Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, General Committee of Adjustment, Union Pacific Western Lines and Pacific Harbor Lines v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 14 is denied and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 20 is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter Rule 58 judgment in favor of Defendant. Any pending deadlines and hearings are terminated. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable John Robert Blakey on 3/31/2017. Mailed notice(vcf, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE
ENGINEERS AND TRAINMENT,
GENERAL COMMITTEE OF
ADJUSTMENT, UNION PACIFIC
WESTERN LINES AND PACIFIC
Case No. 1:16-cv-07233
Judge John Robert Blakey
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This dispute concerns the dismissal of R.J. Griff (“Griff”), a former employee
with Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Defendant” or “Union Pacific”).
Griff, through his representatives at Plaintiff Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
and Trainmen, General Committee of Adjustment, Union Pacific Western Lines and
Pacific Harbor Lines (“Plaintiff” or “BLET”), contended that his dismissal from
Union Pacific was procedurally improper and submitted this dispute to the First
Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (the “Board” or “NRAB”). The
Board ultimately denied Plaintiff’s claim and upheld his termination.
In response to the Board’s decision, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, bringing
claims pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (“RLA”), and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
at 5-7. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and, for the
reasons explained below, Defendant’s motion  is granted while Plaintiff’s motion
 is denied.
From 1984 through 2005, Griff was a “craft” employee at Union Pacific
represented by BLET, eventually becoming a Locomotive Engineer.
 at 2.
When he was a Locomotive Engineer, the terms and conditions of Griff’s
employment were governed by the parties’ collective bargaining agreements. Id. at
6. Two particular provisions of the collective bargaining agreements are salient
here: the “Discipline Rule” and “Article 9” (collectively, the “CBA Provisions”). Id.
The CBA Provisions
Under the Discipline Rule, “Locomotive Engineers will not be disciplined
without first being given a fair and impartial investigation.”
[12-1] at 135.
Practically, this provision guarantees that a Locomotive Engineer: (1) will be
apprised “of the specific charges against him or her”; (2) is entitled to
“representation by a [BLET] representative” in a “recorded and transcribed”
investigatory hearing; (3) will be “afforded the opportunity to examine or cross
The facts are taken from the Arbitration Record [12-1] and the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements.
 refers to Plaintiff’s statement of facts.  contains Defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s
statement of facts and Defendant’s statement of additional material facts.  contains Plaintiff’s
responses to Defendant’s statement of additional material facts.  is supported by a declaration
from David Foley [23-1], a Labor Relations official at Union Pacific. Plaintiff suggests that this
declaration represents an improper attempt to introduce new evidence and should be stricken. 
at 4. Defendant contends that Foley’s declaration properly serves to “authenticate documents in the
arbitral record and to summarize the arguments made to the NRAB by the parties.”  at 1. The
Court declines to strike Foley’s affidavit. While the Court reviews the Arbitration Record and the
Board’s decision independently, Foley’s declaration contextualizes those same materials, and is
proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4).
examine all witnesses” who testify at the investigatory hearing; and (4) will receive
Union Pacific’s written decision on the merits within ten days of the investigatory
hearing.  at 2-3 (citing [12-1] at 135-37). If the Locomotive Engineer disagrees
with Union Pacific’s disciplinary decision, BLET may challenge it through the
CBA’s grievance-and-appeal process and the RLA, culminating in binding
arbitration before the Board. Id. at 3.
Article 9, meanwhile, provides that any employee (including any Locomotive
Engineer) promoted to a supervisory position after July 1995 can either: (1)
continue to “accumulate seniority [in their original craft position] so long as he/she
pays a fee [to BLET] no greater than the applicable current membership dues”; or
(2) decline to pay a fee to BLET, in which case “he/she shall retain but cease to
accumulate seniority” in their original craft position. Id. at 4; see also [12-1] at 132.
Griff’s Promotion and Termination
In December 2005, Griff was promoted by Union Pacific to “Manager of
Operating Practices.”  at 2. In September 2011, Union Pacific promoted Griff
again, this time to “Manager of Road Operations.” Id. The parties agree that both
of these positions are “supervisory” and “at-will,” such that they “are not covered by
any collective bargaining agreement between the parties.”
 at 2.
nevertheless elected, pursuant to Article 9, to continue to pay BLET dues, and he
accordingly continued to accrue seniority as a Locomotive Engineer while working
in a supervisory capacity. Id. at 3.
