Broadnax v. Colvin

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 9/26/2017. Mailed notice. (dm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LONNA RAE BROADNAX,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 1

No. 16 C 9239
Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lonna Rae Broadnax filed this action seeking reversal of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under
Title II and XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 423 et. seq.,
1381 et seq. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States
Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
I. THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
To recover DIB or SSI, a claimant must establish that he or she is disabled
within the meaning of the Act. York v. Massanari, 155 F. Supp. 2d 973, 977 (N.D.

On January 23, 2017, Nancy A. Berryhill became Acting Commissioner of Social
Security and is substituted for her predecessor as the proper defendant in this action. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 25(d).
1

Ill. 2001). 2 A person is disabled if he or she is unable to perform “any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). In determining whether a claimant suffers from a
disability, the Commissioner conducts a standard five-step inquiry:
1. Is the claimant presently unemployed?
2. Does the claimant have a severe medically determinable physical or
mental impairment that interferes with basic work-related
activities and is expected to last at least 12 months?
3. Does the impairment meet or equal one of a list of specific
impairments enumerated in the regulations?
4. Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation?
5. Is the claimant unable to perform any other work?
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520, 416.909, 416.920; see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d
863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). “An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on
Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any
point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination that a
claimant is not disabled.” Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985).
“The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; only at step five does the
burden shift to the Commissioner.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
The regulations governing the determination of disability for DIB are found at 20
C.F.R. § 404.1501 et seq. The SSI regulations are set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 416.901 et seq.
The standards for determining DIB and SSI are virtually identical. Craft v. Astrue, 539
F.3d 668, 674 n.6 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although the Code of Federal Regulations contains
separate sections for DIB and SSI, the processes of evaluation are identical in all respects
relevant to this case.”). Accordingly, this Court cites to both DIB and SSI cases.
2

Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 2 of 15

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI benefits on February 8, 2013, alleging that she
became disabled on January 1, 2009—later amended to February 28, 2013—due to
diabetes, heart condition, high blood pressure, back injury, and sprained ankle. (R.
at 22, 86, 240). The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after
which Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing. (Id. at 86, 101–38, 159–63). On
December 12, 2014, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified at a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Id. at 18–51, 86). The ALJ also heard
testimony from Ashok G. Jilhewar, M.D., a medical expert (ME), and GleeAnn L.
Kehr, a vocational expert (VE). (Id. at 42–51, 86, 187, 190).
The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request for benefits on March 5, 2015. (R. at 86–95).
Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found, at step one,
that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 28,
2013, the amended alleged onset date. (Id. at 88). At step two, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus, obesity, and fibromyalgia syndrome are severe
impairments. (Id. at 88–89). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically
equal the severity of any of the listings enumerated in the regulations. (Id. at 89).
The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) 3 and
determined that she can perform sedentary work, except:

Before proceeding from step three to step four, the ALJ assesses a claimant’s residual
functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). “The RFC is the maximum
3

Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 3 of 15

she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs but never ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds. [Plaintiff] can occasionally balance and stoop but never
kneel, crouch and crawl. [Plaintiff] can frequently reach in all
directions, including overhead with both upper extremities. [Plaintiff]
can frequently handle, finger and feel with both upper extremities;
[Plaintiff] can tolerate occasional exposure to and work around hazards
such as moving machinery or unprotected heights.
(R. at 89–90; see id. at 90–94). Based on Plaintiff’s RFC and the VE’s testimony, the
ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant
work. (Id. at 94). At step five, based on Plaintiff’s RFC, her vocational factors, and
the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including address
clerk, account clerk, and telephone clerk. (Id. at 94–95). Accordingly, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not suffering from a disability as defined by the Act.
(Id. at 95).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on March 18, 2016. (R.
at 1–7). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, which stands as
the final decision of the Commissioner. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561–62 (7th
Cir. 2009).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is authorized by § 405(g) of
the Act. In reviewing this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of
whether the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security

that a claimant can still do despite his mental and physical limitations.” Craft, 539 F.3d at
675–76.
Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 4 of 15

Regulations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it
“reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or,
in general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Id. The
Court’s task is “limited to determining whether the ALJ’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing § 405(g)). Evidence is considered
substantial “if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004); see Moore v.
Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We will uphold the ALJ’s decision
if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”) (citation
omitted). “Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less than
a preponderance.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). “In addition
to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis of the
evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.”
Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).
Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ’s determination, it “must
do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d
589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “This deferential standard of review is
weighted in favor of upholding the ALJ’s decision, but it does not mean that we
scour the record for supportive evidence or rack our brains for reasons to uphold the
ALJ’s decision. Rather, the ALJ must identify the relevant evidence and build a
‘logical bridge’ between that evidence and the ultimate determination.” Moon v.

Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 5 of 15

Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014). Where the Commissioner’s decision “lacks
evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the
case must be remanded.” Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
IV. DISCUSSION
In support for her request for reversal, Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ erred in
mechanically determining that an older age category did not apply to Plaintiff, (2)
the ALJ’s assessment of the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective allegations was
legally insufficient, and (3) the Appeals Council erred in failing to consider new and
material evidence. (Dkt. 12 at 1).
A. The ALJ’s Subjective Symptom Evaluation Is Patently Wrong
The Social Security Administration determined recently that it would no longer
assess the “credibility” of a claimant’s statements, but would instead focus on
determining the “intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms.” SSR 163p, at *2. “The change in wording is meant to clarify that administrative law judges
aren’t in the business of impeaching claimants’ character; obviously administrative
law judges will continue to assess the credibility of pain assertions by applicants,
especially as such assertions often cannot be either credited or rejected on the basis
of medical evidence.” Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in
original).
The regulations describe a two-step process for evaluating a claimant’s own
description of his or her impairments. First, the ALJ “must consider whether there
is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that
Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 6 of 15

could reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s symptoms, such as pain.”
SSR 16-3p, at *2; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. “Second, once an underlying physical
or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce the
individual’s symptoms is established, we evaluate the intensity and persistence of
those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an
individual’s ability to perform work-related activities . . . .” SSR 16-3p, at *2.
In evaluating the claimant’s subjective symptoms, “an ALJ must consider
several factors, including the claimant’s daily activities, her level of pain or
symptoms, aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and limitations, and justify
the finding with specific reasons.” Villano, 556 F.3d at 562 (citations omitted); see
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p. An ALJ may not discredit a claimant’s
testimony about his symptoms “solely because there is no objective medical evidence
supporting it.” Villano, 556 F.3d at 562 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)); see
Johnson v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The administrative law
judge cannot disbelieve [the claimant’s] testimony solely because it seems in excess
of the ‘objective’ medical testimony.”). Even if a claimant’s subjective symptoms are
not supported directly by the medical evidence, the ALJ may not ignore
circumstantial evidence, medical or lay, which does support the claimant’s
subjective symptoms. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539–40 (7th
Cir. 2003). Indeed, SSR 16-3p, like former 96-7p, requires the ALJ to consider “the
entire case record, including the objective medical evidence, the individual’s own
statements about symptoms, statements and other information provided by treating

Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 7 of 15

or examining physicians or psychologists and other persons about the symptoms
and how they affect the individual, and other relevant evidence in the case record.”
Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
The Court will uphold an ALJ’s subjective symptom evaluation if the ALJ gives
specific reasons for that finding, supported by substantial evidence. Moss v. Astrue,
555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009). The ALJ’s decision “must contain specific
reasons” for the subjective symptom evaluation; “the ALJ may not simply recite the
factors that are described in the regulations.” Steele, 290 F.3d at 942 (citation
omitted). “Without an adequate explanation, neither the applicant nor subsequent
reviewers will have a fair sense of how the applicant’s testimony is weighed.” Id.
Plaintiff testified that she suffers from severe arm, back, and knee pain. (R. at
33). She is unable to raise her arms straight and is often unable to get out of bed
due to severe pain. (Id.). She has trouble sleeping for more than an hour or two. (Id.
at 38). She ambulates with the assistance of a cane even when she’s at home. (Id. at
33). She has difficulty ascending and descending stairs and sometimes needs to take
a break after doing so because of exhaustion. (Id. at 33–34). She can stand or sit for
only 20 minutes at a time. (Id. at 35). She can walk less than a block before needing
to rest. (Id. at 38). She is unable even to carry a gallon of milk. (Id. at 36). Plaintiff
relies on her daughter and granddaughter, who both live with her, to cook, clean,
launder, and shop. (Id. at 28–29).
In her decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegations “not entirely credible.” (R.
at 92). Specifically, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms because of her
Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 8 of 15

