Gracz v. Colvin
ORDER: Plaintiff Linda Jean Gracz ("Plaintiff") appeals the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. For the reasons discussed more fully below, the Court remands this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse the Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [dkt. 13 ] is granted as stated herein. The Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt. 15 ] is denied. - Signed by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 4/12/2017. [For further details see order] Mailed notice (np, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LINDA JEAN GRACZ,
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 1
No. 16 cv 4099
Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox
Plaintiff Linda Jean Gracz (“Plaintiff”) appeals the decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act. For the reasons discussed more fully below, the Court
remands this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reverse the Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [dkt. 13] is granted as stated
herein. The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt. 15] is denied.
Procedural History and Claimant’s Background
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on December 26, 2012, with
an alleged onset date of disability as of November 15, 2008. [Record (“R”) 12, 243.] Her last day
of work coincided with her alleged onset date. [R 124.] Plaintiff was last insured for disability
insurance benefits on December 31, 2013. [R 14, Finding 1.] To obtain benefits, Plaintiff would
have to establish disability onset on or before her date last insured, which was December 31,
Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for her predecessor, Carolyn W. Colvin, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
During the application process for disability insurance benefits, Plaintiff claimed that she
stopped working on the alleged onset date due to a combination of physical and mental
impairments: fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue, pubic symphysis separation, anxiety, depression,
nerve pain, and insomnia. [R 124, 284.] Plaintiff’s past relevant work consisted of one
occupation (sales/office manager) from June of 1991 through November 15, 2008. [R 60-61,
132, 285.] She worked for builders of new homes, where she greeted new customers and took
them through model homes, worked with contractors and builders, and managed the paperwork
in connection with the sales activities. [R 60-62.]
Plaintiff’s disability insurance benefits application was denied initially on October 10,
2013, and again at the reconsideration stage on July 23, 2014, on the basis that Plaintiff retained
the ability to perform simple, light, unskilled work. [R 153-163.] Plaintiff timely requested an
administrative hearing, which was held on September 3, 2015, before Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) Victoria A. Ferrer. [R 32, 166.] Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and a Vocational
Expert (“VE”) testified. [R 32-123.]
The ALJ’s Decision
On November 20, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff disability
benefits. [R 9-31.] As an initial matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Act through December 31, 2013. [R 14]. At step one, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of
November 15, 2008. [R 14-15.] At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe
impairments of fibromyalgia; pubis dysfunction; obesity; depression; and anxiety. [R 15.] At step
three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments of 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1. [Id.] Before step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 2 to perform a wide range of light work limited to simple,
routine, repetitive tasks involving simple instructions and simple decisions. [R 17.] In
determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found the Plaintiff “credible as to the existence of her
impairments, [but did] not find credible her allegations regarding the severity and persistence of
her symptoms as well as the functional limitations they allegedly cause, or caused prior to the
date last insured”, and specifically noted that the evidence did not reveal the presence of the
requisite number tender points for fibromyalgia. [R 20.] However, Plaintiff’s “continued
complaints of pain, as well as her obesity, [were] taken into consideration in determining that she
is limited to work at the light exertional level.” [Id.] At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
was unable to perform her past relevant work, which was skilled and performed at a light
exertional level by Plaintiff for both the sales/office manager functions. [R 23.] Finally, at step
five, the ALJ found there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy
Plaintiff could perform. Specifically, the ALJ relied upon VE testimony that Plaintiff could
perform the unskilled light exertional jobs of office helper, maid/housekeeper cleaner, 3 and
arcade attendant. [R 23-24.] Because of this determination, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled
under the Act. [R 24-25.]
Issues Before the Court
On February 12, 2016, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review [R 1-6],
making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff now seeks judicial review, alleging: a) the ALJ’s determination was erroneous at
step two of her analysis; b) the ALJ’s determination was erroneous at step three of her analysis;
c) the ALJ’s RFC determination was erroneous; d) the ALJ’s credibility determination was
RFC is defined as the most one can do despite one’s impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The actual DOT title specified by the VE is “housekeeping cleaner” (DOT #323.687-014), not “housekeeper
cleaner” as used by the ALJ.
patently wrong; and e) the ALJ’s determination was erroneous at step five of her analysis. [Dkt.