In an announcement dated August 12, 2012, Union Pacific’s former Chief
Operating Officer Lance Fritz advised supervisory employees (including Griff) that
any “non-agreement employee who knowingly provides false information and/or who
willingly fabricates reporting will be terminated from the Company—employees
who have seniority will not be allowed to return to their seniority.” [12-1] at 2-3;
[23-1] at 5.
On February 27, 2013, Union Pacific terminated Griff’s employment “for
falsifying performance evaluations and check rides of employees.” [12-1] at 3, 106.
On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff appealed Griff’s termination by way of a letter to Union
Pacific’s Assistant Director of Labor Relations. Id. at 112-15. BLET challenged
Union Pacific’s termination of Griff on two separate grounds. First, Plaintiff argued
that, as a dues-paying BLET member, he could not be fired absent the “fair and
impartial” investigatory hearing described in the Discipline Rule.
further contended that Griff had the right to exercise his seniority privileges as a
Locomotive Engineer under Article 9. Id.
Union Pacific denied Plaintiff’s appeal eleven days later.
Id. at 117.
Defendant explained that Griff “was not part of a collective bargaining unit or
covered by a collective bargaining agreement at the time of his discharge.” Id.
Accordingly, Union Pacific “had no obligation to hold an investigative hearing or
permit Mr. Griff to exercise his seniority to an agreement position.” Id.
In September 2013, Plaintiff filed its Notice of Intent to appeal Union
Pacific’s decision to the Board. Id. at 35.
The Board’s Decision
In its submission to the Board, Plaintiff insisted that, under “the plain
contractual language” of the CBA Provisions, he was entitled to both a full
investigatory hearing and reinstatement as a Locomotive Engineer. See generally
id. at 89-104 (“So long as an employee holds seniority under a collectively bargained
agreement, he cannot be ‘at-will.’ . . . The Carrier breached the contract by failing to
provide the Claimant and the Organization notice and an investigation hearing.”).
Union Pacific predictably disagreed, arguing that Griff’s employment was not
“governed by the provisions of the Engineer’s collective bargaining agreement,” such
that he “was not due a hearing nor does he have the right to exercise his seniority
back to the craft.” Id. at 9.
On January 28, 2016, the Board denied BLET’s claim and upheld Griff’s
See generally id. at 1-6.
quoted directly from Article 9.
In reaching its decision, the Board first
Id. at 2.
The Board then explained that its
interpretation of Article 9 was informed by its own arbitral precedent, as this was
“not a case of first impression” for “either the Board or these Parties.” Id. at 3. In
fact, “several” cases previously decided by the Board held that “covered employees
who are promoted to management positions, but continue to accrue craft seniority,
may be terminated while performing their management duties for engaging in
wrongdoing without resort to their contractual due process protections.” Id.
The Board also noted that its earlier decisions were animated by cogent
policy concerns also present here:
If the Carrier has terminated a non-covered employee for
cause, and did this unilaterally, this employee, even if he
possesses seniority in a contractually covered craft, may
not then seek to invoke the contractual protection that
inheres to members of his craft. This is so because when
the Carrier permanently terminated the non-bargaining
unit employee from service for cause, the Carrier severed
the employment relationship permanently, albeit
unilaterally, and this employee, although he retained
seniority in a covered craft, cannot invoke the contractual
protection of that craft, because at this time he was no
longer an employee. The employee relationship having
been irrevocably ended for cause, there is no longer any
valid basis upon which the employee’s seniority can
operate. The Board is led to this conclusion for otherwise
an employer could not discharge a non-covered employee
for cause no matter how egregious and reprehensible his
offense, because this employee continued to hold seniority
in a covered craft.
Id. at 4 (internal quotation omitted).
The Board concluded its analysis by returning to the language of the CBA
Provisions. Id. at 5-6. The Board flatly rejected BLET’s argument that the Board’s
earlier decisions were distinguishable in light of Article 9’s particular language. Id.
at 5 (Article 9 “makes absolutely no reference to a promoted employee being able to
exercise seniority in the face of termination from a management position for
cause.”). Instead, the Board held Article 9 only gave Griff “the right at any time
prior to his termination to return to his covered position in the event he was unable
to satisfactorily perform his management duties, or was simply dissatisfied with the
position.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir.
2014). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The party seeking summary
judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In determining
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court must construe all facts
and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland School Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff has two claims: Count I, under the RLA, and Count II, pursuant to
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
 at 5-7. As discussed below, neither claim survives summary judgment.
Count I - RLA
Under the RLA, “a railroad employee alleging a violation of a collective
bargaining agreement must submit such a dispute” to the Board for resolution.
Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 89 (1978). A railroad employee may
then petition a federal district court for review of the Board’s decision. See 45
U.S.C. § 153(q). During the district court’s review, the findings and order of the
Board “shall be conclusive on the parties, except that the order” of the Board “may
be set aside, in whole or in part, or remanded”: (1) for failure of the Board to comply
with the requirements of the RLA; (2) for failure of the order to conform, or confine
itself, to matters within the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction; or (3) for fraud or
corruption by a member of the Board. Id. The Supreme Court has “time and again
emphasized that this statutory language means just what it says,” such that “only
upon one or more of these bases may a court set aside an order of the Adjustment
Board.” Sheehan, 439 U.S. at 93.
Judicial review of the Board’s decision under the RLA is “among the
narrowest known to law.” Id. at 91. As the Seventh Circuit has said “too many
times to want to repeat again, the question for decision by a federal court asked to
set aside an arbitration award—whether the award is made under the Railway
Labor Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, or the United States Arbitration Act—is not”
whether the Board “erred in interpreting the contract; it is not whether they clearly
erred in interpreting the contract; it is not whether they grossly erred in
interpreting the contract; it is whether they interpreted the contract. If they did,
their interpretation is conclusive.” Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192,
1194-95 (7th Cir. 1987) (internal citation omitted); see also Dexter Axle Co. v. Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. 90, Lodge 1315, 418 F.3d 762, 768
(7th Cir. 2005) (“any reasonable doubt” about whether an arbitral award “draws its
essence” from the governing collective bargaining agreement should be resolved in
favor of award-enforcement); Lyons v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 163 F.3d 466, 470 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“Because we find that the [Board] interpreted the contract, its
interpretation is conclusive.”).
The Board Conclusively Interpreted The Relevant CBA
Griff contends he was entitled to supervisory privileges under Article 9 and
an investigatory hearing under the Discipline Rule; Defendant disagrees. There is
no suggestion in the record that Griff would be entitled to either supervisory
privileges or an investigatory hearing absent the CBA Provisions. In short, the CBA
Provisions form the crux of this case, and the Board’s final decision understandably
turned upon its interpretation of this contractual language.
The Board extensively quoted from Article 9, and discussed multiple arbitral
precedents construing language similar to the CBA Provisions. [12-1] at 1-5. The
Board held that, under this same precedent, management employees are “not
entitled to exercise their seniority back to their Agreement positions or to an
investigation prior to being terminated.” Id. at 3. The Board specifically rejected
Plaintiff’s reading of Article 9, as Plaintiff had “not pointed to any language
contained in Article 9 that distinguishes it from the other seniority accumulation
provisions relied on by those employees in [earlier decisions] who similarly (and
unsuccessfully) attempted to protect their employment when terminated from their
management positions.” Id. at 5.
Ultimately, the Board’s decision reflects that it “interpreted the contract” and
that “interpretation is conclusive.”
Lyons, 163 F.3d at 470 (internal quotation
omitted); see also Dexter Axle Co., 418 F.3d at 768 (“any reasonable doubt” about
whether an arbitral award flows from CBA should be resolved in favor of awardenforcement).
The Board Acted Within Its Jurisdiction
Plaintiff first attempts to evade the foregoing result by suggesting that the
Board “purported to address a dispute over whether an ‘at-will’ supervisory
employee is entitled to any process before termination—a dispute over which it has
no jurisdiction.”  at 5. This argument is belied by the record and governing case
law. See Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 288 F.3d 313, 314 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Arbitral
boards established pursuant to the Railway Labor Act have exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve disputes over the application of collective bargaining agreements in the
railroad and airline industries.”); see also Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Union
Pac. R. Co., 358 F.3d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The RLA grants exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve ‘minor’ disputes regarding railway labor agreements to
arbitrators on the National Railroad Adjustment Board or adjustment boards
established by an employer and a union.”).
As discussed supra, the parties’ dispute turned on Union Pacific’s decision to
deny Plaintiff both the investigatory hearing described in the Discipline Rule and
the seniority privileges reflected in Article 9. These privileges were conferred by the
CBA Provisions, and the Board explicitly interpreted this same contractual
language to determine if these privileges were actually implicated by Griff’s
termination. See [12-1] at 5. Plaintiff’s suggestion that the Board did not “engage
with the collective bargaining agreements” is specious.  at 6.
