Nadzhafaliyev v. Hardy et al
Filing
109
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. The court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 83 . The court denies the motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Tom Comeford, Jeff Pharis, an d Daniel Hardy for failure to provide a bed accommodation for Plaintiff's back pain. In addition, the court denies the motion for summary judgment against the same Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court grants t he motion for summary judgment in all other respects and dismisses claims against Defendants Nidea, Mohiuddin and Kiss. Count III of the Third Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as moot.The parties are directed to submit, on or before Jan uary 15, a joint written report on the status of their discovery; efforts, if any, to resolve the case; and their interest, if any, in referral of this matter to Magistrate Judge Gilbert for settlement conference. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 11/30/2020. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 1 of 23 PageID #:826
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ALI NADZHAFALIYEV,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DANIEL HARDY, individually, JEFF PHARIS,
)
individually, ANTHONY NIDEA, individually,
)
GHOUSE MOHIUDDIN, individually, TOM
)
COMEFORD, individually, and MEREDITH KISS, )
individually and in her official capacity, 1
)
)
Defendants.
)
Case No. 16 C 6844
Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ali Nadzhafaliyev was a civil detainee at the Elgin Mental Health Center (“EMHC”)
from 2005 to March 2019. In this lawsuit, he alleges that EMHC personnel violated his rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing his repeated requests for special bed
support to alleviate his chronic back pain and ignoring his repeated complaints that his room was
too cold. Defendant Meredith Kiss, EMHC’s Administrator, is sued in her individual and official
capacities. The remaining EMHC Defendants are sued in their individual capacities: Daniel
Hardy, the Medical Director; Jeff Pharis, the Forensic Director; Dr. Anthony Nidea, a medical
doctor; Dr. Ghouse Mohiuddin, a psychiatrist; and Tom Comeford, a Nurse Manager. Plaintiff
asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants for failure to provide a reasonable
medical accommodation in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (See Third Am. Compl., Counts
I.) He also asserts a claim under Section 1983 against Defendants Hardy, Pharis, and Comeford
1
Plaintiff incorrectly spells Pharis as “Pharris” and Mohiuddin as “Mouhoudini” in the
operative complaint. (See Third Am. Compl. [54]).) Plaintiff originally sued all Defendants in their
official capacities but now sues only Defendant Kiss in her official capacity. (Compare Compl. [1]
with Third Am. Compl.) Plaintiff has dropped his claim against Elgin Mental Health Center.
(Compare Compl. with Third Am. Compl.)
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 2 of 23 PageID #:827
for failure to provide medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (See id., Count II.)
Finally, he asserts a claim against all Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress
under Illinois law. (See id., Count IV.) 2 Defendants now move for summary judgment on all
claims. For the following reason, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
In 2005, Plaintiff was found not guilty by reason of insanity for an unspecified offense.
(Resp. to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp.”) [102] ¶ 3.)
As a result, he was committed to EMHC for an indefinite time. (Id.; see also id. ¶ 1 (agreeing that
all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was a civil detainee at EMHC).) 3 EMHC is divided into
different housing units. (See id. ¶ 5.) For his first few months at EMHC, Plaintiff lived in the Pinel
unit. (Id.) Next, he lived in the K unit for approximately one year; the N unit for nine years; the M
unit for nine months; and the L unit from August 2017 until his release. (id.)
At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Kiss was the Administrator of EMHC.
(Id. ¶ 23.) Kiss directly supervised all Defendants. (See id. ¶ 24.) Defendant Pharis was EMHC’s
Forensic Director at all relevant times. (Id. ¶ 19.) 4 Defendant Hardy was EMHC’s Medical
Director at all relevant times through May 31, 2017. (Id. ¶ 9.) Defendant Dr. Nidea was Plaintiff’s
primary care physician during his entire stay at EMHC. (Id. ¶ 22.) Defendant Dr. Mohiuddin was
Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist at EMHC beginning in December 2016. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant
Comeford began working as a Nurse Manager at EMHC in 2011. (Comeford Dep., Ex. 1 to Pl.’s
2
Plaintiff agrees that his claim under Section 1983 for injunctive relief against
Defendant Kiss is moot because he is no longer detained at EMHC. (See Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’
Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp.”) [101] at 10.) The court dismisses that claim (Count III of the Third
Amended Complaint) with prejudice.
3
The parties agree that “[a]s of March 22, 2019, Plaintiff is no longer a resident of
EMHC.” (Id. ¶ 2.) The court assumes this means he was released from civil detention. Plaintiff
now lives in Chicago, Illinois. (Id.)
4
Neither side explains Pharis’s job duties as a Forensic Director.
2
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 3 of 23 PageID #:828
L.R. 56.1 Stat. of Add’l Facts [102-1] at 17:8-11.) Comeford was Plaintiff’s Nurse Manager for
approximately six of the nine years he lived in the N unit at EMHC and for a few months while he
lived in the M unit. (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 6-7.) While living at EMHC, Plaintiff received
treatment not only from Defendants Dr. Nidea and Dr. Mohiuddin, but also from a chiropractor, a
physical therapist, and doctors at University of Illinois Chicago. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff attended
“Monthly Staffing Meetings” where he could voice concerns to EMHC staff about his health and
living facilities. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 10, 46.)
A.
Bed Accommodation
Before Plaintiff was involuntarily committed to EMHC, he was involved in three car
accidents that caused injuries to his back. (Id. ¶ 4.) He suffers from chronic back pain. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that throughout his stay at EMHC, he complained to Defendants about his back
pain and asked for a “better sleeping surface.” (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stat. of Add’l Facts (“Pl.’s L.R.
