Sioux Steel Company v. Prairie Land Millwright Services, Inc.
Filing
675
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER: For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion for permanent injunction 562 is granted; Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment and post-judgment interest and supplemental damages 571 is granted; Plaintiff's motio n for enhanced damages 572 is denied; Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees 574 597 is denied; Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative a new trial 593 is denied; Defendants' motion for rem ittitur or a new trial on damages in the alternative to their renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law 595 is denied; Defendants' motion to strike sealed document 609 is denied as moot; Plaintiff's motion for bill of costs 650 is granted. Defendants' motion to stay execution of judgment pending disposition of post-trial motions and appeal [640, 641] is denied. Plaintiff's motion for writ of execution 653 is denied. If Defendants wish to stay enforcement of the judgment, they must post bond in the amount of the judgment entered on today's date by September 15, 2023. In light of the ruling herein, this Court sua sponte extends its August 10, 2023 order 649 , currently set to expire on September 8, 202 3, to September 15, 2023. The Court also requires Sioux Steel to submit a revised proposed permanent injunction to the Court's proposed order box consistent with this Order by September 11, 2023. To calculate supplemental damages, by September 1 8, 2023 Defendants shall produce financial data showing their sales from October 13, 2022, through the date of the jury's verdict. Sioux Steel shall calculate the simple prejudgment interest rate and the supplemental award and by September 29, 2023 file a status report to that effect. Final judgment shall enter in Sioux Steel Company's favor. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 9/7/2023. Mailed notice (ags)
Case: 1:16-cv-02212 Document #: 675 Filed: 09/07/23 Page 1 of 30 PageID #:19484
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Sioux Steel Company,
Plaintiff,
v.
Prairie Land Mill Wright Services and
Duane Chaon,
Case No. 16-cv-2212
Judge Mary M. Rowland
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this suit Plaintiff Sioux Steel alleged that Defendants Prairie Land Mill Wright
Services and Prairie Land’s owner, Duane Chaon, infringed a patent Sioux Steel owns
related to a piece of farm equipment. This case proceeded to a jury trial in December
2022. The Court entered judgment on July 11, 2023. [636]. Before the Court are the
parties’ post-trial motions.
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion for permanent injunction [562] is
granted; Plaintiff’s motion for prejudgment and post-judgment interest and
supplemental damages [571] is granted; Plaintiff’s motion for enhanced damages
[572] is denied; Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees [574] [597] is denied. Defendants’
motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative a new trial [593] is
denied; Defendants' motion for remittitur or a new trial on damages in the alternative
to their renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law [595] is denied; Defendants’
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motion to strike sealed document [609] is denied as moot. Plaintiff’s motion for bill of
costs [650] is granted.
Defendants’ motion to stay execution of judgment pending disposition of post-trial
motions and appeal [640, 641] is denied. If Defendants wish to stay enforcement of
the judgment, they must post bond in the amount of the judgment by September 15,
2023.
Plaintiff’s motion for writ of execution [653] is denied.
BACKGROUND
The following is a summary relevant to the present motions; this opinion
otherwise assumes familiarity with the background and technology in this case. Sioux
Steel developed a piece of farm equipment—a modular storage bin sweep that uses
interconnected paddles to sweep and empty grain bins. Its patent, entitled “Modular
Storage Bin Sweep System,” was issued by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office on
March 3, 2015 (U.S. Patent No. 8,967,937 (“the Patent” or “937 Patent”)). In February
2016, Sioux Steel filed this case against Defendants alleging patent infringement. In
response Defendants denied infringement and asserted various affirmative defenses.
In September 2016, Prairie Land filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) with
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). On April 4, 2018, the PTAB issued a final
written decision, holding that Prairie Land failed to prove any claim of the ‘937 Patent
was invalid in view of the prior art of record in the IPR. Prairie Land appealed and
the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s judgment on June 15, 2020.
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At trial, only Claim 1 of the ‘937 Patent (and the only independent claim of the
patent) was at issue. 1 Trial began on December 12, 2022. After eight days, on
December 21, 2022, the jury entered a verdict, finding in favor of Sioux Steel and
against Defendants. (Dkts. 530, 532). 2 The jury awarded lost profits in the amount of
$11,422,720 and a reasonable royalty at a rate of 17% on $2,063,382.40 in total sales.
The parties’ post-trial motions raise several issues. The Court begins with Sioux
Steel’s motion for permanent injunction.
ANALYSIS
I.
Plaintiff’s motion for permanent injunction
Sioux Steel seeks a court order permanently enjoining Defendants from
continuing to infringe the ‘937 Patent. Sioux Steel argues that Defendants’ willful
infringement continued throughout seven years of this litigation and continues today,
even after a jury verdict in favor of Sioux Steel. For the reasons discussed herein, the
Court grants Sioux Steel’s motion for permanent injunction.
a. Standard
A patentee has the right to exclude others from infringing its patent. 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(1). Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the proper form
Claim 1 of the Patent contains the following phrases relevant here: “a pivot unit configured
to carry a portion of the succession of interconnected paddles” and “a pivot structure
positioned between and connecting the sections to permit pivoting of a first section with
respect to a second section and thereby to permit a degree of pivotability of the unit
longitudinal axes of the adjacent units with respect to each other in the array of units of the
sweep assembly” (see Dkt. 178).
1
After the close of evidence both parties orally moved for judgment as a matter of law under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The Court submitted the case to the jury.