Plaintiff then claims that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding two
issues “outside the arbitral record”: (1) “that Griff was dismissed ‘for cause’”; and (2)
“that Griff was on notice that he forfeited his rights under the contract when he
accepted a promotion to a supervisory position.” Id.
This argument misreads the Board’s decision. The Board explicitly noted
that “having ‘cause’ to terminate” an employee in this context “does not mean that
the terminated management employee is entitled to a formal investigation under
the craft Agreement.” [12-1] at 6. Instead, “cause” simply means “that the Carrier
cannot fire a management employee with Article 9 rights without articulating a
good faith basis as to why it has cause to do so. The Carrier has done so in this
case.” Id. (emphasis added). The Board did not decide that Griff was terminated for
cause; instead, the Board decided that Union Pacific had articulated a good faith
basis for its termination decision, which was all that was required by the CBA
Provisions under controlling precedent.
Plaintiff’s “notice” argument is similarly unavailing.
Although the Board
referenced Mr. Fritz’s letter, its analysis of the parties’ rights and obligations
turned on the language of the CBA Provisions and governing precedent. Id. at 1-4.
This analysis is entirely consistent with the letter and spirit of the RLA’s
See Tice, 288 F.3d at 314 (“Arbitral boards established
pursuant to the Railway Labor Act have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes
over the application of collective bargaining agreements in the railroad and airline
The Board Complied With Other RLA Rules
Plaintiff then argues that, even if the Board’s decision was within its
jurisdictional purview, it should nevertheless be vacated for failure to comply with
various other RLA requirements. Each of these arguments is rejected in turn.
Plaintiff first invokes 45 U.S.C. § 152, which provides that representatives
under the RLA “shall be designated by the respective parties without interference,
influence, or coercion by either party over the designation of representatives by the
other.” Plaintiff suggests that the Board’s ruling violated this principle, insofar as
it “deprive[d] Griff of the advantages of BLET membership.”  at 7.
This argument is a non-starter. There is no suggestion in the record that
Defendant “interfered, influenced, or coerced” Plaintiff in the selection of his BLET
Instead, the undisputed record demonstrates that the Board,
interpreting the CBA Provisions in light of its precedent, explained to Griff’s
designated BLET representatives that he had “the right at any time prior to his
termination to return to his covered position in the event he was unable to
satisfactorily perform his management duties, or was simply dissatisfied with the
position.” [12-1] at 5 (emphasis in original). § 152 does not grant this Court the
authority to second-guess the Board’s contractual interpretation, and Plaintiff’s
reading to the contrary is rejected.
The “Usual Manner”
Plaintiff then suggests that the Board’s decision violated 45 U.S.C. § 153,
which provides that disputes between employees and carriers “shall be handled in
the usual manner . . . but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the
appropriate division of the Adjustment Board.” Plaintiff argues that Griff’s dispute
was not handled in the “usual manner,” insofar as Union Pacific did not conduct the
investigatory hearing contemplated by the Discipline Rule.  at 8.
This argument must be rejected.
Before a grievance is submitted to the
Board, “the dispute is between private parties” and the “rights available to an
employee, therefore, are governed by the CBA.” Kulavic v. Chicago & Ill. Midland
Ry. Co., 1 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Ryan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 286 F.3d
456, 459 (7th Cir. 2002) (The “usual manner provision allows the railroad and the
union to prescribe in the collective bargaining agreement the manner in which
grievance proceedings shall be conducted on the property.”) (emphasis in original).
Pursuant to the Board’s definitive interpretation of the CBA Provisions, no
investigatory hearing was required, and Plaintiff’s attempt to re-litigate this
question through § 153 fails.2
Plaintiff is essentially making a circular argument that Griff was entitled to an investigatory
hearing under the Discipline Rule prior to the arbitration designed to determine whether such an
investigatory hearing was due in the first instance.
A “Full Statement”
Finally, Plaintiff insists that the Board’s decision was improper, because the
referral to the Board was not accompanied by “a full statement of the facts and all
supporting data bearing upon the disputes.”  at 8-9; see also 45 U.S.C. § 153(i)
(“disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the
appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and
all supporting data bearing upon the disputes”); 29 C.F.R. § 301.5 (both parties
submissions to the Board must “set forth all relevant, argumentative facts,
including all documentary evidence submitted in exhibit form, quoting the
agreement or rules involved, if any; and all data submitted in support of [the
submitting party’s] position must affirmatively show the same to have been
presented to the [opposing party] and made a part of the particular question in
This argument fails because the undisputed record reflects that the Board
was in possession of all the material needed to resolve this dispute. Both parties’
submissions focused on the meaning of the CBA Provisions. Compare [12-1] at 9
(“In this case Claimant was not part of a collective bargaining unit or covered by a
collective bargaining agreement . . . .”) with id. at 94 (“Under the plain contractual
language, the Claimant as a bargaining unit member acquired a vested right . . . .”)
