Evans v. City of Chicago et al

Filing 75

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 5/11/2017: Defendants' motions to dismiss, 43 , 44 , 47 , are granted. The dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice. Plaintiff has leave to file an amended compla int by June 1, 2017. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, this dismissal will convert to a dismissal with prejudice as to the federal claims and without prejudice as to the state-law claims, and final judgment will be entered. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed. (psm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
GLENN EVANS,
Plaintiff,

No. 16 CV 7665

v.

Judge Manish S. Shah

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Glenn Evans sues the City of Chicago and several employees of the
city’s Independent Police Review Authority, alleging First Amendment retaliation
and various state-law claims. Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them.
For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss are granted.
I.

Legal Standards
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegations that plausibly suggest a right
to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The court must construe all
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor, but the court need not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations. Id.
at 677–79. A plaintiff’s failure to respond to an argument raised in a motion to
dismiss forfeits any argument on that issue. See Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d
715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] litigant effectively abandons the litigation by not
responding to alleged deficiencies in a motion to dismiss.”).

Evans attached to his complaint the ruling from his criminal trial, [1-1], and
he and one of the defendants have also attached various documents to their briefs
on the defendants’ motions to dismiss. See [47]; [58].1 “[D]ocuments that are
attached to the complaint, documents that are central to the complaint and are
referred to in it, and information that is properly subject to judicial notice” may be
considered on a motion to dismiss. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th
Cir. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). The only documents meeting these criteria are: (1)
the ruling from Evans’s trial, [1-1], which is attached to the complaint; (2) Evans’s
complaint to the inspector general, [58-3], and the articles published by WBEZ, [586], which are central to his complaint and referred to in it; and (3) the appointment
of Fairley to IPRA, [47-2], which is a public record subject to judicial notice. The
other documents and any unsupported facts in Evans’s response brief that were not
alleged in his complaint are not considered.
II.

Background2
Plaintiff Glenn Evans is a Chicago police officer. In 2011, he assisted in

processing Rita King, an arrestee. King later sued Evans, alleging that he pressed
his hand against her nose for an extended period of time. (King’s lawsuit, King v.
Evans et al., Case No. 13-cv-01937 (N.D. Ill.), remains pending.) The City of
Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority investigated King’s allegations, and
Evans gave IPRA a statement in November 2013. IPRA recommended a fourteen1

Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket.

The allegations from Evans’s complaint, [1], are taken as true for resolving the motions to
dismiss.
2

2

day suspension for Evans, but the Chicago Police Department declined to discipline
him.
In 2013, Evans was the subject of another IPRA investigation. Rickey
Williams filed a complaint with IPRA, alleging that Evans had shoved a gun down
Williams’s throat and held a taser to his groin. IPRA investigators had Evans’s gun
tested for DNA, and the results revealed Williams’s DNA on the gun. At the time,
Martrice Campbell and Vincent Jones were two of the IPRA investigators working
on the Williams matter.3 In May 2014, Jones, Campbell, and a Cook County
Assistant State’s Attorney met with Williams, showing him a series of photos to
identify the officers involved in his arrest. Williams misidentified several officers
and identified a “filler” photo, but he did not identify Evans by photo. He did
identify Evans by name, saying that he found it by searching the Internet with his
girlfriend, who used to be a friend of Evans.
Campbell gave the DNA test results and other confidential materials from
the Williams IPRA file to WBEZ reporter Steven “Chip” Mitchell. On July 30, 2014,
Mitchell contacted Evans for an interview and told him that he received information
from Campbell. The next day, WBEZ and Mitchell began publishing stories about
Evans and allegations of misconduct, which were picked up by other media outlets.
During the summer of 2014, other allegations of police misconduct had been

The complaint spells her name as “Matrice.” Campbell’s motion to dismiss and Evans’s
opposition brief spell her name as “Martrice.”
3

