury would, by association,
impermissibly tag the Defendant Officers with accountability for the notorious and
lurid “Burge era” after having been presented with evidence to that effect. See Dollard
v. Whisenand, 946 F.3d 342, 359 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he concept of guilt by association
is repugnant to our notion of elemental justice and fair play.”).
Hood and Washington counter this concern by appealing to the availability of
limiting instructions and stipulations. Although it is beyond debate that “limiting
instructions are taken very seriously in this Circuit as a tool for reducing or
eliminating prejudice, and it has long been the law that juries are presumed to follow
them” (Dkt. 587 at 7 (citing McLaughlin, 30 F.3d at 870–71; United States v. Gomez,
763 F.3d 845, 860–61 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“Lay people are capable of
understanding the foundational principle in our system of justice that ‘we try cases,
rather than persons.’ ”) (cleaned up))), there are limits to that rule. See, e.g., United
States v. Chaparro, 956 F.3d 462, 482 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that although the usual
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view is that “limiting instructions cure everything,” the Seventh Circuit has “made
clear” that “this presumption is rebuttable”) (citing Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v.
Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815, 834 (7th Cir. 2016)). This case presents
one of those perhaps-rare occasions where, in the Court’s view, limiting instructions
and stipulations are insufficient to ameliorate the potential prejudice to Defendants.5
More broadly, it bears emphasis that the present decision is not whether to admit
Burge-era evidence: it is whether Hood and Washington’s Monell claims should be
heard by the same jury that hears the claims against the Defendant Officers. Hood
and Washington will still get their day in court on the Monell claims.
Under Rule 42(b), the Court may order bifurcation of claims “[f]or convenience,
to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (emphasis
added); see also Chlopek v. Federal Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[i]f
one of these criteria is met, the district court may order bifurcation as long as doing
so will not prejudice the non-moving party or violate the Seventh Amendment.”). In
view of the finding that bifurcation is warranted to avoid prejudice to Defendants,
the Court is not obligated to address convenience or expedition. But addressing those
considerations briefly, the Court finds that both Plaintiffs and Defendants have
persuasive arguments concerning convenience and expedition. For example,
Omitting Commander Burge’s name to refer only to a “Chicago police commander” or
some similar anonymous formulation, as Plaintiffs suggest, would still fail sufficiently to
ameliorate the potential prejudice to the Defendant Officers. Given the notoriety of the
Burge-related evidence, there is a significant risk the average juror in this District and
Division would put two-and-two together and understand that the evidence and references
pertained to Burge. Conversely, bifurcating Plaintiffs’ Monell claims properly maintains the
focus of the case on the Defendant Officers and thus is the safer course.
5
15
bifurcation allows for a more efficient against the Defendant Officers, but it also
opens the possibility of a second trial against the City of Chicago. But even if
convenience or expedition entirely favored Hood and Washington, the Court would
still find that the avoidance of prejudice is the overriding concern and justifies
bifurcation.
Bifurcation cannot be allowed if it results in unfair prejudice to Hood and
Washington as the nonmoving parties. Houseman, 171 F.3d at 1121. There is,
however, no unfair prejudice apparent to the Court. Hood and Washington contend
that their apparent social goals in bringing the Monell claims should weigh heavily
(Dkt. 587 at 10–11), but those interests must be balanced against the Defendant
Officers’ competing interests. Hood and Washington seek to thrust “this important
issue into the public light and [to] allow a cross-section of our society to consider this
evidence” (id. at 11), but nothing in today’s decision will frustrate that goal. Hood and
Washington will still have the opportunity for a forum to present their Monell
evidence; that forum will simply consist of a second, later trial. And although
bifurcation might require Hood and Washington to “expend additional resources to
conduct two separate trials” when much of the evidence and the witnesses for Hood
and Washington’s Monell claim “overlaps with evidence relevant to his underlying
claims” (id.), that cost is both justified for the reasons provided above and, to a lesser
extent, incidental to Hood and Washington’s choice to bring Monell claims in this
action.
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Finally, Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree whether the City of Chicago’s
liability depends on the Defendant Officers’ liability. Although determining whether
Heller or Thomas provides the applicable rule might have an effect on the bifurcation
analysis, the effect is secondary to the considerations outlined earlier. It remains,
moreover, that the rule of Thomas concerned the question of law whether a
municipality could ever be held liable under Monell when individual defendants were
found not liable for the underlying episode—not whether that liability should be
established in a single trial or separately. See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 305 (a
municipality “can be held liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless
such a finding would create an inconsistent verdict.”) (emphasis in original). In any
event, the Heller-or-Thomas issue can be revisited after the Defendant Officers’
potential liability is resolved at the first trial.
For these reasons, Defendants’ motions to bifurcate for trial Hood and
Washington’s claims against the Defendant Officers from their Monell claims against
Defendant City of Chicago (Dkt. 578; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 362) are granted.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motions to consolidate for trial the Hood and Washington cases
(Dkt. 593; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 375) are granted. Defendants’ motions to bifurcate for
trial Plaintiffs’ claims against the Defendant Officers from their Monell claims
against the City of Chicago (Dkt. 578; 16-cv-01893, Dkt. 362) are granted.
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SO ORDERED in Nos. 16-cv-01893 and 16-cv-01970.
Date: January 13, 2023
JOHN F. KNESS
United States District Judge
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