Bishop v. Colvin
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Michael T. Mason on 3/30/2018.(rbf, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DONNA BISHOP,
Plaintiff,
No. 16 C 7703
v.
Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL T. MASON, United States Magistrate Judge:
Claimant Donna M. Bishop (“Bishop” or “Claimant”) brings this motion for
summary judgment seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”). The Commissioner denied Bishop’s claim for
disability insurance benefits under Sections 216 and 223 of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(I) and 423(d). The Commissioner filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment, requesting that this Court uphold the decision of the administrative
law judge (the “ALJ”). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3). For the reasons set forth below, Claimant’s motion for summary judgment
[23] is granted and the Commissioner’s cross-motion [33] for summary judgment is
denied. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Bishop filed for period of disability, disability insurance benefits and disability for
disabled widow’s benefits on September 12, 2003. (R. 21.) Bishop alleges that she has
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been disabled since September 5, 2013 due to inflammatory arthritis, degenerative disc
disease, a mixed connective tissue disease, fibromyalgia, and depression. (R. 24-26.)
Both of Bishop’s applications were initially denied on January 2, 2014, and upon
reconsideration on June 23, 2014. (R. 21.) On July 7, 2014, Bishop filed a request for a
hearing. (Id.) She appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Roxanne J. Kelsey
on August 25, 2015. (R. 21-31.) The ALJ issued a decision denying Bishop’s disability
claim on November 18, 2015. (R. 31.) On January 17, 2016, Bishop requested review
by the Appeals Council. (R. 6.) On May 25, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Bishop’s
request for review, at which time the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. (R. 1-3); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001). Bishop
subsequently filed this action in the District Court.
B. Relevant Medical Evidence
1. Dr. Syed Rizvi - Rheumatologist
Prior to her alleged disability onset date, Bishop had a number of visits with Dr.
Syed Rizvi, a rheumatologist. During these early appointments, Claimant reported pain
and stiffness in many areas including her back (447-48, 462-63, 503), neck (R. 482483), right arm (R. 480-81), wrists (Id., R. 484-85), hands (R. 473-74), fingers (R. 516),
knees (R. 480-81, 484-85), and joints (R. 455-56). On July 14, 2012, Dr. Rizvi gave
Claimant a cortisone injection in her wrist. (R. 471.) Over the course of several visits,
Dr. Rizvi diagnosed Claimant with seropositive rheumatoid arthritis (R. 448, 479, 515),
fibromyalgia (R. 501, 507, 531), meralgia paresthetica (R. 501, 520, 534), idiopathic
osteoporosis (R. 463, 501, 506), osteopenia (R. 448, 456, 501), osteoporosis of the left
hip (R. 463, 466, 515), cervical and lumbosacral spondylosis (R. 448, 472, 515),
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unspecified internal derangement of the left knee (R. 485, 520, 534), restless leg
syndrome (R. 448, 477, 516), and stage 3 chronic kidney disease (R. 508, 526).
During appointments with Dr. Rizvi after her alleged September 5, 2013 onset,
Claimant reported that she continued to experience pain in her neck, back, wrists,
hands, joints, and all over her body. (R. 391, 564, 604, 611, 637.) She also reported
that physical activity caused her pain to worsen. (R. 391, 564, 620.) At various
appointments, Dr. Rizvi observed that Claimant had swelling and tenderness in the
wrists, joints, shoulders and thumb. (R. 391, 480-81, 471.) Dr. Rizvi also observed that
Claimant had full range of motion in her cervical spine and neck, a bilateral complete
handgrip, and normal ambulation. (R. 481, 391-392.)
2. Dr. Sheila Berndt – Primary Care Physician
In August of 2013, Claimant reported chronic constipation, bloating, and
abdominal pain to her primary care doctor, Dr. Sheila Berndt. (R. 444.) A pelvic
ultrasound demonstrated fatty infiltration of Plaintiff’s liver. (R. 433.) In September of
2014, she reported feeling depressed, having trouble sleeping, and experiencing
anxiety. (R. 575.) She was tearful during examination. (R. 576.) Dr. Berndt diagnosed
Claimant with depression, prescribed Sertraline and Zoloft, and referred her to a
therapist. (R. 576-77.) Dr. Berndt again diagnosed her with depression in May of 2015.