14.] With regard to the ALJ’s alleged step five errors, the Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the
ALJ erred in accepting the VE’s testimony without any proof as to the source and reliability of
the VE’s information, particularly when the VE was questioned as to how he arrived at his
numbers for certain jobs existing in the economy and his reduction of the number of those jobs to
accommodate the ALJ’s hypotheticals. [Id. at p. 19.]
The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt. 15] is styled as a summary
judgment motion although it is a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Reverse the
Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [dkt 14]. The Commissioner’s Motion
raises no new issues in its response to Plaintiff’s memorandum of law.
Social Security Regulations and Standard of Review
The Social Security Act requires all applicants to prove they are disabled as of their date
last insured to be eligible for disability insurance benefits. ALJs are required to follow a
sequential five-step test to assess whether a claimant is legally disabled. The ALJ must
determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; and (3) whether the severe impairment meets or
equals one considered conclusively disabling such that the claimant is impeded from performing
basic work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). If the
impairment(s) does meet or equal this standard, the inquiry is over and the claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). If not, the evaluation continues and the ALJ must determine (4)
whether the claimant is capable of performing her past relevant work. Cannon v. Harris, 651
F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1981). If not, the ALJ must (5) consider the claimant’s age, education,
and prior work experience and evaluate whether she is able to engage in another type of work
existing in a significant number of jobs in the national economy. Id. At the fourth and fifth steps
of the inquiry, the ALJ is required to evaluate the claimant’s RFC in calculating which workrelated activities she is capable of performing given her limitations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d
995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004). In the final step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that
there are jobs that the claimant is able to perform, in which case a finding of not disabled is due.
Smith v. Schweiker, 735 F.2d 267, 270 (7th Cir. 1984).
In disability insurance benefits cases, a court’s scope of review is limited to deciding
whether the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is based upon substantial
evidence and the proper legal criteria. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004).
Substantial evidence exists when a “reasonable mind might accept [the evidence] as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Zurawski v. Halter, 245
F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001). While reviewing a commissioner’s decision, the Court may not
“reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or substitute
[its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d at 1001.
Although the Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially, the ALJ must nevertheless build a
“logical bridge” between the evidence and her conclusion. Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121
(7th Cir. 2014). The Court cannot let the Commissioner’s decision stand if the decision lacks
sufficient evidentiary support, an adequate discussion of the issues, or is undermined by legal
error. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,539 (7th Cir. 2003); see also, 42 U.S.C.§
The VE’s Backup Data Must Be Available on Demand
The Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in accepting the VE’s testimony concerning his
numbers for certain jobs existing in the economy and his reduction of the number of those jobs
based on the ALJ’s hypotheticals, without any data in support of the same after the VE had
specifically been asked by Plaintiff’s attorney to provide that data during the administrative
As mentioned above, the VE in the instant case opined that Plaintiff 4 could perform the
unskilled light exertional jobs of office helper, maid/housekeeping cleaner, and arcade attendant.
[R 108-09.] As to office helper, the VE reduced the Bureau of Labor Statistics job availability
numbers by 25%; the VE reduced the number of available maid/housekeeping cleaner positions
by 40%; and the VE reduced number of available arcade attendant positions by 50%. [Id.] For
each of these positions, the VE never specified whether he reduced the numbers in the national
economy, the numbers in Illinois, or took some other type of reduction. Nonetheless, this is the
data the ALJ (and this Court) is left to work with. Thus, the argument raised by Plaintiff that the
ALJ’s step five determination was erroneous holds particular sway.
In general, the role of a vocational expert is to provide information regarding the kinds of
work and the number of jobs in the national economy a hypothetical person with certain
limitations can perform. Pagos v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1502923, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2015);
Pelfrey v. Com’r of Soc. Sec., 2010 WL 909134, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2010); see also,
Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1982) (role of a VE is to “translate[ ] factual
scenarios into realistic job market probabilities”). Typically, one of the sources a VE will rely on
is The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). The DOT is a compendium of basic
occupational information which lists occupational demands and duties and their accompanying
mental and physical requirements and skills. However, the DOT was last revised in 1991, and as
to its relevance, the Seventh Circuit has stated, “not only is [the DOT] an obsolete catalog of jobs
(most of the entries in it date back to 1977) but it contains no statistics regarding the number of
A hypothetical question posed to the VE must accurately portray the claimant’s individual physical and mental
impairments and RFC, to the extent they are supported by the medical evidence in the record. Herron v. Shalala, 19
F.3d 329, 337 (7th Cir. 1994).
jobs in a given job category that exist in the local, state, or national economy.” Herrmann v.
