Laurens v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC et al
Filing
60
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 11/8/2017:Mailed notice(wp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
XAVIER LAURENS and KHADIJA
LAURENS, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 16 C 4507
v.
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
VOLVO CARS OF NORTH
AMERICA, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability
Corporation, and VOLVO CAR
USA, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Corporation,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
As described by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]his
case,
at
base,
expectations.”
is
about
car
purchaser’s
disappointed
Laurens v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC, 868
F.3d 622, 623 (7th Cir. 2017).
Defendants’
a
Rule
12(b)(1)
This Court had previously granted
Motion
to
Dismiss
based
on
mootness
before the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the claims were
indeed not moot, and remanded the case.
12(b)(1)
Motion,
Defendants,
Volvo
In addition to their Rule
Cars
of
North
America,
LLC
(“VCNA”) and Volvo Cars USA, LLC (“VCUSA”), had also filed a Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Because
the Court had found a lack of jurisdiction based on mootness, it
did not reach the alternative grounds for dismissal.
The Court
now considers Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This dispute centers on the mileage capability of the Volvo
Model XC90 T8, a plug-in hybrid sport utility vehicle capable of
being operated solely on battery power.
Khadija
Laurens,
advertisements
allegedly
issued
under
read
the
placing an order for the T8.
Plaintiffs, Xavier and
certain
of
name
press
prior
VCUSA
release
to
their
These releases stated that “at the
push of a button the driver can switch to quiet and emission-free
city driving on pure electric power where the range will be about
40
kilometers”
(Pls’
electric” mode:
Ex.
1)
and
touted
the
vehicle’s
“pure
“In this mode, when the high-voltage battery is
fully charged, it serves as the car’s sole energy source, powering
the electric motor over the rear axle.
The XC90 T8 has a range of
more than 40 km using just electricity, which covers the total
distance most people drive in one day.”
according
to
Plaintiffs’
Complaint,
(Pls’ Ex. 2.)
subsequent
Further,
Volvo
press
releases, a T8 new car brochure, and written information gained
from auto
trade
publications
all
reaffirmed
that
the
T8
under
normal driving conditions would achieve at least 40 kilometers (or
its mileage equivalent of 25 miles) on a single charge.
Exs. 3, 4, 5, and 6).
(Pls’
Plaintiffs claim that they relied on this
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information when they decided to order the T8 (which commanded a
$20,000 premium over the non-hybrid CX 90), when they made a down
payment of $1,000, and again eight months later when they paid the
$83,495.00 balance due.
T8
“both
for
the
Plaintiffs claim that they purchased the
lessened
environmental
impact
and
the
gas
new
T8,
savings.” (ECF No. 22 (“FAC”) ¶ 41.)
Unfortunately,
after
taking
possession
of
the
Plaintiffs found that it was only able to travel 8 to 10 miles on
a single electric charge.
advertised
mileage
and
Due to this discrepancy between the
the
actual
mileage
achieved,
they
were
unable to operate the car in normal daily travel without using
gasoline.
dealer
They returned the T8 to their Volvo dealer so that the
could
discrepancy.
determine
the
reason
for
the
large
mileage
The dealer initially pointed out to them that the
“sticker” on the new Volvo claimed that the T8 had only a 13-mile
electric driving range rather than the 25-mile range promised in
the advertising material.
The dealer than sought to test drive
the T8 but was only able to travel 10 miles in electric mode under
normal
driving
conditions.
The
dealer
then
tested
the
T8
by
driving at no more than 40 mph, with all safety features and the
heat turned off, and was able to achieve a distance of between 14
and 18 miles.
Based
putative
on
class
the
foregoing,
action
consisting
Plaintiffs
of
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Count
bring
I,
a
four-count
Violation
of
the
Illinois
Consumer
Fraud
Act
(the
“CFA”);
Count
II,
Common
Law
Fraud; Count III, Breach of Express Warranty; and Count IV, Unjust
Enrichment.
They bring all four counts on behalf of a national
class of buyers of the Volvo T8.
Defendants have moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
III.
A.
DISCUSSION
Counts I and II against Both Defendants
Defendants contend that neither the CFA nor the common law
fraud count can stand because Plaintiffs have failed to allege a
false representation.
Defendants cite Wiegel v. Stork Craft Mfg.,
Inc.,
804,
946
F.Supp.2d
810-12
(N.D.
Ill.
2013)
for
the
proposition that accurate statements cannot form the basis of a
CFA
claim.
Defendants
make
three
arguments
accuracy of their advertising materials.
concerning
the
First, they point out
that the press release in Exhibit 1 sets forth a parenthetical
phrase “NEDC driving cycle” in the paragraph immediately preceding
the
claimed
electric
driving
range,
intended to modify the distance claim.
which
they
maintain
is
Second, they point out
that their advertising states the range in kilometers rather than
miles.
located
Third, they spotlight to what they assert is a disclaimer
at
the
very
end
of
the
release,
which
reads:
“Descriptions and facts in this press material relate to VolvoCar
Group’s international car range,” and “Vehicle specifications may
vary from one country to another and may be altered without prior
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notification.”
Thus, they say, Plaintiffs were on notice that the
release really did not invite a buyer to rely on the statement
that “the range will be around 40 kilometers.”
Defendants detail
how the NEDC testing methods differ from the EPA methods, which
they claim could account for the discrepancy, and they then fault
Plaintiffs for failing to allege in their complaint that the NEDC
testing results were false.
