Megan Nelson v. Bryan Lutzou et al
Filing
62
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42). Status hearing set for 9/20/18 at 9:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 9/11/2018:Mailed notice(maf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MEGAN NELSON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16 C 6962
v.
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
DET. BRYAN LUTZOU, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants Bryan Lutzou and the City of Chicago move for
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 42].
For the reasons stated herein,
Defendants’ Motion is denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Megan Nelson (“Nelson” or “Plaintiff”), an AmeriCorps
tutor at Richards Career Academy (“Academy”), files suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Detective Bryan Lutzou (“Lutzou”
or “Defendant”) and the City of Chicago. (See generally Compl.,
ECF No. 1.)
Nelson claims Defendant violated her Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable
cause. (Id.)
The arrest at issue in this case arose from an investigation
conducted by Defendant Lutzou.
Lutzou was assigned to investigate
a claim by B.G. (Pl. Resp. to Defs. Statement of Facts (“SOF”)
¶ 2, Dkt. No. 55), a 15-year-old sophomore student at the Academy.
(SOF ¶ 15.)
B.G. was a resident of SOS Children’s Villages
(“SOS”), a halfway home for troubled youth, when two SOS employees
overheard B.G. telling friends that a teacher kissed him. (SOF
¶ 18.)
and
One of those employees called the Department of Children
Family
Services
(“DCFS”)
to
report
the
possible
sexual
interaction, resulting in a separate DCFS investigation. (SOF
¶ 19.)
DCFS
then
notified
investigation. (SOF ¶ 2.)
Lutzou,
who
began
the
criminal
Lutzou’s investigation lasted from
January 22, 2016 until May 10, 2016, when Lutzou arrested Plaintiff
Nelson. (Defs. Resp. to Pl. Statement of Additional Material Facts
(“SOAMF”) ¶¶ 7, 15, Dkt. No. 58.)
During the first week of the
investigation, B.G. made four separate statements:
one to the SOS
employees, one to the DCFS investigator, one to Lutzou, and one to
both Lutzou and the State’s Attorney. (SOAMF ¶¶ 14-16.)
In
these
statements,
B.G.
generally
described
Nelson
as
having approached him several times, touched his thigh and kissed
him while watching a movie alone with him, and hugged him at a
later pizza party. (SOAMF ¶¶ 14-16.)
After Lutzou completed both
interviews of B.G., Lutzou decided to continue the investigation
further rather than arrest Nelson right away. (SOAMF ¶ 18.)
In
the subsequent four months, Lutzou interviewed several witnesses,
including the two SOS employees, two other AmeriCorps tutors, two
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Academy students, and B.G.’s bus driver. (SOF ¶¶ 53-63.)
Five of
the seven are eye-witnesses, having witnessed B.G. and Nelson
interact
statement.
first-hand
during
the
times
mentioned
in
B.G.’s
The remaining two witnesses—the SOS employees—base
their knowledge solely on what B.G. told them.
Each will be
discussed in turn.
The Court first turns to the two SOS employees.
One employee
stated she believed B.G.’s statement given his ability to “repeat[]
the same thing multiple times.” (SOF ¶ 22.) The other employee
believed B.G.’s statement for similar reasons but described B.G.
as a liar who “could not keep a story straight if you gave him a
ruler,” (SOF ¶ 23.) Both employees based their beliefs on personal
knowledge of B.G. and what B.G. told them, (SOF ¶¶ 18-24), though
neither witnessed first-hand any interactions between Nelson and
B.G. (SOF ¶¶ 18-24).
The Court turns next to the two AmeriCorp tutors. Lutzou’s
interview revealed that the tutors were, for the most part, present
when B.G. and Nelson interacted.
Both told Lutzou that they never
saw or heard anything inappropriate occur between B.G. and Nelson.
(SOAMF ¶¶ 25-26.) Both were initially present when B.G. and Nelson
watched a movie together and Nelson allegedly kissed B.G. (SOF
¶ 29.)
One tutor recalled Nelson and B.G. watching the movie with
more than a foot in distance between them, (SOF ¶ 6), and the other
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tutor informed Lutzou that she and Nelson were out buying pizza at
the time Nelson allegedly kissed B.G. (SOAMF ¶ 25.)