56.1 Stat.”) [102] ¶¶ 1-3.)
According to Plaintiff, Defendants ignored his request for this
accommodation until 2016, when they bolted a piece of plywood to his bedframe. (See Pl.’s L.R.
56.1 Resp. ¶ 41.)
The parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements paint an incomplete picture of
Plaintiff’s complaints and Defendants’ responses, including their chronology. The court has done
its best to identify the undisputed facts and present them clearly.
The court begins with Plaintiff’s complaints to his physician, Defendant Dr. Nidea. Dr.
Nidea testified during his deposition that he never made an independent determination that
Plaintiff needed “greater bed support”, and that none of Plaintiff’s other medical providers—
including physical therapists and orthopedic surgeons—advised Plaintiff that they had made such
a determination. (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 34; see also id. ¶ 40 (Plaintiff’s admission that during
his own deposition, he could not provide the names of any doctors who told him that sleeping on
a flat surface would improve his back pain).) It is undisputed that Plaintiff approached Dr. Nidea
with the idea that “bed support” might alleviate his pain. (Id. ¶ 35; see also Dr. Nidea Dep., Ex.
13 to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. [85-13] at 28:21-30:7.) The parties do not specify what kind of bed
3
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 4 of 23 PageID #:829
support Plaintiff requested nor when he first raised the idea. But according to Dr. Nidea’s
deposition testimony, Plaintiff first asked about bed support while he was living in the K unit. (See
Dr. Nidea Dep. at 30:10-14, 31:12-15.) That was sometime in 2005 or 2006. (See Pl.’s L.R. 56.1
Resp. ¶¶ 3, 5.)
In response to Plaintiff’s request, Dr. Nidea asked “the nurse manager, forensic director,
and medical director” whether it was possible to provide Plaintiff with additional bed support.
(Id. ¶ 36; see Dr. Nidea Dep. at 30:19-31:6.) Dr. Nidea explained that he needed their approval
to order the equipment. (Dr. Nidea Dep. at 30:24-31:2.) At the time, Defendant Pharis was the
Forensic Director and Defendant Hardy was the medical director. (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 9, 19.)
It is unclear who was serving as the Nurse Manager at the time, as Defendant Comeford did not
hold that role until 2011. (Comeford Dep. at 17:8-11.) Defendants denied the request because
of “safety issues.” (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 37; Dr. Nidea Dep. at 31:7-8.). The parties do not
describe what equipment Dr. Nidea requested nor identify the specific safety issues, but Dr. Nidea
testified that the safety issues were “something about how they’re going to try to secure the board
in his bed without that being loose or being used as a weapon or used as a barricade in his room
or something like that.” (Dr. Nidea Dep. at 32:18-23.) As the court interprets this testimony, it
appears that Plaintiff’s initial request was for a board or flat surface to put beneath his mattress.
After the request was denied, Plaintiff began sleeping on the floor of his room. (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 38.) When asked if he “believe[s] that someone sleeping on the floor for a more firm
support is reasonable,” Dr. Nidea testified, “It’s too hard. I mean, there’s no support. . . . [T]hat
may even aggravate it. You may get muscle spasms.” (Dr. Nidea Dep. at 33:19-34:10; see Pl.’s
L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 39.) He also testified that “bed supports” like “a firm mattress” can help support
one’s back. (Dr. Nidea Dep. at 27:6-14; see Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stat. of Add’l Facts
(“Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Resp.”) [108] ¶ 8.)
Approximately 10 years later, in September 2016, Plaintiff “was given a new bed with a
support.” (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 41.) The support “was a piece of plywood approximately half
4
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 5 of 23 PageID #:830
an inch thick, which was bolted to the bed frame.” (Id.) Defendants maintain that “[t]his type of
bed support had not been recommended in the past due to concerns regarding infection control
and patient safety.” (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. of Undisputed Material Facts (“Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat.”)
[85] ¶ 42.) Plaintiff disputes this assertion but does not cite contrary evidence. (See Pl.’s L.R.
56.1 Resp. ¶ 42.) Defendants, for their part, provide e-mails from September 29 and 30, 2016 in
which Defendant Comeford wrote to Defendant Pharis and others that a plywood board “was not
recommended in the past” because of “infection control issues. In time the board may start to
sag, the paint will eventually peel, and may pose a safety risk if a patient takes a piece of the
wood to make a [sic] item that could harm others.” (Sept. 2016 Comeford E-Mails, Ex. 14 to Defs.’
L.R. 56.1 Stat. [88-4] at 1.) Defendants also maintain that they suggested using a metal hospital
bed instead. (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff disputes this assertion as well, but again cites
no contrary evidence. (See Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 43.) In the September 29 and 30, 2016 emails, Comeford wrote that he recommended “modifying the other bed with a metal support”; that
“[t]his has been addressed before”; and that “[t]hey need to come up with a metal support or
medical justification.” (Sept. 2016 Comeford E-mails at 1.) It is unclear whose responsibility it
was to “come up with” one of those alternatives. (Id.) Despite Defendants’ safety concerns about
the plywood board, Plaintiff kept it for some time. Indeed, in an October 3, 2016 e-mail from
Defendant Comeford to Defendants Pharis, Kiss, Hardy, and third parties, Comeford wrote that
there “remains a concern regarding the bed that was delivered last week. It does pose a [sic]
Infection Control concern. Please advise.” (See Oct. 2016 E-Mails, Ex. 15 to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1
Stat. [88-5] at 1.)
According to Defendants, “Plaintiff was ultimately given a hospital bed, despite the
absence of a doctor order or any medical indication that he needed on[e].” (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1
Stat. ¶ 45.) In support of the assertion that Plaintiff received a hospital bed, Defendants cite Dr.
