Mission Measurement Corporation et al v. Blackbaud, INC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 10/27/2016:Mailed notice(kef, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MISSION MEASUREMENT
CORPORATION and MISSION
METRICS, LCC,1
)
)
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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BLACKBAUD, INC., and MICROEDGE, )
LLC,
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Defendants.
)
Case No. 16 C 6003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On June 8, 2016, Plaintiff Mission Measurement Corporation (“Mission Measurement”)
brought the present seven-count Complaint against Defendants Blackbaud, Inc. (“Blackbaud”)
and MicroEdge, LLC (“MicroEdge”) alleging violations of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016, 18 U.S.C. § 1831, et seq., as well as supplemental state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1367(a). Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, motion for a more definite statement
under Rule 12(e). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motions.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I.
Motion Under Rule 12(b)(6)
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the
viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
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Plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss Mission Metrics as a party to this lawsuit. [21].
granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). The
relevant question at the motion to dismiss stage is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail on the merits, but whether the complaint is sufficient to cross the federal pleading
threshold. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529-30, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233
(2011). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under the federal notice
pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167
L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Put differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). In determining the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, courts must
“accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.”
Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). Also, “a plaintiff ordinarily need
not anticipate and attempt to plead around affirmative defenses.” Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U,
Ltd., 821 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016).
II.
Motion Under Rule 12(e)
Under Rule 12(e), a party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading that is
“so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(e). The rule “is designed to strike at unintelligibility rather than want of detail.” Gardunio v.
Town of Cicero, 674 F.Supp.2d 976, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2009). “Motions under Rule 12(e) are
disfavored generally, and courts should grant such motions only if the complaint is so
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unintelligible that the defendant cannot draft responsive pleading.” Rivera v. Lake Cnty., 974 F.
Supp. 2d 1179, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
BACKGROUND
In the Complaint, Mission Measurement alleges that it is the market leader in social
sector data and insights relating to social change programs aimed at addressing issues such as
poverty, hunger, access to healthcare, and climate change. (R. 1, Compl. ¶ 14.) One of Mission
Measurement’s goals is to change the way non-profits, corporations, governments, and
foundations invest in philanthropic causes by using data to measure and forecast social impact
program outcomes. (Id.) Using data collected from social program evaluations, Mission
Measurement has compiled a database of over 75,000 different data points, which it has
categorized into approximately 130 social outcome types. (Id. ¶ 15.) Mission Measurement
alleges that these data are used to grade whether a particular program will achieve its objectives,
the average expected cost to do so, and the total number of people the program will serve. (Id.)
Over the last eleven years, Mission Measurement has developed its proprietary database
– the Outcome TaxonomyTM – that implements Mission Measurement’s vision for database and
software products and methods to gauge social impact. (Id. ¶ 16.) Certain aspects of Mission
Measurement’s novel system are detailed in the pending U.S. Patent Application Ser. No.
14/137,580 entitled “System and Method for Analyzing and Predicting the Impact of Social
Programs,” filed on December 20, 2013. (Id.)
Defendant MicroEdge is a provider of software solutions to automate the charitable
giving process. (Id. ¶ 17.) On February 29, 2012, Alan Cline (“Cline”), Principal at Vista
Equity Partners (“Vista”), contacted Mission Measurement’s CEO Jason Saul (“Saul”) to help
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MicroEdge develop a way to measure outcomes. (Id.) Mission Measurement contends that
Vista is a private equity firm that has held significant investments in MicroEdge. (Id.) Also,
Mission Measurement alleges, upon information and belief, that Vista and MicroEdge knew that
MicroEdge had little to no knowledge or experience in measuring outcomes from philanthropic
programs and that they needed Mission Measurement’s expertise. (Id. ¶ 18.) In addition,
Mission Measurement maintains that Cline’s initial contact led to a series of communications
between Mission Measurement and MicroEdge with the goal of jointly developing and owning a
new software application based on Mission Measurement’s trade secrets, the Outcome
Taxonomy, and other intellectual property. (Id.)
