Sroga v. Hondzinski et al
Filing
158
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 140) is granted. Count I is dismissed with prejudice. Status hearing set for 2/19/20 at 9:00 AM. Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 12/5/19: Mailed notice(maf) (Main Document 158 replaced on 12/5/2019) (maf, ).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KEVIN SROGA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16 C 5796
v.
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
JENNIFER HONDZINSKI, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
As noted in the Court’s two previous opinions issued in this
case, Plaintiff is a “prolific civil litigant.”
As initially
filed, this case contained 11 counts against 17 individuals and
the City of Chicago.
A Motion to Dismiss was granted as to all
counts, but one, either with or without prejudice.
Sroga v.
Hondzinski, et al., 2017 WL 3278916 (Aug. 2, 2017).
Plaintiff
then filed (with the aid of a court-appointed attorney) an Amended
Complaint containing three counts:
Count I, for illegal seizure
of Plaintiff’s motor vehicle; Count II, for excessive force; and
Count
III,
against
the
City
of
Chicago
under
Monell.
The
Defendants, once again, filed a Motion to Dismiss which the Court
denied as to Counts I and II, but granted with prejudice as to
Count III against the City of Chicago.
The Defendants have now
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I, for illegal
seizure, but do not move on Count II, for excessive force.
II.
DISCUSSION
Count I - Alleged Illegal Seizure
The Defendants contend that at the time the Plaintiff’s motor
vehicle was seized, it was parked along a city street without a
license and with its VIN obscured.
Plaintiff acknowledges that
the vehicle was unlicensed but claims that it had affixed to the
back window a so-called “seven-day permit” issued by the Illinois
Secretary of State, and that “to the best of his knowledge the VIN
was visible outside of the car.”
(See Pl.’s Response to Def.’
Rule 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 20 and 22.)
It is this somewhat equivocal
response that Plaintiff contends raises a question of fact as to
Count I so as not to be amenable to a summary judgment motion.
Be that as it may, this equivocation does not save Count I,
because, in addition to the alleged obscured VIN, the vehicle was
unlicensed, and, apparently never had been.
According to the
Secretary of State’s records, Plaintiff did not re-register the
vehicle after its initial registration after Plaintiff purchased
the vehicle from the City of Chicago on July 14, 2011, so the
vehicle was unregistered on June 18, 2014, the date of seizure as
Defendants
set
out
as
undisputed
facts
in
their
Rule 56.1
Statement.
Defendants cite in support of this allegation records
obtained from the Secretary of State which contains a certification
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in support.
(Def. Rule 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 11 and 12.)
Although
Plaintiff admits that the vehicle was unregistered on the date of
seizure, he contends that he applied for and received a seven-day
permit because the reason the vehicle was unlicensed was because
it had failed an emission test.
Concerning the lack of registration statement of fact, ¶ 11,
Plaintiff responds with the following language:
Disputed that the Illinois Secretary of State’s Office
does not have a record of the plaintiff renewing the
registration of the vehicle.
The defendants have not
presented any evidence as to the entirety of the records
in the Secretary of State’s possession. They have also
not presented any evidence to explain what the records
in Exhibit D are, how they were obtained, whether they
are complete and what they would ordinarily contain.
However, Plaintiff did not cite to any portion of the record in
support of his denial.
If in fact Plaintiff wished properly to
dispute the issue of re-registration, he could have produced some
evidence
in
support
of
the
denial,
not
just
criticize
the
completeness of Defendants’ Statement of Facts.
All Plaintiff is willing to allege under oath is that at some
point the Secretary of State “issued the 7-day permit to me for my
car.”
(Pl.’s Aff., ¶ 2.)
He does not say when the permit was
issued but he does admit in response to Para. 15 and 16 of
Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement, that the 7-day permit had expired
on May 23, 2014, 25 days prior to the seizure.
Therefore, at the
time of the seizure the vehicle may or may not have had its VIN
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obscured but was unlicensed and had on display a 7-day permit that
had long since expired.
The Chicago Municipal Code § 9-80-220 provides as follows:
9-80-220 False, stolen or altered temporary registration
permits.
No person shall operate or park on the public way
any vehicle bearing a false, stolen or altered state
temporary registration permit.
A vehicle operated or
parked in violation of this section is subject to
immediate impoundment.
The owner of record of such
vehicle shall be liable to the city for an administrative
penalty of $500.00 in addition to fees for towing and
storage of the vehicle. Whenever a police officer has
probable cause to believe that a vehicle is subject to
seizure and impoundment under this subsection, the
police officer shall provide for the towing of the
vehicle to a facility controlled by the city or its
agents. When the vehicle is towed, the police officer
shall notify the person who is found to be in control of
the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation, if
there is such a person, of the fact of the seizure and
of the vehicle owner’s right to request a preliminary
hearing to be conducted under Section 2-14-132 of this
Code.
If the vehicle is unattended, notice shall be
sent to the owner of record of the vehicle, at the
address indicated in the last valid registration of the
vehicle.
Plaintiff acknowledges that this provision was in effect on
the date of the seizure but relies solely for the illegality of
the seizure, the so-called unobscured VIN.
Thus, his argument is
irrelevant to the legality of the seizure.
The Chicago Municipal
Code makes a vehicle with a “false” temporary registration permit
subject
to
immediate
impoundment.
Certainly,
a
long-expired
permit that is attached to make the vehicle appear to be registered
is a false document and makes the vehicle subject to impoundment
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under the ordinances.
The impoundment ordinances have passed
muster on both substantive and procedural due process grounds.
Towers v. Chicago, 173 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2013) and Jackson v.
Chicago, 975 N.E.2d 153 (1st Dist. 2012).
With respect to this point, the Court in its opinion denying
the motion to dismiss Count I, illegal seizure, stated that insofar
as the notice pleading is concerned:
an allegation the car had a temporary permit affixed to
the window would be sufficient to put Defendant Officers
on notice that Plaintiff was relying on a valid permit.
It may turn out that the permit was indeed not valid,
but this is a question of fact.
Sroga v. Hondzinski, et al., 2018 WL 3068331 (June 21, 2018).
The question that was open at the motion to dismiss stage is
now closed.
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I is
granted.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 140) is granted.
Count I is dismissed
with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: 12/5/2019
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