Nidea’s testimony at his May 14, 2018 deposition that “[w]e just got [the hospital bed for Plaintiff]
recently. I would say probably less than six months.” (Dr. Nidea Dep. at 43:17-21; see Defs.’
5
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 6 of 23 PageID #:831
L.R. 56.1 Stat. ¶ 45.) In support of the assertion that a hospital bed was not medically necessary,
Defendants cite a March 28, 2016 e-mail from Eleonore Tiu, a third party, to Defendants
Comeford, Dr. Nidea, and others. (See Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. ¶ 45.) Ms. Tiu wrote that Plaintiff
was “asking for a hospital bed due to c/o back pain” and she inquired whether there was “really a
need for the bed[.]” (Mar. 28, 2016 Tiu E-mail, Ex. 16 to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. [88-6] at 1.) She
added, “Our hospital beds are used for pts who are debilitated . . . or those who need the head of
their beds elevated . . . . MD has to order the hospital bed because they would know if it is really
indicated for the pt.” (Id.) Defendant Comeford responded, “Patients are trying to get hospital
beds without medical indications. [Redacted] was removed a couple weeks ago and [Plaintiff] is
requesting. Currently is getting followed up with Dr. Nidea and PT.” (Id.)
Plaintiff disputes that he ever received a hospital bed, despite his insistence that the bed
was medically necessary, but he cites no evidence in support of his position. (See Pl.’s L.R. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 45.) Regarding medical necessity, the court notes that defense counsel asked Dr. Nidea
during his deposition why the hospital bed was requested. Dr. Nidea answered, “Well, because
we hadn’t gotten the proper mattress for him. And well, he still continues to complain of lack of
bed support.” (Dr. Nidea Dep. at 43:22-44:1.) He added, “I think we got lucky that there was
another gentleman in the unit that didn’t want his hospital bed. . . . So we made an exchange for
that other individual’s hospital bed to give it to [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 44:2-6.) Dr. Nidea also testified
that he had to ask the nurse manager (Defendant Comeford) to give Plaintiff the bed. (See id. at
44:19-45:1.)
Plaintiff alleges that until he received the plywood bed support in 2016, he complained to
Defendant Comeford “daily” about his back pain. (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 46.) Comeford testified
during his deposition that Plaintiff first approached him about back pain “within [his] first year as
nurse manager,” which was in 2011. (Comeford Dep. at 16:11-14, 17:8-16); see Defs.’ L.R. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 4.) According to Comeford, Plaintiff told him that “he didn’t like the mattress and the
support of the bed.” (Comeford Dep. at 23:12-14; see Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 4.) At some point,
6
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 7 of 23 PageID #:832
Plaintiff submitted a written complaint to Defendant Comeford; the parties do not specify when
this happened, or what kind of bed accommodation he was requesting. (See Defs.’ L.R. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 6.) The parties agree that Comeford marked the form “unable to resolve” and “forwarded
it to the program director.” (Id.) Comeford testified that as of his August 31, 2018 deposition, to
his knowledge, the program director had not responded to Plaintiff’s complaint. (See Comeford
Dep. at 45:19-22; see Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 6.) Defendants maintain that Comeford would not
necessarily have known if the program director had responded because, according to Comeford,
the program director delivers complaint responses directly to patients. (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 6
(citing Comeford Dep. at 44:24-45:22).)
Plaintiff communicated with other Defendants about the bed request, as well. The parties
agree that at Monthly Staff Meetings, Plaintiff told Hardy that he was experiencing back pain and
asked for a “bed accommodation.” (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 10.) They also agree that Plaintiff
“informed Defendant Pharis about his desire for a bed support.” (Id. ¶ 20.) In Plaintiff’s response
to Pharis’s First Set of Interrogatories, which Defendants cite, Plaintiff stated that he told Pharis
about his back pain “approximately once a week” when Pharis visited his room. (Pl.’s Resp. to
Pharis Interrogatories, Ex. 9 to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. [85-9] ¶ 1; Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. ¶ 20 (citing
same).) Plaintiff does not offer any evidence that he communicated directly with Defendant Dr.
Mohiuddin. Rather, he alleges that because Dr. Mohiuddin was his treating psychiatrist, he “had
an obligation to adequately review [his] medical records and provide appropriate care,” and “failed
to ensure at the Monthly Staffing Meetings that his needs were being met.” (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1
Stat. ¶ 30 (quoting Pl.'s Resp. to Mohiuddin Interrogatories, Ex. 12 to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. [8512] ¶ 1); Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 30.) Similarly, Plaintiff admits that he never told Defendant Kiss
that he was sleeping on the floor (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 25), but he asserts that in her
supervisory role, Kiss “was allegedly made aware of all issues by her staff members and failed to
act.” (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. ¶ 24 (quoting Pl.’s Resp. to Kiss Interrogatories, Ex. 11 to Defs.’ L.R.
56.1 Stat. [85-11] ¶ 2); Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 24.)
7
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 8 of 23 PageID #:833
Defendants insinuate that Plaintiff’s complaints of back pain were not credible because,
according to Defendants, the Monthly Staff Meeting records from “May 2013 through February
2017 reflect that Plaintiff affirmatively denied that he was experiencing any back pain. They also
reflect that Plaintiff indicated that he did not need any medication for pain, and that he would
request it if he did need it.” (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff disputes this characterization of
the records but does not explain why or cite contrary evidence. (See Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 47.)
From the court’s review of the records, it appears that on May 1, 2013, Plaintiff met with a nurse
about his chronic back pain and stated: “I don’t have pain, I will ask for medicine if I need it.”