(R. 600-01.)
3. Dr. Mahesh Shah – Internal Medicine Consultative Examiner
On June 2, 2014, Claimant underwent an internal medicine consultative
examination with Dr. Mahesh Shah, who noted that Claimant had a mild tenderness in
her lower back, mild swelling of the joints and wrists, slight difficulty with heel and toe
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walking, and trouble squatting. (R. 551-54.) Claimant reported she was in good health
until 2005 when she started having pain in her hips which then spread to her joints. (R.
551.) She also reported significant pain in her shoulders. (Id.) Dr. Shah noted that
Claimant could walk into the office without assistance, she was able to move around
with no problem, and she was able to get up from the chair and onto the examining
table without difficulty. (R. 552.) Dr. Shah also noted full range of motion in all her
joints and upper extremities and normal handgrip. (R. 553-54.) Dr. Shah diagnosed
rheumatoid arthritis, mild fibromyalgia, and mild depression. (R. 554.)
C. Claimant Testimony
At the hearing, Claimant testified that she had worked until September 27, 2013.
(R.41.) Claimant testified that she continued to receive payments from her job in
October, November, and December of 2013, and during the first quarter of 2014 for
accrued vacation time and sick days. (R. 42.) Claimant also reported she lives alone
with two large dogs. (R. 43.) She walks them about once a month. (R. 44.) She can
drive but not for too long. (Id.) She does her own laundry, shopping, cooking, and
cleaning but with limited ability because she has to stop often and she can lift only a few
items. (R. 46-47.) Claimant enjoys drawing and cross-stitching but has not been doing
those activities lately because those items are packed up in boxes, in light of an
upcoming move. (R. 47-48.) She reported that her house is in foreclosure, which is
why she is moving. (R. 48.) She also reported that she has a computer and she is able
to type to send emails but she is unable to stay on the computer longer than ten
minutes at a time before her hands start cramping. (Id.) Claimant testified that lately
she has only been able to clean, do laundry, and grocery shop about once a month.
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(Id.) She has no trouble remembering her doctors appointments or to take her
medication. (R. 49.) She reported that she has pain in her hands, back, right shoulder,
and knees. (R. 50.) Most days the pain is at a 20 on a scale of 1 to 10. (R. 51.) She
also reported that moving and stacking boxes for her move have irritated her pain and
she had to stop. (R. 52.) Claimant can sit for 45 minutes at a time and stand for 10
minutes at a time. (Id.) When she washes a dish, she is unable to pick it up and she
must pin it down to the sink or against her stomach to wash it with one hand. (R. 53.)
She uses a wagon to transport groceries from her car in the garage into the house. (R.
55.)
D. Vocational Expert Testimony
Vocational Expert Pamela Tucker (the “VE”) also testified at the hearing. (R. 5867.) The ALJ asked the VE to classify Claimant's past work as a custodian and a
security guard. (R. 60.) The VE asked Claimant to clarify some of the work she did
during her employment as a custodian in which she was cutting grass and shoveling
snow. (Id.) Claimant testified that she only shoveled light snow and used a snow
blower. (R. 61.) When the snow was too heavy, Claimant explained that another
employee would be assigned to assist with the heavy shoveling or snow blowing. (Id.)
Claimant also testified that the lawn mower was a self-propelled mower and she only
had to place her hands on the bar to push it slightly. (R. 62.) The VE testified that
Claimant’s occupation as a custodian is classified as medium and unskilled, although
the VE noted that Claimant performed it more as light. (R. 64.) The VE also classified
Claimant’s occupation as a security guard as light and semi-skilled. (Id.)
