Andersen v. City of Chicago et al

Filing 90

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 12/14/2016. City of Chicago's Motion to bifurcate and stay discovery on Andersen's Monell claim 74 is granted. Mailed notice(lk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
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DANIEL ANDERSEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 16 C 1963
Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Daniel Andersen filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Defendants City of Chicago (“City”) and a number of Defendant Officers1 arising out of
his wrongful conviction and incarceration. Specifically, Andersen sues the Defendant Officers
for violating his constitutional rights by allegedly coercing his false confession, fabricating false
evidence, and concealing exculpatory evidence. He also sues the City alleging that its police
department’s policies and practices render it liable for his wrongful conviction and injuries
pursuant to Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The City
now moves to bifurcate and stay discovery on Andersen’s Monell claim. For the reasons set
forth below, the Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery on Plaintiff’s Monell Claim [74] is
granted.

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The Defendant Officers are James Bernarkiewicz, Richard Bedran, Craig Cegielski, Dan Fitzgerald, John Herman,
James Higgins, Daniel McWeeny, Ted Melko, Paul Nielsen, John Olson, L. Pawlowski, N. Rajewski, Michael
Riley, Richard Rochowicz, and any unknown employees of the City. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.)

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BACKGROUND
In 1982, Andersen was wrongfully convicted for the murder and attempted rape of Cathy
Trunko in Chicago. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 1.) In 2014, Andersen was exonerated through DNA
evidence that conclusively excluded him as the assailant. (Id. at ¶ 3.)
The relevant facts of the crime and subsequent investigation and conviction are that on
January 19, 1980, Trunko was found dead – she was stabbed three times – in front of 4938 South
Paulina Street in Chicago. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.) A few days after the crime, the Defendant Officers
recovered a knife and an Old Style beer bottle that was found near the location of the murder.
(Id. at ¶¶ 19-24.) Andersen, who was nineteen years old at the time, was aware of the crime
because he knew Trunko from the neighborhood, but was not involved in any aspect of the
crime. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 26.) On January 24, five days after the murder, Andersen went out drinking
to celebrate his friend Norman Venegas’s birthday. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Andersen was sleep-deprived
that night because he had not gotten enough sleep and was also taking Activid, a prescription
drug that, when combined with alcohol, could cause cognitive impairments. (Id. at ¶ 30.)
Andersen and Venegas went to the Red Mist Tavern and drank beer and shots until Venegas left,
driving Andersen’s car to Andersen’s home because Andersen was too drunk to drive himself.
(Id. at ¶ 31.) Andersen stayed at the tavern, eventually getting a ride home from another friend.
(Id.) Andersen’s mother, who was concerned that he was out drinking, called Defendant Riley,
the neighborhood police officer, to bring Andersen home. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
Shortly after the phone call, Defendant Officers Bednarkiewicz and Nielsen pulled
Venegas over, who was driving Andersen’s car, and began to question him about the Trunko
murder. After speaking with Venegas, who stated that he knew nothing about the murder,
Bednarkiewicz, Nielsen, and Venegas went to Andersen’s home, arriving there at the same time

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as Andersen. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-35.) Upon seeing Andersen, Bednarkiewicz and Nielsen grabbed
Andersen and began to search him. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Venegas allegedly heard one of the officers say
something to the effect of “[t]hat's the guy. Let’s get him.” (Id.) Nielsen allegedly twisted
Andersen’s arm and pressed him against the hood of the car for several minutes while he and
Bednarkiewicz questioned Andersen about the murder.

(Id. at ¶¶ 36-37.)

Bednarkiewicz

pressured and eventually succeeded in having Andersen’s mother sign a disorderly conduct
complaint against Andersen.

Andersen’s mother allegedly heard one of the officers say

“[y]ou’re the guy that did it,” to Andersen after they arrested him. (Id. at ¶ 38.)
At approximately 2 A.M. on January 24, Bednarkiewicz and Nielsen brought Andersen to
the Ninth District Police Station. The Defendants knew that Andersen was heavily intoxicated,
were allegedly physically violent with him, handcuffed him to a locker, and denied his requests
for water.