(Monthly Staff Meeting Records, Ex. 17 to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. [85-17] at DHS Defs000155.)
The nurse wrote that Plaintiff “is active, independent and high functioning.” (Id.) Similar records
exist for every month through February 2014. (See id. at DHS Defs000172, 181, 193, 206, 215,
231, 241, 272.) The records from March 2014 to May 2017 make no mention of back pain. (See
id. at DHS Defs000273-409.) On June 21, 2017, Plaintiff again reported back pain. (Id. at DHS
Defs000410; see Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 48.)
A CT scan of Plaintiff’s back taken in August 2017 showed “severe degenerative
changes.” (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 53.) Defendant Dr. Nidea attributed the changes to a “previous
injury”—likely from the car accidents referenced above. (Id. ¶ 54.) The parties agree that Plaintiff
“perform[ed] his own exercise regimen in his room” and that Dr. Nidea could not “say whether
those exercises [were] beneficial for Plaintiff’s pan management because” he did not know what
the exercises were. (Id. ¶ 55.)
B.
Complaints About Cold Room
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants repeatedly ignored his complaints about the cold
temperature in his room, and that the cold exacerbated his back pain and caused his prostate to
enlarge. (See, e.g., Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 49, 52.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants moved
him to a new room in the N unit in January 2012; the room was too cold; he complained about the
temperature orally and in writing for five years; and Defendants ignored his complaints. (See
8
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 9 of 23 PageID #:834
id. ¶ 49.) The following are undisputed facts relevant to these allegations.
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that it was “always cold” in room N-3. (Pl.’s Dep., Ex. 3
to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. [85-3] at 63:8-15; see Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 50.) At Monthly Staff
Meetings, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Hardy about the cold room and told him “he was
experiencing discomfort.” (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff also told Defendant Pharis “that
his room was too cold.” (Id. ¶ 20.) In Plaintiff’s response to Pharis’s First Set of Interrogatories,
cited by Defendants, Plaintiff stated that he told Pharis about the cold temperature when Pharis
visited his room and “renewed [that] complaint over the course of many years,” but “[n]o action
was taken.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Pharis Interrogatories ¶ 2; see Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. ¶ 20 (citing
same).) Dr. Nidea testified during his deposition that he was “informed” that Plaintiff’s room was
too cold. (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 9 (citing Dr. Nidea Dep. at 34:11-24).) Plaintiff does not offer
evidence that he communicated directly with Defendants Dr. Mohiuddin or Kiss about the
temperature of his room. Rather, he repeats his allegations that those Defendants were or should
have been aware of the complaints by virtue of their job duties. (See Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 24,
26, 30.)
Plaintiff submitted at least two written complaints about the temperature in his room.
(Id. ¶ 13.) The first, dated December 18 or 19, 2013, states that Plaintiff’s room was too hot. (See
id. ¶¶ 13-14; see also EMHC Consumer Complaint/Concern Form, Ex. 6 to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat.
(“Room Temp. Compl.”) [88-1] at 1-2 (“The temperature in the room is too hot. I have requested
an [sic] new room for 5 months already . . . . Tom Comeford . . . refuses to move me. I have not
been given a reason for the refusal.”).) In response, Defendant Comeford submitted a work ticket
dated December 18, 2013, which states: “Please adjust temperature—patient room too warm.”
(Work Tickets, Ex. 7 to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. [88-2] at 1.)
Plaintiff’s second written complaint is dated September 21, 2015. (See Pl.’s L.R. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 13; Room Temp. Compl. at 3.)
It states that the room temperature “[is] very
uncomfortable. In the wintertime its [sic] way too hot and during the summertime its [sic] too cold.”
9
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 10 of 23 PageID #:835
(Room Temp. Compl. at 4.) The complaint continues, in relevant part: “I have a serious medical
condition and the extreme shifts in temperature affects [sic] my arthritis. I often get muscle
spasms or body aches and pain . . . . I’ve complained about my room temperature for over three
years and nothing has been resolved.” (Id.) In response, Defendant Comeford submitted a work
ticket dated September 21, 2015, which states: “Please check temperature in patient room—
patient complains room is too cold in the summer and too hot in the winter.” (Work Tickets at 2.)
An e-mail dated September 22, 2015, from Defendant Comeford to Defendant Pharis (and a third
party) states that an engineer checked Plaintiff’s room temperature “today” and found it was 74
degrees. (Sept. 2015 E-mail, Ex. 8 to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. [88-3].) The parties agree that Plaintiff
submitted a written complaint to Defendant Hardy “regarding his cold room.” (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 12.) The court is uncertain whether this is a reference to the September 2015 complaint.
DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts show
they did not act with deliberate indifference to any of Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, did not
intentionally inflict emotional distress, and are entitled to qualified immunity and sovereign
immunity. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). A genuine dispute exists, and summary judgment is precluded, if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See McCann v. Ogle Cnty., 909 F.3d
881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018).
A.
Section 1983 Claims
A threshold issue for the court is what protections are afforded to someone who, like
10
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 11 of 23 PageID #:836
Plaintiff Nadzhafaliyev, is involuntarily confined but has not been convicted of a crime.
