Osterholt v. Corepower Yoga, LLC

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 5/18/2017: Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification, 36 , is granted. CorePower shall disclose to plaintiffs identifying information on the class by June 8, 2017. The parties shall file a status report with a proposed case schedule (to include proposed deadlines for the close of discovery, dispositive motions, and motions for class certification and decertification of the collective action) and any new objections to the notice by June 15, 2017. A status hearing is set for June 29, 2017 at 9:30 a.m. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed. (psm, )

Case: 1:16-cv-05089 Document #: 64 Filed: 05/18/17 Page 1 of 18 PageID #:1101

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ZURI OSTERHOLT and
MICHELLE BENIKOV,
Plaintiffs,

No. 16 CV 5089

v.

Judge Manish S. Shah

COREPOWER YOGA, LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Zuri Osterholt and Michelle Benikov taught yoga classes for
defendant CorePower Yoga, LLC, first as interns and later as instructors. They
were paid for their time spent in the yoga studio, but plaintiffs say that when
accounting for the time they were required to spend outside the studio preparing for
each class, the equivalent hourly rate of their wages fell below the federal
minimum. Plaintiffs brought claims against CorePower under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS
105/1 et seq., and the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance, Chicago, IL, Municipal
Code, § 1-24-020. They want to pursue their federal claims as a collective action,
and they now move to conditionally certify two classes—one for interns and one for
instructors. For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ motion is granted.
I.

Legal Standards
The Fair Labor Standards Act allows plaintiffs to recover unpaid minimum

wages on behalf of a class of similarly situated employees in a collective action

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against their employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Unlike the class members in a Rule
23 class action, unnamed plaintiffs must opt in to be bound by an FLSA collective
action. Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 771 (7th Cir. 2013). Most
district courts use a two-stage process for determining if named plaintiffs are
similarly situated to class members with respect to whether an FLSA violation has
occurred, such that a case may proceed as a collective action. See, e.g., Jirak v.
Abbott Labs., Inc., 566 F.Supp.2d 845, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (collecting cases). In the
first stage, plaintiffs must make a modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate
that “the putative class members were together the victims of a single decision,
policy, or plan.” Id. at 848 (quoting Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d
1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001)). The purpose of the first stage is to determine whether
any similarly situated class members exist. See Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537,
555 (2d Cir. 2010). If plaintiffs meet their burden, then they may send notice to
potential class members, giving those individuals the opportunity to opt in to the
collective action. See id.
In the second stage, after the opt-in plaintiffs are identified and discovery is
complete, defendants may move for decertification. Plaintiffs then must meet a
higher standard for the collective action to proceed, and courts generally consider
three factors: “(1) whether the plaintiffs share similar or disparate factual and
employment settings; (2) whether the various affirmative defenses available to the
defendant would have to be individually applied to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness
and procedural concerns.” Mielke v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 313 F.Supp.2d 759, 762

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(N.D. Ill. 2004). Ultimately, the standard for proceeding as a collective action is no
different from the standard for certifying a class action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. See Espenscheid, 705 F.3d at 772.
CorePower argues that, because the parties have conducted limited
discovery, the flexible, lenient standard typically applied at the first stage should be
heightened to a standard more stringent than the lenient standard but less
stringent than the second-stage, post-discovery standard. Plaintiffs object to this
approach, as they filed this motion early in the case and, at the time, the parties’
discovery efforts were limited to information necessary to meet the lenient
standard. Since then, however, the two named plaintiffs and a third-party witness
were deposed, the parties submitted multiple declarations from other CorePower
employees, and CorePower produced over 10,000 documents. Plaintiffs were given
the opportunity to file both a reply and a sur-surreply with much of that discovery
in hand. The limited discovery conducted so far is sufficient to warrant an
intermediate standard. Like other courts that have applied such an intermediate
standard to conditional certification, I consider the evidence put forth by both
parties but remain mindful of the fact that CorePower has greater access to
evidence than plaintiffs. See, e.g., Steger v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., No. 14-CV-6056,
2016 WL 245899, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2016); Bergman v. Kindred Healthcare,
Inc., 949 F.Supp.2d 852, 856 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

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II.