(Id. at ¶¶ 40-41.)

Defendant Riley saw Andersen and observed that he was

intoxicated, upset, and not talking rationally, but did not intervene even though Riley allegedly
knew that officers were intending on interrogating Andersen. (Id. at ¶ 42.) Although Andersen
did not make any inculpatory statements to them, Bednarkiewicz and Nielsen allegedly
fabricated a statement stating that Andersen spontaneously and voluntarily confessed to stabbing
Trunko three times (once in her right chest and twice in her left chest) and further confessed to
throwing the knife away in the area that the Officers found it. (Id. at ¶ 43.) Following the
fabrication of the statement, Bednarkiewicz and Nielsen transferred Andersen to Area 3
Homicide for further investigation. Upon arriving at Area 3, the Defendants began to threaten
and beat Andersen, causing bruising on his face and a large cut on his forehead. (Id. at ¶ 46.)
After an allegedly lengthy beating, the Defendant Officers began to feed Andersen facts that
would implicate him in the Trunko murder. Andersen was in police custody for approximately

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sixteen hours, during which time he was denied access to a bathroom, forced to urinate in a
trashcan, and denied food and water before he agreed to give a confession. (Id. at ¶¶ 47-49.)
In coercing Andersen’s false statement, the Defendants convinced Andersen that they
were seeking his assistance in the murder investigation and that they needed him to get into the
mindset of the killer. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-51.) The Defendants allegedly (1) had Andersen draw a map
of the neighborhood marking specific locations, (2) had him write notes on the map such as
“[h]ad to do what I had to do,” and (3) fed him information regarding the knife and a pair of
gloves. (Id. at ¶¶ 51-55.) They also created a narrative in which Andersen, as the attacker,
wanted to have sex with Trunko and killed her when she refused.

After fabricating the

statement, Higgins forced Andersen to adopt the story by threatening to return him to the officers
who had previously beaten him and offering to release him if he confessed. (Id. at ¶ 56.)
Higgins also offered to get Andersen a job at Ford Motors, Andersen’s previous employer, if
Andersen confessed to the crime.

By the end of the sixteen-hour period, Andersen was

convinced that Defendant Higgins was his “friend,” “buddy,” and “attorney.” (Id. at ¶¶ 60-61
(Andersen allegedly telling his parents that “Higgins is my friend, my buddy” and “Higgins told
me I don’t need an attorney. That he is my attorney.”).)
In addition to fabricating Andersen’s statement, the Defendants allegedly also destroyed
exculpatory evidence. Specifically, on January 21, Defendants Melko and Rajewski lifted two
fingerprints from the Old Style beer bottle that was connected the homicide.

They

communicated the results of the fingerprint analysis to Defendants Higgins and Cegielski at Area
3. (Id. at ¶¶ 69-71.) Andersen alleges, on information and belief, that the fingerprint contained
“exculpatory or potentially exculpatory evidence” that could have corroborated the involvement
of an alternate, viable suspect, and could have excluded him as the perpetrator. (Id. at ¶ 70.)

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Andersen further alleges that instead of turning over the exculpatory evidence, as required by
Chicago Police Department rules, the Defendants destroyed or caused the destruction of the
evidence. (Id. at ¶¶ 72-73.) Finally, Andersen alleges that the City’s policies and practice
permits its officers to coerce false confessions, see id. at ¶¶ 74-86, and maintain “street files” –
allegedly undisclosed files that are maintained by the police officers and that contain information
about defendants but are not disclosed to the defense – that led to Andersen being denied access
to exculpatory information. (See id. at ¶¶ 87-93.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 42(b), the Court has considerable discretion to decide claims or issues in
separate trials “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 42(b); see Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th Cir. 2000). Bifurcation may
be appropriate if one or more of the Rule 42(b) criteria is met as long as bifurcation will not
prejudice the non-moving party or violate the Seventh Amendment, “which guarantees a jury
trial for civil cases in federal court.” See Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 365 (7th Cir.
2000); Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007).
“Bifurcation may be appropriate if ‘the separation would prevent prejudice to a party or
promote judicial economy.’” See, e.g., Horton v. City of Chicago, No. 13-CV-6865, 2016 WL
316878, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2016) (citing Chlopek, 499 F.3d at 700). Such motions are “now
commonplace and ‘[c]ourts in our district have both granted and denied similar motions…[t]hus
there is a going body of precedent in this district for both granting and denying bifurcation in §
1983 cases.’” See, e.g., Allison v. Gallagher, No. 10 C 6887, 2012 WL 4760863, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 5, 2012) (citations omitted). Finally, “Monell claims are most often bifurcated in this