Nadhzhafaliyev has invoked both the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment of prisoners, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
protects pretrial detainees, but those standards differ. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389, 391, 400 (2015) (explaining that “[t]he language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of
the claims often differs. Importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be
punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically’” (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 671-72 & n.40 (1977)); Turner v. Paul, 953 F.3d 1011, 1015 (7th Cir. 2020) (pretrial
detainee’s “claim of deficient medical treatment” is “analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than under the Eighth Amendment standard applied to prisoners”); Miranda v. Cnty. of
Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[C]laims of state detainees being held on probable
cause arise under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.”). Similarly, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects civil detainees, such as those involuntarily committed
to a mental institution. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-16 (1982). This is because
“[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish.” Id. at 321-22; see Smego v. Jumper, 707 F. App’x 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Because
Smego is a civil detainee—not a prisoner—his claims derive from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of due process, not the Eighth Amendment’s right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.”).
Plaintiff in this case was involuntarily committed to EMHC after a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has directly addressed
whether it is the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment that affords protection in this circumstance.
The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that it is the Fourteenth Amendment that is relevant
here, because the purpose of confinement is the same as for other civil detainees: to treat, not
to punish. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (“The purpose of commitment
11
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 12 of 23 PageID #:837
following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual’s mental illness
and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.”); see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 73, 80 (1992) (similar). In the absence of contrary authority, the court concludes that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause governs Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims. Both sides
approve this approach. (See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Br.”) [84] at 6-7
& n.3 (arguing that Plaintiff’s “status was comparable to that of a pretrial detainee,” and
maintaining that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment even if Plaintiff had properly
pleaded his claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause)); Pl.’s Opp. at 3
(arguing that the court should construe Plaintiff’s claims as having been brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment).)
Having agreed that Plaintiff’s claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, both sides
also appear to agree that the governing standard for Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims
are functionally the same—that is, a “deliberate indifference” standard. (See Defs.’ Mot. at 7 n.3;
Pl.’s Opp. at 3.) In doing so, the parties overlook the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Miranda, which
applied Kingsley’s objective inquiry to claims by pretrial detainees of constitutionally inadequate
medical treatment, replacing the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard. See
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 395-98; Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352. Later, the Seventh Circuit held that
“Kingsley’s objective inquiry applies to all Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement
claims brought by pretrial detainees.” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019).
The court will apply that objective standard to the fully developed record in this case.
To succeed on a conditions-of-confinement claim (including an allegation of inadequate
medical care) under that standard, Plaintiff must show, first, that “the medical defendants acted
purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when they considered the consequences of
their handling of [his] case,” because “negligent conduct does not offend the Due Process
Clause.” Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
Second, Plaintiff must show that Defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable. Miranda,
12
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 13 of 23 PageID #:838
900 F.3d at 354. “This standard requires courts to focus on the totality of facts and circumstances
faced by the individual alleged to have provided inadequate medical care and to gauge
objectively—without regard to any subjective belief held by the individual—whether the response
was reasonable.” McCann, 909 F.3d at 886. Plaintiff must also show that the conditions in
question are or were objectively serious. See, e.g., Williams v. Ortiz, 937 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir.
2019) (to survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must identify a genuine dispute of material fact
concerning whether he “suffered from an objectively serious medical condition”). The objective
inquiry articulated in Kingsley and its progeny is “less demanding” than the deliberate indifference
standard. Smego, 707 F. App’x. at 412.
1.
Failure to Provide a Medical Accommodation (Bed)
a.
Objectively Serious Condition
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide a reasonable medical accommodation
for his back pain by refusing his requests for a better sleeping surface. Defendants appear to
maintain that Plaintiff’s back pain was not an objectively serious medical condition because
certain medical records show that “Plaintiff affirmatively denied that he was experiencing any back
pain.” (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. ¶ 47; see Defs.’ Br. at 4.) The records do THshow that Plaintiff
denied having pain between May 2013 and February 2014, but Plaintiff resided at EMHC for much
longer—from 2005 or 2006 through March 2019. It is undisputed that Plaintiff sustained back
injuries before he arrived at EMHC and suffered from chronic back pain. There is also evidence
that Plaintiff repeatedly complained about the pain to Defendants Dr. Nidea, Comeford, Pharis,
and Hardy. And a CT scan of Plaintiff’s back taken in August 2017 showed “severe degenerative
changes.” (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 53.) A jury reasonably could conclude from this evidence that
Plaintiff experienced back pain for years while he lived at EMHC, despite records showing that he
denied pain between May 2013 and February 2014. Thus, there is enough evidence to support
a finding that Plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical condition. See, e.g., Lewis v.
McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that the plaintiff’s descriptions of his
13
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 14 of 23 PageID #:839
“excruciating pain” and a “diagnosis of a muscle spasm” requiring treatment supported a finding
that his “muscle spasm and the accompanying back pain” was an objectively serious medical
condition); Diaz v. Godinez, 693 F. App’x 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We even have acknowledged
that chronic arthritis pain is a serious medical need . . . as are other conditions that cause serious
or chronic pain . . . .” (citations omitted)).
b.
Whether Defendants Acted Purposefully, Knowingly, or Recklessly
The court next asks whether Plaintiff has shown that Defendants acted “purposefully,
knowingly, or . . . recklessly when they considered the consequences” of handling his request for
a bed accommodation. Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353. Plaintiff has identified a genuine dispute of
fact on this issue for Defendants Comeford, Pharis, and Hardy. There is evidence that Plaintiff
complained for years to those Defendants about his back pain and asked them for a bed
accommodation. There is also evidence that these Defendants had the authority to approve the
accommodation; indeed, Dr. Nidea testified that he had to ask them to do so. Although Defendant
Comeford stated that he was “unable to resolve” one complaint (Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 6),
Defendants do not argue that he lacked authority to address the problem. Finally, it is undisputed
that Defendants Pharis and Hardy refused Dr. Nidea’s request in 2005 or 2006 to give Plaintiff a
bed accommodation and that Plaintiff did not receive one until 2016, despite his persistent
complaints about pain—including complaints to Defendant Comeford beginning in 2011.