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The ALJ asked VE Tucker to assume the following hypothetical person: an
individual with Claimant's age, education, and work experience who (1) would be limited
to sedentary work, (2) could not climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, (3) could occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, and (4) should avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected
heights and dangerous moving machinery. (R. 64.) The ALJ asked the VE whether
such an individual would be able to perform the custodian and security guard jobs. (Id.).
VE Tucker testified that such circumstances would preclude the custodian job at the
medium but would allow for it to be performed as light, which is how Claimant had been
performing it. (R. 65.) The ALJ then asked the VE to assume the same facts as the first
hypothetical but to make the following changes; no more than occasional use of the left
non-dominant upper extremity for fine and/or gross manipulation. (Id.) The ALJ asked
how those changes would impact the Claimant’s ability to do either job. (Id.) The VE
testified that those circumstances would not allow for the custodian job but would allow
for the security job. (Id.) The ALJ then asked the VE to assume the individual was
limited to no more than rare use of the left non-dominant extremity for fine and/or gross
manipulation and the VE testified that this would still be allowable. (R. 65-66.) The VE
noted that the regulations do not discuss the use of the dominant versus non-dominant
so her determination on this issue was based on her own experience. (R. 66.)
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
This Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence
and free from legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th
Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence; it is “such relevant
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 S.Ct. 1420 (1971)). In our review, we must consider the entire
administrative record, but will not consider “re-weigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide
questions of credibility, or substitute or own judgement for that of the Commissioner.”
Lopez v. Barnart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d
863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000)). This Court will “conduct a critical review of the evidence” and
will not let the Commissioner’s decision stand “if it lacks evidentiary support or an
adequate discussion of the issues.” Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539 (quoting Steele, 290 F.3d
at 940).
In addition, while the ALJ “is not required to address every piece of evidence,”
she “must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion.”
Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must “sufficiently articulate [her] assessment of the
evidence to assure us that the ALJ considered the important evidence…[and to enable]
us to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning.” Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th
Cir. 1993) (per curium) (quoting Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.
1985)).
B. Analysis under the Social Security Act
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must be “disabled” under the Act. A
person is disabled under the Act if “he or she has an inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of no less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the
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ALJ must consider the following five-step inquiry “(1) whether the claimant is currently
employed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, (3) whether the claimant’s
impairment is one that the Commissioner considered conclusively disabling, (4) if the
claimant does not have a conclusively disabling impairment, whether she can perform
past relevant work, and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in
the national economy.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). The
claimant has the burden of establishing a disability at steps one through four. Zurawski,
245 F.3d at 885-86. If the claimant reaches step five, the burden then shifts to the
Commissioner to show that “the claimant is capable of performing work in the national
economy.” Id. at 886.
Here, the ALJ followed this five-step analysis. At step one, the ALJ found that
Claimant was “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 5, 2013, the
alleged onset date.” (R. 24.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Claimant has the
severe impairments of inflammatory arthritis, degenerative disc disease, and a mixed
connective tissue disease. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that Bishop “does not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. 26.)
The ALJ evaluated each of Claimant’s impairments (inflammatory arthritis, degenerative
disc disease, and mixed connective tissue disease) in the context of an identified listing.
(R. 26-27.) Based on the findings in Claimant’s lab tests and medical records, the ALJ
found that none of her impairments meet or was medically equal to the listed
impairments. (Id.)
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At step four, the ALJ found that Claimant has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work and also that she could frequently climb, stoop, kneel,
crouch or crawl. (R. 27.) The ALJ examined the daily activities as part of her analysis
and she noted that Claimant can drive for 3 to 4 hours, limited only by her difficulty
holding the steering wheel for longer periods. (R. 28.) The ALJ also noted that
Claimant watched television for 12 hours per day and sang karaoke 3 hours at a time
twice per week. (Id.) Although the ALJ noted that Claimant could use the computer
only for up to 10 minutes at a time before her hand started cramping, the ALJ also noted
that Claimant reported hobbies such as needlework for 3 hours per day and drawing.