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district when a case is rooted in allegations of excessive force.” See, e.g., Horton, 2016 WL
316878, at *2 (quoting Carr v. City of N. Chicago, 908 F. Supp. 2d 926, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2012)).
DISCUSSION
The City claims that bifurcation of the Monell claim2 is warranted because: (1) before
Andersen can prevail on his Monell claim, he must first succeed in his actions against the
individual Defendants for violating his constitutional rights; (2) bifurcation best serves the
interests of litigation and judicial economy; and (3) bifurcation will assist in eliminating the risk
of unfair prejudice against the parties. (See Dkt. No. 67.)
I.

Split or Inconsistent Verdicts
The City first argues that bifurcation is appropriate because Andersen must succeed in his

action against the individual Defendants before he can obtain a judgment against the City
pursuant his Monell claim. (Id. at 3.) As an initial point, to the extent that the City argues that
that the individual officers must always be found liable before Monell liability can be established
against a municipality, that argument is rejected because “a municipality can be held liable under
Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such a finding would create an inconsistent
verdict.” Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing City of
Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798–99 (1986)) (emphasis in original).

Rather, “to

determine whether the [City]'s liability is dependent on its officers, we look to the nature of the
constitutional violation, the theory of municipal liability, and the defenses set forth.” Id.; see
also, e.g., Horton, 2016 WL 316878, at *4.
2

Under Monell, to establish liability against the City, Andersen must show that: (1) he suffered a deprivation of a
federal right; (2) as a result of either an express municipal policy, widespread custom, or deliberate act of a decisionmaker; which (3) was the proximate cause of his injury. See Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 416 F.3d 531,
535 (7th Cir. 2005); Board of County Com’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (“[I]t is not
enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must
also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury
alleged.”).

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Andersen’s Monell claim, made in paragraphs 74 to 93 of his Complaint, relate
specifically to the City’s policy and practice of coercing false confessions through psychological
and physical torture, and police officers’ use of “street files.” The City argues that both theories
of municipal liability – (1) that the City’s policies caused the Defendant Officers to coerce a false
confession from Andersen and (2) the City’s policies were the moving force behind the
Defendant Officers’ keeping street files that were then not disclosed to the defense – first require
a jury to find that the Officers did in fact violate Andersen’s constitutional rights. Addressing
first the Monell claim premised on the coercion of a false confession, it is clear that “fabricating
a confession and coercing Plaintiff into making that confession, depends on the individual
officers' actions.” See, e.g., Harris v. City of Chicago, No. 14-CV-4391, 2016 WL 3261522, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2016) (citing Taylor v. Kachiroubas, 2013 WL 6050492, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 15, 2013) (“Here, however, the actions of the individual officers in collecting and
fabricating evidence against [plaintiffs] are the source of the alleged harm to the plaintiffs, and
any ‘policy’ exerted harm through those actions, not independently of them.”)). Even if the City
had a policy or practice of permitting its officers’ to coerce false confessions through force, the
harm caused by the policy could only manifest itself through the officers’ actions. Although
Andersen does assert that “[t]here are several ways that a jury could consistently find that the
City is liable but its officers were not,” see Dkt. No. 70 at 9, none of his specific arguments relate
to the coerced confession claim. (See Dkt. No. 74 at 3 (City’s Reply noting “[i]ndeed, Plaintiff’s
Response does not even try to make those arguments in relation to his practice based Monell
claim about coercing false confessions.”).)
The same conclusion applies to the street files allegation because any harm caused by an
alleged street files policy or practice could only manifest itself through the Defendant Officers

