Petri v. PNC Financial Services Group

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM Opinion: As stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. See Order for further details. Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 2/15/2018. Mailed notice(ep, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRIS A. PETRI,
Plaintiff,
v.
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP,
Defendant.

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No. 16 C 9114

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant PNC Financial Services Group’s
(PNC) motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion for
summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND
On June 2, 2014, Plaintiff Chris A. Petri (Petri) went to PNC’s location in St.
Charles, Illinois and inquired about the availability of a 1% interest rate for certain
investment accounts. Petri allegedly met with Susan Featherstone (Featherstone), the
branch Vice President, and Featherstone allegedly confirmed that such an interest
rate would be available to Petri. Petri allegedly opened an account that day (7903
Account). Petri also subsequently opened accounts on July 31, 2014 (8195 Account)

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and on August 1, 2014 (1963 Account). Despite the fact that Petri signed documents
indicating that the 1% interest rate was only for a 90-day promotional period and
despite the fact that Petri was regularly sent notices indicating that fact to him, Petri
claims that he believed that it would earn the 1% interest on the 7903 Account and
the 1963 Account for an indefinite period of time. After 90 days, the interest rate for
the 7903 Account and the 1963 Account was allegedly reduced to 0.01%. Petri
allegedly contacted PNC and was informed that the 1% interest rate was only for an
initial 90-day period. Petri includes in his amended complaint a fraud in the
inducement claim (Count I), a claim alleging a violation of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (Count II), a
breach of oral contract claim (Count III), a breach of express contract claim (Count
IV), and an unjust enrichment claim (Count V). PNC now moves for summary
judgment on all claims.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009). A “genuine
issue” in the context of a motion for summary judgment is not simply a
“metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material
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fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
Insolia v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the record as a whole, in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens
Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

I. Local Rule 56.1
Petri denies a significant portion of PNC’s statement of facts. Petri, however,
has consistently failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 in such denials. The Seventh
Circuit has made clear that a district court can “require strict compliance with Local
Rule 56.1. . . .” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2016). If a party fails to
comply with Local Rule 56.1 when responding to a statement of facts, “those facts
are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion.” Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
807 F.3d 215, 218-19 (7th Cir. 2015)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting Cracco v.
Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009)). If a responding party fails
to “cite to any admissible evidence to support facts presented in response” as
required by Local Rule 56.1, “the facts presented” in the statement of facts are
deemed to be undisputed.” Curtis, 807 F.3d at 219. Petri has disputed a significant
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number of facts provided in PNC’s statement of material facts, but Petri has failed to
comply with Local Rule 56.1 and provide citations to the record to support such
denials. (RSF Par. 5-14, 18-22, 26-29, 33-34, 36-45). Such facts are therefore
deemed undisputed.
Petri’s responses also fail to comply with Local Rule 56.1 because they
contain evasive responses. See Jankovich v. Exelon Corp., 2003 WL 260714, at *5
(N.D. Ill. 2003)(indicating that evasive responses fail to comply with Local Rule
56.1). For example, in PNC’s statement of material fact PNC asserts that on June 9,
2014, it mailed a Rate Disclosure to Petri informing him that the 1% interest rate
would only last for 90 days. (SF Par. 19-20). Petri responds: “Denied to the extent
that Plaintiff received the 7903 Disclosures sporadically and received fewer than
Defendant claims to have sent.” (RSF Par. 19-20). Petri provides no admission or
denial in regard to the specific mailed disclosure at issue, and makes additional
argument that does not relate to the fact at issue. Another example is PNC’s
statement of fact indicating that the Account Agreement for Personal Checking, (SF
Par. 18). Savings and Money Market Accounts included certain language and terms.
Petri is unwilling to admit to such facts, stating: “Denied to the extent that Plaintiff
never received the Account Agreement.” (RSF Par. 18). Petri neither admits nor
denies that the language and terms presented are accurate and instead makes
additional arguments on issues not presented by PNC.
Petri also makes denials that are not supported with references to the record
and arguments that incorrectly state the record. For example, PNC states in its
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statement of facts that Petri “received statements for the three Accounts from PNC in
the mail but he discarded them because he did not think he had opened checking
accounts.” (SF Par. 42). Petri responds: “Denied: Never was it demonstrated that
Plaintiff discarded statements for the three Accounts.” (RSF Par. 42). Petri himself
in fact stated at his deposition that he discarded the statements. At Petri’s deposition,
he was asked “Do you recall getting anything in the mails from PNC?” (Pet. Dep.
63). Petri responded “Yes. I recall receiving some notices that are general notices
that said something about checking account[s], which we do not have a checking
account. So we discarded it.” (Pet. Dep. 63). Therefore, the facts presented in
PNC’s statement of material facts in paragraphs 5-14, 18-22, 26-29, 33-34, and 3645 are therefore deemed undisputed.