3

highlighted in the media.4 In September 2014, Evans was indicted for aggravated
battery with a deadly weapon and official misconduct. Evans alleges that these
charges arising out of the Williams incident were “due to the political pressures
facing” the mayor of Chicago and the Cook County State’s Attorney “in light of
police misconduct in the media.” [1] ¶ 112. He was placed on no-pay status in
October 2014.
In May 2015, Evans filed a complaint with the city’s Office of the Inspector
General about IPRA. Evans “complained about IPRA leaking confidential
information to the media and investigators Jones and Campbell being allowed to
participate in investigations against him despite conflicts of interest.” [1] ¶ 116; [583]. (In 1999, when Campbell worked in the administrative office for the Chicago
Police Department, she was suspended after Evans initiated a complaint register
against her for active insubordination. [1] ¶¶ 27–30. Evans alleges that he and
Jones had “prior adversarial contact during other IPRA investigations” but does not
elaborate. [1] ¶ 54.)
At a bench trial in December 2015, Evans was acquitted of all criminal
charges. [1-1]. He returned to work in April 2016 but was assigned to the Medical
Section against his wishes and was denied back pay for the pendency of his criminal
case. After his return to work, Evans received up to thirty phone calls from
Evans’s complaint refers not only to the WBEZ articles about Evans in July and August
2014, but also to national reports of deaths and shootings attributed to police misconduct,
including the July 2014 death of Eric Garner in New York City, the August 2014 death of
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the October 2014 death of Laquan McDonald in
Chicago (although October 2014 is after Evans was indicted). [1] ¶¶ 106–09.
4

4

superiors, who pressured him to retire. Senior Police Command Staff also
personally delivered retirement documents to Evans, but he refused to retire.
In July 2016, Evans received notice that IPRA investigators Linda Franko
and Shannon Hayes alleged that he testified falsely at his 2013 IPRA interview
regarding the King investigation. (Sharon Fairley had been appointed as Chief
Administrator of IPRA in early 2016.5 [47-2].) The investigation was reopened and
Evans was ordered to appear for a second interview (which had yet to occur at the
time he filed this complaint). Evans heard that IPRA was seeking to change its
recommendation from the King investigation from suspension to termination.
Shortly after receiving notice that the King investigation was being reopened,
Evans filed this suit. [1]. He brings claims for retaliatory inducement to prosecute
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Campbell (Count I) and Fairley, Franko, and Hayes
(Count V). He also brings Illinois state-law claims for malicious prosecution against
Campbell, Jones, and other IPRA employees (Count II), false light against Campbell
(Count III), tortious interference against all defendants (Count IV), civil conspiracy
against

Campbell

and

Jones

(Count

VI),

and

respondeat

superior

and

indemnification claims against the City of Chicago (Counts VII and VIII).6
Defendants now move to dismiss all claims against them.

Fairley argues that she worked at OIG in 2015, before her appointment to IPRA in 2016.
Although that fact is outside the complaint, Evans adopts it in his opposition brief. [58] at
22–23.
5

Evans also sued WBEZ and Mitchell but dismissed the claims against them without
prejudice. [40].
6

5

III.

Analysis
A.

Retaliatory Inducement to Prosecute

The First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an
individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). An individual subject to criminal
prosecution in retaliation for exercising his right to free speech may bring a § 1983
claim against an official who induced the prosecutor to bring charges that would not
have been initiated without the nonprosecuting official’s urging. Id. at 262; Peals v.
Terre Haute Police Dep’t, 535 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2008). To establish a prima
facie case for a typical First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) he
suffered a deprivation likely to deter the free exercise of his First Amendment
rights; and (3) his speech was a motivating factor in the defendant’s retaliation.
Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006).
“[T]he need to demonstrate causation in the retaliatory-prosecution context
presents an additional difficulty” beyond the requisite causation in ordinary
retaliation claims. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 259. An action for retaliatory inducement
to prosecute is unique in that “the causal connection required here is not merely
between the retaliatory animus of one person and that person’s own injurious
action, but between the retaliatory animus of one person and the action of another.”
Id. at 262. “To succeed on such a claim, the plaintiff must show a causal connection
between the official’s retaliatory animus and a subsequent injury in a retaliation
action.” Peals, 535 F.3d at 626 (citing Hartman, 547 U.S. at 259). Therefore, a
6

plaintiff must not only show that the nonprosecuting official acted in retaliation,
but he must also show that the nonprosecuting official “induced the prosecutor to
bring charges that would not have been initiated without his urging.” Hartman, 547
U.S. at 262; Peals, 535 F.3d at 626. To buttress this causal connection, “[t]he
plaintiff also must plead and prove, as an element of his case, that there existed no
probable cause to support the underlying charge.” Peals, 535 F.3d at 626 (citing
Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265–66).
1.

