Haywood v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 3/1/2017:Mailed notice(kef, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DONALD HAYWOOD,
Plaintiff,
v.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16-CV-3566
Hon. Amy St. Eve

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On March 23, 2016, Plaintiff Donald Haywood, an inmate within the Illinois Department
of Corrections (“IDOC”), brought the present Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his
mental health needs. Plaintiff has sued Wexford Health Sources (“Wexford”), certain Wexford
employees, and several members of the IDOC medical staff (collectively, “Defendants”). Before
the Court is Wexford’s motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a prisoner currently in the custody of IDOC at Pontiac Correctional Center
(“PCC”). (R. 16, Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) At all times relevant to this complaint, Plaintiff was
incarcerated at either PCC or Stateville Correctional Center (“SCC”). (Id.) Wexford is a
Pennsylvania corporation with a place of business in St. Charles, Illinois. (Id. ¶ 2.) Wexford
provides health care services on behalf of IDOC to prisoners at PCC and SCC. (Id.) Wexford

also has the responsibility for the implementation and oversight of health care policies at PCC
and SCC. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that prior to his incarceration, he had a long history of diagnosed mental
illness, including five suicide attempts. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25.) Plaintiff has been diagnosed with
depression, antisocial personality disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder, and as a result,
IDOC classified him as “seriously mentally ill” or “SMI.” (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiff alleges that,
since June 2014, Defendants have failed to treat Plaintiff’s mental illnesses and have instead
punished him when he requested treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 32.)
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that while in segregation at SCC in June 2014, Catherine
Larry, the Wexford doctor assigned to provide medical care to inmates in segregation, failed to
visit Plaintiff or provide him with mental health treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.) Beth Hart, a Wexford
employee, also failed to provide treatment to Plaintiff or visit him in segregation. (Id. ¶¶ 38-40.)
Plaintiff alleges that he filed multiple complaints and grievances in response to Larry and Hart’s
failure to treat him, and in response, Larry and Hart falsified reports indicating that they had in
fact visited Plaintiff and that he was receiving medical care. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36, 41-42.) Plaintiff
alleges that Larry and Hart commonly failed to provide mental health treatment to SMI inmates
or other mentally ill inmates at SCC for whom they had a personal dislike. (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff
alleges that Larry and Hart personally disliked Plaintiff, and as a result, they denied him mental
health treatment. (Id. ¶ 45.)
On or about June 11, 2015, Plaintiff sought assistance from Jason Berry, a “Crisis Team”
member, but Berry filed a disciplinary report against Plaintiff instead of providing him with
treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 55-56.) On or about June 15, 2015, Plaintiff informed Charles Best and
Lakeisha Acklin, members of the “Adjustment Committee,” that Berry filed a disciplinary report

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against him in order to deny him mental health treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 57, 59.) Plaintiff alleges that
Best and Acklin also failed to provide him with mental health treatment. (Id. ¶ 60.) On
December 1, 2015, eighteen months after his initial request for treatment, Dr. Conrad, a Wexford
employee, met with Plaintiff to provide medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 61.) Plaintiff alleges that he
complained to Conrad about his lack of treatment, and Conrad threatened to discontinue
Plaintiff’s prescription medications. (Id. ¶¶ 62-63.) In response, on January 1, 2016, Plaintiff
filed a written complaint seeking assistance in the treatment of his mental illnesses. (Id. ¶ 64.)
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of this complaint, various SCC correctional officers physically
assaulted him. (Id. ¶ 65.)
In July 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to PCC. (Id. ¶ 69.) Plaintiff alleges that on July
29, 2016, he met with Kelly Haag, a Wexford mental health therapist, but that Haag did not
provide any mental health treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 70-71.) Plaintiff alleges that he requested
additional treatment, but Haag did not meet with him again until the September or October 2016,
at which point, Haag revoked Plaintiff’s SMI status and placed him on suicide watch. (Id. ¶¶ 7273.) Plaintiff alleges that he has since made multiples requests for mental health assistance, but
PCC psychologists have refused to treat him and instead approved the revocation of his SMI
status. (Id. ¶¶ 38-40.) Plaintiff alleges that no one at PCC has provided him with a mental health
evaluation, and as a result, his mental health disorders have worsened. (Id. ¶¶ 77, 80.)
LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the
viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). Under
Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule
8(a)(2) must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Under the federal
notice pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a “complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In determining the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, courts must “accept
all well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.” Roberts v.
City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016).
ANALYSIS
In Count I of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Wexford had policies and customs in
effect that allowed Defendants to exhibit deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s mental health
needs causing him physical injuries and mental anguish in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In Count II, Plaintiff seeks to hold Wexford liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the
deliberately indifferent actions of the various individuals that denied Plaintiff mental health
treatment. In its motion to dismiss, Wexford makes three arguments: (1) the Court should
dismiss Count I because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Monell v. Department of Social
Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (2) the Court should dismiss Count II
because there is no respondeat superior liability for § 1983 actions against private corporations;
(3) Plaintiff is not entitled compensatory damages because he has not sustained a physical injury.
The Court addresses each argument in turn.

