Raymer v. Colvin
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 5/17/2017. Mailed notice (ao,)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DAVID JOHN RAYMER,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1 Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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No. 16 C 9208
Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff David John Raymer appeals the Commissioner’s decision denying his
application for Social Security benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the
Commissioner’s decision.
Background
Plaintiff filed an application for benefits on January 29, 2014, alleging a disability onset
date of March 4, 2013. (R. 79.) His application was denied initially on May 20, 2014, and again
on reconsideration on January 30, 2015. (R. 79, 88.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on May 18, 2016. (R. 21-71.) On June 6,
2016, the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff’s application. (R. 92-103.) The Appeals
Council denied review (R. 1-3), leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the
Commissioner. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).
1
On January 23, 2017, Nancy A. Berryhill succeeded Carolyn W. Colvin as Acting Commissioner of Social
Security. See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited May 17, 2017). Accordingly, the Court
substitutes Berryhill for Colvin pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
Discussion
The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially, affirming if it is supported by
“substantial evidence in the record,” i.e., “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” White v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir.
1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Although this standard is
generous, it is not entirely uncritical,” and the case must be remanded if the “decision lacks
evidentiary support.” Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The
regulations prescribe a five-part sequential test for determining whether a claimant is disabled.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Under the regulations, the Commissioner must consider: (1) whether
the claimant has performed any substantial gainful activity during the period for which he claims
disability; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of
impairments; (3) if so, whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals any listed impairment;
(4) if not, whether the claimant retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his
past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether he is unable to perform any other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. Id.; Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885 (7th
Cir. 2001). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and if that burden
is met, the burden shifts at step five to the Commissioner to provide evidence that the claimant is
capable of performing work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2).
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At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since March 4, 2013, the alleged onset date of his disability. (R. 94.) At step two, the ALJ found
that plaintiff had the severe impairments of “hypertension, diabetes mellitus with peripheral
neuropathy, and obesity.” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of
the listed impairments.
(Id.)
At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”):
[T]to perform light work . . . in that [he] would be able to lift and carry 20 pounds
frequently and occasionally. However, he would be limited to sitting for a total of
four hours and standing a total of four hours in an eight-hour workday. He would
require a job that would allow him to alternate between sitting and standing every
thirty minutes. He would be limited to fingering bilaterally, and he should avoid
exposure to extreme cold.
(R. 95.) At step five, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that plaintiff can perform, and thus he is not disabled. (R. 102-03.)
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not appropriately weigh the opinion of plaintiff’s
treating physician, Dr. Christou, who opined that plaintiff can only sit or stand for thirty minutes,
can only walk for one block, and handles objects poorly because of pain. (R. 270.) An ALJ
must give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if “it is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). “If an ALJ does not give
a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the regulations require [her] to consider the
length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, the physician’s
specialty, the types of tests performed, and the consistency and supportability of the physician’s
opinion,” in assessing the opinion. Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009); see 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
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The ALJ only “accord[ed] some weight” to Dr. Christou’s opinion because: (1) his
treatment notes are “sparse” and “contain[] . . . very few objective clinical findings”; (2) he saw
plaintiff “only a few times per year”; and (3) it was contradicted by evidence that plaintiff had
worked as a bouncer from August 2015 through February 20162 and had “normal ability to
perform fine dexterous movements.” (R. 101.) Though the ALJ did not explicitly weigh each of
the regulatory factors in assessing Dr. Christou’s opinion, “she did note the lack of medical
evidence supporting [it] . . . and its inconsistency with the rest of the record,” which “is enough.”
Henke v. Astrue, 498 F. App’x 636, 640 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, the Court finds no error in the
ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Christou’s opinion.
Alternatively, plaintiff argues that “objective evidence such [as] blood pressure readings
and blood work” are sufficient to establish that he is disabled. However, hypertension “generally
causes disability through its effects on other body systems,” and thus the Listings instruct ALJs
to evaluate hypertension “by reference to the specific body system(s) affected (heart, brain,
kidneys,
or
eyes).”
See
Social
Security
Listing
4.00
H,
available
https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/4.00-Cardiovascular-Adult.htm
at,
(last
visited May 17, 2017). As the ALJ noted, the record “does not show [that plaintiff has a] cardiac
abnormality, brain abnormality, kidney abnormality, or ocular abnormality.” (R. 95.) Therefore,
she correctly concluded that plaintiff did not have Listing-level hypertension.
The ALJ’s conclusion that there is no evidence of Listing-level neuropathy is equally
sound.
Plaintiff would meet that Listing only if the record showed that he has:
(1)
“[d]isorganization of motor function in two extremities . . . resulting in an extreme limitation . . .
in the ability to stand up from a seated position, balance while standing or walking, or use the
2
The ALJ apparently believed this work did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1572 (defining “substantial gainful activity” as “work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental
activities . . . . for pay or profit”).
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upper extremities”; or (2) “[m]arked limitation . . . in physical functioning” and in
“understanding,
remembering,
or
applying
information,”
“[i]nteracting with others,”
“[c]oncentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace,” or [a]dapting or managing oneself.” See
Social
Security
Listing
11.14,
available
at
https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/11.00-Neurological-Adult.htm#11_14
(last visited May 17, 2017). Though plaintiff repeatedly complained to Dr. Christou about hand
or leg pain, Dr. Christou consistently noted that plaintiff was “[a]ble to move [his] extremities
appropriately.” (See R. 303, 305, 308-09, 312, 316.) Moreover, the consulting examiner said
that plaintiff has “normal fine dexterity in both hands,” walks without an assistive device, and
has only “moderate difficulty” with special maneuvers like walking on his toes because of his
neuropathy. (R. 275-76.) In short, the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff does not have a Listinglevel impairment is supported by the record.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment [10], grants the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [17], and affirms the
Commissioner’s decision. Judgment is entered in defendant’s favor and against plaintiff, and
this case is terminated.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: May 17, 2017
________________________________
M. David Weisman
United States Magistrate Judge
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