Kinzy et al v. Howard and Howard, PLLC et al
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court denies Fidelity and Pierce's Motion to Dismiss or Transfer 17 , and grants Howard & Howard, First Tennessee, and Pierce's Motion to Stay 14 . This matter shall be stayed until a final judgment in Foreclosure Action is rendered. The parties also shall file a status report notifying the Court of the conclusion of State Foreclosure Action within seven days of the final disposition of that case. Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 1/17/2017:Mailed notice(srn, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KYLE KINZY and JACKI KINZY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HOWARD AND HOWARD, PLLC, an Illinois
professional limited liability company,
HOWARD AND HOWARD ATTORNEYS, an
Illinois limited liability company, HOWARD
AND HOWARD, LLC, an Illinois limited
liability company, HOWARD AND HOWARD,
LTD., an Illinois corporation, FIDELITY
NATIONAL LAW GROUP, a business entity,
PIERCE AND ASSOCIATES, an Illinois
corporation, PIERCE AND ASSOCIATES, PC,
an Illinois corporation, PIERCE &
ASSOCIATES, LTD., an Illinois corporation,
and FIRST TENNESSEE BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCATION, a national bank,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 16 C 8230
Judge Virginia M. Kendall
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Kyle and Jacki Kinzy filed an eight count complaint against Defendants
Howard & Howard PLLC, Fidelity National Law Group, Pierce and Associates, P.C., and First
Tennessee Bank, National Association, related to First Tennessee’s alleged improper foreclosure
of the Kinzys’ home, which was effectuated by the rest of the Defendants, law firms that
represented First Tennessee in the foreclosure action. 1
1
The complaint alleges (1) violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (the “FDCPA”); (2) false or
misleading representations; (3) violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (the
“ICFDPA”); (4) identity theft; (5) fraud, forgery, counterfeiting and violations of the RICO Statute; (6) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (7) quiet title; and (8) slander of title.
1
Two motions are currently pending before the Court: (1) Fidelity and Pierce’s 2 Motion to
Dismiss or Transfer Case (Dkt. 17); and Howard & Howard, First Tennessee, and Pierce’s (the
“Stay Defendants”) Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Plaintiffs’ Appeal (Dkt.
14). For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss or Transfer is denied and the Motion to
Stay is granted.
BACKGROUND
In January 2006, the Kinzys purchased a property in Long Grove, Illinois by obtaining a
$1,060,000 mortgage loan from First Horizon Home Loan Corporation. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 13, 4; Dkt. 12 at 4-37; Dkt. 34 ¶ 17.) In the first half of 2007, First Tennessee acquired First Horizon’s
assets as part of a merger. (Dkt. 1-2 at 1; Dkt. 34 ¶¶ 18-20.) In September 2007, First Horizon
recorded a mortgage on the Property, which was recorded to “add the husband’s name” (the
“2007 Mortgage”). (Id. ¶¶ 23-26.) The Kinzys allege that the 2007 Mortgage was created
without their knowledge, included forgeries of Mr. Kinzy’s initials, had a forged notary
certification, and included other material alterations. (Id. ¶ 24.) On July 14 2009, First Horizon,
then a division of First Tennessee and represented by Pierce, filed a foreclosure action in Lake
County, Illinois Circuit Court against the Plaintiffs regarding the Property (the Foreclosure
Action), alleging that the Kinzys had failed to pay their mortgage since August 2008 and
attached the 2007 Mortgage. (Id. ¶ 28; Dkt. 14-6.) On April 9, 2010, First Horizon, again
through Pierce, filed an amended complaint in the Foreclosure Action, also attaching the 2007
Mortgage.
(Dkt. 14-7.)
In response, the Kinzys filed various affirmative defenses and
counterclaims against First Horizon and First Tennessee in the Foreclosure Action, including
allegations that the 2007 Mortgage was invalid because it included forgeries. (Dkt. 14 ¶ 8-9.)
The Kinzys’ counterclaims were dismissed by the Circuit Court on October 24, 2013. (Dkt. 142
On November 2, 2016, the Court granted Pierce’s motion to join both motions. (See Dkt. 35.)
2
9.) Following the dismissal of their counterclaims, the Kinzys filed First Amended Verified
Counterclaims, again alleging the 2007 Mortgage included forged initials and First Tennessee
was not the holder of the note due to alleged improprieties in its merger with First Horizon.