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I.

Count I—Monell Claim
In Monell, the Supreme Court established that a municipality may face liability for

money damages under § 1983 only if the unconstitutional act about which the plaintiff complains
was caused by (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental
practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3)
an official with final policy-making authority. Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d
293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). Wexford, a private corporation
contracted by IDOC, is subject to a Monell claim just like any municipality would be. See, e.g.,
Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 832 (7th Cir. 2010). “To establish municipal liability, a
plaintiff must show the existence of an ‘official policy’ or other governmental custom that not
only causes but is the “moving force” behind the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Teesdale
v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, to prevail on his Monell claim
against Wexford, Plaintiff must show that “his injury was caused by a Wexford policy, custom,
or practice of deliberate indifference to medical needs, or a series of bad acts that together raise
the inference of such a policy.” Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir. 2014).
In addition, a plaintiff asserting a policy or practice claim ultimately “must demonstrate that
there is a policy at issue rather than a random event.” Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303. “This may take
the form of an implicit policy” or “a series of violations to lay the premise of deliberate
indifference.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit has not adopted a bright-line rule defining what constitutes a
widespread custom or practice, and there is no clear consensus as to how frequently such conduct
must occur to impose Monell liability. See id.; see also Arita v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
No. 15-CV-01173, 2016 WL 6432578, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2016). It is clear, however, that

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the conduct complained of must have occurred more than once, or even three times. Thomas,
604 F.3d at 303. Also, importantly, while “it is not impossible for a plaintiff to demonstrate the
existence of an official policy or custom by presenting evidence limited to [one individual’s]
experience,” it is difficult because “what is needed is evidence that there is a true municipal [or
corporate] policy at issue not a random event.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d. 763, 774 (7th
Cir. 2008).
In its motion to dismiss, Wexford argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege a custom or
practice of deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Several courts in this district have found
that there is not a sufficient pattern of deliberate indifference to support a Monell claim where the
alleged indifference is directed at only the plaintiff individually and not at multiple inmates. In
Arita, for example, the court dismissed a Monell claim against Wexford because although the
plaintiff alleged that he requested medical treatment for nine months with no response, and did
not receive treatment for over a year, there were “no facts—outside of those related to [the
plaintiff’s] own experience—that plausibly suggest Wexford has maintained a widespread
custom or practice of ignoring [] inmates’ medical needs.” 2016 WL 6432578, at *3. The court
further explained that the plaintiff’s allegation of a Wexford policy was “unsupported by any
facts regarding the experiences of other inmates,” and there was nothing in the plaintiff’s
complaint that even indicated “what specific policy might lead to the systematic disregard of
inmates’ medical needs.” Id. Similarly, in Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15 C
5190, 2016 WL 3227310, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2016), the court dismissed the plaintiff’s
Monell claim because the plaintiff did “not allege that any other detainee suffered from similar
issues” and only included “a conclusory reference to other prisoners’ experiences.” See also
Valazquez v. Williams, No. 14-cv-9121, 2015 WL 4036157, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2015) (the

