Williams v. Colvin
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 7/27/2017. Mailed notice (ao,)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RONALD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.
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No. 16 C 7269
Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ronald Williams appeals the Commissioner’s decision denying his application
for Social Security benefits.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court reverses the
Commissioner’s decision and remands this case for further proceedings.
Background
Plaintiff filed an application for benefits on May 18, 2011. (R. 122.) His application was
denied initially on August 26, 2011, and again on reconsideration on November 9, 2011. (R. 6768.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held
on September 12, 2012. (R. 27-66.) On October 17, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision denying
plaintiff’s application. (R. 9-18.) The Appeals Council denied review (R. 1-4), and plaintiff
appealed to this Court. (R. 452-54.) On September 19, 2014, this Court granted the parties’
agreed motion to remand the case back to the agency. (R. 446.)
1
On January 23, 2017, Nancy A. Berryhill succeeded Carolyn W. Colvin as Acting Commissioner of Social
Security. See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited July 27, 2017). Accordingly, the Court
substitutes Berryhill for Colvin pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
On August 4, 2015, the ALJ held a second hearing (R. 391-435), and on October 15,
2015, he issued another opinion denying plaintiff’s application for benefits. (R. 374-84.) The
Appeals Council denied review (R. 353-56), leaving the ALJ’s 2015 decision as the final
decision of the Commissioner. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).
Discussion
The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially, affirming if it is supported by
“substantial evidence in the record,” i.e., “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” White v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir.
1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Although this standard is
generous, it is not entirely uncritical,” and the case must be remanded if the “decision lacks
evidentiary support.” Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The
regulations prescribe a five-part sequential test for determining whether a claimant is disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Under the regulations, the Commissioner must consider: (1) whether
the claimant has performed any substantial gainful activity during the period for which he claims
disability; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of
impairments; (3) if so, whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals any listed impairment;
(4) if not, whether the claimant retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his
past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether he is unable to perform any other work existing in
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significant numbers in the national economy. Id.; Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885 (7th
Cir. 2001). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and if that burden
is met, the burden shifts at step five to the Commissioner to provide evidence that the claimant is
capable of performing work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2).
At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since his alleged disability onset date. (R. 376.) At step two, the ALJ found that, through
plaintiff’s date last insured (“DLI”), plaintiff had the severe impairments of “obesity and
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine.” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that
plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. (R. 377.) At step four, the ALJ found that,
through his DLI, plaintiff had the RFC to perform his past relevant work, and thus was not
disabled. (R. 378-84.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinion evidence, which
consists of the RFC assessment by agency physician Panepinto dated August 25, 2011, the
reconsideration of that assessment by agency physician Dow dated October 5, 2011, a second
RFC assessment by Dr. Dow dated November 3, 2011,2 and the RFC assessment of plaintiff’s
treating physician Ahmedy dated June 28, 2012.3 (See R. 264-83, 287-94, 324-26.) Three of the
four assessments contain standing/walking restrictions that preclude plaintiff from doing his past
relevant work as a photo engraver and limit him to sedentary work, which plaintiff says is a de
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It is not clear why Dr. Dow rendered two, contradictory, opinions less than a month apart.
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Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ should have given controlling weight to the opinion of his treating physician,
Dr. Ahmedy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (stating that an ALJ must give the opinion of a treating physician
controlling weight if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and
is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record”).
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facto finding of disability under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines for someone of his age,
education, and skills. (See R. 274, 283, 325, 432-33); see also Medical-Vocational Guidelines §
201.14, available at, https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm (last visited
July 27, 2017.) But the ALJ credited the fourth assessment, Dr. Dow’s November 3, 2011
assessment, because plaintiff “demonstrated relatively unremarkable signs on a thorough
examination performed by [consultative examiner] Dr. DeBiase on August 10, 2011.” (R. at
383.)
Reliance on Dr. Biase’s consultative exam (“CE”) might make sense if it occurred before
Dr. Dow’s November 2011 assessment and after the other three assessments, all of which
contained standing/walking restrictions. However, the CE occurred before any of the RFC
assessments was made. In fact, Dr. Panepinto explicitly references the CE in his August 25,
2011 RFC assessment that includes the standing/walking restriction – an assessment that Dr.
Dow subsequently affirmed. (See R. 280, 283.) Given that the CE was completed before and
incorporated into the three RFC assessments the ALJ rejected as well as the RFC assessment the
ALJ adopted, the CE is not a basis for distinguishing among them. Moreover, because the CE
was the only reason the ALJ gave for adopting Dr. Dow’s second RFC, i.e., for rejecting the
standing/walking limitation of the other RFCs, that decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. In other words, the ALJ cannot give greater weight to Dr. Dow’s November 3, 2011
opinion and justify doing so because of the CE.
Two of the three contradictory medical
opinions, which had significant restrictions, also relied on the CE. The ALJ’s reasoning is
opaque, facially illogical, and/or inconsistent. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for
reconsideration of the medical evidence.
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Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s credibility finding/symptom evaluation. Because the
symptom evaluation rested, in part, on the ALJ’s view of the medical evidence, that issue will
have to be revisited on remand as well.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment [22], reverses the Commissioner’s decision, and remands this case for further
proceedings. This case is terminated.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: July 27, 2017
_________________________________
M. David Weisman
United States Magistrate Judge
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