Lintzeris et al v. City of Chicago, et al
Filing
49
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 8/3/2017: Defendants' motion to dismiss, 30 , is granted. Plaintiffs have amended the complaint once in response to a motion to dismiss, and, as a result, there is no re ason to believe that an amended complaint would cure the defects in plaintiffs' federal theories. The federal claims are dismissed with prejudice, and the state-law claims are dismissed without prejudice. Enter judgment and terminate civil case. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed. (psm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RITA LINTZERIS, ZARON JOSSELL, and
CLARENCE DANIELS, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly
situated,
No. 16 CV 09154
Judge Manish S. Shah
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs bring a putative class action against the City of Chicago and city
officials to challenge the imposition of administrative penalties on impounded
vehicle owners under Chicago municipal code. Defendants move to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
I.
Legal Standards
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegations that plausibly suggest a right
to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The court must accept all
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor, but need not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations. Id. at 678–79.
II.
Background
Plaintiffs Rita Lintzeris, Zaron Jossell, and Clarence Daniels each had their
car impounded by the City of Chicago and were required to pay administrative
penalties ranging between $2,000 and $4,000 in order to reclaim their vehicles. In
April 2016, Lintzeris’s son borrowed her car, was involved in an accident, and was
arrested by Chicago police offers for allegedly driving while intoxicated and
possessing drugs. The police seized and impounded Lintzeris’s car, pursuant to the
Municipal Code of Chicago § 2-14-132 (the City’s impoundment ordinance).1 The
ordinance authorizes seizure and impoundment of vehicles for vehicle-related
violations of Chicago ordinances. MCC § 2-14-132(a)(1); [24] ¶ 34. The impoundment
ordinance also imposes an administrative penalty on the owner of an impounded
vehicle because it was used in a vehicle-related violation. MCC § 2-14-132(a)(1); [24]
¶ 33. The amount of the administrative penalty varies depending on the underlying
violation. MCC § 2-14-132(a)(1).
About two days after the accident, Lintzeris paid the City $4,210 to reclaim
her car, including $4,000 in administrative penalties, $150 for towing, and $60 for
two days of storage. Four months later, Lintzeris appeared at an administrative
hearing to contest the administrative penalty. Her counsel argued that the
impoundment ordinance was facially invalid because it violated 625 ILCS 5/11208.7 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code (enacted in 2012) and required a vehicle
owner to pay a fine. (625 ILCS 5/11-208.7 provides rules regarding fees and
municipal ordinances covering the impoundment of vehicles.) The presiding
administrative law judge advised that he could not consider counsel’s arguments
The text of § 2-14-132 is on the docket at [31-1]. Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the
district court docket.
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because under MCC § 2-14-132 and the City’s Department of Administrative
Hearings, a vehicle owner could present only certain defenses to impoundment: (1)
the vehicle was stolen and the theft timely reported to law enforcement, (2) the
vehicle was operating as a common carrier and the violation occurred without the
knowledge of the person in control of the vehicle, or (3) the vehicle had been
donated, traded-in, or sold to another person prior to the violation.
In August 2016, Jossell was driving and arrested for allegedly possessing
drugs. His vehicle was seized and impounded. About five days later, he paid $2,250
to reclaim his car, including a $2,000 administrative penalty, $150 for towing, and a
$100 storage fee. At his administrative hearing two months later, Jossell was
represented by counsel, who attempted to challenge the ordinance for the same
reasons as Lintzeris but was not successful. In December 2016, Daniels was
arrested for allegedly driving while intoxicated, and his car was seized and
impounded. He needed to pay an administrative penalty of $2,000 to reclaim his
car, but he did not have the funds and never reclaimed his car. Daniel alleges that
he was not given notice of the date, time, or location of his administrative hearing
and that a default judgment was entered against him by the City’s Department of
Administrative Hearings.