On March 16, 2012, MicroEdge’s CEO Preston McKenzie (“McKenzie”) communicated
with Saul that MicroEdge desired to engage Mission Measurement to help it develop a software
product to measure outcomes. (Id. ¶ 20.) According to Plaintiff, Saul made it clear that Mission
Measurement had intended to develop a software application for its own commercialization and
would not be interested in helping MicroEdge develop a product unless Mission Measurement
received equity in MicroEdge or royalties based on sales of the software product. (Id.) In April
and May 2012, Saul and McKenzie began discussing the terms of this agreement. (Id. ¶ 21.) To
protect the confidential and proprietary nature of such discussions, Mission Measurement and
MicroEdge executed a Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement dated June 26, 2012. (Id.
¶ 22.) Two months later, Mission Measurement sent MicroEdge an email with attachments that
described the joint project and included confidential information. (Id. ¶ 23.) In the fall of 2012,
Mission Measurement and MicroEdge conducted focus groups to determine market demand and
to test potential client response to their jointly-developed product. (Id. ¶ 24.) During that time,
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Mission Measurement and MicroEdge negotiated a Joint Development Agreement (“JDA”),
which specified that the software was jointly-owned by the parties, that Mission Measurement
exclusively owns the Outcomes Taxonomy, and that MicroEdge would pay royalties and a
development fee to Mission Measurement upon commercialization. (Id.) The parties never
executed the JDA. (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, throughout the course of their dealing, MicroEdge repeatedly
recognized the significant value of Mission Measurement’s intellectual property and its
importance to the joint software product. (Id. ¶ 26.) In 2012 and early 2013, Mission
Measurement and MicroEdge began discussing the terms of a definitive agreement to
memorialize their understanding that the software product they were developing was and is
jointly-owned and that they would share the revenues based on the sales of the product. (Id.) As
of January 2013, Mission Measurement and MicroEdge had reached an agreement on essential
terms, but other terms and conditions had yet to be finalized. (Id. ¶ 27.) The parties, however,
wanted to finalize the jointly-developed product and launch it as soon as possible, therefore, on
January 16, 2013 Mission Measurement and MicroEdge executed a Letter of Intent. (Id.) The
Letter of Intent explicitly acknowledged the joint nature of the product in terms of joint product
development, joint technology development, and joint sales pitch meetings. (Id. ¶ 29.)
Moreover, the Letter of Intent clearly stated that the Outcomes Taxonomy is Mission
Measurement’s sole property. (Id.)
After execution of the Letter of Intent on January 16, 2013, Mission Measurement
continued to share intellectual property with MicroEdge in order to develop a project plan. (Id. ¶
30.) On February 19, 2013, MicroEdge’s development team visited Mission Measurement in
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Chicago where Mission Measurement shared additional confidential information, after which
multiple meetings and telephone calls occurred to develop and finalize the product. (Id. ¶¶ 30,
31.) Mission Measurement and MicroEdge worked in close collaboration for over two years,
from June 2012 through May 2014, to educate MicroEdge’s software engineers and executives
on Mission Measurement’s intellectual property, including its Outcomes Taxonomy, that would
be integrated into the jointly-owned software product. (Id. ¶ 32.) According to Plaintiff, despite
MicroEdge’s representations and conduct, MicroEdge failed to act in good faith in negotiating
the definitive agreement, but instead embarked on an intentional and consistent strategy of delay
and obfuscation in its communications with Mission Measurement. (Id. ¶ 37.) Shortly
thereafter, in the summer of 2014, MicroEdge ceased communications with Mission
Measurement. (Id. ¶ 39.)