Plaintiffs, of course, take issue with these arguments as to
why
the
advertised
representation.
40-kilometer
diving
range
was
not
a
false
They point out that Defendants ignore all of the
marketing materials that Defendants issued in the United States to
entice consumers to buy the T8.
of
these
marketing
materials
(See, Exhibits 1 through 6.)
contain
mileage
claims
All
that
Plaintiffs’ Volvo dealer was unable to come close to matching.
They also point out that it does not take a genius to convert 40
kilometers to 25 miles.
It appears to the Court at this stage of the case that the
Plaintiffs have the better of the argument on Counts I and II.
First, all of the cases Defendants cite concerning the truth of
particular
claims
were
stage or after trial.
decided
either
at
the
summary
judgment
This is particularly important here because
at this stage prior to discovery, Plaintiffs are not privy to the
NEDC testing so as to prove or disprove if and why the European T8
model - as opposed to the one available to purchasers in the
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United States - could truly go 40 kilometers without a recharge.
Further, the press releases do not state that the 40-kilometer
distance was obtained through the “NEDC driving cycle,” or even
what the NEDC driving cycle is.
This parenthetical phrase is
located in a paragraph regarding reduced emissions and does not
ever
refer
to
mileage.
Moreover,
the
so-called
“disclaimer”
statement is located at the very end of the release and refers to
the “VolvoCar Group’s international car range” without defining
what this means.
Fairly read, “international car range” appears
to refer to the fact that certain option features may not be
universally available and does not even apply at all to electric
mileage
range.
The
purported
disclaimer’s
statement
that
“specifications” vary from one country to another appears to refer
to possible variations implicated by climate and local regulations
rather
than
electric
mileage.
In
other
words,
the
disclaimer
neither contradicts nor modifies the 40-kilometer mileage claim.
Defendants also contend that the fraud and CFA counts should
be dismissed pursuant to the heightened pleading standards of Rule
9(b).
Defendants are partially correct.
While Rule 8 applies to
Count I under the CFA for unfair conduct or practices, Rule 9(b)
applies
to
Count
II,
Common
Law
Fraud.
Windy
City
Metal
Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Financing Servs., Inc.,
536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008).
Consequently, with respect to
Count I, the only question is whether “the allegations raise a
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right
to
relief
Blagojevich,
omitted).
526
above
F.3d
the
1074,
speculative
1084
(7th
level.”
Cir.
Tamayo
2008)
v.
(quotation
However, Count II requires the Rule 9(b) “who, what,
when, where, and how.”
(7th Cir. 1990).
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627
With respect to VolvoUSA, whose name is on the
press release, Plaintiffs appear to have satisfied Rule 9(b).
For
example, VolvoUSA is the “who”; the claim that the T8 will go 40
kilometers on a single charge is the “what”; October 21, 2014, the
date of the press release in Ex. 1, is the “when”; the United
States, where the press release was published, is the “where”; and
disseminating the press release in the United States is the “how”.
However, the Complaint fails to satisfy Rule 9(b) with regard to
VCNA.
Plaintiffs claim that VCNA can be held liable because of
its corporate affiliation with VCUSA (it was VCUSA’s sole member).
However, this is not sufficient under Rule 9(b).
Goren v. New
Vision Int’l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 730 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding it
necessary to allege “facts sufficient to notify the defendants of
their purported role in the scheme”) (quotation omitted).
B.
Count III - Breach of Express Warranty against VCUSA
Count III alleges that, by asserting in press releases and
advertising materials that the T8 would achieve 25 miles on a
single charge, VCUSA created an express warranty that was violated
with respect to Plaintiffs’ T8.
To create an express warranty
under Section 2-313 of the Illinois Commercial Code (26 ILCS 2- 7 -
313), a seller must (1) make an affirmation of fact or promise
that (2) relates to the goods and (3) becomes part of the basis
for the bargain between the parties.
The seller warrants that the
goods will conform to the affirmation of fact or promise.
A
seller’s statement of opinion or commendation, on the other hand,
does not create an express warranty.
the
affirmation
false.
of
fact
or
promise
The difference is whether
can
be
demonstrated
to
be
Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d
34, 42 (7th Cir. 1980).
Whether a seller made a promise amounting
to a warranty is normally a question of fact.
Ibid.
Here, the
“promise” that a driver would be able to drive 25 miles on a
single charge is subject to proof and could therefore constitute
an express warranty.
If, in fact, the T8 could only achieve 8 to
10 miles, as opposed to 25, this could be considered a violation
of an express warranty, and the allegation clearly rises above the
speculative level.
C.
The
Count IV - Unjust Enrichment against VCUSA
basis
for
Defendants’
Motion
to
Dismiss
the
unjust
enrichment claim is their argument that Plaintiffs have not been
able to allege a claim under the CFA.
Insofar as the Court has
not dismissed the CFA claim, the Motion to Dismiss is denied in
relevant part.
Leiner v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies,
Inc., 215 F.Supp.3d 670, 673 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court rules as follows:
1.
The Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied as to VCUSA but
granted as to VCNA without prejudice;
2.
The Motion to Dismiss Count II is denied as to both
Defendants;
3.
The Motion to Dismiss Count III is denied; and
4.
The Motion to Dismiss Count IV is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: November 8, 2017
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