Background
Plaintiffs Michelle Benikov and Zuri Osterholt trained to be yoga teachers by

enrolling in and completing a training program administered by defendant
CorePower Yoga, LLC. [54-3] at 11, Tr. at 43:7–16; [54-4] at 8, Tr. 29:9–30:2.1 After
completing their training, they joined the CorePower internship program, which
required that they teach 30 yoga classes and qualified them to be CorePower
instructors. See [37-10]. Benikov began the internship program in Chicago in
November 2011, and taught her 30th class in January 2012. [54-3] at 11–12, Tr. at
43:17–45:22. Osterholt taught classes as an intern in Chicago from June 15, 2015
until August 9, 2015. [37-1] ¶ 2. Following their internships, Osterholt and Benikov
worked for CorePower as instructors. Osterholt worked in Chicago from August 10,
2015, until February 4, 2016. Id. Benikov started out in Chicago but later moved to
Portland, Oregon, working as an instructor there from November 2014 to January
2016. [37-2] ¶ 4. In addition to teaching yoga classes, Benikov also trained new
CorePower teachers in both cities. [37-2] ¶ 10.
There is some evidence that CorePower teachers nationwide received the
same training, using a standardized training manual. [54-2] at 21, Tr. at 82:14–
82:22. In their training, plaintiffs learned that preparing for each class included
developing and memorizing a choreography and sequence of yoga poses, the verbal
cues they will use to lead students into the next pose, the type of physical assistance
students may require for each pose, and the music to be played during the class.

1

Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket.

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[54-3] at 43, Tr. at 169:19–170:17; id. at 93, Tr. at 369:14–371:14; [54-25]. It was
also their responsibility to develop a theme to which each of these class components
related. [54-18]–[54-20].
The standard instructor employment agreement defines an instructor’s
essential job duties, one of which is as follows: “Provide superior yoga instruction by
teaching CorePower Yoga classes, adhering to CPY sequencing expectations,
structure, and quality standards at all times.” [37-14]. The agreement also requires
that instructors provide students with individual assistance as appropriate, interact
with them before and after each class, and promote additional CorePower trainings
and classes. Id. And it directs instructors to “[c]omply with expectations for
classroom

environment,

teacher

substitution,

format

structure,

and

other

guidelines” provided in other CorePower documents and communications. Id.
Teaching manuals and other documents sent to teachers say that each class should
provide a “World Class Experience,” [54-15], and that “no two classes will be exactly
the same.” [54-17]. To aid the teachers in preparing for their classes, CorePower
regularly circulated sample playlists and suggested themes. [49-15] ¶ 13; [54-4] at
48, Tr. at 191:3–192:18.
According to CorePower’s standard intern and instructor employment
agreements, CorePower also required interns and instructors to work at the front
desk for thirty minutes before and after each class they taught. See [37-10], [37-11].
The CorePower employee manual states that while staffing the front desk,
employees had to interact with students, market additional classes and training

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programs, and perform other non-teaching activities as required by the studio
manager. [54-13]. Benikov testified that, in her training in Chicago, she was
explicitly informed of a policy prohibiting class preparation while at the front desk,
and that she in turn informed others of that policy while training teachers in
Portland. [54-3] at 68–70, Tr. at 271:4–279:3. Plaintiffs also testified that
CorePower required interns and instructors to spend time marketing their classes
on social media and reviewing newsletters and email announcements from
CorePower. [54-3] at 60, Tr. at 237:23–238:11; id. at 98, Tr. at 389:1–390:4. And if
an intern or instructor could not teach a scheduled class, he had to solicit a
substitute teacher via email. [54-32]. CorePower also provided the following
instruction: “If you ask for a sub, return the Karma and sub for someone else when
you are able.” Id.
Osterholt testified that she spent an average of four hours preparing for each
class. [54-4] at 43–44, Tr. at 172:4–173:9. Benikov testified that she spent between
four and five hours preparing for each class. [54-3] at 102, Tr. at 407:4–13. Thirdparty witness Fitzgerald, a former studio manager, said she spent anywhere from
three to five hours before each class preparing. [54-2] at 14, Tr. at 54:3–20. In their
declarations, Osterholt and Benikov stated that CorePower paid them below all
applicable minimum wages, but do not provide more detail than that. See [37-1]
¶ 12; [37-2] ¶ 19. And according to plaintiffs and Fitzgerald, their managers had
some awareness of how much time and effort were required to prepare for a class.