2
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and scope of an injunction. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006),
the Supreme Court explained that a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must
show that (1) it suffered irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, would not adequately remedy that injury; (3) a remedy in equity
is warranted considering the balance of hardships between the parties; and (4) the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. Id. at 391. 3
b. Analysis
Beginning with the first factor, Sioux Steel argues that it is suffering irreparable
harm because: Sioux Steel and Prairie Land are direct competitors in the market for
paddle sweeps; the paddle sweep incorporating the ‘937 patent is an important
product line to Sioux Steel; Sioux Steel has never licensed the ‘937 patent; and the
evidence at trial showed that Defendants will continue their infringement. Sioux
Steel further contends that it has proven a causal nexus between the infringement
and the irreparable harm it is suffering, and that a reasonable royalty would not fully
compensate it for the damage from Defendants’ willful infringement.
Defendants are correct that irreparable harm is not presumed upon a finding of
patent infringement. See Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149
(Fed. Cir. 2011). “[I]t does not follow,” however, “that courts should entirely ignore
the fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to
exclude.” Id. (And Sioux Steel does not ask for that presumption in any event).
The Court is also bound by the jury’s explicit findings of fact and findings necessarily
implicit in the verdict. Sunny Handicraft (H.K.) Ltd. v. Envision This!, LLC, No. 14 C 1512,
2019 WL 4735459, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2019).
3
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Defendants concede that Prairie Land and Sioux Steel are direct competitors. (see
Dkt. 581 at 6-7; Dkt. 641 at 11). While this does not automatically favor an injunction,
direct competition with the infringer can support a finding of irreparable harm. See
TEK Glob., S.R.L. v. Sealant Sys. Int'l, Inc., 920 F.3d 777, 793 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Although Defendants insist their conduct has a “small [] effect” on Sioux Steel’s
business, Defendants do not dispute that the paddle sweep incorporating the ‘937
patent is an important product line to Sioux Steel. See i4i Ltd. Partnership v.
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (significant that plaintiff's
business relied heavily on products based on his patent).
At trial, Sioux Steel’s damages expert Krista Holt explained that Sioux Steel has
about a 77 percent market share of the paddle sweep market, but in the absence of
Prairie Land’s products Sioux Steel would have around 95 percent market share. (See
Tr., Dkt. 506). Defendants argue that Sioux Steel’s expert’s exhibit “is not actual
evidence of a loss of market share”, but do not rely on any authority or otherwise
develop this argument. [581 at 11]. Defendants say the existence of another paddle
sweep manufacturer, Sukup, undermines Sioux Steel’s irreparable harm argument.
But Defendants do not dispute that Sukup does not practice the claims of the ’937
patent (see Dkt. 581), and in any event that company has less than 5 percent market
share (Tr., Dkt. 506, pg. 14777). 4 Holt’s expert opinion and trial testimony showed
that Sioux Steel was at a minimum “susceptible to lowered market share.” TEK Glob.,
920 F.3d at 793. See also Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1151 (district court’s finding of no
4
These page numbers refer to the ECF page number.
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irreparable harm was error in case involving direct competitors and loss in market
share and access to potential customers).
In addition to their argument that there are multiple competitors in the market
for grain conveyance in a grain bin, Defendants contend that Sioux Steel sells its own
product to another company, GSI, who directly competes in the market with Sioux
Steel. Even if Defendants are correct that this is not solely a two-player market, that
is not dispositive for this Court’s analysis. See Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech.
Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (evidence of “direct and
substantial competition between the parties” weighed in favor of irreparable harm);
Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1151 (“While the existence of a two-player market may well
serve as a substantial ground for granting an injunction…the converse is not
automatically true”). Indeed, the Federal Circuit in Robert Bosch explained that the
district court there erred in concluding “that the presence of additional competitors,
without more, cuts against a finding of irreparable harm.” Id.
Another factor supporting a finding of irreparable harm is the trial evidence
showing Sioux Steel has never licensed the ‘937 patent. (Tr., Dkt. 498, pg. 14202). See
Presidio Components, 702 F.3d at 1363 (“The district court correctly found [plaintiff’s]
unwillingness to license favored finding irreparable injury.”); Douglas Dynamics,
LLC v. Buyers Prod. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (the evidence showed
that plaintiff “had never licensed the infringed patents, and intentionally chose not
to.”). Defendants assert that Sioux Steel licenses its patent rights to GSI. (Dkt. 581
at 10-11). But they rely on trial testimony that Sioux Steel sells paddle sweeps to GSI
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and allows GSI to re-sell its product, not that Sioux Steel licenses the ‘937 patent to
GSI. (Tr., Dkt. 506). Even so, irreparable harm “may exist even if there is evidence
that, for example, the patent owner is willing to license its patent.” Texas Advanced
Optoelectronic Sols., Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Am., Inc., 895 F.3d 1304, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (cleaned up).
Defendants also contend that Sioux Steel’s sales of sweeps with pivot units have
increased in the years that Prairie Land’s paddle-sweep products have been on the
market. But a showing of irreparable injury is not undermined “[s]imply because a
patentee manages to maintain a profit in the face of infringing competition,” or
experiences an increase in market share. Douglas Dynamics, LLC, 717 F.3d at 1344.5
Next, the Court finds that there is a sufficient causal nexus between Defendants’
infringement and Sioux Steel’s irreparable harm. The purpose of this requirement “is
to establish the link between the infringement and the harm, to ensure that there is
‘some connection’ between the harm alleged and the infringing acts.” Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 640 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Sioux Steel relies on multiple
witnesses’ testimony about the importance of the pivot unit. (Dkt. 582 at 7-8).