(Dkt. 14-10.) The Amended Counterclaims included claims for breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, slander of title, false and misleading representations, various statutory violations,
including violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and allegations
that First Tennessee participated in a conspiracy to commit fraud, in addition to a claim to quiet
title. (Dkt. 14-10, 14-11.) The amended counterclaims were stricken by the Circuit Court in the
Foreclosure Action on January 8, 2015. (Dkt. 14-15.) A week later, First Tennesee filed its
Third Amended Complaint in the Foreclosure Action, the Kinzys failed to respond, and a default
judgment was entered against them on May 6, 2015. (Dkt. 14-16, 14-19.) On July 29, 2015, a
Judgment of Foreclosure was entered against the Kinzys. (Dkt. 14-20.) Approximately one year
later, the judicial sale of the Property was confirmed, and the court in the Foreclosure Action
noted that both the 2006 and 2007 Mortgages “were properly executed and recorded with the
Lake County Record of Deeds.” (Dkt. 14-21.) Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal in the
Foreclosure Action on August 26, 2016, and filed their opening brief on December 23, 2016.
(Dkt. 14-22.) A review of their appeal brief reveals that the Kinzys’ appeal primarily focuses on
alleged failures by the trial court in the Foreclosure Action to properly consider their argument
that the 2007 Mortgage is unenforceable because it includes forgeries and other defects.
On April 14, 2016, before the judicial sale was confirmed, the Kinzys filed suit against
the Defendants in federal court, primarily alleging that the Defendants violated various state and
federal laws for prosecuting the Foreclosure Action based on the 2007 Mortgage, which
according to them, was a fraud and unenforceable. Kinzy v. Howard & Howard, No. 16 C 4375
3
(N.D. Ill. 2016). In that action, which was assigned to this Court, Plaintiffs failed to timely serve
the Defendants and then moved to voluntarily dismiss the suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(1) before responding to the Defendants’ 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. Three days
after voluntarily dismissing the action, Plaintiffs filed the instant action, which was initially
assigned to Judge Durkin and is substantively the same as the original federal action. (See Dkt.
1.) Upon the Defendants’ request this action was transferred to this Court on October 4, 2016.
(See Dkt. 21.)
MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER
Fidelity and Pierce have moved for sanctions to be assessed against the Kinzys, arguing
that the Kinzys’ voluntary dismissal of the original federal action and then the refiling of a
substantively similar complaint was an improper attempt to “judge-shop” and avoid this Court’s
review. As a sanction for this alleged impropriety, Fidelity and Pierce urge the Court to either
dismiss the suit with prejudice or, pursuant to Rule 41(d), order Plaintiffs to pay for Defendants’
costs in defending the original federal action and stay this matter until they have complied with
such an order. 3 (Dkt. 17 at 5-9.)
As Fidelity and Pierce point out, this Court “possesses inherent powers that are governed
not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs
so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct.
1885, 1891 (2016) (quotation omitted). This inherent power includes the ability to sanction
parties through dismissal, a sanction only reserved for the most egregious abuses of the judicial
process, like fraud on the court, perjury, submission of falsified evidence, and destruction of
evidence. Jackson v. Murphy, 468 F. App’x 616, 619-20 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Kovilic
3
Fidelity’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer was filed when Judge Durkin was presiding over this matter. In their
Motion, Fidelity and Pierce also asked that the case be transferred back to this Court, which has already been done.
4
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Missbrenner, 106 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that cases that have
upheld sanction of dismissal typically involve “bad faith, fraud, or undue delay by one of the
parties”). Although judge-shopping could be considered to be conduct that abuses the judicial
process, this Court is not convinced that by voluntarily dismissing the original federal action and
then refiling a substantively similar suit, the Kinzys engaged in judge-shopping. Rather, it is
possible that the Kinzys voluntarily dismissed the original federal action because the suit was
potentially going to be dismissed due to their failure to timely serve the Defendants. That
dismissal, as the Kinzys point out, would have been without prejudice, allowing them to refile
their action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Although the Kinzys’ prosecution of the original action
may have been dilatory, their conduct does not rise to the level warranting dismissal of the
instant action with prejudice, nor does it involve perjury, the submission of falsified evidence, or
other actions warranting dismissal. Furthermore, the primary case cited by Fidelity in support of
their argument for dismissal undercuts their position. See Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138
F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the district court abused its discretion when it
dismissed actions with prejudice for judge-shopping because it failed “to consider less drastic
sanctions for judge-shopping than dismissal of both actions”). Furthermore, Fidelity failed to
cite to any authority from the Seventh Circuit where a court has dismissed an action under
analogous circumstances.