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[54-2] at 11–12, Tr. at 44:7–45:22; [54-3] at 47, Tr. at 186:4–187:9; [54-4] at 55–56,
Tr. at 220:16–221:16.
Fitzgerald also testified, based on her experience as a studio manager and
her attendance at corporate meetings, that CorePower paid interns and instructors
only for their time spent in the studio—either teaching a class or managing the
front desk before and after their classes—and not for any time spent working
outside the studio. [37-3] ¶¶ 5–9. Plaintiffs provide CorePower documents related to
the payroll system that directed interns and instructors to record their time spent
working at the front desk before and after each class—one hour total—and their
time spent actually instructing each class—generally, one more hour—, but do not
mention time spent preparing for classes. See [54-9], [54-10]. Plaintiffs’ payroll
records reflect that for the vast majority of classes they taught, CorePower explicitly
compensated them for two hours of work time. See [54-11], [54-12].
According to plaintiffs, CorePower paid all of its interns for the time they
report at an hourly rate equal to the minimum wage applicable to each jurisdiction
in which they work. [37-2] ¶ 12. CorePower paid Osterholt between $8.25 and
$10.00 per hour reported when she worked as an intern. [19] ¶¶ 38–39. CorePower
paid instructors on a per-class basis; Osterholt received $30 per class when she
worked as an instructor, and Benikov received $38.50 per class. [19] ¶¶ 45–46.
Osterholt seeks to represent a class of interns and proposes the following
class definition: “all persons who have been employed by CorePower Yoga as interns
throughout the United States, from three years prior and up through the date the

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order granting conditional certification is entered.”2 [37] at 6. Both Osterholt and
Benikov seek to represent an instructor class, consisting of “all persons who have
been employed by CorePower Yoga as instructors throughout the United States,
from [three] years prior and up through the date the order granting conditional
certification is entered.” Id. CorePower employed over 3,700 interns and instructors
in the last three years. [49-2] ¶ 4.
III.

Analysis
A.

Conditional Certification

Plaintiffs make a modest factual showing that they and the rest of the
putative class members are similarly situated, because they were subject to the
same practices and policies requiring them to perform certain tasks off-the-clock
which, in the case of named plaintiffs and others, may have resulted in payment
below the federal minimum wage. CorePower paid all of its interns nationwide at
an hourly rate and paid its instructors a fixed amount per class. For both interns
and instructors, CorePower accounted for the time spent instructing a class, and for
time spent at the front desk before and after each class, where they were required to
interact with students and market additional classes or training programs. But
CorePower also directed interns and instructors across the country, in their training
courses and in various manuals and newsletters, to perform certain tasks in
preparation for each class they were to instruct, and to review emails related to
substitution requests or corporate announcements. CorePower did not separately
Because Benikov’s time as an intern ended more than three years ago, she cannot be a
member of the intern class.
2

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compensate its teachers for the time spent performing those duties. Plaintiffs
submit evidence of those nationwide policies in the form of their declarations and
deposition testimony, standard employment agreements, training documents, and
corporate newsletters. Plaintiffs also submit declarations of five other current and
former CorePower interns and instructors, who taught different types of CorePower
classes at different studios and shared plaintiffs’ understanding of CorePower’s
policies.3 See [37-3]–[37-7]. Plaintiffs testified that they spent a significant amount
of time outside the studio performing that additional work, and that their managers
were aware of the significant time commitment required for those tasks, though
there is no evidence to suggest that either plaintiffs or their managers knew the
precise number of additional hours worked. Plaintiffs do not claim that spending
time working outside the studio necessarily entitles them to relief. Rather,
plaintiffs’ theory of liability rests on their contention that, when accounting for the
time spent on additional tasks, CorePower paid them less than $7.25 per hour in
violation of federal law. See 29 U.S.C. § 206. Plaintiffs testified that they spent
between three and five hours preparing for each class which, based on their wages,
places them below the federal minimum wage. Plaintiffs therefore meet their
modest burden in showing that they and the rest of the putative class members
were subject to a policy that resulted in plaintiffs, and perhaps others, being paid
below minimum wage.