Retaliatory Inducement to Prosecute Claim against Campbell
(Count I)

Evans alleges that his discipline of Campbell in 1999 was an exercise of his
right to free speech and one of the duties of his employment, that Campbell
harbored a longstanding grudge against him for it, that she leaked information to a
reporter to induce the Cook County State’s Attorney to seek an indictment against
Evans for the Williams incident, and that there was no probable cause to prosecute
Evans because the IPRA investigation was botched and incomplete. Campbell
argues that Evans’s allegations of retaliatory animus are implausible, that he fails
to allege a causal connection between Campbell’s actions and his prosecution, and
that his allegations show that there was probable cause for the charges brought
against him.7

Campbell does not argue that the 1999 discipline was not protected speech, but in the
event Evans files an amended complaint, I note that “[p]ublic–employee speech is subject to
a special set of rules for First Amendment purposes. Whether a public employee’s speech is
constitutionally protected depends on ‘whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter
of public concern.’ If the speaker is not wearing her hat ‘as a citizen,’ or if she is not
speaking ‘on a matter of public concern,’ then the First Amendment does not protect her.”
7

7

Evans’s allegations as to Campbell’s retaliatory animus are short but not
implausible. Campbell asserts that Evans needed to plead more details describing
her insubordination, her interactions with Evans, or that she knew that it was
Evans who initiated the complaint resulting in her discipline, citing Bianchi v.
McQueen, No. 12-CV-00364, 2014 WL 700628, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2014), as an
example where a retaliatory-prosecution claim was dismissed because the plaintiffs
failed to allege that the defendants’ retaliatory animus caused their injury.
In Bianchi, however, the complaint was devoid of any allegation that any of
the defendants knew of the plaintiffs prior to the events in question or worked in
concert with unnamed “political enemies.” “[A] plaintiff must provide only enough
detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests, and, through his allegations, show that it is plausible, rather than
merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief.” Reger Dev., LLC v. National City
Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010) (marks omitted). Here, Evans pled that
when he and Campbell both worked at the Chicago Police Department, she was
suspended after he complained about her conduct and that fifteen years later, she
leaked confidential and damaging information from an IPRA investigation about
Evans to a reporter. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Evans’s favor, these
allegations are sufficient to raise an inference that Campbell held a grudge against
Evans for causing her suspension in 1999 and leaked confidential information to get
Brown v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)). An employee does not
speak as a citizen when he makes statements pursuant to his official duties. Id.

8

back at him years later, even though the complaint does not specifically allege that
Campbell knew Evans initiated her suspension.
But “[e]ven if retaliatory animus can be shown, the retaliation must be the
cause-in-fact of the claimed injury.” Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 321 (7th Cir.
2016). Campbell argues that Evans’s allegation that Campbell’s leak of information
to the media “directly induced the Cook County State’s Attorney to criminally
charge him,” [1] ¶ 146, is not credible. She reasons that this allegation is belied by
his other allegations that he was indicted in September 2014 “due to the political
pressures facing” the mayor of Chicago and Cook County State’s Attorney “in light
of police misconduct in the media” and due to the mayor’s and state’s attorney’s
upcoming reelections. [1] ¶¶ 110–12. She also points out that he does not allege that
Campbell herself recommended to the state’s attorney’s office that Evans be
charged for the Williams incident. Evans responds that if not for Campbell’s leak to
the media, the state’s attorney would not have been pressured to charge him.8
Evans argues that he was indicted because the state’s attorney wanted to look
tough on police officers.
Evans alleges that the state’s attorney’s office had been investigating him for
the Williams incident since at least May 2014. [1] ¶ 57. He does not allege that
Campbell provided false information to the state’s attorney’s investigation, that she

Evans also argues that it is widely known that IPRA avoids recommending to the state’s
attorney’s office that officers be charged and that the state’s attorney avoids charging
officers. [58] at 8. Facts supporting such arguments are not alleged in his complaint,
however, and are not considered.
8