The Court also declines to impose monetary sanctions on the Kinzys pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d). In situations where, as here, plaintiffs filed an action based on or
including the same claims against the same defendant after previously dismissing an action, Rule
41(d) permits the court to order plaintiffs to pay all or part of the costs of defending the previous
action and may stay the proceedings until the sanctioned party has complied. Fed. R. Civ. P.
5
41(d). The decision to award such a sanction, however, is entirely within the court’s discretion.
Id. The Court declines to impose such sanctions under these circumstances. First, the voluntary
dismissal occurred prior to any of the Defendants entering an appearance in the original suit.
Furthermore, the Kinzys did not receive any adverse rulings from this Court in the original
federal suit prior to their dismissal, a fact that makes it unlikely that they engaged in judgeshopping and that distinguishes it from Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Cubano, 341 F.Supp.2d
69 (D.P.R. 2004), a case Fidelity and Pierce point to in support of their plea for sanctions.
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDING PENDING RESOLUTION OF PLAINTIFFS’
APPEAL
The Stay Defendants have moved to dismiss or stay the action pursuant to the Colorado
River abstention doctrine because they argue that resolution of the Foreclosure Action, which is
now on appeal, will resolve many, if not all of the Kinzys’ claims in the instant action. See
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Instead
of
addressing the threshold questions regarding the applicability of the doctrine, however, the Stay
Defendants spend most of their motion arguing that various preclusive doctrines would eliminate
the Plaintiffs’ claims if the Illinois Court of Appeals affirms the judgment of the trial court in the
Foreclosure Action. Similarly, in their response, the Kinzys focus on the substantive legal issues
that would arise if the state court’s decision in the Foreclosure Action were to be affirmed.
Because none of the parties have examined whether the doctrine applies, the Court will perform
that analysis.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
Motions seeking abstention due to the Colorado River doctrine are typically filed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and the Court will construe the Defendants’ motion to stay or dismiss
as one filed pursuant to that rule. When evaluating such a motion, the Court must accept all
6
well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff when
determining whether it should decline to exercise jurisdiction and stay the proceeding. See
Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993). In its consideration, the
Court “may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view
whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter
jurisdiction exists.” St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625
(7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)). The
party seeking jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction is satisfied. See Glaser v.
Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 913 (7th Cir. 2009).
II.
DISCUSSION
In general, “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings
concerning the same matter in the Federal court.” Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 657 F3d 641,
645 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817)). The Colorado River doctrine
nonetheless creates a narrow exception to this rule, allowing federal courts in exceptional cases
to defer to a concurrent state court case because of the need to give “regard to conservation of
judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.” Id. The Court’s duty is “not to
find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction but instead to ascertain
whether there exist exceptional circumstances, the clearest of justifications…to justify the
surrender of that jurisdiction.” Id. at 645-46 (citation and quotation omitted).
In determining whether to abstain under the Colorado River doctrine, the Court conducts
a two-part inquiry. See Tyrer v. City of South Beloit, Ill., 456 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2006).
First, it must decide whether the concurrent state and federal actions are parallel. Id. The two
suits are parallel when “substantially the same parties are contemporaneously litigating
7
substantially the same issues.” Id. at 752. “Precisely formal symmetry is unnecessary. A court
should examine whether the suits involve the same parties, arise out of the same facts, and raise
similar factual and legal issues.” Deb v. SIRVA, Inc., 832 F.3d 800, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 498–99 (7th Cir. 2011)). This analysis
helps determine “whether there is a substantial likelihood that the state litigation will dispose of
all claims presented in the federal case.” Adkins, 644 F.3d at 499 (quoting Clark v. Lacy, 376
F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 2004)). Second, only if the Court finds that the suits are parallel, it must
then weigh a number of non-exclusive factors that can demonstrate the existence of exceptional
circumstances. Tyrer, 456 F.3d at 751. There are ten such factors:
1) whether the state has assumed jurisdiction over property; 2) the inconvenience
of the federal forum; 3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; 4) the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums; 5) the source
of governing law, state or federal; 6) the adequacy of state-court action to protect
the federal plaintiff's rights; 7) the relative progress of state and federal
proceedings; 8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction; 9) the
availability of removal; and 10) the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal
claim.