Colvin, 772 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir.2014); see also, Forsythe v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 677, 681 (7th
Cir. 2016) (“[t]he vocational experts and administrative law judges can’t be blamed for the
poverty of the data concerning jobs that applicants for social security disability benefits are
capable of performing. It is high time that the Social Security Administration turned its attention
to obtaining the needed data.”) (collecting cases and references); accord Voigt v. Colvin, 781
F.3d 871 (7th Cir.2015) and Browning v. Colvin, 766 F.3d 702 (7th Cir.2014). Nonetheless, the
Social Security Administration relies upon the DOT as an “authoritative” publication and its
definitions are accepted as reliable evidence of how jobs are performed in the national economy.
Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1090 (10th Cir. 1999). A VE will also typically rely on job
data from The Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”). The recent trends in wages, process, and
productivity in the U.S. economy come from the BLS, which is a preferred source for these
figures as it contains the largest number of jobs (but does not set forth numbers based on specific
DOT codes). The Social Security Administration has taken administrative notice of both the
DOT and the Occupational Outlook Handbook published by the BLS. 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(d)(1)(5).
A finding of an ALJ based on unreliable VE testimony is equivalent to a finding that is
not supported by substantial evidence and must be vacated. Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841
(7th Cir. 2007). Although a VE is entitled to rely on various methods and sources of data, the
foundation for the VE’s opinions must be adequate and VE’s testimony must be reliable.
Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002). Although the Seventh Circuit has
recognized that the standards by which an expert’s reliability is measured are less stringent at an
SSA administrative hearing than under the Federal Rules of Evidence, because an ALJ’s findings
must be supported by substantial evidence, an ALJ may depend upon expert testimony only if the
testimony is adequate and reliable. McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2004)
(referencing Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446).
“Evidence is not ‘substantial’ if vital testimony has been conjured out of whole cloth.”
Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446. “A vocational expert is ‘free to give a bottom line,’ but the data and
reasoning underlying that bottom line must be ‘available on demand’ if the claimant challenges
the foundation of the vocational expert’s opinions.” McKinnie, 368 F.3d at 911 (citing Donahue,
279 F.3d at 446). “If the basis of the vocational expert’s conclusions is questioned…then the
ALJ should make an inquiry…to find out whether the purported expert’s conclusions are
reliable.” Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446 (italics omitted.) 5
The matter at hand is highly analogous to the situation in Denham v. Barnhart, 2006 WL
4097284 (N.D.Ill. May 23, 2006), which relied heavily on Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441
(7th Cir. 2002) and McKinnie v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2004) in concluding that
remand was necessary because the VE failed to provide underlying data when the claimant
challenged the foundation of the vocational expert’s opinions as to job availability. We remand
on the same basis.
Donahue and McKinnie, along with a myriad of other Seventh Circuit cases and Northern
District cases interpreting them, concern the proper inquiry an ALJ must make when a VE’s
conclusions conflict with the DOT and what must be done to resolve those conflicts. In Denham,
counsel for the claimant requested to see the VE’s backup data and studies during the
administrative hearing. The ALJ denied Denham’s request. Despite the fact that the SSA argued
Donahue and McKinnie are binding precedent on this Court. The Court is aware of the Second Circuit’s Brault v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., Com’r, 683 F.3d 443 (2d Cir. 2012) decision, discussing Donahue and its Seventh Circuit
progeny, and noting how the “duty to inquire” exists only in the Seventh Circuit whereas other courts review the
entirety of a VE’s testimony and methods to make sure it rises to the level of “substantial” evidence. Brault, 683
F.3d at 449-50 (references omitted). However, the Second Circuit still cited Donahue when it ruled: “[w]e do not
hold that an ALJ never need question reliability, and we agree with the Seventh Circuit that evidence cannot be
substantial if it is ‘conjured out of whole cloth.’” Id. at 450 (citing Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446).
the data was not necessary because the VE’s answers at the hearing provided a detailed and
credible explanation of how he reached his conclusions, the Denham court disagreed and ordered
a remand based of the Seventh Circuit’s mandate that the VE’s backup data and documentation
be “available on demand” when the foundation of the VE’s opinions is challenged. Denham v.
