Carter v. Monarch Recovery Management, Inc.

Filing 87

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 2/12/19.Mailed notice(ca, )

Case: 1:16-cv-06376 Document #: 87 Filed: 02/12/19 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:864

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
STEVEN CARTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
MONARCH RECOVERY
MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant.

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16 C 6376

Judge John Z. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Steven Carter sued Defendant Monarch Recovery Management, Inc.
(“Monarch”), alleging that Monarch sent him a debt-collection letter that violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq, and the Illinois Collection Agency
Act (“ICAA”), 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 425/9(a).1 The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, and the Court granted Monarch’s motion. Carter now seeks relief under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the following reasons, Carter’s motion [64] is denied.
Background
As explained in greater detail in the Court’s summary-judgment opinion, the basis for this
lawsuit is a debt-collection letter Carter received from Monarch in May 2016. Mem. Op. & Order
at 2, ECF No. 58. Earlier that year, Carter had defaulted on a credit-card debt to Citibank, and
Citibank placed the account with Monarch for collection. Id. at 1–2. Monarch then sent Carter a
letter seeking $16,743.33––the balance of the account––and informing Carter that the balance may
subsequently increase due to interest, late fees, or other charges. Id. at 2. Monarch itself did not
have authority to add charges to the account, but Citibank could do so, in which case Monarch
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Carter’s Rule 59(e) motion does not address the ICAA claim.

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would pass on the additional fees to the consumer. Id. Here, no additional charges were added
to Carter’s account. Id.
In ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court concluded that
Carter had failed to present evidence that the statement in Monarch’s letter was a legal
impossibility or an action it intended not to take, and that Carter had failed to identify any evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the statement was false, misleading, or deceptive.
Id. at 4–7. As such, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of Monarch. Id. at 9.
Legal Standard
Rule 59(e) permits parties to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days of
the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of
allowing courts to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to consider newly-discovered evidence.
See Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 505 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Resnick, 594
F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2010). Whether to grant a Rule 59(e) motion “is entrusted to the sound
judgment of the district court.” Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
Resnick, 594 F.3d at 568 (noting that an appellate court reviews a denial of a Rule 59(e) motion
for abuse of discretion). Relief under Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary” remedy “reserved for the
exceptional case.” Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West, 791 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2015).
Analysis
Carter makes several arguments as to why relief under Rule 59(e) is warranted; however,
each of the points he raises was considered and rejected by the Court on summary judgment.
Carter first argues that the Court misapprehended his argument “that Monarch . . . did not
intend to add additional charges” because Monarch “only intended to do what Citibank” instructed.
Pl.’s Rule 59(e) Mot. at 3, ECF No. 64 (emphasis in original). But the Court considered this

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argument in its opinion and concluded that “the evidence show[ed] that it was Citibank who
controlled whether additional charges were to be placed on the account, and Monarch simply
followed suit.” Mem. Op. & Order at 7. In other words, Monarch’s intent was to do as Citibank
instructed, which would have included adding charges to Carter’s account, had Citibank directed
it to do so. Carter has not identified any controlling precedent that the Court disregarded,
misapplied, or failed to recognize, and mere rejection of an argument does not demonstrate
manifest error. See Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A ‘manifest
error’ is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party.”).
Further, Carter argues that the Court “misstated” the facts, Pl.’s Rule 59(e) Mot. at 5, when
it said that “the only evidence that Carter cite[d] in support [of his claim] [was] the fact that, at the
end of the day, Monarch did not add any more interest or fees to the original balance.” Mem. Op.
& Order at 6. Carter instead notes that “Citibank had not add[ed] interest or fees to the balance in
the seven months between being charged-off and placed with Monarch [and] [f]urther, once placed
with Monarch for collection, Citibank did not add additional interest or fees.” Pl.’s Rule 59(e)
Mot. at 5. Based on these facts, Carter contends, the Court should have drawn the inference that
“Carter’s account balance would never have increased.” Id. (emphasis in original).
While Carter is entitled to reasonable inferences in his favor, the inference that he would
have the Court make is not a reasonable one. As the Court previously stated, the fact that no new
charges were added to Carter’s account, in and of itself, does not compel the conclusion that
Monarch knew, at the time it sent the letter, that it would not add any new charges under any
circumstances––for instance, if Citibank directed it to do so. See Mem. Op. & Order at 6. And
Carter did not present any facts to support such an inference, as it was his burden to do.
For the same reasons, Carter’s argument that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to

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whether his account balance would have increased is unpersuasive. Carter contends that the Court
erred in “weighing conflicting evidence,” but fails to identify any such evidence. Pl.’s Rule 59(e)
Mot. at 7. That is because, rather than weighing conflicting evidence, the Court based its ruling
on the undisputed facts. Mem. Op. & Order at 6.
Finally, Carter states that the Court failed to rule on his broader § 1692e claim or properly
analyze it under the “unsophisticated consumer” standard. This is incorrect. The Court discussed
this claim in the summary-judgment opinion,2 described the “unsophisticated consumer” standard,
and concluded that “Carter [had] point[ed] to no evidence that Monarch’s ability to adjust the
balance . . . was a legal impossibility.” Id. at 6. The Court then went on to discuss the question of
Monarch’s intent to add additional charges to the account balance. See id. at 6–7. The Court
ultimately determined that Carter had “failed to point to any evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that the statement in the letter was false, misleading, or deceptive” in a way
that violated § 1692e. Id. at 7. That is because the evidence in the record showed that Monarch
could have increased the account balance––and would have done so––if so instructed by Citibank.
To the extent that Carter argues that the § 1692e claim was wrongly decided because the Court
should have drawn the inference that the account balance would never have increased, as discussed
above, that is an unreasonable inference based on the evidence before the Court.
In short, Carter has not identified any manifest error of law or fact, or newly-discovered
evidence, that would warrant relief under Rule 59(e).

See Mem Op. & Order at 4 (“Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, debt collectors may not use any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. ‘It is
deceptive or misleading to imply that certain outcomes might befall a delinquent debtor when, legally, those
outcomes cannot come to pass.’”) (quoting Lox v. CDA, Ltd., 689 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2012)).
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Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Carter’s motion to alter or amend the judgment [64] is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED 2/12/19

______________________________
John Z. Lee
United States District Judge

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