Plaintiffs brought this putative class action on behalf of themselves and a
purported class of people who paid administrative penalties under the City’s
impoundment ordinance, MCC § 2-14-132. [1]. Defendants moved to dismiss, [13],
and the plaintiffs responded by amending their complaint to include Daniels as a
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named plaintiff and additional state-law counts. [21]; [24]. Plaintiffs sue the City of
Chicago, the City’s Commissioner for the Department of Streets and Sanitation, the
Director of the Department of Administrative Hearings, and the Superintendent of
the Chicago Police Department in their official capacities, challenging the
impoundment ordinance under the Fourth Amendment (Count I), the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause (Count II), and the Illinois Constitution’s Due
Process Clause (Count III). The plaintiffs also bring state-law counts for declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief, unjust enrichment and restitution, constructive trust,
conversion, and conspiracy (Counts IV though IX). Defendants move to dismiss all
claims.
III.
Analysis
A.
Fourth Amendment Claim
Plaintiffs bring a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that every impoundment under MCC § 2-14-132 constitutes a per se unreasonable
seizure and that the ordinance exceeds the legal authority granted to the City by
the state of Illinois and under the U.S. Constitution. Defendants seek dismissal of
this claim, asserting that impoundment under the ordinance is not an
“unreasonable” seizure under the Fourth Amendment and that the plaintiffs cannot
base a Fourth Amendment challenge on an alleged state-law violation.
Plaintiffs mount a facial challenge under the Fourth Amendment, meaning
that they assume the burden of establishing that the impoundment ordinance is
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unconstitutional in all of its applications.2 Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738
(7th Cir. 2016) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Patel, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2443,
2451 (2015)). These challenges are the most difficult to mount successfully, and the
proper inquiry under this exacting standard should be only on applications of the
statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct. Id. (citing Patel, 135
S.Ct. at 2449, 2451). The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable”
searches and seizures, and warrantless seizures are generally unreasonable,
although there are exceptions. Id. at 739 (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,
330 (2001)).
In Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2016), the Seventh Circuit
upheld the City’s impoundment ordinance against a facial challenge based on the
Fourth Amendment. When plaintiffs bring a facial challenge, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the ordinance is unconstitutional in all its actual applications. Id.
at 739 (citing Patel, 135 S.Ct. at 2451). Bell held that the plaintiff failed to state a
facial challenge under the Fourth Amendment because MCC § 7-24-225—one of the
vehicle-related violation ordinances associated with the general impoundment
ordinance, § 2-14-132—requires the officer seizing the vehicle without a warrant to
have probable cause to believe the vehicle has illegal drugs in it or has been used in
an illegal drug transaction. Id. at 740. More generally as relevant here, the
impoundment ordinance requires the police to have probable cause that an
Plaintiffs also challenge related ordinances (see [24] ¶¶ 2, 33–34), but § 2-14-132 is the
nucleus of the dispute.
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enumerated offense (in which the vehicle was used in an illegal manner or in
connection with an illegal act) occurred. Id. at 739. In these circumstances, there
was no difference between the warrantless seizures authorized by the ordinance
and those permitted by the Supreme Court, and therefore seizures authorized by
§ 2-14-132 were not facially invalid. Id. at 740. Just as the plaintiffs in Bell failed to
establish a facial challenge to § 2-14-132, here the plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that the ordinance is “is unconstitutional in all its actual applications,
including its application to them.” Id. The plaintiffs’ disjointed arguments about the
extent of probable cause required for vehicle stops versus vehicle seizures do not
address the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Bell and miss the Fourth Amendment
issue at hand, which is whether the warrantless vehicle seizures authorized under
Chicago impoundment ordinances are unreasonable in all their applications.
The plaintiffs’ main argument is that any seizure under the impoundment
ordinance is per se unreasonable because the ordinance is void—according to the
plaintiffs, the impoundment ordinance exceeds the city’s home rule authority under
Illinois law (specifically 625 ILCS 5/11-208.7). But whether the city ordinance
violates Illinois state law is irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim,
which addresses only whether a warrantless vehicle seizure is reasonable under
federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “[I]t is not the province of the Fourth
Amendment to enforce state law.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008); see
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968) (“The question in this Court upon review
of a state-approved search or seizure ‘is not whether the search (or seizure) was
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authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Just as a search authorized by state law may be an
unreasonable one under that amendment, so may a search not expressly authorized
by state law be justified as a constitutionally reasonable one.’”) (quoting Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967)). A vehicle seizure supported by probable cause to
believe an offense involving the vehicle occurred is constitutionally reasonable even
if state law did not authorize the seizure.