(Id.) The ALJ acknowledged that Claimant could prepare sandwiches and soups, and
eats food out of cans or jars she opens by herself. (Id.)
The ALJ also highlighted some medical evidence in the record. Claimant’s
rheumatologist, Dr. Rizvi, found that Claimant had full range of motion in her cervical
spine, elbows, shoulders, hips, and knees, and while she exhibited some mild swelling
and tenderness in her left wrist, she retained a bilateral complete handgrip. (Id.) The
ALJ further noted that Claimant’s primary care physician, Dr. Berndt, found that her
hand and finger grasps, and fine and gross manipulations were all normal. (R. 29.) Dr.
Berndt also noted that Claimant had 5 out of 5 motor strength in all extremities,
exhibited a full range of motion in all joints in her upper and lower extremities, and her
gait was normal. (Id.) The ALJ also noted that the opinions of two state agency medical
consultants, Dr. Gotanco and Dr. Madala, showed Claimant could frequently lift or carry
10 pounds, occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour work
day, stand and/ or walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour work day, occasionally climb ramps,
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stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl. (Id.) For these reasons, the ALJ found that “[C]laimant’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not
entirely credible.” (R. 28-30.) The ALJ ultimately found that Claimant could perform her
past relevant work as a custodian and as a security guard. (R. 30-31.)
Because the ALJ found that Claimant could perform her past relevant work, the
ALJ’s sequential evaluation of Claimant’s disability claim ended at step four.
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Claimant “has not been under a disability, as
defined in the Social Security Act, from September 5, 2013 through the date of
decision.” (R. 31.)
Bishop now argues that the ALJ’s analysis of her subjective complaints was
legally insufficient and that her conclusion that Claimant’s statements were not credible
was not supported by substantial evidence. Bishop also argues that in determining
Claimant’s RFC, the ALJ improperly relied on the testimony of one state agency
physican over another without providing an adequate reason. Finally, Bishop argues
that the ALJ’s determination that Bishop could perform her past work at Step 4 was
contrary to Social Security Ruling 82-62.
C. The ALJ Failed To Build An Accurate And Logical Bridge From The
Evidence To Her Conclusion That Claimant Was Not Entirely
Credible.
We first address Bishop's argument that the ALJ improperly analyzed her
credibility with respect to her disabling symptoms. In particular, Bishop argues that the
ALJ misstated facts and overlooked other relevant evidence in order to improperly find
inconsistencies in Bishop’s testimony and render this testimony not credible.
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An ALJ’s credibility determination is granted substantial deference by a reviewing
court unless it is “patently wrong” and not supported by the record. Schmidt v.
Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir.
2000); see also Elder, 529 F.3d at 413 (holding that in assessing the credibility finding,
courts do not review the medical evidence de novo but “merely examine whether the
ALJ’s determination was reasoned and supported”). An ALJ must give specific reasons
for discrediting a claimant’s testimony, and “[t]hose reasons must be supported by
record evidence and must be ‘sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to
any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements
and the reasons for that weight.’” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539–
40 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887–88); see SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186, at *4 (SSA 1996).
In addition, the lack of objective evidence is not by itself reason to find a
claimant’s testimony to be incredible. See Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746–47
(7th Cir. 2005). Villano, 556 F.3d at 562 (an ALJ may not discredit a claimant's
testimony about his symptoms “solely because there is no objective medical evidence
supporting it.”); Johnson v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The
administrative law judge cannot disbelieve [the claimant's] testimony solely because it
seems in excess of the ‘objective’ medical testimony.”). When evaluating a
claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must also consider “(1) the claimant’s daily activity; (2) the
duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors;
(4) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) functional
restrictions.” Scheck, 357 F.3d at 703; see also SSR 96-7p at *3;
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562 (in evaluating the claimant's subjective symptoms, “an ALJ must consider several
factors, including the claimant's daily activities, [his] level of pain or symptoms,
aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and limitations, and justify the finding with
specific reasons”); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p. An ALJ’s “failure to
adequately explain his or her credibility finding...is grounds for reversal.” Minnick v.
Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Finney v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 3815,
2018 WL 1377908, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2018).
Initially, we note that the Social Security Administration recently determined that
it would no longer assess the “credibility” of a claimant's statements, but would instead
focus on determining the “intensity and persistence of symptoms.” Social Security
Regulation (SSR) 16-3p, at *2. “The change in wording is meant to clarify that
administrative law judges are not in the business of impeaching claimants' character;
obviously administrative law judges will continue to assess the credibility of
pain assertions by applicants, especially as such assertions often cannot be either
credited or rejected on the basis of medical evidence.” Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411,
412 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). The regulations describe a two-step process
for evaluating a claimant's own description of his or her impairments. First, the ALJ
“must consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical
or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual's
symptoms, such as pain.” SSR 16-3p, at *2; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. “Second,
once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected
to produce the individual's symptoms is established, we evaluate the intensity and
persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an
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individual's ability to perform work-related activities....” SSR 16-3p, at *2. SSR 16-3p,
like former SSR 96-7p, requires the ALJ to consider “the entire case record, including
the objective medical evidence; an individual's statements about the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information
provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other relevant evidence in the
individual's case record.” SSR 16-3p, at *4.
In addition, the court will uphold an ALJ's subjective symptom evaluation if the
ALJ gives specific reasons for that finding, supported by substantial evidence. Moss v.
Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009). The ALJ's decision “must contain specific
reasons for a credibility finding; the ALJ may not simply recite the factors that are
described in the regulations.” Steele, 290 F.3d at 942 (citation omitted). “Without an
adequate explanation, neither the applicant nor subsequent reviewers will have a fair
sense of how the applicant's testimony is weighed.” Id. Further, when an ALJ does
analyze a claimant's daily activities, the analysis “must be done with care.” See Roddy
v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2013).
Here, we find that the reasons provided by the ALJ for rejecting Claimant’s
statements are legally insufficient and not supported by substantial evidence, warranting
remand on this issue. See Ghiselli v. Colvin, 837 F.3d 771, 778–79 (7th Cir. 2016).
First, we find that in her analysis of Claimant’s statements about her disabling
symptoms, the ALJ misstated or misrepresented certain testimony and ignored
qualifying statements made by the Claimant that would have undermined the ALJ’s
findings. The ALJ cited many daily activities without acnkowledging testimony that
Claimant performed these activities only in a limited way. In particular, the ALJ relied on
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Claimant’s statements that she takes care of her personal hygiene, performs household
chores such as laundry, vacuuming and mowing the lawn, caring for her large dogs,
driving and maintaining a social life. But Bishop made some qualifying statements
about her ability to do all of these tasks, which the ALJ ignored. For example, while she
does “care for her large dogs,” Claimant’s testimony is that she takes them for a walk
only about once a month. Otherwise, she simply lets them out in her backyard and
feeds them. Contrary to the ALJ’s findings, we do not believe that caring for her dogs in
this limited manner is inconsistent with her complaints of disablying symptoms and
limitations. Similarly, the ALJ stated that Bishop takes care of her personal hygiene, but
the record actually demonstrates that Claimant has some difficultly with this. She stated
she often has trouble holding a razor, using a hairbrush, or turning on the water. The
ALJ also ignored her testimony that she uses a special tool for opening jars and that her
wrist and hand pain prevent her from stirring, cutting, chopping or typing on the
computer for long periods of time. The ALJ also stated that she handles laundry and
vacuuming, but her testimony was that she only does these things about once per
month. And lastly, the ALJ noted that she does needle work, but her testimony was that
she enjoys this as a hobby but it does cause her hands to swell. For these reasons, we
find that the ALJ has overstated her ability to handle these household tasks and ignored
her qualifying statements about her ability to perform these without pain or assistance.