CorePower discounts these declarations because most reflect the experiences of employees
in the Chicago area, but CorePower does not provide any evidence to suggest that its
compensation policies or the duties of interns and instructors differ by region.
3

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CorePower’s primary argument is that the corporate policies identified by
plaintiffs were vague directives that were open to interpretation and did not
explicitly require substantial preparation time, and that certification would require
individualized analysis of each class member. CorePower believes that plaintiffs’
subjective interpretations of their job responsibilities are to blame for any
uncompensated work time.4 For example, CorePower does not dispute that it
required teachers to prepare for their classes by performing certain tasks like
developing themes and music playlists. Nor does it dispute that it told its teachers
in newsletters and teaching manuals that they should provide a “World Class
Experience,” and that no two classes will be exactly the same. But CorePower
insists that interns and instructors would have been reasonable in interpreting
those statements to require making minor changes to each class with minimal
effort. Moreover, CorePower submits that the variety of those interpretations was
likely compounded by the decisions and directions of individual studio managers.
Liability may also turn on the abilities and personal preferences of individual

The parties focus on the nature of the work that CorePower required its instructors and
interns to perform, rather than the practice of consistently compensating them for roughly
two hours per class. CorePower notes that its employee manual explicitly instructs its
employees to accurately record their hours and prohibits them from working “off the clock.”
See [49-4] at 3. But testimony in the record suggests that that policy was not enforced.
Plaintiffs testified that teachers were compensated for only in-studio time (generally two
hours), regardless of the work they performed outside of the studio. And it is worth noting
that declarations submitted by CorePower are consistent with plaintiffs’ testimony—they
describe a compensation policy that accounted for only in-studio time while conceding the
possibility that they spent at least a nominal amount of time working outside of the studio.
See, e.g., [49-19] ¶ 5 (“Interns and instructors are paid for two hours of work time per class.
This includes class time (which is generally one hour), as well as up to a half-hour of time
before and after class.”); id. ¶ 7 (“I generally spend only nominal amount of time, if any,
outside of the studio preparing for class.”).
4

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interns and instructors. From a procedural standpoint, CorePower argues that the
need for and applicability of individualized evidence and defenses make a collective
action an inefficient method of resolving these claims.
CorePower’s concerns have some merit. Wages varied among the putative
class members, and many of them, like plaintiffs, were paid more than minimum
wage for the time that CorePower does account for—time spent in the studio during
class or at the front desk. Whether an employee’s average hourly rate dropped
below minimum wage depends on that employee’s actual wage, his own
interpretation of what his duties were, and how efficient he was at performing those
duties. CorePower points out that an instructor earning the same wage as Benikov
would have to work more than three hours outside the studio for every class she
taught in order for her average hourly rate to fall below the minimum wage. Of
course, Benikov testified that she did spend more than three hours preparing for
each class, but CorePower submits declarations from nearly 20 teachers and former
teachers who testified that their hourly rate, averaged over any given week, would
not entitle them to relief. Those employees stated in their declarations that they did
not interpret CorePower’s directives as requiring them to develop a new sequence of
poses or assemble a new music playlist for every class. Instead, they made small
changes every few classes, or on a weekly or monthly basis. They also spent less
time than plaintiffs did on theme development, and some were able to come up with
themes, verbal cues, and physical assists on the fly, rather than planning them out
before each class. They prepared for classes during their front-desk time, with only