Moreover, the plaintiffs’ objection to the City’s imposition of administrative
penalties is not a Fourth Amendment issue about whether, at the time of seizure,
warrantless seizure of their vehicles was reasonable. Complaints about the return
of property, lawfully seized, do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Lee v. City of
Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2003). The plaintiffs’ focus on
administrative penalties relates more to post-seizure proceedings. See Bell, 835 F.3d
at 741 (“Plaintiffs cannot explain how their challenge to the post-seizure procedure
process implicates the Fourth Amendment, as the seizure in Plaintiffs’ case and all
others under the Ordinances is complete when the officer or agent seizes and
impounds the vehicle.”); Lee, 330 F.3d at 466 (The Fourth Amendment “cannot be
invoked by the dispossessed owner to regain his property.”).
The plaintiffs have failed to state a Fourth Amendment facial challenge to
the impoundment ordinances. Count I is dismissed.
B.
Procedural Due Process Claim
The plaintiffs also bring a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim under
§ 1983, alleging that the City’s administrative law judges will only hear three
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limited defenses to the impoundment ordinance, foreclosing plaintiffs’ constitutional
and state-law arguments. Plaintiffs also argue that the ordinance’s notice provision
does not meet notice requirements under Illinois Motor Vehicle Code. Defendants
contend that the ordinance’s limit on available defenses does not violate due process
and that the plaintiffs cannot premise a federal due process claim solely on an
alleged violation of state law.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state from
depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a procedural due process claim for violation of a
property right, the plaintiffs must allege that they were deprived of a cognizable
property interest without due process of law. Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th
Cir. 2010). The parties tacitly agree that the plaintiffs have a constitutionally
protected property interest in their vehicles.3 See, e.g., Sutton v. City of Milwaukee,
672 F.2d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Since a person’s car is property, the state may
not deprive him of it without due process of law; and the deprivation need not be
permanent to be actionable.”). The question here, then, is whether the plaintiffs
have sufficiently alleged that the City deprived them of that property interest
without “constitutionally sufficient procedural protections.” Colon v. Schneider, 899
F.2d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 1990).
The complaint refers to the plaintiffs’ “liberty” interest in their automobiles, but the City’s
seizure and retention of their cars implicates a property interest, not a liberty interest. See,
e.g., Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 577 (1972) (distinguishing
liberty and property interests).
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Under the impoundment ordinance, after a vehicle has been impounded, the
owner has 15 days to request a preliminary hearing from the City’s Department of
Administrative Hearings. MCC § 2-14-132(a)(1). That preliminary hearing must be
conducted by an administrative law officer within 48 hours of the request (excluding
weekends and holidays). Id. If the administrative law officer determines that there
is probable cause to believe that the vehicle was used in one of the enumerated code
violations for which seizure and impoundment applies, the impoundment continues
unless the owner pays the requisite administrative penalty for the violation, plus
towing and storage fees and any outstanding traffic debts to the city. MCC §§ 2-14132(a)(1)–(2). If the officer determines there is no probable cause, the vehicle is
release without the administrative penalty or fees. MCC § 2-14-132(a)(3).
Within 10 days of the impoundment, the City is required to notify the owner
(by certified mail) of the owner’s right to a full hearing within 30 days to challenge
the impoundment. MCC § 2-14-132(b)(1). At that hearing (also before an
administrative law officer), the City must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the vehicle was used in the violation. MCC §§ 2-14-132(b)(1), (3). If the City
does not meet its burden, the vehicle is returned and any penalties or fees refunded.
MCC § 2-14-132(b)(3). If the City meets this burden, then the administrative law
officer enters an order finding the owner liable for the prescribed administrative
penalty, plus storage and fees. MCC § 2-14-132(b)(3)(A). The vehicle is released
upon payment of the administrative penalty, fees, and other traffic debts. MCC § 214-132(c)(1)(A). If the owner does not pay the amount owed or does not request
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judicial review within 10 days after entry of the order, the City may sell the vehicle
to satisfy the debt. MCC §§ 2-14-132(c)(1), (d). A default judgment is entered
against an owner who fails to request or attend a hearing, but an owner may
petition to set aside the default if the owner establishes that they were not provided
with proper service of process. MCC §§ 2-14-108(a), 2-14-132(b)(4).