At another
time, one tutor also witnessed Nelson giving B.G. a side hug at a
pizza party, (SOAMF ¶ 25), which is acceptable under school policy
so long as in the presence of others. (SOF ¶ 36.)
The Court turns finally to the two other Academy students and
B.G.’s bus driver.
B.G. referred to the two students as being
present during his interactions with Nelson. (SOAMF ¶¶ 14-16.) In
the interview with Lutzou, one such student recalls a “pinky
promise” exchange between Nelson and B.G. (SOAMF ¶ 20.)
The other
does not recall any interaction with B.G. at the pizza party.
(SOAMF ¶ 21.)
In Lutzou’s interview of B.G.’s bus driver, Lutzou
referred to B.G.’s statement.
B.G. said he had informed the bus
driver that Nelson kissed him, and, in response, the bus driver
accused him of being a liar. (SOAMF ¶ 19.)
To Lutzou, the bus
driver denied both hearing the story and calling B.G. a liar.
(SOAMF ¶ 19.)
It
was
not
until
after
Lutzou
completed
the
foregoing
interviews that he decided to call Nelson in for questioning.
Then, upon arrival at the station on May 10, 2016 for said
questioning, Lutzou arrested Nelson. (SOAMF ¶¶ 20-31.)
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II.
Under
Defendant
42
U.S.C.
Lutzou
§
ANALYSIS
1983,
falsely
Plaintiff
arrested
Nelson
her,
alleges
that
violating
her
constitutional rights. Defendant Lutzou rebuts that, contending he
had probable cause for the arrest, and, regardless of the probable
cause determination, is immune from suit under the qualified
immunity
doctrine.
Defendant
indemnification purposes.
City
of
Chicago
is
named
for
Defendants Lutzou and the City of
Chicago move for summary judgment on all counts.
A.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
A fact is
“material” if it is one identified by the law as affecting the
outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986).
An issue of material fact is “genuine” if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Id.
The Court must construe all facts and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773
(7th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
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B.
Probable Cause
“[T]he existence of probable cause for arrest is an absolute
bar
to
a
Section
1983
claim
for
unlawful
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution[.]”
arrest,
false
Schertz v. Waupaca
Cnty., 875 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
An
officer has probable cause to arrest when “the totality of the
facts and circumstances within his knowledge and of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information is sufficient that a prudent
person would believe that the suspect committed or was committing
an offense.”
Marshall v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citing United States v. Sawyer, 224 F.3d 675, 678-79 (7th Cir.
2000)).
Moreover, probable cause must exist “at the moment the
arrest was made.” Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir.
1998) (citation omitted).
Finally, if “there is room for a
difference of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them,” the question of probable cause
must be submitted to the jury.
Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578
F.3d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 2009).
Defendant asserts that B.G.’s statement, alone, is sufficient
to establish probable cause, citing Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d
756, 765 (7th Cir. 2007), Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979,
996 (7th Cir. 2002), and Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 726
(7th Cir. 1999). These cases support the proposition that probable
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cause exists when a victim positively identifies the suspect, and
the police have no reason to disbelieve the victim.
However, in
each of those cases, the arrest occurred immediately after the
victim provided the incriminating statement.
488
F.3d
at
information
759
he
(“Later
had
that
gathered,
same
day,
[defendant
See, e.g., Reynolds,
after
reviewing
officer]
the
questioned
[plaintiff] and arrested him for telephone harassment.”); Woods,
234 F.3d at 996 (“[T]he arresting officers arrested [plaintiff]
after [the victim] made out a criminal complaint against him,
claiming that [plaintiff] had brandished a lead pipe and threatened
to kill [the victim].”); Spiegel, 196 F.3d at 720-21 (Finding
probable cause for arrest occurring same day the victim reported
the altercation and provided photographs of an injury).
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has held that absent exigent
circumstances,
a
witness’s
statement
can
be
insufficient
to
establish probable cause if further reasonable investigation would
undermine the statement.
See BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128
(7th Cir. 1986) (finding that defendants lacked probable cause for
an arrest when simple questions would have led to important
information exonerating plaintiffs from the alleged crime); Moore
v. The Marketplace Restaurant, 754 F.2d 1336, 1345-1346 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that officers did not have probable cause despite
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witness’s complaint because arrest could have been avoided if a
proper investigation had been conducted).
Here, B.G. provided a statement to Lutzou in January, but
Nelson
was
not
arrested
until
May.
In
the
interim,
Lutzou
continued his investigation and more of the story unfolded.
Taken
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Defendant may have
had probable cause to arrest Nelson at the time B.G.’s statement
was
provided,
but
these
subsequent
original probable cause determination.
findings
diminished
the
See BeVier v. Hucal, 806
F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A police officer may not close her
or his eyes to facts that would help clarify the circumstances of
an
arrest.”).
implicate Nelson.
Lutzou
uncovered
no
new
evidence
to
further
In fact, his investigation revealed more to
bolster Nelson’s defense against the alleged misconduct. A handful
of witnesses provided exculpatory information to Lutzou.
Some
witnesses contradicted B.G.’s statement, others informed Lutzou
they had never seen Nelson behave inappropriately towards B.G.
during the relevant time.
One witness even claimed to be with
Nelson buying pizza at the time Nelson allegedly kissed B.G.
Despite all this evidence undermining B.G.’s statement and
contradicting his credibility, however, Lutzou proceeded to arrest
Nelson. In light of that, a reasonable jury could find that Lutzou
lacked probable cause to arrest Nelson.
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C.
Qualified Immunity
The Court next addresses whether Defendants are entitled to
qualified
immunity.
Qualified
immunity
shields
government
officials from liability for performing discretionary actions
within their official capacity so long as the actions do “not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”
Eversole v. Steele,
59 F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The doctrine allows “ample room for mistaken
judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.”
229 (1991).
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
Moreover, the immunity is available for “officers who
make a reasonable error in determining whether there is probable
cause to arrest an individual.”
Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d
678, 691 (7th Cir. 2008).
Qualified immunity applies unless:
(1) the facts, taken in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, show the violation of
a federal constitutional right, and (2) the constitutional right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 (2009); Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Plaintiffs have the burden of showing
that the constitutional right was clearly established.
Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Purtell v.
They can meet this
burden by showing either “a clearly analogous case establishing a
right to be free from the specific conduct at issue” or that “the
conduct is so egregious that no reasonable person could have
believed that it would not violate clearly established rights.”
Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2001).
Lastly,
“[w]hen
the
qualified
immunity
inquiry
cannot
be
disentangled from disputed facts, the issue cannot be resolved
without a trial.”
Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 540 (citing Clash v.
Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996)).
As this Court has discussed, taking the facts in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff, a prudent person in Lutzou’s
position
would
not
believe
Nelson
had
establishing probable cause for her arrest.
committed
a
crime
See Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); Smith v. Ball St. Univ., 295
F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2002).
Lutzou’s investigation revealed
ample evidence contradicting B.G.’s statement and questioning
B.G.’s credibility, as well as exculpating Nelson at the alleged
time of unlawful activity. In light of this evidence, a reasonable
jury could find that Defendant lacked probable cause at the time
of Nelson’s arrest and thus, violated her constitutional rights.
Moreover, that right has been clearly established for decades.
See Marshall ex rel. Gossens v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765, 772 (7th Cir.
2002); Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998);
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United States v. Gilbert, 45 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1995);
Simkunas v. Tardi, 930 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1991).
The Defendants are thus not entitled as a matter of law to
qualified immunity.
However, if the jury accepts the Defendants’
account of the facts and determines Lutzou had probable cause,
Defendants may still prevail on the merits.
D.
Indemnification
Nelson also brings an indemnification claim against the City
of
Chicago,
which
goes
unmentioned
in
Defendants’
briefing.
Because Defendants moved for summary judgment in full, however,
the Court will address the claim here.
As established above,
Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Given that
Plaintiff’s constitutional claim proceeds to trial, there is no
basis
for
the
Court
to
grant
summary
judgement
on
the
indemnification claim.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 42.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated:
9/11/2018
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