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a minimal amount of additional time spent outside the studio, and some spent less
time on class preparation as they became more experienced. They also fulfilled
substitution requests when they wanted more work, but did not interpret
CorePower’s substitution policy as a mandate to review every email request they
received. CorePower believes that the declarants, who worked at different studios
across the country, demonstrate the variability inherent in plaintiffs’ theory of
relief.
The discretionary acts of CorePower’s studio managers present another
variable to consider and contribute to the potential heterogeneity of the proposed
classes. Some of the declarations submitted by CorePower are from former
instructors who became studio managers and whose individual decisions may have
disqualified their employees from plaintiffs’ proposed classes. Several testified that
they told instructors to prepare for classes while sitting at the front desk, that they
explicitly advised new instructors against changing sequences too frequently, and
that they required that instructors stay at the front desk after class only until the
last student leaves, even if thirty minutes had not yet passed. See, e.g., [49-13], [4935]. CorePower notes that, in her deposition, even Osterholt conceded that some job
responsibilities varied by studio and studio manager. CorePower says that the
people included in the class definitions—3,700 instructors and interns who worked
in 120 different studios in 18 states—are too diverse, and liability and damages
depend on too many variables specific to each individual, such that resolving
plaintiffs’

claims

would

require

individualized

12

findings

of

liability

and

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determinations

of

damages.

And

if

that

were

true,

then

post-discovery

decertification is all but inevitable, and sending notice to the classes would be a
waste of resources.
Liability and damages might ultimately depend on a variety of individualized
factors, but it is still too early in the case to make that determination. Plaintiffs
have not had the opportunity to depose a corporate representative of CorePower or
the employees who submitted declarations on its behalf. It is possible that further
discovery will reveal that many teachers put in enough time outside the studio to
bring their pay below the minimum wage, and that CorePower expected or
encouraged such behavior. Even though certain studio managers said in their
declarations that they set their own requirements related to front-desk time, their
statements directly contradict CorePower’s employee manual. The variability they
introduce militates against proceeding as a collective action, but it cannot be said,
based on the current record, how much of a concern they present. It may be that the
vast majority of studio managers do not deviate from CorePower’s corporate
policies, and that they do not actively discourage intense class preparation, in which
case their discretion would play no role in whether CorePower’s policies resulted in
an FLSA violation. The written directives identified by plaintiffs are vague, and
assessments of quality vary by individual, but plaintiffs demonstrate that, through
its training program and corporate communications, CorePower established certain
expectations that may have been interpreted with some degree of consistency by
other interns and instructors.

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CorePower also notes that plaintiffs did not keep track of the additional time
they spent working outside the studio and were able to provide general estimates of
total time spent, but not hourly breakdowns of that time by task. But with the
benefit of further discovery, plaintiffs may be able to prove their claims on behalf of
the classes using representative discovery. The credibility of plaintiffs’ claims of
extensive off-the-clock work—which CorePower has some basis to challenge—is also
better tested at a later stage. CorePower draws a comparison between the factual
scenario presented here and that described in Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC,
705 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2013), where the court affirmed decertification of a collective
action class because the plaintiffs had failed to provide sufficiently representative
evidence to establish liability for the class. Id. at 776–77. Some of the problems
identified by Espenscheid may loom on the horizon. For example, the plaintiffs in
that case argued that all employees were paid for each assignment they completed,
but did not report all of the time spent working. Id. at 773–74. And the court noted
the difficulty of compensating each employee fairly when they had no record of their
time spent working, and that time was dependent on a number of individualized
factors like each employee’s efficiency. Id. at 774–75. But the court did not reject out
of hand the use of a collective action when faced with such a scenario. It rejected the
plaintiffs’ showing of proof, after they had the opportunity to identify an opt-in
class, pursue discovery, and flesh out the relevant issues. It was at the second stage
that the class was decertified, and the court explicitly noted that, in theory,
representative evidence could be used “to enable[] the trier of fact to draw a ‘just