Additionally, the testimony at trial showed that Prairie Land intentionally advertised
the Bin Gator by referencing Sioux Steel’s patented features. Mr. Chaon testified that
the pivot unit is an important part of the sweep. (Tr. Dkt. 521, pg. 15376-77). He
testified that when Prairie Land first started advertising its paddle sweeps, it
The Court disagrees that Sioux Steel’s decision not to request a preliminary injunction bars
a finding of irreparable harm. Mytee Prod., Inc. v. Harris Rsch., Inc., 439 F. App'x 882, 888
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“we have never held that failure to seek a preliminary injunction must be
considered as a factor weighing against a court's issuance of a permanent injunction.”).
5
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advertised the pivot unit and has always advertised the pivot unit in its marketing
communications. (Id.).
In addition, Sioux Steel argues, the jury awarded it lost profits. To make this
award, the jury had to find there was demand for the patented product. (See Jury
Instr. (Dkt. 527) at 35-36). Indeed, causation of lost profits “is a classical jury
question.” Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1578 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). Though Sioux Steel’s evidence is “not as strong as proof that customers
buy the infringing products only because of these particular features,” Apple Inc., 809
F.3d at 642 (emphasis added), Sioux Steel established “’some connection’ between the
harm alleged and the infringing acts.” Id. at 644. 6
Next, Sioux Steel has satisfied its burden to show monetary damages would not
adequately remedy its injury. In addition to the reasons discussed related to
irreparable harm, Sioux Steel’s argument is supported by evidence that Prairie
Land’s market share increased from 16.6% in 2016 to 20.3% in 2020. (Dkt. 563-1 at
9). Defendants respond that the evidence about its market share is not relevant (Dkt.
581), but the Court disagrees. See Douglas Dynamics, 717 F.3d at 1345 (“[t]his record
evidence [of defendants’ rise in market share] underscores the profitability of
infringement and suggests that mere damages will not compensate for a competitor’s
increasing share of the market, a market which [plaintiff] competes in, and a market
Other design features “set the Bin Gator products apart from the competition,” according to
Defendants [581 at 15]. However, requiring a plaintiff to show a patented feature is the only
reason for consumer demand would be too high a standard: “Consumer preferences are too
complex—and the principles of equity are too flexible—for that to be the correct standard.”
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
6
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that [plaintiff] has in part created with its investment in patented technology.”). And
the jury’s award of a reasonable royalty does not undermine a finding of irreparable
harm and inadequate remedy at law. Indeed “infringement may cause a patentee
irreparable harm not remediable by a reasonable royalty.” Acumed LLC v. Stryker
Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A patentee “may find a royalty to be the
most appropriate remedy for past infringement [but] [t]hat does not mean [] that
there do not exist the kinds of hard-to-measure harms, such as impaired goodwill and
competitive position.” Texas Advanced, 895 F.3d at 1331.
Turning to the balance of hardships between the parties, Sioux Steel argues that
it suffers a greater hardship absent an injunction since its business depends so
heavily on sales involving its patent. The trial evidence showed that 85-90% of Sioux
Steel’s paddle sweep sales are derived from the ‘937 patent and is central to Sioux
Steel’s Koyker division. (See Dkt. 563-1). On the other hand, only 25% of Prairie
Land’s sales are derived from the infringing product. Id. Prairie Land does not
dispute these numbers but argues that the comparison to Prairie Land’s overall
business is misleading. But Prairie Land does not dispute that most of its revenues
are derived from other sources (not the Bin Gator sweeps). The evidence supports that
requiring Sioux Steel “to compete against its own patented invention, with the
resultant harms described [], places a substantial hardship [on it].” Robert Bosch, 659
F.3d at 1156. Further, Prairie Land does not articulate any particular hardship it
would suffer from being prevented from selling the infringing product. See Horne v.
Elec. Eel Mfg. Co., Inc., 987 F.3d 704, 727 (7th Cir. 2021) (in the “adversarial system
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of adjudication,” courts refrain from constructing “arguments for a party, especially
in civil cases and especially when the party is represented by counsel”). In sum, this
factor favors Sioux Steel.
As to the public interest factor, the Court finds the public interest would be served
by a permanent injunction. The public interest is generally served by granting an
injunction against infringers. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d at 647 (“[T]he public interest
nearly always weighs in favor of protecting property rights in the absence of
countervailing factors, especially when the patentee practices his inventions.”). In
addition to the strong public interest in enforcing a patentee’s right to exclude, Sioux
Steel argues that it has the manufacturing and sales/marketing capacity to meet the
market demand if Prairie Land is excluded from the market. Defendants assert that
Sioux Steel does not provide evidence that it has this capacity. But Scott Rysdon,
president and CEO of Sioux Steel, testified that Sioux Steel could be making at least
50 percent more sweeps than it is now. (Tr., Dkt. 498, pgs. 14194 – 14199).
Finally, Defendants contend that Sioux Steel’s proposed injunction is overbroad.
The Federal Circuit has held that “the only acts the injunction may prohibit are
infringement of the patent by the adjudicated devices and infringement by devices
not more than colorably different from the adjudicated devices.” Int'l Rectifier Corp.
v. IXYS Corp., 383 F.3d 1312, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004). So “the injunction should
explicitly proscribe only those specific acts.” Id. Defendants argue the definition of
“Enjoined Products” includes not just the subset of bin sweeps that were accused of
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infringing the ’937 patent, but the entire “product line known as the ‘Bin Gator’”.