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actually maintaining such files, and therefore a finding of municipal liability is predicated on a
finding first that the Officers themselves were liable. See, e.g., Veal v. Kachiroubas, No. 12 C
8342, 2014 WL 321708, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2014) (“It is true that a municipality can be held
liable for failure to train and supervise its employees in the appropriate handling of exculpatory
evidence, as Veal notes….But that does not mean that could occur without officer liability in
Veal's case.”) (citation omitted). In response, Andersen first contends that the Officers’ alleged
qualified immunity defense creates the possibility that the Officers could be found not liable
while the City could be found liable. (See Dkt. No. 70 at 9.) However, whether the Officers can
be found liable is beside the point; rather, the issue is “whether the individual defendants
committed a constitutional violation that is a prerequisite for” the City’s liability. See, e.g.,
Taylor, 2013 WL 6050492, at *4. Moreover, the fact that the City has consented to entry of
judgment against itself in the event that the Defendant Officers are found to have violated
Andersen’s constitutional rights undermines Andersen’s position. See, e.g., Horton, 2016 WL
316878, at *4; (see Dkt. No. 67-4).
Second, Andersen seeks to distinguish Veal and Taylor on the ground that the Chicago
Police Department’s history of unconstitutional policies regarding custodial interrogations and
street files distinguish it from the police departments in those cases. (Dkt. No. 70 at 9-10.) Yet,
Andersen fails to explain how an alleged history of unconstitutional policies is in any way
relevant to whether municipal liability is dependent upon officer liability here.

Finally,

Andersen contends that a jury could consistently find only the unknown individual defendants
liable, which would then cause a new round of litigation on the Monell claim. Not only is this
contention speculative at best, other courts in this district have granted motions to bifurcate

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where such a possibility existed. See, e.g., Castillo v. City of Chicago, No. 11 C 7359, 2012 WL
1658350, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012); Veal, 2014 WL 321708, at *1.
As such, because there is no way that a jury could consistently find the City liable
without first finding the Defendant Officers liable, this factor weighs heavily in favor of
bifurcation.
II.

Economy of Judicial Resources
The City next contends that bifurcation would best serve the interests of the litigation and

judicial economy. Bifurcation can, especially in instances where municipal liability is dependent
on individual liability as here, present a number of benefits including the bypassing of significant
discovery (and associated discovery complications) related to the municipality’s policies and
practices and a shorter trial. See, e.g., Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F. Supp. 2d 893, 895
(N.D. Ill. 2000). The City argues that allowing the Monell claims to proceed will lead to both
costly fact discovery – specifically, the City points to the fact that Andersen issued fifty-five
discovery requests that are broadly worded and relate in part to all documents related to any
training for officers, see Dkt. No. 67 at 8 – and expert discovery, reports, and subsequent
depositions. (Id.) Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360 (7th Cir. 2000) proves instructive. In that
case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to bifurcate Treece’s Monell claim
from her Section 1983 claim alleging malicious prosecution in part because the City agreed to
entry of judgment against itself if Defendant Hochstetler was found liable. Id. at 361. The Court
held that bifurcation was proper given the City’s agreement to enter judgment against itself, and
because bifurcation would avoid “the needless costs and burdens of a second trial, as well as, but
not limited to, the waste of valuable time and resources of the court, and the inconveniencing of
the witnesses.” Id. at 365. The Court further noted that bifurcation was appropriate because the

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municipality's lability was a “derivate of Hochstetler’s liability.” Id. Those are the same
circumstances before this Court. Here, the City has already agreed to “entry of judgment against
it for the amount of damage assessed by the trier of fact if Plaintiff can establish a violation of
his constitutional rights,” see Dkt. No. 74 at 15, and, as discussed above, the City’s liability is a
derivative of the individual officers’ liability.3 See also, e.g., Carr, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 934
(granting bifurcation on similar grounds).
Andersen counters that bifurcation is inappropriate because (1) the discovery essential to
the case against the individual officers and against the City overlaps significantly such that
bifurcation is unnecessary and (2) the amount of required discovery is much less than the City
contends because a significant portion of the relevant discovery has already been done in other
wrongful conviction cases. (Dkt. No. 70 at 6.) In terms of his overlap contention, Andersen
argues that because he intends to show that the Defendant Officers maintained a street file that
was not disclosed to the defense, he will “rely on much of the same evidence of a department3