II. Breach of Contract Claims
PNC contends that the allegations supporting the breach of contract claims are
directly contradicted by the terms of the written contracts and are barred by the
parole evidence rule. Under Illinois law, it is presumed that a written contract
“speak[s] the intention of the parties who signed it, and their intentions must be
determined from the language used.” W.W. Vincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins.
Co., 814 N.E.2d 960, 966 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). In accordance with that presumption,
the parole evidence rule generally bars: (1) “evidence of understandings not reflected
in the contract, reached before or at the time of its execution, which would vary or
modify its terms,” and (2) “parol evidence of prior negotiations to create an ‘extrinsic
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ambiguity’ where the parties to a contract have included an integration clause.” TAS
Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625, 637 (7th Cir. 2007).
In response to the instant motion, Petri concedes that in neither the Account
Agreement for the 7903 Account (7903 Agreement) nor the Account Agreement for
the 1963Account (1963 Agreement) guaranteed in writing that he would continue to
receive 1% in perpetuity for the 7903 Account or the 1963 Account . (Resp. SJ 7-8);
(RSF Par. 8). Petri claims that he never received a copy of the written contract, but
he does not dispute the accuracy of the signature cards for the 7903 Agreement and
1963 Agreement (collectively referred to as “Agreements”), which PNC has included
as exhibits to the instant motion. In the Agreements, Petri agreed to “be bound by
the terms and conditions of PNC Bank’s Account Agreement for Checking Accounts
and Savings Accounts. . . .” (PNC Ex. B and C ). Petri does not dispute that PNC
Bank’s Account Agreement for Checking Accounts and Savings Accounts
specifically provides the following:
Your interest rate and annual percentage yield may change. At out discretion,
we may change the interest rate on your Account at any time without notice to
you.
(RSF Parl 18). Thus, the undisputed terms in writing in the Agreements did not
guarantee Petri 1% interest on the Accounts any longer than 90 days. Recognizing
that undeniable fact, Petri has apparently abandoned the breach of contract claim that
is premised on the breach of the written terms of the Agreements. In response to the
instant motion, Petri maintains that he formed an oral agreement with Featherstone

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regarding the interest on the Accounts. However, Petri admits that in regard to the
interest on the Accounts, he entered into the written Agreements. Thus, the extrinsic
evidence such as allegedly oral representations would be barred by the parole
evidence rule.
Petri argues that he can introduce extrinsic evidence under an exception to the
parole evidence rule. Petri relies upon Goodwine State Bank v. Mullins, 625 N.E.2d
1056 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), which provides that an exception to the parole evidence
rule exists “where one party alleges the parties reached an agreement, but due to a
mistake, the written contract between the parties does not reflect the true agreement
of the parties.” Id. at 1068. However, in Goodwine, the court was addressing a
reformation action states that “in a reformation action, extrinsic evidence in the form
of the agreement of the parties . . ., is admissible to show that the written contract . . .
does not express the true agreement of the parties.” Id. In the instant action Petri is
not bringing a reformation claim. Nor do the undisputed facts in this case indicate
that a mistake was made in the preparation of the written agreement. The undisputed
facts show that the standard promotional rate for accounts of that type was a 1% rate
for a 90-day period. (RSF Par. 8-9). The undisputed facts also indicate that Petri
signed the signature cards for Agreements, agreeing in writing to be bound by the
Agreements, which did not require a 1% rate after 90-days. (RSF Par. 8-9, 16, 25).
Petri further admits that he read the signature cards before signing them. (RSF Par.
16, 25).