Accordingly, a jury reasonably could conclude that these Defendants acted purposefully,
knowingly, or recklessly in handling Plaintiff’s requests for a bed accommodation. 5
On the other hand, Plaintiff cannot clear this hurdle for Defendants Dr. Nidea, Kiss, and
Dr. Mohiuddin. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that Dr. Nidea ignored or refused his
5
The court is not persuaded otherwise by Defendants’ argument that in Plaintiff’s
deposition, he admitted that Pharis and Hardy did not refuse to give him the bed he requested.
(See Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stat. ¶¶ 11, 21; Defs.’ Br. at 10.) Plaintiff merely clarified that he meant to
allege that those Defendants communicated the refusal to Dr. Nidea, not to him. (See Pl.’s Dep.
at 47:1-48:10.)
14
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 15 of 23 PageID #:840
request for a bed accommodation. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Nidea
tried to get a bed accommodation for Plaintiff. 6 Plaintiff also fails to offer evidence that Defendants
Kiss and Dr. Mohiuddin were aware of his requests for a bed accommodation. That Dr. Mohiuddin
was Plaintiff’s psychiatrist does not support a reasonable inference that he knew about or ignored
the requests. In addition, the record lacks evidence that Dr. Mohiuddin attended Monthly Staff
Meetings in which Plaintiff made the requests. The evidence does not support a finding that Dr.
Mohiuddin was “personally responsible for the alleged” constitutional deprivation, and as a result,
he cannot be held liable under Section 1983. Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018).
The court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claim for failure to provide a
bed accommodation against Defendants Dr. Nidea and Dr. Mohiuddin.
Regarding Defendant Kiss, the court notes that Comeford sent her a copy of the October
3, 2016 e-mail, which discussed safety concerns about the plywood board and Plaintiff’s request
for a foam mattress. (See Oct. 2016 E-mails at 1.) But Plaintiff does not discuss this evidence,
and the court concludes that this e-mail would not by itself permit a jury to conclude that Kiss
knew about Plaintiff’s repeated demands for a bed accommodation. Plaintiff is left with his
argument that Kiss should be held liable because she supervised the other Defendants and
learned about his requests through them. “[T]here is no respondeat superior liability for claims
under § 1983,” however. Diaz, 693 F. App’x at 444 (citing Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692
(7th Cir. 2008)). Apart from the October 3, 2016 e-mail just referenced, there is no evidence that
Kiss knew about Plaintiff’s requests. Therefore, the court grants Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the claim for failure to provide a bed accommodation against Defendant Kiss in her
6
Even if a jury could find that Dr. Nidea acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly,
no jury could find that Dr. Nidea’s failure to obtain the bed accommodation was objectively
unreasonable. The evidence shows that Dr. Nidea lacked authority to obtain the accommodation;
indeed, he had to ask Defendants Comeford, Pharis, and Hardy for approval. See, e.g., Turner,
953 F.3d at 1016 (“Because the medical defendants had no control over the scheduling of the
appointments, Turner cannot claim that their failure to schedule him for surgery, or their failure to
nag the residents, constituted objectively unreasonable conduct.”).
15
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 16 of 23 PageID #:841
individual capacity. If Plaintiff’s claim against Kiss in her official capacity was intended to be one
for municipal liability, the court concludes that Plaintiff abandoned it by failing to argue that he has
satisfied the requirements set forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978). Accordingly, the court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the
claim against Kiss in her official capacity as well.
c.
Whether Defendants’ Actions Were Objectively Reasonable
Because a jury reasonably could find that Defendants Comeford, Pharis, and Hardy acted
purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly, the court asks whether a jury could find that those
Defendants handled Plaintiff’s requests for a bed accommodation in an objectively unreasonable
manner. Miranda, 900 F.3d at 354. Defendants argue that no jury could find that they were
deliberately indifferent because the bed accommodation was not medically necessary. (See
Defs.’ Br. at 8.) The proper standard is objective, however. True, it was Plaintiff’s idea to obtain
a better sleeping surface, and there is no evidence that Dr. Nidea or any of Plaintiff’s other doctors
made an independent determination that a bed accommodation was medically necessary. But
the reason Defendants Pharis and Hardy gave for refusing the request in 2006 had nothing to do
with medical necessity: they were concerned that a plywood board would be unsanitary or unsafe.
And although Defendant Comeford was not a Nurse Manager in 2006, there is sufficient evidence
to support a finding that he became aware of this rationale and applied it after he became a Nurse
Manager in 2011. (See Sept. 2016 Comeford E-mails at 1 (stating that the safety and sanitation
issues with the plywood board had “been addressed before”).)
Similarly, there is no evidence that Defendants refused Plaintiff’s request for a hospital
bed on the ground that it was medically unnecessary. Some evidence suggests that EMHC gives
hospital beds to patients only when they are medically necessary (see Mar. 28, 2016 Tiu E-mail
at 1; Sept. 2016 Comeford E-mails at 1), but Defendants ignored that purported rule here: they
eventually gave Plaintiff a hospital bed despite maintaining that it was medically unnecessary.
According to Dr. Nidea’s testimony, Defendants provided the bed because another patient
16
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 17 of 23 PageID #:842
decided he no longer wanted it. The evidence also suggests that Defendants made no effort to
obtain a determination that any of Plaintiff’s requested accommodations were medically
necessary. Their failure to do so is surprising considering that Plaintiff’s primary care physician,
Defendant Dr. Nidea, asked Defendants on several occasions if they could provide a bed
accommodation for Plaintiff. Finally, Dr. Nidea testified during his deposition that he asked
Defendants to give Plaintiff a hospital bed because “we hadn’t gotten the proper mattress for him.