Andersen contends that the City’s proffered “Limited Consent to Entry of Judgment” should be disregarded
because it is both procedurally and substantively flawed. Procedurally, Andersen contends that the Consent is not a
Rule 68 offer of judgment, a Rule 16 stipulation, or an otherwise permissible pleading. (Dkt. No. 70 at 13.)
However, as the City points out in its briefing, the Consent is an agreement to accept judgment if the jury finds any
individual defendant liable. (See Dkt. No. 74 at 15.) Such agreements have been considered and accepted by other
courts. See e.g., Saunders v. City of Chicago, 146 F. Supp. 3d 957, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Substantively, Andersen
first argues that the certification is insignificant because it provides that the City will indemnify the individual
officers who are found guilty, something that the City is already required to do by law. See 745 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 10/9-102 (West 2002). However, because the Consent, for example, states that the City will also pay for
attorneys’ fees and costs, the Consent “does go beyond what is required of the City under state law.” See, e.g.,
Saunders, 146 F.Supp.3d at 971. Finally, Andersen contends that the Consent would limit his ability to hold the
City accountable for its systemic practices that caused his constitutional harm. (Dkt. No. 70 at 11, 15.) While it is
certainly the case that Monell claims are in part intended to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional
deprivations, see Owen v. City of Indep., Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980), Andersen’s argument itself is a false one
because staying discovery on the Monell claims does not foreclose Andersen from pursuing his Monell claim if he is
successful against the individual officers. See, e.g., Ojeda-Beltran v. Lucio, No. 07 C 6667, 2008 WL 2782815, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2008) (“While the City's stipulation does remove the potential for any economic benefit to
Plaintiffs through pursuit of their Monell claim, our inclination is to agree with Plaintiffs that there are noneconomic benefits that can be obtained through suing the City that are unavailable through the suit of Defendant
Officers. However, we decline to engage in this debate. A necessary premise of the City's and Plaintiffs' arguments
on this topic is that bifurcation of Plaintiffs' Monell claim means that the claim cannot go forward. This is a premise
that we do not accept. If Plaintiffs are successful in their claims against Defendant Officers, they are free to pursue
their Monell claim against the City. In ordering the bifurcation and stay of Plaintiffs' Monell claim against the City,
we have simply attempted to balance party convenience, judicial economy, prejudice against Defendant Officers,
and prejudice against Plaintiffs. Bifurcation of the Monell claim is not dismissal of the Monell claim.”).

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wide street files practice that is relevant to the Monell claim.”4 (Dkt. No. 70 at 6.) However,
Andersen fails to explain how discovery related to whether there was a street file in this case
overlaps significantly with the much broader issue of whether the City had a policy or practice of
allowing street files in all of its criminal investigations and prosecutions. Even assuming that a
street file existed in this case – an assumption that the City denies throughout its briefing – the
existence of that file would constitute only a small amount of the discovery that would underlie a
department-wide Monell claim. The fact that the City has received fifty-five discovery requests
related to officer training exemplifies the discrepancy in the discovery between the individual
case and the case against the City as a whole. (See Dkt. No. 67 at 8; see also Dkt. No. 74 at 5
(City identifying litany of discovery requests related to the City’s policy and practice.).)
Andersen’s second contention, that much of the discovery necessary for the Monell claim
here has already occurred in other cases, is also flawed because the two principal cases that
Andersen points to, Kluppelberg v. Burge, No. 13 CV 3963, and Rivera v. City of Chicago, No.
12 CV 4428, took place after the police department changed its homicide investigation policies
in late 1982, and after Andersen had already been convicted in this case. (See Dkt. No. 74 at 67.) As such, based on defense counsel’s representations in its briefing here and the fact that
counsel also represents the City in Rivera, much of the discovery done in those two cases is
irrelevant to the Monell issues now before the Court. (Id. at 6.) Moreover, although Andersen
does note that Kluppelberg and Rivera also had allegations and discovery regarding department
policies about street files and coerced confessions, Andersen fails to provide any specific
examples of discovery overlap that could lead the Court to infer that much of the discovery
4

This street files contention is the only example of the allegedly “significant overlap” that Andersen provides.
Andersen entirely fails to assert, much less explain, an overlap of discovery for the coercive interrogation claim.
(See Dkt. No. 74 at 6 (City noting that “Plaintiff has no response to the minimization of complexities, burdens of
litigation and judicial economy with regard to his multifaceted coercive interrogation practice claim….The Court
should therefore weigh this factor overwhelmingly in favor of bifurcation.”).)