Specifically, the proposed injunction would restrain enjoined parties from:
making, using, importing, selling, and/or offering to sell in the United
States any modular storage bin paddle sweep product that constitutes
or includes any reproduction, copy or colorable imitation of the sweep
claimed in the ‘937 Patent, including but not necessarily limited to, the
product line known as the “Bin Gator,” which Prairie Land has made,
used, and offered for sale as a “single arm,” “twin arm,” “arm and a half,”
and “linear model”, and any product not colorably different from the
foregoing (collectively, “Enjoined Products”)
Sioux Steel does not view its proposed language as including Bin Gators that did
not contain the pivot unit that was at issue during trial. The Court agrees with
Defendants though that the language could be read as including the entire Bin Gator
product line. The Court requires Sioux Steel to submit a revised proposed permanent
injunction to the Court’s proposed order box consistent with this Order by September
11, 2023. A permanent injunction will then issue pursuant to Rule 65(d)(1)(C).
In sum, the Court has considered the facts of this case in light of the eBay factors
and determined that a permanent injunction in Sioux Steel’s favor is warranted (with
the modification described above).
II.
Motion for JMOL
Defendants move under Rule 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law of no direct
infringement, no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, no indirect
infringement, and no willful infringement. Defendants argue that no reasonable jury
could have found for Sioux Steel on the evidence presented to the jury. The Court
denies Defendants’ motion.
a. Standard
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Under Rule 50, judgment as a matter of law is proper only if “a reasonable jury
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find as the actual jury did.”
Ruiz-Cortez v. City of Chicago, 931 F.3d 592, 601 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)). 7 “This is a high bar.” Id. The court
must “give the nonmovant the benefit of every inference while refraining from
weighing . . . the credibility of the evidence and testimony.” Id. Following a jury
verdict, in ruling on a Rule 50 motion, a court reviews the entire record and
“disregard[s] all evidence favorable to the movant that the jury is not required to
believe.” Id. It is appropriate to overturn a jury verdict only if “no rational jury could
have found for the nonmovant.” Id. “Infringement is a question of fact that we review
for substantial evidence when tried to a jury.” Ironburg, 64 F.4th at 1291.
Courts construe “the trial evidence strictly in favor of the party who prevailed
before the jury.” Roberts v. Alexandria Transportation, Inc., 968 F.3d 794, 798 (7th
Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). The Court’s role is “to decide whether a highly charitable
assessment of the evidence supports the jury's verdict or if, instead, the jury was
irrational to reach its conclusion.” Bowers v. Dart, 1 F.4th 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2021)
(cleaned up).
b. The Jury’s Finding of Direct Infringement
Sioux Steel asserts that there was ample evidence at trial that Prairie Land’s
products were made or designed to support the weight of the paddles and that the
The Federal Circuit reviews “decisions on motions for judgment as a matter of law, motions
for a new trial, and evidentiary rulings under the law of the regional circuit.” Ironburg
Inventions Ltd. v. Valve Corp., 64 F.4th 1274, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
7
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infringing products contain the pivot structure limitation. Defendants contend that
their accused products do not infringe claim 1 of the Patent because they lack: (1) a
pivot or drive unit “configured to” carry a portion of the succession of interconnected
paddles; and (2) a “pivot structure.” Defendants largely re-argue issues from the
earlier claim construction stage of this case, raise new arguments, or assert
arguments that Defendants could have, and often did, raise with the jury at trial.
However, whether Defendants’ products met the claim limitations was a question of
fact for the jury to decide. See Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 811 F.3d
1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The question for this Court “is limited to whether
substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict under the issued construction.” WiLan, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 811 F.3d 455, 465 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Considering the record as a whole and giving Sioux Steel “the benefit of every
inference” without weighing “the credibility of the evidence and testimony,” RuizCortez, 931 F.3d at 601, the Court finds that a rational juror would have a legally
sufficient basis to find that Defendants infringed claim 1 of the ’937 Patent. 8
Initially, the Court agrees with Sioux Steel that Defendants did not fully comply
with Rule 50, permitting a party to renew its earlier Rule 50(a) motion but “only [on]
the grounds it advanced in the pre-verdict 50(a) motion.” Andy Mohr Truck Ctr., Inc.
v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., 869 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2017). For their part Defendants
say the Court and Sioux Steel “had sufficient notice” of their position based on their
Because the Court finds no reason to overturn the jury’s verdict about direct infringement,
it need not address Defendants’ arguments about the doctrine of equivalents.
8
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summary judgment briefs. [627 at 6-8]. That does not suffice, but the Court will
nevertheless consider the merits of the parties’ arguments.
First, Defendants argue that at trial Sioux Steel ignored the Court’s claim
construction of “configured to” and confused the jury. Defendants argue that Sioux
Steel only elicited testimony that the return floor supports the weight of the paddles,
not that it was “made or designed to” do so. According to Defendants, the evidence
showed the “pivot unit” and “drive unit” of the accused products “were not specifically
made or designed to carry a portion of the succession of interconnected paddles as
required by the claims, but rather to contain grain that is not deposited at the sump.”
[594 at 23].
Defendants ask the Court to credit Defendants’ expert’s testimony and discredit
Sioux Steel’s. It is well-settled that a jury is “entitled to credit [one party’s] experts
over [the other’s].” Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Virginia, Inc., 602 F.3d 1325,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010). See also Ironburg Inventions, 64 F.4th at 1293 (“Both parties
presented expert testimony…and we see no reason why the jury was not entitled to
credit [plaintiff's] evidence over [defendant's] evidence.”) (quoting Ericsson, Inc. v. DLink Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1224-25 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). It was the jury’s role to weigh
the evidence. See Roberts, 968 F.3d at 798. It is this Court’s role to now give the
benefit of every inference to Sioux Steel “while refraining from weighing . . . the
credibility of the evidence and testimony.” Ruiz-Cortez, 931 F.3d at 601.