And well, he still continues to complain of lack of bed support.” (Dr. Nidea Dep. at 43:22-44:1.)
That testimony could support a reasonable finding that Dr. Nidea ultimately concluded that a
hospital bed was medically necessary, and therefore creates a genuine dispute about the issue.
It could also support a reasonable finding that Defendants could have obtained a determination
of medical necessity sooner if they had asked for one. In these circumstances, a jury reasonably
could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for Defendants Comeford, Hardy, and Pharis
to refuse Plaintiff’s requests for a bed accommodation for approximately 10 years.
Defendants contend that the delay in providing a bed accommodation “was rationally
related to important governmental interests” (Defs.’ Br. at 1), but they do not develop this
argument. (See generally Defs.’ Br.; Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply”)
[107].) The court assumes Defendants are referring to their safety and sanitation concerns about
the plywood board. By ultimately giving Plaintiff a plywood board and allowing him to keep it,
Defendants undermine their argument that the delay was rationally related to safety and sanitation
concerns. They also compromise their position that the concerns were genuine. Accordingly, a
jury reasonably could conclude that Defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable despite
their purported safety and sanitation concerns.
Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff suffered no harm as a result of their conduct is also
unpersuasive. (See Defs.’ Br. at 8 (arguing that Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation
without showing harm from failure to provide medical care).) According to Defendants, they never
deprived Plaintiff of a mattress or forced him to sleep on the floor. (Id. at 8-9.) But there is
17
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 18 of 23 PageID #:843
evidence that for many years, Plaintiff complained that the mattress Defendants provided did not
support his back and requested a new one that would help his pain. (See, e.g., Dr. Nidea Dep.
at 28:21-29:1 (testimony that Plaintiff asked for better bed support to alleviate his pain); id. at
43:22-44:1 (testimony that as of 2018, “we hadn’t gotten the proper mattress for him” and “he still
continues to complain of lack of bed support”).) In addition, Dr. Nidea testified that “bed supports”
like “a firm mattress” can help support a person’s back. (Id. at 27:6-14.) Although Dr. Nidea also
testified that the “severe degenerative changes” reflected in Plaintiff’s August 2017 CT scan
resulted from a “previous injury” (see Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 53, 54), a jury considering the
totality of the evidence could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff suffered additional pain as a result
of Defendants’ delay in providing a bed accommodation. That Plaintiff did exercises in his room
would not require a jury to find that the back pain was entirely self-imposed, as Defendants seem
to suggest. (See, e.g., Defs.’ Br. at 9.)
Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. To decide whether
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the court asks two questions: “first, whether the
constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff[ ] was clearly established at the time the defendants
acted; and second, whether defendants’ actions violated that clearly established right.”
Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820. “If either inquiry is answered in the negative, the defendant official
is protected by qualified immunity.” (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)). For the reasons just
explained, the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by denying his requests for a bed
accommodation to alleviate back pain. Indeed, a prisoner has an Eighth Amendment right to be
free from the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640
(7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)), and “anything that would
violate the Eighth Amendment would also violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lewis v. Downey,
581 F.3d 467, 475 (7th Cir. 2009). The court concludes Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity and court denies the motion for summary judgment on the claims against Defendants
18
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 19 of 23 PageID #:844
Comeford, Pharis, and Hardy for failure to provide a bed accommodation.
2.
Failure to Provide a Medical Accommodation (Cold Room)
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants ignored his medical needs by disregarding his
complaints about the cold temperature in his room for five years, beginning in January 2012.
(See, e.g., Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 49.) According to Plaintiff, the cold temperature exacerbated
his back pain and caused prostate problems. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 52.) “[P]risoners have a right to
protection from extreme cold.” Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997); see also
Shelby Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1986) (inmates have a “right
to be free from extreme hot and cold temperatures”). Because Plaintiff was entitled to more
protection than a prisoner, he, too, enjoyed this right.
Courts “examine several factors in
assessing claims based on low cell temperature,” including “the severity of the cold; its duration;
whether the prisoner has alternative means to protect himself from the cold; the adequacy of such
alternatives; as well as whether he must endure other uncomfortable conditions as well as cold.”
Godinez, 114 F.3d at 644. No single factor is determinative. Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot support the allegation that they forced him to live in
an unreasonably cold room at any time during his detention at EMHC. (See Defs.’ Br. at 11-12.)
The court agrees. Plaintiff contends that he began complaining about the cold temperature in
January 2012 and persisted in his complaints for five years, but the record contains only two
written complaints from Plaintiff. The first is dated December 2013—nearly a year after the cold
allegedly began—and states that Plaintiff’s room was too hot. The second is dated September
2015 and states that Plaintiff’s room was too hot in the winter and too cold in the summer.
Defendant Comeford submitted work requests to address the temperature within a day of each
complaint , and Plaintiff does not dispute that in September 2015, the recorded temperature in his
room was 74 degrees. Considering this evidence, no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff’s
room was too cold, let alone that the cold was “severe” or persistent. Godinez, 114 F.3d at 644.
The court recognizes that in the September 2015 complaint, Plaintiff wrote that
19
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 20 of 23 PageID #:845
Defendants had ignored his temperature-related complaints for more than three years. (See
Room Temp. Compl. at 4.) Contrasted with the other evidence just discussed, however, this
statement is too vague to permit a reasonable inference that Plaintiff lived in extreme cold for an
unconstitutionally long period of time. So, too, is Dr. Nidea’s deposition testimony that at some
point, he learned about the cold temperature in Plaintiff’s room. Finally, there is no evidence that
Plaintiff lacked “means to protect himself” from the allegedly cold temperature. Godinez, 114 F.3d
at 644.