Adkins, 644 F.3d at 500-01.
Assessing these factors does not involve application of a
“mechanical checklist” but instead requires a “careful balancing” by the Court in light of the
specific facts of the case. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
16 (1983).
A.
The State and Federal Actions Are Parallel
Both the Foreclosure Action and the instant suit involve substantially the same parties
contemporaneously litigating similar factual and legal issues. First Tennessee and the Kinzys are
parties to both actions.
Although the rest of the Stay Defendants are not parties to the
Foreclosure Action, as noted above, formal symmetry is not required. Furthermore, a finding of
8
parallel parties is justified because Howard & Howard, Pierce and Fidelity are only defendants in
the federal action “because of acts in furtherance of [their] representation of First Tennessee in
the Foreclosure Action. See, e.g., Nieves v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 14-CV-2300, 2015 WL
753977 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2015) (finding state foreclosure action and federal case regarding
breach of contract, FDCPA, ICFA, RESPA, and TILA were parallel where three parties were
involved in both actions but one party in federal action was not in state action); Smith v. Bank of
Am., N.A., No. 14 C 1041, 2014 WL 3938547, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2014) (finding that
foreclosure action and subsequent action filed in federal court were parallel even though law firm
that represented lender was party in federal suit but not in underlying foreclosure action); Pirard
v. Bank of America, No. 12 C 2901, 2013 WL 1154294 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2013)
(concluding state foreclosure action and federal case were parallel even though some defendant
lenders were not parties in state foreclosure action); Charles v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 11
CV 8217, 2012 WL 6093903 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2012) (same).
The Foreclosure Action and this action also involve substantially the same factual and
legal issues. In the instant action, all of the Kinzys claims primarily relate to the authenticity of
the 2007 Mortgage, its enforceability, and the actions that the Defendants took to foreclose on
the mortgage. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 17-25.) The Foreclosure Action by its very nature involves
assessing whether the 2007 Mortgage is valid and enforceable and the Appellate Court is now
assessing the propriety of the foreclosure action. Second, as either counterclaims and defenses in
the Foreclosure Action, the Kinzys have repeatedly asserted and litigated that the 2007 Mortgage
was unenforceable because it included forgeries and other defects and that First Tennessee had
no legal right to foreclose on the note. Those same claims are at the heart of their complaint
before this Court.
9
Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood that a final judgment in the Foreclosure
Action will dispose of all claims presented in the Kinzys’ federal complaint, which is the critical
question in considering whether a state and federal case are parallel. See Huon, 657 F.3d at 646.
If the Illinois Appellate Court affirms the determination that the 2007 Mortgage was valid and
enforceable, the Kinzys’ central claims – that the 2007 Mortgage was fraudulent and that First
Tennessee does not have a valid claim to the note – would be precluded. While the Foreclosure
Action may not dispose of every component of the Kinzys’ complaint, it will certainly resolve
the bulk of the factual and legal questions “by examining largely the same evidence” as this case.
Id. at 647. The fact that the Foreclosure Action is not guaranteed to resolve every issue is not
fatal to finding the cases parallel. See Freed v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 756 F.3d 1013,
1020 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he parallel nature of the actions cannot be destroyed by simply tacking
on a few more defendants, neither can it be dispelled by repackaging the same issue under
different causes of action.”) (quoting Clark v. Lacy, 376 F.3d 682, 686-87 (7th Cir. 2004); AAR
Intern., Inc. v. Nimelias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Suits need not be
identical to be parallel and the mere presence of additional parties or issues in one of the cases
will not necessarily preclude a finding that they are parallel.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, any
minor differences between the Foreclosure Action and this case does not raise a substantial doubt
that the Foreclosure Action will be an “adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution
of the issues between the parties.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 28. The Foreclosure Action and
this case are parallel because they involve substantially the same parties, arise from a
substantively similar set of facts, and present analogous legal issues that the Illinois Appellate
Court has a substantial likelihood of resolving.
10
B.
Factors Weigh in Favor of Abstention
Because the Foreclosure Action and the instant action are parallel, the Court must next
determine whether extraordinary circumstances militate in favor of abstention by considering the
ten nonexclusive factors described above. See Adkins, 644 F.3d at 500-01. The Seventh Circuit
has noted that this Court “is given the discretion to apply more significant weight and analysis to
those factors that are most relevant to the case at hand.” Freed, 756 F.3d at 1021.