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and reasonable inference’ concerning the amount of time the employee had worked.”
Id. at 775 (citing Urnikis–Negro v. American Family Prop. Servs., 616 F.3d 665, 669
and n.2 (7th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiffs here do not put forth the type of representative
evidence that the Seventh Circuit envisioned. Nor do they have to at this stage of
the litigation. Instead, they explain that they plan to introduce representative
evidence to establish how much work was required outside the studio per class, and
to determine, based on payroll records, which opt-in members would be entitled to
relief. The sufficiency of their evidence will be examined once they have presented
it.
Both sides cite to other district court decisions in support of their arguments,
but the fact-specific nature of this type of case limits their value. District courts
have wide discretion in administering collective actions, Alvarez v. City of Chicago,
605 F.3d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Hoffmann–La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493
U.S. 165, 171 (1989)), so some degree of inconsistency is to be expected. If the
individual issues and case management concerns identified by CorePower do
develop, and the classes turn out to be “hopelessly heterogeneous,” Jonites v. Exelon
Corp., 522 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2008), then decertification will follow. But that
decision will be reserved for a later date, when the parties have a better sense of
what the class looks like and what the facts are. Conditional certification will
undoubtedly increase the costs of this litigation, Woods v. New York Life Insurance
Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982), but plaintiffs make the necessary factual
showing, considering the discovery taken so far, that there exists a group of

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employees who were subject to a common policy that caused them to be paid less
than the minimum wage. Putative class members should be notified of this action
“so that they can make informed decisions about whether to participate.”
Hoffmann–La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170. The motion to conditionally certify the intern
and instructor classes is therefore granted.
B.

Notice

Plaintiffs want to notify potential opt-ins by both U.S. mail and email, and
they propose a 90-day notice period. They say that most interns and instructors are
young and do not have permanent housing, and that supplementing mail notice
with email notice is likely to substantially increase exposure. They also argue that a
90-day notice period is necessary in case they run into difficulties tracking class
members down. I agree. Both methods of delivery may be used, and recipients are
allotted 90 days to opt in. Plaintiffs also seek authorization to send out reminder
emails and to hang posters in CorePower studios. But plaintiffs do not explain how
posters would reach any current or former interns or instructors that mail and
email would not, and there is no need to notify potential opt-ins more than once.
Plaintiffs’ request for the authorization of reminder emails and posters is denied.
The parties dispute the form of the notice to be sent out to potential opt-ins.
CorePower worries that plaintiffs’ proposed notice might be mistaken for judicial
sponsorship and an endorsement of the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. It invokes Woods
v. New York Life Insurance Co., 686 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1982), in which the Seventh
Circuit raised the same concerns and warned against the issuance of notice on a

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court’s letterhead. Id. at 581. Unlike the notice proposed in Woods, however, the
proposed notice here includes an appropriate disclaimer: “This notice and its
content has [sic] been authorized by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, the Honorable Manish Shah, United States District
Court. The court has made no decision in this case about the merits of plaintiffs’
claims or defendant’s defenses.” That should be enough to minimize the appearance
of a judicial endorsement of plaintiffs’ claims.
CorePower also wants to include in the notice warnings about opt-ins’
potential discovery obligations and the possibility that opt-ins will be partly
responsible for CorePower’s costs if CorePower prevails.5 Plaintiffs argue that such
warnings might have a chilling effect. Disclosing how opt-ins may be required to
participate in the lawsuit is fair and will allow them to make an informed decision
about joining the suit. The notice will include the following sentence: “If you join
this lawsuit, you may be required to provide information, sit for a deposition, or
testify in court.” But I agree that a reference to cost-shifting—an event of unknown
likelihood—would unnecessarily deter participation. The parties shall meet and
confer on a revised notice that is consistent with this opinion. Objections, if any, will
be resolved at the next status hearing.

CorePower also requests the inclusion of an accurate description of the lawsuit and
CorePower’s position, but it does not actually say that the proposed descriptions are
inaccurate. Its request is therefore denied.
5

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IV.

Conclusion
Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification, [36], is granted. CorePower

shall disclose to plaintiffs identifying information on the class by June 8, 2017. The
parties shall file a status report with a proposed case schedule (to include proposed
deadlines for the close of discovery, dispositive motions, and motions for class
certification and decertification of the collective action) and any new objections to
the notice by June 15, 2017. A status hearing is set for June 29, 2017 at 9:30 a.m.
ENTER:
___________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge

Date: May 18, 2017

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