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necessary for the present Monell claims has already been completed. Indeed, aside from facially
referencing the Requests for Production from the Kluppelberg case, Andersen does not provide
any analysis indicating that the discovery in those cases tracks the discovery necessary here.
See, e.g., Carr, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 933 (“The Plaintiffs contend that, because much of the written
discovery is already being kept by the City pursuant to an agreement between the City and the
NAACP, the burden of producing the material should be nominal. The Plaintiffs do not provide
any evidence, however, that their discovery requests actually track that agreement or what that
agreement requires.”).
Accordingly, because the Monell claims are reliant on the individual officers’ liability
and because the City has agreed to accept liability against itself if the individual officers are
found liable, judicial economy counsels in favor of bifurcation.
III.

Prejudice to the Parties
Having found that the Rule 42(b) criteria are met, bifurcation is appropriate as long as it

will not prejudice the non-moving party or violate the Seventh Amendment.5 Treece, 213 F.3d at
365. The City argues that bifurcation would benefit, rather than prejudice, both parties because it
would allow the parties to avoid costly discovery and receive a dispositive ruling more quickly.
In addition, the City contends that Andersen will not be prejudiced without Monell discovery
because the Limited Consent provides that the City will agree to judgment against itself if the
jury finds any individual defendant liable or if, notwithstanding a finding of liability, an
individual defendant’s qualified immunity defense is successful.6 (See Dkt. No. 67 at 7-10.)
5

Because the parties do not raise any Seventh Amendment concerns in their briefing, the Court focuses on the
prejudice dispute. See Chlopek, 499 F.3d at 700.
6
The City also argues that it will suffer prejudice if the case is not bifurcated because a joint trial may cause the jury
to find the individual defendants liable based on the evidence related to the City’s conduct. (See Dkt. No. 67 at 1112.) Although the Court recognizes that there is a possibility of such prejudice, concerns of prejudice at trial are
premature at this stage. Moreover, “judicious use” of limiting instructions, motions in limine, and other tools can
limit any such prejudice, and if such steps are inadequate, the Court could assess the propriety of bifurcating the trial

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Based upon the above findings and the fact that numerous courts have found that bifurcation
allows parties to bypass burdensome and potentially unnecessary litigation and related costs,
bifurcation certainly presents benefits to both parties. See, e.g., Medina, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 895;
Moore v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 5130, 2007 WL 3037121, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2007).
In opposition to this finding, Andersen contends bifurcation would prejudice him because
it would merely delay the outcome of the litigation because the underlying claims overlap
heavily with his Monell claims. However, as the Court already held above, Andersen has failed
to show that the overlap is significant such that bifurcation would prejudice him. Similarly,
although the Court acknowledges that Andersen, as the master of his Complaint, brought his
Monell claim to hold the City accountable for its systemic practices, as discussed above, a stay of
discovery of the Monell claim does not foreclose him from pursuing his Monell claim at a later
date if he is successful against the individual officers. (See supra n. 3.)
Given that Andersen does not present any other arguments alleging prejudice and based
on the Court’s finding that bifurcation would expedite, rather than delay, a conclusion of this
litigation, bifurcation is appropriate in this case.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the City’s motion to bifurcate and stay discovery on
Andersen’s Monell claim [74] is granted.

________________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Court Judge
Northern District of Illinois
Date: 12/14/2016

at a later time. As such, prejudice at trial does not militate in favor of bifurcation at this time. See, e.g., Cadle v.
City of Chicago, No. 15 C 4725, 2015 WL 6742070, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2015).

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