In early September 2014, Charles Vanek (“Vanek”), MicroEdge’s then Vice President of
Business Development, forwarded a news report to Saul that stated Defendant Blackbaud bought
MicroEdge for $160 million. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 40.) In that correspondence, Vanek told Saul that the
“radio silence over the last several months was due to this deal.” (Id. ¶ 40.) During a follow-up
telephone conversation with Saul, Vanek stated that the acquisition was a “good thing” for
Mission Measurement and that Vanek expected that their joint product would be brought to
market even more successfully with Blackbaud’s large user base and support. (Id.) At no time
during the call, or on any of their prior calls, had Vanek terminated the Letter of Intent or
Confidentiality Agreement nor did Vanek state that Defendants would not honor their promise to
share in the revenue of the joint product. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 41.) Nonetheless, on October 26, 2015,
Defendants issued a press release that “unveiled its transformational outcomes solution”
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featuring “a first-of-its-kind outcomes measurement taxonomy,” which Plaintiff alleges, upon
information and belief, is the joint product covered by the Confidentiality Agreement and Letter
of Intent. (Id. ¶ 43.) In the fall of 2015 – without Mission Measurement’s knowledge or
permission – MicroEdge began marketing their jointly-developed software solution. (Id. ¶ 44.)
Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have blatantly re-characterized the joint
product as their own and are acting as if the prior two and one-half years’ of work with Mission
Measurement never happened. (Id. ¶ 45.) On information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that
MicroEdge, beginning on or about May 2014, executed a plan to misappropriate Mission
Measurement’s trade secrets and other intellectual property and to repackage them as its own.
(Id. ¶ 46.) Unbeknownst to Mission Measurement, Blackbaud was in the process of acquiring
MicroEdge, and thus MicroEdge had every motivation to cut Mission Measurement out of the
financial rewards attributable to the joint product. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Vista’s
and MicroEdge’s plan to pump up MicroEdge’s value worked because during the sale process to
Blackbaud, the joint software product was valued at tens of millions of dollars. (Id. ¶ 47.) Also,
during the sale process, either MicroEdge failed to disclose Mission Measurement’s rights under
the agreements and intellectual property rights, or Blackbaud knew of such rights and
Defendants fashioned a strategy to exclude Plaintiff. (Id.)
Furthermore, in February 2016, Blackbaud issued a press release concerning Blackbaud
OutcomesTM, which Plaintiff alleges embodies most – if not all – of the joint product offering
developed by Mission Measurement and MicroEdge during 2012 to 2014, including Mission
Measurement’s Outcome Taxonomy, trade secrets, and other intellectual property. (Id. ¶ 48.)
Defendants have yet to attribute or pay Mission Measurement for the product it developed with
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MicroEdge. (Id.)
ANALYSIS
I.
Trade Secrets Allegations
In Count III of the Complaint, Mission Measurement brings a trade secret
misappropriation claim under the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”), which creates a
private cause of action in favor of the “owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated ... if the
trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1). Under the DTSA, a trade secret includes:
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program
devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes,
procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or
how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if –
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information[.]
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). Under the DTSA, “misappropriation” is defined as “an unconsented
disclosure or use of a trade secret by one who (i) used improper means to acquire the secret, or,
(ii) at the time of disclosure, knew or had reason to know that the trade secret was acquired
through improper means, under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy of the
trade secret, or derived from or through a person who owed such a duty.” Syntel Sterling Best
Shores Mauritius Ltd. v. Trizetto Grp., Inc., No. 15CV211, 2016 WL 5338550, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2016) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)).
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In Count IV, Plaintiff brings a trade secret misappropriation claim under the Illinois
Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”), 765 ILCS 1065. “To prevail on a claim for misappropriation of a
trade secret under the Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the information at issue was a
trade secret, that it was misappropriated and that it was used in the defendant’s business.”
Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
Alpha Sch. Bus Co. v. Wagner, 391 Ill. App. 3d 722, 740, 910 N.E.2d 1134 (1st Dist. 2009). The
ITSA defines a “trade secret” as:
information, including but not limited to, technical or non-technical data, a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing,
process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers, that:
(1) is sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy or confidentiality.
See 765 ILCS 1065/2(d); Triumph Packaging Grp. v. Ward, 834 F. Supp. 2d 796, 806 (N.D. Ill.
2011).