Further, the Court construed the term “configured to” and instructed the jury
accordingly. (Dkt. 480; Jury Instr. (Dkt. 527)). Notably, Defendants do not argue that
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the Court erred in construing “configured to” (indeed, this Court adopted Defendants’
construction of the term (Dkt. 480)) or in its instruction to the jury. The Court
“accords substantial deference to a jury's factual application of a claim construction
to the accused device in an infringement determination.” Moba, B.V. v. Diamond
Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“parties cannot reserve
issues of claim construction for the stage of post-trial motions”); Power Integrations,
Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc., 904 F.3d 965, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 9
Echoing their arguments about “configured to”, Defendants argue that the
evidence at trial showed that the accused products do not satisfy the “pivot structure”
requirements of claim 1 of the Patent. They maintain that the “uncontroverted
evidence at trial was that the movement in Prairie Land’s ball-and-socket joints is
not ‘about’ any pin or shaft as required by the claims, but rather is ‘about’ the
spherical surface of the ball.” [594 at 26]. They cite the testimony of Chaon, Meyer,
and Decker in support. The jury was free to credit or discredit all this testimony.
Again, the Court finds no reason to disturb the jury’s verdict. Considering the
applicable standard, the parties’ arguments, and the trial evidence construed “strictly
in favor of” Sioux Steel, Roberts, 968 F.3d at 798, the Court finds that substantial
evidence supports the jury’s direct infringement finding.
Although Defendants insist that the jury was confused or mislead by Sioux Steel at trial
(noting the “jury’s failure to comprehend and/or follow the Court’s instructions”) the Court
does not discern an argument that this Court erred in its instruction to the jury.
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Finally, Defendants assert that they were “prevented from presenting a number
of demonstrative exhibits that had a significant chance of educating the jury about
the purpose of the return box in the accused products.” [594 at 24]. Use of a
demonstrative exhibit “is properly left to the sound discretion of the judge presiding
over the trial.” Baugh ex rel. Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. de C.V., 730 F.3d 701, 708 (7th
Cir. 2013); see also Jackson v. Willis, 844 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The trial
court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence.”).
The Court is not persuaded that its discretionary decision at trial about Defendants’
demonstrative exhibits warrants judgment as a matter of law in their favor.
c. Jury’s Finding of Induced Infringement
The jury in this case found that Mr. Chaon was liable for inducing Prairie Land
to infringe claim 1 of the Patent. Defendants argue this finding should be overturned.
Induced infringement requires knowledge that the inducing conduct amounts to
patent infringement. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766
(2011). To determine whether a defendant had that knowledge, “direct evidence is not
required; rather, circumstantial evidence may suffice.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v.
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).
The evidence at trial supports the jury’s verdict. For example, Mr. Chaon testified
that he knew about the ‘937 patent since at least 2015, it was his decision to continue
to sell the sweep despite knowing about the '937 patent, and he designed the product
Sioux Steel alleged was infringing. (Tr. Dkt. 521, pg. 15398). Defendants rely on Mr.
Chaon’s testimony that he believed he was “avoiding infringement.” But as fact
16
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finders, the jury was free to weigh and credit this testimony and to decide that it was
more likely than not that Mr. Chaon induced Prairie Land to infringe Claim 1 of the
Patent. The Court will not disturb the jury’s verdict on induced infringement.
d. Jury’s Findings of Willful Infringement
Defendants also challenge the jury’s finding that Defendants willfully infringed.
Defendants’ burden to challenge that finding “is a heavy one.” Comark Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A willfulness determination
is fact intensive. See Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 987 (Fed.
Cir. 2021); WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Defendants insist that they engaged in “extensive design-around efforts” that
undermine the jury’s willfulness finding. As Sioux Steel points out, Mr. Chaon
testified that he learned of the ‘937 Patent at least as early as 2015 but started the
“design-around” in 2016 after the filing of this lawsuit. (Dkt. 619 at 32; Tr., Dkt. 521,
pg. 15369-70). Again, the jury was permitted to consider this testimony and the other
evidence at trial and conclude that Defendants willfully infringed the Patent. See
WBIP, LLC, 829 F.3d at 1341 (noting “established law that the factual components
of the willfulness question should be resolved by the jury.”). Because the Court draws
all reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict, it finds the jury’s willfulness
verdict supported by substantial evidence.
In short, it is well-settled that “it takes a lot to set aside a jury verdict.” Valdivia
v. Twp. High School Dist. 214, 942 F.3d 395, 396 (7th Cir. 2019). The Court finds the
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jury had a sufficient basis to find for Sioux Steel and there is no reason to set aside
the jury’s verdict in this case.
III.
Motion for a New Trial
In the alternative to its request for judgment as a matter of law, Defendants move
for a new trial. This motion is denied. A new trial is appropriate under Rule 59(a) “if
the trial was in some way unfair to the moving party.” Martinez v. City of Chicago,
900 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). Such a motion seeks “dramatic relief.”
Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., 30 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 1994). “A motion for a new trial can
be granted when the district court—in its own assessment of the evidence
presented—believes that the verdict went against [its] manifest weight.” Mejia v.
Cook County, 650 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2011); Plyler v. Whirlpool Corp., 751 F.3d
509 (7th Cir. 2014). This case does not meet the high standard warranting a new trial.