During either the preliminary hearing or the full hearing, a vehicle owner
may assert the following defenses to the impoundment: (1) the vehicle used in the
violation had been stolen at the time (and the theft was reported to police within 24
hours); (2) the vehicle had been operating as a common carrier and the violation
occurred without knowledge of the person controlling the vehicle; or (3) the vehicle
was sold to another person prior to the violation. MCC § 2-14-132(h). The municipal
code also provides for judicial review of administrative hearings. See MCC § 12-14102 (“Any final decision by the department of administrative hearings that a code
violation does or does not exist shall constitute a final determination for purposes of
judicial review and shall be subject to review under the Illinois Administrative
Review Law.”).
Defendants argue that when the City defines illegal conduct, it has the right
to define the defenses to that conduct and that the violation of a state law, alone,
cannot be the basis for a federal procedural due process claim. The plaintiffs object
that the City has denied them due process by limiting owners to the three
enumerated defenses to impoundment, without hearing their argument that the
impoundment ordinance violates due process and Illinois law, specifically 625 ILCS
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5/11-208.3(b)(2) and 208.7. But even if the administrative judge had agreed with
plaintiffs that the ordinance was void, the City’s Department of Administrative
Hearings had no authority to question its validity. See Texaco-Cities Serv. Pipeline
Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill.2d 262, 278 (1998) (“[A]dministrative agencies lack the
authority to invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds or even to question its
validity.”).
The plaintiffs’ state-law arguments are also misplaced. The requirement of
due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The basic rights
guaranteed by procedural due process are notice of the intended deprivation and an
opportunity to be heard, although more elaborate procedural rights such as the
right to present evidence, confront witnesses, and be represented by counsel may
apply in cases where vital private interests are at risk. Simpson v. Brown Cty., 860
F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). To
determine what process is due, courts evaluate procedural safeguards under the
balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, (1976), which requires
weighing: (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and
the value of any additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s
countervailing interests. Here, the plaintiffs have entirely failed to develop any
argument that the procedural safeguards under the City’s ordinance (including the
opportunity for judicial review) are insufficient due process protections for
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impoundment and any corresponding administrative penalties.4 Instead, the
plaintiffs emphasize that the City ordinance violated Illinois law. Even assuming
that the City ordinance violates Illinois law (an issue that I do not reach), that
allegation is insufficient to state a federal due process claim. “[A] unit of state or
local government does not violate the federal Constitution just because it violates a
state or local law.” Garcia v. Kankakee Cty. Hous. Auth., 279 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir.
2002); see Colon, 899 F.2d at 672 (dismissing procedural due process claim based on
plaintiff’s theory that state actor violated state law).
The plaintiffs have failed to argue or allege how the ordinance violated
federal due process requirements, instead premising their due process claim on the
ordinance’s failure to comply with Illinois law. The plaintiffs have failed to state a
due process claim, and Count II is dismissed.
C.
State-Law Claims
The plaintiffs’ federal claims (Counts I and II) are dismissed, and there is no
diversity jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims (Counts III–IX).
This case is in its initial stages, and there is no reason not to follow the presumption
Daniels alleges that he did not receive notice of an administrative hearing. Because the
City impoundment ordinance requires notice and a hearing, Daniels’ failure to receive
notice is the result of a government actor’s alleged “random and unauthorized” conduct.
See, e.g., Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 323 (7th Cir. 1996). When a deprivation
results from the random and unauthorized conduct of a government actor and state-law
remedies exist, a plaintiff must either avail himself of state-law remedies or demonstrate
that they are inadequate. Id. Daniels has failed to allege that he petitioned to set aside the
order of default or that he sought judicial review of that decision in Illinois courts. See MCC
§§ 12-14-102, 2-14-108(a), 2-14-132(b)(4). Daniels therefore has failed to state a due process
claim based on his failure to receive notice.
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that federal courts will relinquish jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims.
See RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2012).
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [30], is granted. Plaintiffs have amended the
complaint once in response to a motion to dismiss, and, as a result, there is no
reason to believe that an amended complaint would cure the defects in plaintiffs’
federal theories. The federal claims are dismissed with prejudice, and the state-law
claims are dismissed without prejudice. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.
ENTER:
___________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: August 3, 2017
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