In the present motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s trade secret allegations lack
sufficient particularity because Plaintiff has failed to specifically identify the exact trade secrets
at issue in this lawsuit. Courts in this district, however, have concluded trade secret “allegations
to be adequate in instances where the information and the efforts to maintain its confidentiality
are described in general terms.” Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC v. Berry, 15 F. Supp. 3d 813, 818
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (collecting cases). In other words, while “‘[i]t is not enough to point to broad
areas of technology and assert that something there must have been secret and misappropriated,’
Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1992),
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trade secrets ‘need not be disclosed in detail in a complaint alleging misappropriation for the
simple reason that such a requirement would result in public disclosure of the purported trade
secrets.’”2 Covenant Aviation, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 818 (quoting AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160
F.Supp.2d 915, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (quotation omitted). In sum, “[a]t the pleading stage,
plaintiffs need only describe the information and efforts to maintain the confidentiality of the
information in general terms.” Scan Top Enter. Co., Ltd. v. Winplus N. Am., Inc., No. 14 C 7505,
2015 WL 4945240, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2015); see also AutoMed Techs., 160 F.Supp.2d at
921 (identifying software and source code met Rule 8(a)(2) requirements). In this context,
“[c]ourts only dismiss a claim for lack of specificity on the pleadings in the most extreme cases.”
Fire ‘Em Up, Inc. v. Technocarb Equip. Ltd., 799 F. Supp. 2d 846, 850 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citation
omitted).
Viewing the well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff
has adequately alleged specific information about the confidential information, trade secrets, and
intellectual property supporting its trade secret misappropriation claims. More specifically, two
months after the parties signed the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement, Mission
Measurement sent MicroEdge an email with attachments that described the joint project and
included confidential information such as a taxonomy sample, screen-shots of an outcomes
prototype, and aspects of Plaintiff’s system that were not described in the patent allegations.
(Compl. ¶ 23.) Mission Measurement also provided MicroEdge with confidential information
2
In Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1266-68 (7th
Cir. 1992) (per curiam), the Seventh Circuit reversed a jury’s verdict in which the jury found
trade secret misappropriation because the verdict was not supported by the evidence presented at
trial.
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and product design specifications on July 10, 2012, August 13, 2012, and during September and
October 2012. (Id.) After the parties executed the Letter of Intent in January 2013, Mission
Measurement continued to share its intellectual property. (Id. ¶ 30.) In particular, Plaintiff
alleges that at the February 2013 meeting in Chicago, the parties discussed product design, gap
analysis, technical requirements, and customer lists – raising a reasonable inference that in
sharing this information, Mission Measurement revealed confidential information and
intellectual property. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff sets forth the following confidential and proprietary
information that it disclosed to MicroEdge during the relevant time period: (1) a specialized
Outcomes Taxonomy; (2) a method for collecting standardized data; (3) a method for calculating
grantee impact; (4) software design specifications; (5) impact reports and analytics; and (6)
business models for selling access to metrics databases. (Id. ¶ 33.) Other confidential
information included drawings, sketches, designs, screen mock-ups, measurement concepts and
calculations, business plans, and product development plans. (Id. ¶ 34.) Mission Measurement
also explains that it did not disclose certain aspects of its intellectual property in the patent
application – as permitted by patent law – because these aspects were trade secrets. (Id.)
MicroEdge used and then disclosed this information to Blackbaud in an effort pump up
MicroEdge’s value by millions of dollars. (Id. ¶ 47.) Both Blackbaud and MicroEdge used
Plaintiff’s trade secrets in their businesses by marketing and selling Blackbaud OutcomesTM,
which embodies most, if not all, of the joint product offering. (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff’s allegations
also reflect that it made reasonable efforts to maintain the information’s secrecy and
confidentiality by entering into the detailed Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement
concerning its trade secrets, Outcome Taxonomy, and other intellectual property. (Id. ¶ 23.)
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Based on these detailed allegations, Plaintiff has sufficiently identifying the trade secrets
at issue, including the dates and ways it shared this information with Defendants, especially
because the only relationship the parties had was collaborating on the jointly-developed
software. Therefore, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants misappropriated the relevant
trade secrets. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Defendants’ insistence that Plaintiff allege its trade secrets
with “particularity” is not supported by case law or the federal pleadings standards. Similarly,
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff should have separated the relevant trade secrets from the
public information disclosed in Mission Measurement’s patent application is not supported by
any legal authority or Rule 8(a)(2). The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Counts III and IV.