Defendants contend that the evidence at trial failed to show that the accused
products infringe the claims of Plaintiff’s patent, and affirmatively showed they did
not infringe. Defendants’ arguments for a new trial repeat their arguments for
judgment as a matter of law. Even considering that the evidence at trial was
sometimes in conflict, it “is an invasion of the jury’s province to grant a new trial
merely because the evidence was sharply in conflict.” Whitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d
919, 928 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Considering the trial evidence as a whole, the
Court does not find that this is a case of “the record show[ing] that the jury’s verdict
resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be
overturned or shocks our conscience.” Id. (cleaned up).
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IV.
Defendants' Motion For Remittitur Or A New Trial On Damages
The Court turns to Defendants’ motion for remittitur or a new trial on damages.
They argue that the jury’s verdict awarding damages to Sioux Steel was against the
clear weight of the evidence and lacked a rational connection to the trial evidence.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, a patentee whose patent has been infringed is entitled to
damages “adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
the interest and costs as fixed by the court.” At trial Sioux Steel had to prove damages
by a preponderance of the evidence. Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1029 (Fed.
Cir. 1996). As Defendants acknowledge, the decision whether to remit a damages
award or grant a new trial on damages rests in the sound discretion of this Court.
[596 at 4]. A court may vacate a jury’s damages award only if it is “against the clear
or great weight of the evidence.” Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512,
517 (Fed. Cir. 1995). At the same time “any rate determined by the trier of fact must
be supported by relevant evidence in the record.” Id. A court defers to the jury's
verdict, confining its inquiry to: “whether the award is monstrously excessive;
whether there is no rational connection between the award and the evidence,
indicating that it is merely a product of the jury's fevered imaginings or personal
vendettas [;] and whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar
cases.” Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Tr. of Chicago, 433 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2006)
(cleaned up).
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Defendants argue that the jury’s lost profits award is not supported by the trial
evidence. Expert Ms. Holt testified that she calculated Sioux Steel’s total lost profits
to be $11,422,720. (Tr., Dkt. 506, pgs. 14818, 14823, 14860). That was the amount the
jury awarded. For their part Defendants critique Sioux Steel’s President’s testimony
and argue that its damages expert’s opinion was not supported by rational evidence.
Defendants had the opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses. The Court does
not find a reason to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. The jury’s lost profits
award was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Next is the reasonable royalty. As with lost profits, the Court will not second-guess
the jury’s reasonable royalty award. The jury could rely on Holt’s expert testimony
that the midpoint of a reasonable royalty range was 14%. (Tr., Dkt. 506, pgs. 1485758). She then decided 13% to be on the “conservative side.” Id. The jury also heard
Holt specify more than once that she determined there was a range of potential
reasonable royalty rates from 7.6 to 20.4 percent. Id. Although 17% is above Holt’s
conservative 13% estimate, the Court does not find that the 17% rate settled on by
the jury to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Unisplay, S.A., 69 F.3d
at 519 (“[A] jury’s [royalty] choice simply must be within the range encompassed by
the record as a whole.”). 10
Defendants’ motion for remittitur or a new trial on damages is denied.
Defendants rely on Int’l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731
(7th Cir. 2004), where the jury awarded a plaintiff an amount well above the contract
damages it claimed. That case did not involve patent infringement or a royalty rate. And it
does not help Defendants’ position.
10
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V.
Plaintiff’s motion for enhanced damages
Sioux Steel moves for treble damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284. The Patent Act gives
district courts discretion to “increase the damages up to three times the amount found
or assessed.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. Enhanced damages “are generally reserved for
egregious cases of culpable behavior.” Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S.
93, 104 (2016). The type of conduct warranting enhanced damages “has been
variously described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate,
consciously wrongful, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.” Id. See Presidio
Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 875 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
see also Halo, 579 U.S. at 103, (explaining that there is “no precise rule or formula
for awarding damages under § 284 ....”). In this assessment district courts “consider
the particular circumstances of the case.” Sunoco Partners Mktg. & Terminals L.P. v.
U.S. Venture, Inc., 32 F.4th 1161, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
Sioux Steel asserts that the Court should impose enhanced damages for several
reasons including because Defendants deliberately and willfully copied the patented
paddle sweeps, there is no evidence that Defendants had a good faith belief that the
‘937 Patent was invalid or not infringed, they deliberately disregarded every
alternative design, and Defendants engaged in obstructionist discovery tactics. The
Court does not agree that this case involves egregious infringement behavior
warranting a “‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ sanction.” Halo, 579 U.S. at 103. The litigation
misconduct Sioux Steel relies upon does not warrant an increased damages award.
See Sunoco Partners, 32 F.4th at 1179. Even combined with other factors, such as
21
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Defendants’ aggressive advertising, the circumstances do not warrant a punitive
sanction. The jury awarded Sioux Steel lost profits of $11,422,720 and an additional
reasonable royalty at the rate of 17% on $2,063,382.40 of sales. That is a substantial
amount. Punishment is not necessary.
Considering both parties’ positions and the totality of the circumstances, the Court
in its discretion declines to assess enhanced damages against Defendants.
VI.
Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees
Sioux Steel seeks a declaration that this case is “exceptional” and an award of its
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, the district court may
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in “exceptional” cases. An
“exceptional” case is “one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive
strength of a party's litigation position (considering both the governing law and the
facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Octane
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014). Exceptional cases
are rare. Id. “District courts may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in a caseby-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
Courts consider “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the
factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to
advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Id. at 1756 n.6 (quoting
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994)). Sioux Steel has the burden
under this standard. Id. at 1758.