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allegation that Wexford had a policy and practice of denying psychotropic medicines to mentally
disabled inmates was insufficient to state a Monell claim); Winchester v. Marketti, No. 11-cv9224, 2012 WL 2076375, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2012) (“What is fatal to the Monell claims,
however, is that Plaintiff makes no attempt to plead a pattern of similar constitutional violations
with any degree of factual specificity.”); Jones v. Feinerman, No. 09 C 03916, 2011 WL
4501405, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2011) (dismissing Monell claim against Wexford because
plaintiff alleged deliberate indifference that was limited “only to him”).
Plaintiff, relying on Ford v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 12 C 4558, 2013 WL
474494 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2013), argues that a deliberate indifference Monell claim can be
supported by only an individual plaintiff’s experience. In Ford, the plaintiff, an inmate at SCC,
injured his back and then made near daily requests for medical attention. Id. at *1-3. Despite
filing three formal grievances in one month, all of which he appealed to the Administrative
Review Board, the plaintiff did not attend physical therapy until nearly two years after the injury.
Id. The plaintiff then filed an emergency grievance, which was again denied. Id. at *3. After
finally getting an MRI, plaintiff was scheduled to go to a pain clinic at a Chicago hospital, but
was unable to visit the hospital because IDOC denied him sufficient medical restraints. Id.
Given the plaintiff’s consistent complaints, several formal grievances, and the plaintiff’s other
allegations about the institution’s policies and practices, the Court found that the plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged enough facts to support the inference that Wexford had “a widespread
custom or practice of treating inmates’ medical needs with deliberate indifference.” Id. at *9.
Here, like the plaintiffs in Arita and Taylor, Plaintiff here makes only conclusory,
factually unsupported allegations about the experiences of other inmates. (Am. Compl. ¶ 44.)
(“Upon information and belief, Larry and Hart commonly failed to provide mental health

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treatment to ‘seriously mentally ill’ or other mentally ill inmates at SCC for whom they have a
personal dislike.”) These allegations are exactly the type of boilerplate allegations of a
widespread policy that courts in this district have consistently rejected. Further, unlike in Ford,
Plaintiff’s own allegations indicate that the Wexford employees were indifferent to Plaintiff
because they “personal dislike[d]” him and not because they were carrying out a company policy
to deny mental health treatment to all inmates. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-45.) Plaintiff’s allegations
thus suggest that his alleged mistreatment was the isolated result of his personal relationships
with Wexford employees. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to reasonably
infer that there is an actual policy or practice at issue here. See Grieveson, 538 F.3d. at 774 (“it
is necessarily more difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate an official policy or custom based only
on his own experience because what is needed is evidence that there is a true municipal policy at
issue, not a random event.”) (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court grants
without prejudice the Wexford’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim.
II.

Count II—Respondeat Superior Claim
Wexford moves to dismiss Count II, which seeks to hold the company responsible for the

actions and omissions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. As Plaintiff
concedes, it has long been settled law that, as with § 1983 cases against state actors, there is no
respondeat superior liability for § 1983 actions against private corporations. See, e.g., Iskander
v. Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982); Delgado v. Ghosh, No. 11-CV-05418,
2016 WL 316845, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2016). The Seventh Circuit did recently express
reservations about the inapplicability of respondeat superior liability to private corporations in §
1983 claims, but the court nevertheless concluded that “[t]he answer under controlling precedent
. . . is clear . . . [r]espondeat superior liability does not apply to private corporations under §

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1983. Th preceden is binding here. Accor
hat
nt
rdingly, the Court grants Wexford’s motion to
s
s
dismiss Plaintiff’s re
P
espondeat sup
perior claim with prejud
m
dice.
III.

Compensatory Damages Under the PLRA
C
s
e
Given that the Court has dismissed bo of Plaint
G
e
d
oth
tiff’s claims against Wex
xford, there is no

need to address Wexford’s argum that the Prisoner Li
a
ment
e
itigation Ref
form Act onl permits
ly
recovery of compens
satory damag for physi injuries.
ges
ical
.

CON
NCLUSION
N
For these reas
sons, the Court grants Defendant’s R
Rule 12(b)(6 motion to dismiss.
6)

M
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Dated: March 1, 201
ENTERED
D

__________
__________
___________
__
AMY J. ST EVE
T.
United Stat District Court Judg
tes
ge

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