Hines v. Berryhill, No. 16-c-50064, 2017 WL 3310973, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2017)
(remanding where the ALJ repeatedly mischaracterized the record in identifying
purported “inconsistencies” in Plaintiff's testimony). The ALJ did not discuss any of
these qualifications in her analysis of Claimant’s subjective complaints, and her failure
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to do so requires remand. Moss, 555 F.3d at 562 (“An ALJ cannot disregard a
claimant's limitations in performing household activities.”).
In addition, the ALJ discredited Claimant’s complaints because the record did not
contain an opinion from a treating or examining physician who provided greater RFC
limitations than what the ALJ recommended. In support, the ALJ cited to Exhibits 11
and 12. Exhibit 11 consists of medical records and no reference to any RFC evaluation.
And in Exhibit 12, Dr. Rizvi recommends that Claimant have an RFC evaluation.
Therefore, these records do not indicate that Dr. Rizvi made any determination about
what limitations were appropriate. Indeed, it appears that he believed Bishop needed to
be evaluated before he could make any such determination. As a result, again it
appears that the ALJ is overstating facts in the record. While an ALJ need not discuss
or give great weight to every piece of evidence in the record, she “must confront the
evidence that does not support [her] conclusion and explain why it was
rejected.” Indoranto, 374 F.3d at 474.
Lastly, the ALJ failed to explain how Claimant's ability to complete limited daily
activities undermines her allegations of pain or equates to an ability to perform full-time
work. While it is permissible for an ALJ to consider a claimant's daily activities when
assessing a claimant's subjective symptom statements, the Seventh Circuit has
repeatedly instructed that ALJs are not to place “undue weight” on those
activities. Moss, 555 F.3d at 562; see also Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir.
2011) (“[The claimant's] ability to struggle through the activities of daily living does not
mean that [the claimant] can manage the requirements of a modern work-place”).
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Also absent from the ALJ's analysis is an explanation as to how claimant's ability to
perform these limited tasks undermines her complaints of debilitating pain. See Jelinek
v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[An ALJ] must explain perceived
inconsistencies between a claimant's activities and the medical evidence.”); Ghiselli,
837 F.3d at 778 (finding error when ALJ did not “identify a basis for his conclusion that
the life activities [claimant] reported were inconsistent with the physical impairments she
claimed”). We find that these limited activities do not necessarily demonstrate that
Plaintiff can perform full-time work. See Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 647 (“The critical
differences between activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job are that a
person has more flexibility in scheduling the former than the latter, can get help from
other persons ... and is not held to a minimum standard of performance, as she would
be by an employer.”) (collecting cases); Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 755 (7th
Cir. 2004) (ALJ failed to consider the difference between a person being able to engage
in sporadic physical activities and [his] being able to work eight hours a day five
consecutive days of the week). Because the ALJ has failed to sufficiently articulate
adequate grounds for dismissing Claimant’s subjective complaints, we find remand is
appropriate here.
In sum, we find that the ALJ’s decision must be remanded because the ALJ
misstated or ignored relevant evidence in the record regarding Claimant’s subjective
complaints and her statements about her daily activiites. While it is true the ALJ “is not
required to address every piece of evidence,” she “must build an accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. Here, she
ignored certain important qualifications in the Claimant’s testimony about her ability to
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perform daily activities and household tasks. As a result, we find that she failed to
articulate the logical bridge between the record and her decision, and the case must be
remanded.
D. Remaining Arguments
Because we have already determined that remand is appropriate, we need not
address Bishop’s remaining arguments. For the most part, these arguments relate to
her RFC determination, and on remand, the outcome of the ALJ’s analysis may result in
a different RFC assessment. As a result, the Court need not now address Claimant's
arguments regarding this determation.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Claimant’s motion for summary judgment is
granted and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. This
case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion. It is so ordered.
DATED: March 30, 2018
_______________________________
The Honorable Michael T. Mason
United States Magistrate Judge
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