Barnhart, 2006 WL 4097284 at *3 (referencing McKinnie, 368 F.3d at 911).
Denham is significant because it discusses the applicability of the Donahue and
McKinnie rulings in the context of a vocational expert’s job availability statistics rather than the
context of a VE’s interpretations of job descriptions or classifications. To be clear, Denham does
not extend these rulings 6, but rather Denham fairly interprets the Donahue and McKinney
mandates for an ALJ to more closely examine a VE’s opinions when those opinions have had
their foundations challenged to determine the basis reliability of those opinions.
Denham mirrors precisely what counsel for Plaintiff did here. When Plaintiff’s counsel
attempted to nail down the VE’s methodology for arriving at certain numbers, he asked
specifically for the VE’s backup data/notes and the VE refused to provide it. In fact, counsel for
the Plaintiff made four separate requests for the VE to make available the backup data/notes that
support his conclusions. 7 The ALJ was not receptive to these requests. [R 118-121.] Ultimately,
the VE refused to provide his notes to the Plaintiff and the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request to
access the same. [R 121.] It is plain the ALJ did not follow the binding precedent of McKinnie,
which requires the VE to produce this data, when she overruled Plaintiff’s requests for the VE’s
See e.g., Herrmann v. Colvin, 772 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2014), discussed in Section III(b), infra, which the Seventh
Circuit also reversed and remanded based, in part, on insufficient VE testimony regarding job availability statistics.
(1) Q: “[C]an you make the data available to me here and now that supports your testimony concerning the
numbers of jobs that you claim exist in response to the hypotheticals?” [R 119.] (2) Q: “Can you give me your notes
that support how you do these formulas to determine the jobs? A: I said it’s subjective based on my experience.
There’s no specific formula to give you.” [R 120.] (3) Q: “Does that mean you cannot give me your data that you
relied on in testifying to the numbers today? *** A: I do not give out my data. The only data that is available -- my
data is my notes.” [R 120-21.] (4) Q: “Will you make [your notes] available to me? A: No.” [R 121.]
The VE’s Numbers Must Not Be “Conjured Out of Whole Cloth”
Perhaps equally troubling: not only did the VE refuse to make his notes and data
available in this case, but the VE’s testimony on his methodology seems, to this Court, to reveal
that his numbers are indeed “conjured out of whole cloth” as Donahue specifically cautions
against. Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446. After the VE testified he’d modified the numbers taken from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Plaintiff’s attorney asked the VE what his methodology was for
reducing the job availability numbers, the VE responded that he’d “just taken a reasonable
estimate.” [R 116.] When the VE was asked how he determined the reduction percentage was
proper, the VE responded, “it’s a subjective thing. It’s based on my knowledge of the DOT, and
it’s based on my knowledge of the job market…I don’t have enough data to give a much more
elaborate methodology.” [R 118.] When asked again about his formulas to reduce job numbers,
the VE replied, “I said it’s subjective based on my experience. There’s no specific formula to
give you.” [R 120.] When the VE was asked whether the reduction percentages he’d testified to
were purely guesses, the ALJ objected, 8 and the VE responded, “No. They’re estimates.” [Id.]
Particularly as to the job of “arcade attendant”, a position the VE had never done any
official surveys of (the record appears to indicate the VE had only observed a single arcade
attendant potentially only on a single occasion during his career) [R 116], the VE’s numbers
“sound like guesses.” See Forsythe v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2016) (reversing and
It is uncommon for an ALJ to object to questions posed during an administrative hearing. Because social security
proceedings are non-adversarial, the ALJ always has a duty to ensure that the record is fully and fairly developed,
even when the claimant is represented by counsel. See e.g., Smith v. Sec’y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 587 F.2d 857,
860 (7th Cir. 1978), Elbert v. Barnhart, 335 F. Supp. 2d 892, 905 (E.D. Wis. 2004); see also, Needs v. Shalala, 1994
WL 637486, *1 (N.D. Iowa July 15, 1994) (concerning objections made by the administrative judge and the need for
a fair hearing) and Roman v. I.N.S., 233 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). While the ALJ objected to one of
Plaintiff’s counsel’s questions [R 118] (the ALJ never states the basis for her objection), this objection did not
unduly hamper the presentation of Plaintiff’s case; while the ALJ may have been abrupt or terse [R 118-121], the
Court is unwilling to conclude that Plaintiff did not receive a fair hearing on this record.
remanding in part because the VE’s “suspiciously round [job availability] numbers” “sound like
And the example I can think of like that of arcade attendant. Most arcade
attendants is pretty cut and dried. It’s unskilled and it’s light. But if they have to
empty a machine they may carry coins of more than 20 pounds. So I’ve just taken
a reasonable estimate that half these jobs probably are more than light. And
there’s no one who’s counting which arcade attendants lift 20 pounds, which
don’t. So that’s just a reasonable estimate.