9

requested or urged the state’s attorney’s office to prosecute him, or that she leaked
information not otherwise available to the state’s attorney’s office. At most, Evans
alleges that Campbell’s media leak encouraged his prosecution in combination with
other factors, including a rising tide of national media reporting on police
misconduct and increased political pressure on a mayor and a state’s attorney
nearing reelection. See [1] ¶¶ 110–12. It is not enough that some act of Campbell’s
contributed to events giving rise to Evans’s prosecution. In a retaliatory-prosecution
claim, the retaliation must be “the but-for basis for instigating the prosecution.”
Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261; Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 849 (11th Cir. 2010) (“To
sue for retaliatory prosecution, a plaintiff must establish a ‘but-for’ causal
connection between the retaliatory animus of the non-prosecutor and the
prosecutor’s decision to prosecute.”) (citing Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256, 261); Peals,
535 F.3d at 626 (“[I]nstigation of the retaliatory prosecution is subject to recovery as
the but-for cause of official action offending the Constitution.”) (marks omitted).
Evans’s allegations do not rise to the level of but-for causation sufficient to
rebut the presumption of prosecutorial discretion, particularly when the face of his
complaint alleges facts amounting to probable cause. The absence of probable cause
“is needed both to bridge the gap between the nonprosecuting government agent’s
motive and the prosecutor’s action, and to address the presumption of prosecutorial
regularity.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263. Although probable cause can be a factual
question, a plaintiff may plead himself out of court by alleging facts supporting a
finding of probable cause. See, e.g., Williamson, 714 F.3d at 448 (plaintiff “pleaded

10

herself out of court” on false arrest claim by alleging facts sufficient to find probable
cause).
“Probable cause requires only that a probability or a substantial chance of
criminal activity exist,” Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2010), and it
exists if the facts and circumstances “would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.” Johnson v. Saville, 575 F.3d
656, 659 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cervantes v. Jones, 188 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir.
1999)). Evans was charged with two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly
weapon and seven counts of official misconduct, all felonies. To establish aggravated
battery with a deadly weapon, the state had to prove that Evans knowingly, without
legal justification, by any means caused bodily harm to Williams or made “physical
contact of an insulting or provoking nature” with Williams while using “a deadly
weapon other than by discharge of a firearm.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a), 5/12-3.05(f). To
establish official misconduct, the state had to prove that, while acting in his official
capacity, Evans knowingly performed an act that he knew he was forbidden by law.
720 ILCS 5/33-3; People v. Williams, 239 Ill.2d 119, 127 (2010).
Evans’s allegations, taken as true, show that a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, could believe that Evans had made
insulting physical contact with Williams while using his gun and that, while acting
as a police officer, Evans knowingly performed an act that he knew was forbidden
by law. Evans alleges that he, with other officers, arrested Williams for reckless

11

conduct in January 2013. Within a few days of the arrest, Williams filed a
complaint that Evans shoved a gun down his throat and held a taser to his groin.
Evans’s gun was swabbed within a few days of the arrest, and Williams’s DNA was
found on it. These allegations are sufficient to establish probable cause against
Evans for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and official misconduct.
Williams’s credibility problems—which appear to have been an issue at Evans’s
criminal trial, [1-1]—and Evans’s allegation that Williams’s version of events was
false do not preclude a finding of probable cause if there was other evidence
supporting probable cause. See, e.g., Saville, 575 F.3d at 659–62 (probable cause can
be found despite a victim’s credibility issues or a defendant’s denial of wrongdoing).
Evans’s argument that IPRA botched the DNA test—by allowing the sample
to be consumed, by not testing for blood or saliva, and by not taking different swabs
for different parts of the gun—does not attack or dispute the fact that some form of
Williams’s DNA was found on Evans’s gun. (At a minimum, the complaint alleges
that there was a positive DNA report at the time of the charging decision.) Even if
Evans was eventually acquitted, that “does not negate the existence of probable
cause at the relevant time.” Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d
852, 863 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“[P]robable cause does not depend on the witness turning out to have been right;
it’s what the police know, not whether they know the truth, that matters.”).
Williams’s complaint, Evans’s undisputed participation in his arrest, and the report
that Williams’s DNA was on Evans’s gun were sufficient to warrant a reasonable

12

belief that Evans made provoking physical contact with Williams while using his
gun.9
Evans has not alleged the causal connection required for a retaliatoryprosecution claim and has pled himself out of court on probable cause, so therefore
the retaliatory-prosecution claim against Campbell is dismissed.
2.

Retaliatory Inducement to Prosecute Claim against Fairley,
Franko, and Hayes (Count V)

Evans’s retaliatory inducement to prosecute claim against Fairley, Franko,
and Hayes for reopening the King investigation in retaliation for his OIG complaint
against IPRA also fails for several reasons.10 Most notably, this claim fails because
Evans does not allege that he was criminally prosecuted (or even charged) for the
King incident. Evans’s argument that he need not allege an actual criminal
prosecution because he brings this claim in a civil context as a city employee is
contrary to authority, which makes clear that in these claims, “the claimed
retaliation for protected conduct is a criminal charge.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260
(emphasis added).