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At best, the undisputed facts perhaps indicate possible subjective confusion on
the part of Petri. It is undisputed that Petri was mailed disclosures shortly after
opening the accounts specifically informing him in writing that he would receive the
promotional interest rate only for a 90-day period. (RSF Par. 19-20, 27-29). Petri
admits that he viewed statements for the accounts and thought that a “0.01% interest
rate” was equal to a 1.00% interest rate. (RSF Par. 43). Petri also admits that he
discarded mail sent to him regarding the accounts because the statements related to
checking accounts and he did not realize that he had opened checking accounts at
PNC. (RSF Par. 42). It is also undisputed that until the day of his deposition in this
case, Petri thought that all three of his accounts had earned 1% interest, even though
it is now undisputed even by Petri that the 8195 Account should have never earned
1% interest since its inception . (RSF Par. 40). It is undisputed that the 8195
account was never eligible even for the 1% promotional rate. (RSF Par. 40, 41). The
undisputed facts thus indicate that Petri perhaps did not understand what he was
doing when opening the accounts at PNC.
The undisputed facts, however, also show that Petri did little to correct any
confusion he might have had after opening the accounts. It is undisputed that Petri
was regularly mailed statements explaining the interest on the accounts, but
discarded the statements. (RSF Par. 36). The undisputed facts also show that
Featherstone repeatedly attempted to contact Petri to discuss his accounts, but Petri
either asked her to call back, or did not answer the phone or respond to
Featherstone’s voicemail message. (RSF Par. 14). Inexplicably, Petri claims that
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“by signing the signature cards,” he understood terms that were different than those
indicated in writing on the signature cards. (SAF Par. 50). Although Petri may have
been subjectively confused as to the interest rate for his accounts, he chose to sign
the Agreements, which provided him with information relating to the interest rates.
PNC is not responsible for Petri’s lack of diligence and Petri is bound by the written
agreements he chose to sign. Therefore, PNC’s motion for summary judgment on the
breach of contract claims is granted.

II. Unjust Enrichment Claim
PNC argues that Petri cannot pursue an unjust enrichment claim premised on
the same facts as the breach of contract claims. Under Illinois law, an unjust
enrichment claim is “based upon an implied contract,” and thus, if “there is a
specific contract that governs the relationship of the parties, the doctrine has no
application.” Toulon v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d 725, 742 (7th Cir. 2017)(internal
quotations omitted)(quoting Blythe Holdings, Inc. v. DeAngelis, 750 F.3d 653, 658
(7th Cir. 2014)). PNC is correct that according to Petri’s own complaint, the
relationship between PNC and Petri regarding the accounts and interest earned on the
accounts was governed by the Agreements. Petri thus cannot recover under an unjust
enrichment theory. Therefore, PNC’s motion for summary judgment on the unjust
enrichment claim is granted.

III. Fraud Claims
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PNC moves for summary judgment on the fraud claims. The crux of Petri’s
fraud claims is that he understood oral statements from Featherstone to mean that
Petri was going to earn 1% interest on all his deposits indefinitely. It is not apparent
why Featherstone would make such a representation since it is undisputed that the
1% promotional rate was a standard package at PNC for all customers and it is
undisputed that the 8195 Account was not even eligible for the promotional rate. It
is also undisputed pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 that Featherstone specifically
explained to Petri when he opened the accounts that the 1% rate would expire after
three months. (RSF Par. 13).
The court notes that even if it was not undisputed that Featherstone informed
Petri that the 1% rate was only for 90 days, Petri could not prevail on his fraud
claims. The undisputed facts show that aside from any statement allegedly made by
Featherstone that Petri was informed repeatedly in writing that the 1% rate was a 90day promotional rate. Nor does Petri even represent in his own statement of facts
that Featherstone affirmatively represented to him that he would receive the 1% rate
more than 90 days. Petri merely asserts that Featherstone “confirmed that a 1%
interest rate would be available,” and that there was not “mention of receiving any
rate below 1% on any of the three accounts.” (SAF Par. 47-48). The oral statements
allegedly made by Featherstone were also according to Petri made before he
admittedly read and signed the signature cards. Petri fails to point to any evidence
that would indicate trickery on the part of PNC that would have inhibited him from
understanding what was going on during the transactions. Petri does not point to
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evidence that he was coerced into signing the signature cards. He admits that he read
the cards and voluntarily signed the cards.
Petri claims that “[o]nly upon inquiry by Plaintiff in early-2016 did Ms.
Featherstone state that the interest rate quoted to Plaintiff of 1% was only offered for
an initial 90-day period.” (SAF par. 54). Petri appears to insinuate that PNC
purposefully remained silent as to the interest on the accounts to trick Petri and PNC
planned to spring the new terms on Petri when he finally discovered the alleged ruse.
The undisputed facts, however, show that after Petri opened the accounts, PNC
regularly informed Petri by mail about the current and future interest on his accounts
and that Featherstone repeatedly attempted to contact Petri to discuss his accounts,
but had no success in reaching him. Petri in fact admitted that he travels extensively
for months at a time and that his mail is collected for him at the post office during
such times. (RSF Par. 4-5). Thus, Petri’s alleged confusion as to the interest on his
accounts would likely have been corrected had he bothered to take an interest in the
accounts prior to early 2016. Petri has failed to point to sufficient evidence that
would enable a reasonable trier of fact to find any fraud on the part of PNC.
Therefore, PNC’s motion for summary judgment on the fraud claims is granted.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, PNC’s motion for summary judgment is
granted.

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_____________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: February 15, 2018

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