The majority of the Colorado River factors weigh in favor of abstention. The state court
assumed jurisdiction over the Property in the Foreclosure Action, which was originally filed
more than seven years ago and a judgment has been entered against the Kinzys, which is now
before the Illinois Court of Appeals. In contrast, there have been no responsive pleadings filed in
the instant case, which was filed approximately four months ago. As a result, the first, fourth,
and seventh factors heavily favor abstention. Similarly, the third factor regarding the desirability
of avoiding piecemeal litigation weighs in favor of abstention because the Foreclosure Action
will likely dispose of a majority of the factual and legal issues presented in this case. Abstaining,
therefore, would prevent the parties from simultaneously litigating mirror issues in state and
federal court and save judicial resources as Colorado River intended. See Colorado River, 424
U.S. at 817. The fifth, sixth, and eighth factors also favor abstention. Even though two of the
Kinzys’ claims involve federal statutes, those claims implicate the validity of the 2007 Mortgage
and the propriety of the Foreclosure Action, issues governed by Illinois law. The rest of the
Kinzys’ claims are grounded in state law and many of their federal claims, including their claims
for misrepresentation, quiet title, slander of title, and violations of ICFDPA have already been
asserted in the Foreclosure Action, as they concede in their response brief. The rest of the
factors are neutral. In sum, because the state and federal cases are parallel and the majority of
11
the ten factors weigh in favor of abstention, the Court abstains from exercising jurisdiction
pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine. This conclusion aligns with the holdings of other
district courts in this district addressing these factors in similar claims arising out of state
foreclosure actions. See, e.g., Nieves, 2015 WL 753977 at *5-6; Smith v. Bank of America, N.A.,
14 C 1041, 2014 WL 3938547 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2014); Pirard, 2013 WL 1154294 at *4;
Charles, 2012 WL 6093903 at *4; Petit v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., No. 12 C 318, 2012 WL
3437287 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2012) (Kendall, J.).
The Supreme Court left both dismissal and a stay as options where the Court determines
that the Colorado River doctrine applies. See Selmon v. Portsmouth Drive Condominium Ass’n,
89 F3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit has concluded that a stay of the federal
proceedings rather than a dismissal is appropriate because the federal forum should be available
to the plaintiff in the event that the state court does not adequately adjudicate the issues. See
CIGNA HealthCare of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kaiser, 294 F.3d 849, 851 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that
dismissing instead of staying a case would be “illogical”).
Considering that abstention is
appropriate, the Court therefore stays this case in order to allow a final judgment to be rendered
in the Foreclosure Action.
THE COURT’S INHERENT AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A STAY
Even if the Colorado River doctrine were not applicable, the Court would invoke its
inherent authority to stay this matter pending a final judgment in the Foreclosure Action. As
detailed above, this Court has the inherent authority to control its cases and “the power to stay
proceedings is incidental” to that power. Texas Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v.
E.P.A., 410 F.3d 964, 980 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In determining whether to issue a
stay, courts generally consider three factors: “(1) whether a stay will unduly prejudice or
12
tactically disadvantage the non-moving party; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in
question and streamline the trial; and (3) whether a stay will reduce the burden of litigation on
the parties and the court.” See, e.g., Tel. Sci. Corp. v. Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC, No. 15 C
5182, 2016 WL 47916, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2016). The second and third factors are similar and
courts, therefore, often analyze them together. See id. There is no doubt that a stay will simplify
the issues and reduce the burden of litigation, as many of the issues presently before the Court
will likely be considered by the Illinois Court of Appeals. Furthermore, staying this matter will
not unduly prejudice or tactically disadvantage the Kinzys since they are currently litigating the
same claims before the Illinois Court of Appeals and to the extent that court does not adequately
address their claims, this Court will do so.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Fidelity and Pierce’s Motion to Dismiss or
Transfer and grants Howard & Howard, First Tennessee, and Pierce’s Motion to Stay. This
matter shall be stayed until a final judgment in Foreclosure Action is rendered. The parties also
shall file a status report notifying the Court of the conclusion of State Foreclosure Action within
seven days of the final disposition of that case.
________________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Court Judge
Northern District of Illinois
Date: January 17, 2017
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?