and id. at 97 (“So long as an employee holds seniority under a collectively bargained
agreement, he cannot be ‘at-will.’”) and id. at 99 (“Allowing the Carrier to treat
engineers who hold seniority as ‘at-will’ has absurd consequences that would
undermine the contract.”) and id. at 102 (“The Carrier breached the contract by
failing to provide the Claimant and the Organization notice and an investigation
hearing.”). The Board was in possession of these same CBA Provisions, id. at 132,
135-138, and the Board’s decision turned on its interpretation of this contractual
language. Id. at 1-6. Plaintiff does not identify any facts or data not submitted to
the Board that would have altered the Board’s analysis of the controlling CBA
Provisions, and its argument pursuant to § 153(i) is rejected.
Count II – Due Process
The Seventh Circuit has previously held that “decisions of the National
notwithstanding [Sheehan], and the omission of due process from the statutory
grant of reviewing authority.”
Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen Gen.
Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region v. Union Pac. R. Co., 537 F.3d 789, 790 (7th Cir.
The “requirements of due process are relaxed when the tribunal is an
arbitral tribunal rather than a court.” Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen
Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region v. Union Pac. R. Co., 522 F.3d 746, 751
(7th Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds, 558 U.S. 67 (2009) (internal quotation
omitted). In this more relaxed posture, “due process is satisfied so long as the
arbitrator provided a fundamentally fair hearing, one that meets the minimal
requirements of fairness—adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence and an
impartial decision by the arbitrator.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
On the due process question, Plaintiff presents conflicting arguments that
initially insist that this “is not a case about what sort of procedures are sufficient
under the due process clause” only to later claim that the Board “violated the Due
Process clause because it held Griff to have forfeited” his seniority privileges “by
taking a supervisory position, even though he had no notice that taking the position
would have that effect.”  at 9. In either event, Plaintiff does not dispute the
Board’s impartiality, so the Court must determine whether: (1) Plaintiff had
“adequate notice” of the hearing; and (2) the Board’s decision was “on the evidence.”
Plaintiff claims he “had no notice” of the potential ramifications of “taking a
supervisory position,” id. at 9, but this formulation misstates the pertinent
question. The issue here is whether Plaintiff had “adequate notice” of the hearing
itself. See Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 10cv-6661, 2011 WL 5828129, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2011) (“Moreover, under Section
3, First (j) of the RLA, due process is fulfilled if a party has reasonable notice of the
hearing and the opportunity to be present and heard.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff
clearly had notice of the hearing before the Board.
See supra at 2-4.
Plaintiff, not Defendant, referred this matter to the Board, and Plaintiff was given a
full opportunity to submit his arguments to the Board. Id. Any suggestion to the
contrary is belied by the record.
“On The Evidence”
Plaintiff’s argument that the Board’s decision was not made “on the evidence”
is similarly unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s entire argument on this point concerns the
putative wrongdoing that precipitated Griff’s termination. See  at 7 (“without
an investigatory hearing, BLET was prohibited from presenting evidence to the
NRAB regarding the lack of cause for Griff’s termination,” and “because UP never
presented BLET with any evidence of Griff’s alleged wrongdoing, BLET had no
chance to refute or respond to such accusations”).
As explained previously, however, the basis for Griff’s termination was not
the issue before the Board. The Board was tasked with determining whether, under
the CBA Provisions, Griff was due either an investigatory hearing or seniority
privileges. See supra at 2-4. The Board determined that, pursuant to the CBA
Provisions and controlling precedent, Griff was entitled to neither. Id. In coming to
that determination, the Board noted that although Union Pacific could not “fire a
management employee [like Griff] with Article 9 rights without articulating a good
faith basis as to why it has cause to do so,” Union Pacific had made the necessary
articulation “in this case.”
[12-1] at 6.
Evidence concerning Union Pacific’s
underlying termination decision was simply not required under the Board’s
definitive reading of the CBA Provisions, and Plaintiff cannot avoid this result by
raising the specter of due process.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment  is
granted and Plaintiff’s motion  is denied. Civil case terminated.
Date: March 31, 2017
John Robert Blakey
United States District Judge
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