[R 116.] The VE’s suspiciously round 50% reductions (essentially, the VE determined that half
of all arcade attendant positions are performed at an exertional level more than light and, thus,
50% of all arcade attendant positions surpassed the limitations a hypothetical individual with
some of Plaintiff’s disabilities could perform) 9 also sound like guesses conjured from whole
cloth and are of the type of unsupported conjecture that caused the courts in Forsyth and
McKinnie, among others, to reverse and remand. The same holds true for the VE’s reductions of
the number of available office helper and maid/housekeeping cleaner positions.
We borrow language from another Seventh Circuit case (also deciding to reverse and
remand) to describe the VE’s numbers in this case: “[w]e do not know how the vocational expert
in this case calculated the numbers to which he testified. Nothing in the record enables us to
verify those numbers, which the administrative law judge accepted.” Herrmann v. Colvin, 772
F.3d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 2014). Similar to Herrmann, the only public sources the VE cited for
the numbers he quoted was the DOT and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (although he never
specifies what BLS publication). The VE did testify he relied on his “experience”, “knowledge
of the DOT”, “knowledge of the job market”, and his “40 years of experience working as a -- in
the field of vocational rehabilitation, counseling, dealing with employers, dealing with the
The Court realizes the current digital era might result in more arcade attendants performing their jobs at a light
exertional level if these jobs no longer require the carrying of coins, which would result in more arcade attendant
positions the Plaintiff is allegedly able to perform, but this red herring illustrates precisely the type of impermissible
“whole cloth conjuring” Donahue is meant to prevent. The Court is no more competent or permitted to pull these
numbers from thin air than a VE who fails to provide support for his opinions.
DOT.” [R 120, 114, 118.] However, fatally as in Herrmann, the VE “didn’t explain how
impressions from unspecified past experience and knowledge could enable him to determine
numbers of particular jobs.” Herrmann, 772 F.3d at 1113. Out of an abundance of caution, the
Court also reviewed the VE’s resume [R 352-54], which the ALJ admitted into evidence
(Plaintiff’s counsel also stipulated to the VE’s qualifications), and found no especially relevant
past experience that would enable him to determine numbers of particular jobs. As mentioned
above, the ALJ just accepted the VE’s numbers without comment and without reference to the
fact the ALJ had denied Plaintiff’s counsel’s request for the VE’s backup documentation
regarding these numbers. The Court does not believe a reasonable mind would accept the VE’s
evidence as adequate to support the ALJ’s reliance on it and the conclusions the ALJ drew from
it. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887.
Lastly, the Commissioner’s argument that certain numbers of jobs are significant for
purposes of the act is unavailing. Because it appears the VE’s numbers were spun out of whole
cloth, the Court cannot be certain whether any of the VE’s numbers are correct as to jobs
available the Plaintiff could allegedly perform. In short, the ALJ erred when she
“unquestioningly” accepted vocational testimony without first “inquiring into the reliability” of
the opinion. McKinnie, 368 F.3d at 911.
The Court must reverse and remand this decision as step five of the ALJ’s decision lacks
sufficient evidentiary support and is undermined by legal error. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart,
336 F.3d 535,539 (7th Cir. 2003); see also, 42 U.S.C.§405(g). We reverse and remand with
instructions for the VE to provide his underlying data/notes so that all concerned, including the
ALJ, may inquire as to the source and reliability of the VE’s opinions as to job availability. At
this time, the Court offers no opinion as to the other alleged bases of error in the ALJ’s opinion
as raised by the Plaintiff in Docket No. 14.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reverse the Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
[dkt. 13] is granted. The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt. 15] is denied.
U.S. Magistrate Judge, Susan E. Cox
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