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This Court, considering the totality of the circumstances, including the underlying
facts of the case, the parties’ litigation conduct, generally and at trial in particular,
finds that this is not an exceptional case. Certainly, it was hard-fought at all stages
and there were times both Defendants and their counsel could have shown better
judgment. But Sioux Steel has not shown that Defendants litigated this case in an
obviously unreasonable or vexatious manner or asserted any plainly frivolous
defenses causing the case to be exceptional.
Sioux Steel’s motion for a finding that this case is exceptional and awarding
attorneys’ fees is denied.
VII.
Plaintiff’s motion prejudgment and post-judgment interest and
supplemental damages
Sioux Steel argues it is entitled to prejudgment interest because Defendants have
been found to have willfully violated federal law, it is entitled to post-judgment
interest as a matter of right, and an award of supplemental damages for any
infringing sale in between the last infringing sale of record from which the jury could
assess damages, up to the time a permanent injunction is entered.
28 U.S.C. § 1961 allows for post-judgment interest. Defendants do “not dispute
that Plaintiff would be entitled to post-judgment interest as a matter of federal law
under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 in the event that Plaintiff is ultimately awarded damages in
this case.” [585 at 3]. Accordingly, the Court grants Sioux Steel’s request and finds it
entitled to post-judgment interest on its infringement claim, calculated consistent
with 28 U.S.C. § 1961. Next, prejudgment interest should “ordinarily be awarded.”
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983). This is “consistent with
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Congress' overriding purpose of affording patent owners complete compensation.” Id.
Although the rate for post-judgment interest is set by statute, the pre-judgment
interest rate is left to the discretion of the court. Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v.
Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1989). Sioux Steel seeks
compound interest; Defendants argue for simple prejudgment interest at the prime
rate. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (the
“determination whether to award simple or compound interest is a matter largely
within the discretion of the district court.”). The Court considers that the jury’s 17%
royalty rate award, although not error, as discussed, was above Sioux Steel’s expert’s
suggested rate. The Court in its discretion will award simple prejudgment interest at
the prime rate.
As to supplemental damages, “[d]istrict courts have discretion to award damages
for periods of infringement not considered by the jury.” Whitserve, LLC v. Computer
Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 38 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The jury awarded a reasonable
royalty at the rate of 17% on $2,063,382.40 of sales. Defendants provided an affidavit
from Defendant Duane Chaon, one of the owners of Prairie Land. (Dkt. 585-1). Mr.
Chaon’s declaration states that since the conclusion of trial, Prairie Land has
primarily sold or offered for sale units that do not include return floor plates. Id. The
Court agrees with Sioux Steel that references in Mr. Chaon’s declaration, particularly
in paragraphs 7 and 8, are vague and do not provide sufficient assurance that
Defendants are not and will not sell infringing products. Accordingly, the same
royalty rate found by the jury will apply to the post-verdict supplemental damages
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award. In order to calculate supplemental damages, by September 18, 2023
Defendants shall produce financial data showing their sales from October 13, 2022,
through the date of the jury’s verdict. Sioux Steel shall calculate the simple
prejudgment interest rate and the supplemental award and by September 29, 2023
shall file a status report to that effect.
Accordingly, Sioux Steel’s requests for prejudgment and post-judgment interest
and supplemental damages are granted as set forth in this section. In addition,
Defendants have moved to strike Plaintiff’s submission of “Exhibit A to DN 571.”
[607]. The Court did not need to rely on that document to reach its decision. Therefore,
Defendants’ motion to strike exhibit [609] is denied as moot.
VIII. Defendants’ Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment Pending PostTrial Motions and Appeal
Defendants seek an order staying execution and enforcement of the judgment
entered on July 11, 2023, pending the disposition of post-trial motions and
Defendants’ appeal. They also ask the Court allow Prairie Land to file “other security”
in connection with a stay. Instead of bond, they propose the Court enter an order that
Defendants’ “identified assets of the Company and Mr. Chaon not be transferred,
encumbered, or otherwise dissipated outside the ordinary course of business for
Prairie Land, and outside the ordinary living expenses of Mr. Chaon.” [641]. Sioux
Steel responds that it should be permitted to begin executing on its judgment, and if
not, Defendants must post sufficient security to protect Sioux Steel’s judgment. Sioux
25
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Steel contends that Defendants should post a bond and/or other security in the
amount of the judgment, inclusive of interests and costs. 11
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 provides that “[a]t any time after judgment is
entered, a party may obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security,” and the
stay “takes effect when the court approves the bond or other security and remains in
effect for the time specified in the bond or other security.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b).
Ordinarily, to get a stay of execution of judgment, the movant must post a
supersedeas bond for the full amount of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d); BASF
Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 979 F.2d 615 (7th Cir.1992). “The philosophy
underlying Rule 62[b] is that a plaintiff who has won in the trial court should not be
put to the expense of defending his judgment on appeal unless the defendant takes
reasonable steps to assure that the judgment will be paid if it is affirmed.” Lightfoot
v. Walker, 797 F.2d 505, 506–07 (7th Cir. 1986). A district court has discretion to
authorize unsecured stays pending appeal. See id.; see also Schmude v. Sheahan,
2004 WL 1179418, at *3 (N.D.Ill. May 25, 2004) (“[A] request for a stay is a request
for extraordinary relief, equitable in character, and the movant bears a heavy
burden.”) (citations omitted).