II.
Quasi-Contract Claims
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s quasi-contract claims of promissory estoppel and
unjust enrichment as alleged in Counts V and VII are barred because the January 2013 Letter of
Intent and June 2012 Confidentiality Agreement control the present dispute and that Plaintiff’s
quasi-contract claims are based on the same subject matter.3 Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(d)(2), however, a “party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in separate ones.” Indeed,
under the federal procedural rules, a “party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it
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Plaintiff’s argument that its promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims are not
based on the same factual subject matter as the Letter of Intent and Confidentiality Agreement is
best left for summary judgment after the parties have conducted discovery.
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has, regardless of consistency.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(3). As the Supreme Court explains, the
“[r]ules recognize that a person may not be sure in advance upon which legal theory she will
succeed, and so permit parties” to plead inconsistent claims in the alternative. Cleveland v.
Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805 (1999); see also Peterson v. McGladrey & Pullen,
LLP, 676 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2012); Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits
Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 2011); see, e.g., Santangelo v. Comcast
Corp., 162 F. Supp. 3d 691 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“a plaintiff can bring an unjust enrichment claim in
the alternative to a breach of contract claim.”); In re Fluidmaster, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 940, 963
(N.D. Ill. 2016) (“While Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim may eventually give way to
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and fraud claims, Plaintiffs may plead in the alternative at this stage
in the litigation.”). Therefore, under the federal procedural rules, Plaintiff may allege
promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims in the alternative to its breach of contract
claims. The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts V and VII.
III.
Breach of Contract – Count VI
In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges a breach of contract claim based on MicroEdge’s post-
January 2013 promises that the software product at issue was jointly-owned by both MicroEdge
and Mission Measurement. Defendants first argue that the Court must dismiss this claim
because the January 16, 2013 Letter of Intent includes a merger clause stating that this “letter
constitutes the entire understanding and agreement between the parties hereto and their affiliates
with respect to its subject matter and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous agreements,
representations, warranties and understandings of such parties (whether oral or written).” (R. 16,
Ex. A, LOI ¶ 13.) (emphasis added). Here, the merger clause only covers prior or
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contemporaneous agreements and not oral promises made after the parties executed the Letter of
Intent in January 2013. Therefore, Defendants’ argument is unavailing at this procedural
posture.
Next, Defendants argue that the Illinois Statute of Frauds precludes enforcement of any
such promise that cannot be performed within one calendar year “unless the promise or
agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall
be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by
him lawfully authorized.” 740 ILCS 80/1. The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense as
listed by Rule 8(c)(1) and Plaintiff “need not anticipate and attempt to plead around affirmative
defenses.” Hyson USA, Inc., 821 F.3d at 939. Also, whether the oral promise can be performed
within one calendar year is a question of fact best left for summary judgment. The Court
therefore denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VI.
IV.
Rule 12(e) Motion
In the alternative, Defendants argue that Plaintiff must provide a more definite statement
under Rule 12(e). Courts, however, disfavor Rule 12(e) motions unless a plaintiff’s allegations
are so unintelligible, vague, or ambiguous that the defendant cannot draft a responsive pleading.
See Rivera v. Lake Cnty., 974 F. Supp. 2d at 1195; Gardunio v. Town of Cicero, 674 F.Supp.2d
at 992. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are not vague or unintelligible, but are factually detailed and
state a plausible claim for relief – as discussed in detail above. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”). Also,
Defendants have already drafted one responsive pleading and have failed to convince the Court
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they are unable to admit, deny, or claim lack knowledge in answering Plaintiff’s allegations. See
Rivera, 974 F.Supp.2d at 1195. As such, the Court denies Defendants’ Rule 12(e) motion.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and also
denies Defendants’ Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement.
Dated: October 27, 2016
ENTERED
______________________________
AMY J. ST. EVE
United States District Court Judge
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