A grand jury indictment is also prima facie evidence of probable cause, Swearnigen-El,
602 F.3d at 863, although this presumption may be rebutted by showing that an indictment
was improperly procured. See Cervantes, 188 F.3d at 811 n.7, overruled on other grounds by
Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001). The grand jury indictment is not
considered in this probable cause analysis because Evans contends that Williams’s false
version of events was used to obtain his indictment. See id. (plaintiff’s allegation that his
indictment was the result of the defendant’s perjury “precludes us from considering the
indictment in our probable cause analysis”).
9

Evans does not respond to any of the defendants’ arguments that his refusal to retire was
not constitutionally protected freedom of association, as it was intimately connected with
his professional duties and was not a matter of public concern. His failure to respond
forfeits any argument on that issue. Alioto, 651 F.3d at 721.

10

13

To the extent Evans is arguing that he has alleged a First Amendment
retaliation claim against these defendants, even without a criminal prosecution, a
“complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”
Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 348 (7th Cir. 2012). And
Evans’s allegations fail to even state an ordinary First Amendment retaliation
claim based on the reopened King investigation. Regardless of whether Evans’s OIG
complaint was constitutionally protected (an issue I do not reach), to support a First
Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a deprivation
likely to deter the free exercise of his First Amendment rights. Massey, 457 F.3d at
716. At most, Evans alleges that Fairley, Franko, and Hayes reopened the King
investigation in July 2016 and requested Evans appear for a second interview
(which was not yet scheduled). But Evans cites no case law suggesting that a
retaliatory investigation, alone, is a sufficient deprivation to support a First
Amendment retaliation claim. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262 n.9 (“No one here
claims that simply conducting a retaliatory investigation with a view to promote a
prosecution is a constitutional tort.”); Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 850–51 (“[The] right to
be free from a retaliatory investigation is not clearly established.”).
While the Supreme Court alluded in Hartman to the idea that the adverse
consequences of a retaliatory investigation might theoretically justify recognizing a
retaliatory investigation as a deprivation, 547 U.S. at 262 n.9 (“Whether the
expense or other adverse consequences of a retaliatory investigation would ever
justify recognizing such an investigation as a distinct constitutional violation is not

14

before us.”), Evans’s arguments that the reopened King investigation was harassing
and jeopardized his employment are conclusory, undeveloped, and not reflected in
his complaint. He does not argue or allege that the investigation was conducted in a
harassing manner, only that reopening the investigation constituted harassment.
And his complaint merely alleges that IPRA might seek to recommend termination
upon conclusion of the reopened King investigation, not that it has actually
recommended termination or any discipline (other than the 2013 recommendation
that he be suspended, which was not acted on by the Chicago Police Department).
He has not shown any authority suggesting that a mere investigation or the mere
possibility of disciplinary recommendation are deprivations sufficient to support a
First Amendment retaliation claim.
Because retaliatory investigation is not a clearly recognized tort, Fairley,
Franko, and Hayes are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Qualified
immunity precludes damages liability against government officials performing
discretionary functions when their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Bianchi, 818 F.3d at 319 (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993)).
To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, courts look to
whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right and whether
the right at issue was clearly established. Id. Evans has not shown any case law
suggesting that retaliatory investigation rises to the level of a constitutional
violation or that this right was clearly established when defendants reopened the

15

King investigation. See, e.g., Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262 n.9; Rehberg, 611 F.3d at
850–51 (even assuming that the plaintiff stated a constitutional violation for
retaliatory investigation, the investigators “still receive qualified immunity because
[plaintiff’s] right to be free from a retaliatory investigation is not clearly
established”).
Evans has failed to state a claim for retaliatory inducement to prosecute
against Fairley, Franko, and Hayes and therefore this claim is dismissed.
B.

State-Law Claims

Because Evans’s federal claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim, I
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Evans’s state-law claims. See
RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2012).
This case is in its initial stages, and there is no reason not to follow the presumption
that federal courts will relinquish jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims.
The dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice because ordinarily “a plaintiff
whose original complaint has been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) should be given at
least one opportunity to try to amend [his] complaint before the entire action is
dismissed.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Ind.,
786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015).
IV.

Conclusion
Defendants’ motions to dismiss, [43], [44], [47], are granted. The dismissal of

the complaint is without prejudice. Plaintiff has leave to file an amended complaint
by June 1, 2017. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, this dismissal will

16

convert to a dismissal with prejudice as to the federal claims and without prejudice
as to the state-law claims, and final judgment will be entered.
ENTER:
___________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: 5/11/2017

17