To determine whether Defendants are entitled to a stay the Court assesses: “(1)
whether [Defendants have] made a strong showing that [they are] likely to succeed
Defendants argue that the Court’s “July 11, 2023, Judgment is not a final judgment and
thus is neither executable nor appealable.” [641 at 2]. On August 10, 2023, Defendants filed
a Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and explained
they submitted the Notice of Appeal “to protect its rights and out of an abundance of caution
despite there being no final, executable, or appealable order in this case.” [651].
11
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on the merits; (2) whether [Defendants] will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in
the proceedings; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S.
770, 776 (1987). The Court finds these factors weigh against a stay in this case.
Defendants are concerned about destruction of their business and assert that “Prairie
Land simply cannot satisfy the Judgment at this time” and “Defendants do not have
cash assets in the amount of $15M.” [641]. Id. Sioux Steel counters that Defendants
are not being forthcoming about their financial condition. It troubles the Court that
Defendants have not submitted an affidavit or declaration attesting to their financial
condition or the specific risk to their business.
The “simplest way” to ensure that Rule 62's guaranty that an appellee is not “put
to the expense of defending his judgment on appeal unless the defendant takes
reasonable steps to assure that the judgment will be paid if it is affirmed” is to require
the posting of a supersedeas bond. Walker, 797 F.2d at 506–07. Given the jury verdict,
the date of judgment on the verdict (July 11, 2023)12 and the date of today’s ruling,
Defendants have benefitted from an effective temporary stay in execution and
enforcement of the judgment. 13
The Court withheld entry of the judgment to allow defense counsel a longer briefing period
because the verdict was entered near the holidays and counsel had extensive travel planned
in the new year. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(d) (motion for new trial must be filed 28 days after
entry of judgment).
12
Sioux Steel has filed a second lawsuit against both defendants alleging fraudulent transfer
under Illinois law and requesting an accounting based on post-verdict transfer of assets. See
Sioux Steel Co. v. Prairie Land Mill Wright Services et al., 23 CV 3988. The Court granted
Sioux Steel’s request in this case to partially restrain Defendants’ assets pending ruling on
the post-trial motions. [649].
13
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In deciding whether to waive the posting of bond, the court looks to factors
including: (1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of time required
to obtain a judgment after it is affirmed on appeal; (3) the degree of confidence that
the district court has in the availability of funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether the
movant's ability to the bond to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond
would be a waste of money; and (5) whether the movant is in such a precarious
financial situation that the requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of
the defendant in an insecure position. See Dillon v. City of Chicago, 866 F.2d 902, 904
(7th Cir. 1988).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court will not grant a stay or
allow Defendants to waive bond. If Defendants wish to stay enforcement of the
judgment, they must post bond in the amount of the judgment by September 15, 2023.
IX.
Plaintiff’s motion for writ of execution
Sioux Steel asks the Court to enter a Writ of Execution to enable enforcement of
the previously entered July 11th judgment order. Sioux Steel seeks an order that it is
“entitled to enforce and collect from third parties the judgment debt entered against
Defendants on July 11, 2023.” Under Rule 69(a), “[t]he procedure on execution--and
in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution--must accord
with the procedure of the state where the court is located...” The Court agrees with
Defendants that the procedure sought by Sioux Steel in this motion is not proper. See
In re Hurley, 148 B.R. 298, 302 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd, 158 B.R. 115 (N.D. Ill.
28
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1993) (in Illinois the writ of execution been abolished); 735 ILCS 5/2-1501 (“Writs
Abolished”).
Sioux Steel’s motion is denied. If execution of the judgment is not stayed by
Defendants’ posting of a full bond, discussed supra, Sioux Steel may issue third party
citations to discover assets.
X.
Plaintiff’s motion for costs
Sioux Steel seeks costs. Defendants did not file any objections. (see Dkt. 655). The
Court finds the categories and amounts sought to be allowable and reasonable.
Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to tax costs in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of
$27,334.90. However, the Court will stay taxation of those costs if Defendants post
bond.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for permanent injunction [562] is granted;
Plaintiff’s motion for prejudgment and post-judgment interest and supplemental
damages [571] is granted; Plaintiff’s motion for enhanced damages [572] is denied;
Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees [574] [597] is denied; Defendants’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative a new trial [593] is denied;
Defendants' motion for remittitur or a new trial on damages in the alternative to their
renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law [595] is denied; Defendants’ motion
to strike sealed document [609] is denied as moot; Plaintiff’s motion for bill of costs
[650] is granted. Defendants’ motion to stay execution of judgment pending
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disposition of post-trial motions and appeal [640, 641] is denied. Plaintiff’s motion for
writ of execution [653] is denied.
If Defendants wish to stay enforcement of the judgment, they must post bond in
the amount of the judgment entered on today’s date by September 15, 2023. In light
of the ruling herein, this Court sua sponte extends its August 10, 2023 order [649],
currently set to expire on September 8, 2023, to September 15, 2023. The Court also
requires Sioux Steel to submit a revised proposed permanent injunction to the Court’s
proposed order box consistent with this Order by September 11, 2023. To calculate
supplemental damages, by September 18, 2023 Defendants shall produce financial
data showing their sales from October 13, 2022, through the date of the jury’s verdict.
Sioux Steel shall calculate the simple prejudgment interest rate and the
supplemental award and by September 29, 2023 file a status report to that effect.
Final judgment shall enter in Sioux Steel Company’s favor. Civil case terminated.
E N T E R:
Dated: September 7, 2023
MARY M. ROWLAND
United States District Judge
30
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