And although a jury reasonably could conclude that Plaintiff “endure[d] other
uncomfortable conditions”—i.e., a poor sleeping surface—no jury could find that this factor alone
supports Plaintiff’s otherwise unsubstantiated claim that his room was too cold. Id. at 644. For
these reasons, the court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claim that they
failed to provide a medical accommodation in the form of a warmer room.
3.
Failure to Treat
In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hardy, Pharis, and
Comeford violated his constitutional rights by refusing to send him to an outside specialist for
treatment of his back pain. (See Third Am. Compl., Count II.) Plaintiff offers no evidence to
support this claim and does not address it in his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The court concludes that Plaintiff has forfeited the claim and grants Defendants’
motion.
B.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff asserts claims against all Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) under Illinois law. The claims are based on Defendants’ alleged failure to give Plaintiff a
flat sleeping surface and fix the cold temperature in his room. (See Pl.’s Opp. at 8; see also Third
Am. Compl. ¶ 60.) 7 The court has already determined that no reasonable jury could find in
7
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants caused emotional distress by “limiting his
privileges” and preventing him from obtaining treatment from physicians outside EMHC. (See
Pl.’s Opp. at 9.) Plaintiff offers no evidence to support these allegations, however, so the court
disregards them.
20
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 21 of 23 PageID #:846
Plaintiff’s favor on the constitutional claims against Defendants Dr. Nidea, Dr. Mohiuddin, and
Kiss. Accordingly, the court grants the motion for summary judgment on the IIED claims against
those Defendants. It has also determined that no reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor on
the constitutional claims concerning the temperature of his room. That leaves IIED claims against
Defendants Comeford, Pharis, and Hardy based on their failure to provide a bed accommodation.
Defendants argue that the IIED claims are barred by sovereign immunity. The Illinois
State Lawsuit Immunity Act provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, “the State of Illinois
shall not be made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1; see also Murphy v. Smith,
844 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that 745 ILCS 5/1 “governs claims in federal court
arising under state law”). Although Plaintiff has sued Defendants Comeford, Pharis, and Hardy
in their individual capacities, “[n]aming state employees as defendants would be too simple an
evasion of the statute.” Murphy, 844 F.3d at 658. As Defendants correctly state, courts treat a
claim against a state official as a claim against the state when three conditions are satisfied:
[T]here are (1) no allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond
the scope of his authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty alleged to have been
breached was not owed to the public generally independent of the fact of State
employment; and (3) where the complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily
within that employee’s normal and official functions of the State.
Id. (quoting Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 309, 140 Ill. Dec. 368, 375, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247
(1990)). But Defendants overlook an exception to the Act that is outcome-determinative in this
case: “The doctrine of sovereign immunity affords no protection . . . when it is alleged that the
State’s agent acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law . . . .” Leetaru v. Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ill., 2015 IL 117485 ¶ 45, 392 Ill. Dec. 275, 287, 32 N.E.3d 583, 595 (2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Murphy, 844 F.3d at 658-59; Pl.’s Opp. at 9. “This
exception is premised on the principle that while legal official acts of state officers are regarded
as acts of the State itself, illegal acts performed by the officers are not.” Murphy, 844 F.3d at 659
(quoting Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485 ¶ 46, 392 Ill. Dec. at 288, 32 N.E.3d at 596). Because a jury
reasonably could find that Defendants Comeford, Pharis, and Hardy violated Plaintiff’s right to
21
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 22 of 23 PageID #:847
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, sovereign immunity does not bar the IIED claims
against them. See, e.g., Murphy, 844 F.3d at 660 (sovereign immunity did not bar prisoner’s
claim for aggravated battery under Illinois law where prisoner “proved that the defendants’ actions
violated the United States Constitution”).
On the merits, Defendants advance just one argument: the IIED claims “necessarily fail”
because “Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his] medical
needs” and “the bar for establishing deliberate indifference is lower than that for establishing
intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . .” (Defs.’ Br. at 14; see also Defs.’ Reply at 2-3, 6
(citing Hardy v. Hardy, No. 10 C 5921, 2013 5325077 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2013)(collecting cases).)
As explained earlier, Plaintiff’s constitutional claim is governed by an objective standard of
reasonableness, not by the standard of deliberate indifference. The court has concluded that a
jury reasonably could find in Plaintiff’s favor under that objective standard.
Defendants
presumably would argue that Plaintiff’s satisfying that lower objective standard is not sufficient to
establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, but they have not addressed that standard,
nor have they offered other valid reasons for dismissal of the IIED claims. The motion for
summary judgment on those claims is denied without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment [83]. The court denies the motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants Tom Comeford, Jeff Pharis, and Daniel Hardy for failure to provide a
bed accommodation for Plaintiff’s back pain. In addition, the court denies the motion for summary
judgment against the same Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court
grants the motion for summary judgment in all other respects and dismisses claims against
Defendants Nidea, Mohiuddin and Kiss. Count III of the Third Amended Complaint is dismissed
with prejudice as moot.
The parties are directed to submit, on or before January 15, a joint written report on the
22
Case: 1:16-cv-06844 Document #: 109 Filed: 11/30/20 Page 23 of 23 PageID #:848
status of their discovery; efforts, if any, to resolve the case; and their interest, if any, in referral of
this matter to Magistrate Judge Gilbert for settlement conference.
ENTER:
Dated: November 30, 2020
_____________________________________
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge
23
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?