(1) activities of daily living, (2) past employment, (3) inconsistent and unpersuasive
description of symptoms and limitations, (4) use of a cane, and (5) effective use of
medications. (Id. at 92–93).
After careful consideration, none of the reasons provided by the ALJ for rejecting
Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms are legally sufficient or supported by substantial
evidence. First, the ALJ’s analysis is largely a summary of the medical evidence
without explaining how it undermines Plaintiff’s specific allegations. Norris v.
Astrue, 776 F. Supp. 2d 616, 633 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Unfortunately in this case, . . . we
are left to ponder the exact reasons for the ALJ's findings. In her decision, the ALJ
summarized the history of plaintiff’s medical treatment and recounted plaintiff’s
testimony regarding her daily activities, all of which are relevant to a credibility
determination. The ALJ, however, did not provide analysis and reasons as to why
she found plaintiff not to be credible.”) (citation omitted). Indeed, the ALJ’s analysis
“yields no clue to what weight the trier of fact gave [the] testimony.” Parker v.
Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010). The ALJ does not explain which of
Plaintiff’s allegations were credible, which were incredible, or provide reasoning in
support of her findings. See Groneman v. Barnhart, No. 06 C 0523, 2007 WL
781750, at *11 (N.D. Ill. March 9, 2007) (“The ALJ may have provided a reason for
rejecting [the claimant’s] allegations—because he did not seek treatment and follow
through with medication—but he did not provide reasoning. ”) (emphasis in
original). The ALJ’s decision “must contain specific reasons for the weight given to
the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and

Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 9 of 15

be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how
the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, at *9.
Second, the ALJ erred in relying on Plaintiff’s activities of daily living in
determining that her subjective symptoms were not entirely credible. The ALJ
failed to explain how Plaintiff’s ability to complete limited daily activities
undermines her allegations of pain or equates to an ability to perform full-time
work. While it is permissible for an ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities
when assessing a Plaintiff’s subjective symptom statements, the Seventh Circuit
has repeatedly instructed that ALJs are not to place “undue weight” on those
activities. Moss, 555 F.3d at 562; see Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir.
2011) (“[The claimant’s] ability to struggle through the activities of daily living does
not mean that [the claimant] can manage the requirements of a modern workplace”); Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The pressures, the
nature of the work, flexibility in the use of time, and other aspects of the working
environment as well, often differ dramatically between home and office or factory or
other place of paid work.”). Further, when an ALJ does analyze a claimant’s daily
activities, the analysis “must be done with care.” See Roddy, 705 F.3d at 639.
Here, the ALJ failed to explain how Plaintiff’s ability to maintain contact with
family and friends, use a computer and smart phone, and occasionally read books
(R. at 92) undermines her complaints of debilitating pain. See Jelinek v. Astrue, 662
F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[An ALJ] must explain perceived inconsistencies
between a claimant’s activities and the medical evidence.”); Ghiselli, 837 F.3d at
Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 10 of 15

778 (finding error when ALJ did not “identify a basis for his conclusion that the life
activities [claimant] reported were inconsistent with the physical impairments she
claimed”). Neither did the ALJ explain how preparing simple meals, washing
dishes, doing laundry, and making the bed (R. at 92) equates to an ability to
perform full-time work. See Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 647 (“The critical differences
between activities of daily living and activities in a full-time job are that a person
has more flexibility in scheduling the former than the latter, can get help from other
persons . . . and is not held to a minimum standard of performance, as she would be
by an employer.”) (collecting cases); Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 755 (7th
Cir. 2004) (ALJ failed to consider the difference between a person being able to
engage in sporadic physical activities and [his] being able to work eight hours a day
five consecutive days of the week). And the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s
testimony that she performed many of these activities while relying significantly on
her daughter and granddaughter. Further, the ALJ failed to acknowledge that
Plaintiff drove only to a doctor’s appointment and attended church only “every now
and then.” (R. at 29, 32).
Third, the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s subjective allegations not entirely
credible because of her past work as a community service officer and a part-time
babysitter. The ALJ found that Plaintiff left her job as a community service officer
in 2009 not because she was disabled but because of a layoff. (R. at 92). The ALJ
also found “no evidence of a significant deterioration in [Plaintiff’s] medical
condition,” and therefore inferred “that [Plaintiff’s] impairments would not prevent

Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 11 of 15

the performance of that job, since it was being performed adequately at the time of
the layoff.” (Id.). But the ALJ cited no evidence to support her conclusion that there
were no changes to Plaintiff’s impairments between 2009 and 2013 and failed to
consider that Plaintiff suffers from degenerative disc and joint disease. (R. at 352,
407, 420). An ALJ must consider the effects of a degenerative or deteriorating
impairment. Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2014) (“First, she
failed to consider that, because of the progressive nature of Mr. Scrogham’s disease,
there might have been a legitimate difference between his physical abilities in June
2009 and his abilities in August 2010.”). And an ALJ may not substitute speculation
for evidence. White ex rel. Smith v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“Speculation is, of course, no substitute for evidence, and a decision based on
speculation is not supported by substantial evidence.”). In any event, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a community service
officer. (R. at 94). Similarly, the ALJ does not explain how Plaintiff’s ability to
babysit for three months in 2009 has any relevance to her ability to perform full
time work in February 2013 or later. Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 1046, 1051 (7th Cir.
2014) (“[Plaintiff’s] physical abilities a year before the alleged onset date therefore
tell us little if anything about the credibility of her later complaints of disabling
pain.”).
Fourth, the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of fibromyalgia. Because fibromyalgia “often
produce[s] pain and other symptoms out of proportion to the ‘objective’ medical

Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 12 of 15

evidence, it is crucial that the disability adjudicator evaluate credibility with great
care and a proper understanding of the disease[ ].” Johnson v. Colvin, No. 13-C1023, 2014 WL 2765701, at *1 (E.D. Wis. June 18, 2014). Indeed, “[t]here are no
laboratory tests for the presence or severity of fibromyalgia.” Sarchet v. Chater, 78
F.3d 305, 306 (7th Cir. 1996). The ALJ did not explain how normal range of motion
and a neurological examination within normal limits (R. at 93) is inconsistent with
the debilitating pain associated with fibromyalgia. There is no evidence indicating
that fibromyalgia causes limitations in strength, range of motion, or an inability to
step onto an examination table or walk. On the contrary, fibromyalgia is
characterized by widespread pain, not by an inability to walk or a decrease in range
of motion. See <www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/fibromyalgia> (last visited
August 10, 2017). The ALJ assumed a connection between the tests administered
and Plaintiff’s symptoms of pain. As such, in deciding that they were mutually
exclusive, the ALJ was inappropriately “playing doctor.” Engstrand v. Colvin, 788
F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2015).
Fifth, the ALJ does not explain how Plaintiff’s use of a cane undermines her
complaints of debilitating pain. The ALJ observed that Plaintiff did not have a
prescription for the cane (R. at 93) but Plaintiff testified that she had been given the
cane recently by her arthritis doctor (id. at 32). In any event, canes do not require a
prescription, and so whether a doctor prescribes a cane is not probative of whether
the claimant needs to use one in the first place. See Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920,
922 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing as “absurd” an ALJ’s suspicion stemming from

Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 13 of 15

claimant’s use of cane without prescription); Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477–78
(7th Cir. 2009) (noting that claimant’s use of walker without prescription is not
enough to make pain allegations unbelievable). The ALJ also found no reports of
difficulty with gait or use of a cane during examinations. (R. at 93). But Plaintiff
testified that she uses the cane because of pain associated with rheumatoid arthritis
and fibromyalgia not because of any difficulty with her gait. (Id. at 32–35).
Finally, the ALJ fails to explain how Plaintiff’s medications that were relatively
effective in controlling Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus (R. at 92) undermines her claims
of debilitating pain associated with fibromyalgia. Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811,
815 (7th Cir. 2014), as amended (Aug. 20, 2014) (ALJ must construct a logical
bridge from the evidence to her conclusion). In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ’s
evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms was not supported by substantial
evidence, requiring remand. On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate Plaintiff’s
complaints with due regard for the full range of medical evidence. See Zurawski v.
Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2001).
C. Other Issues
Because the Court is remanding to reevaluate Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms,
the Court chooses not to address Plaintiff’s other arguments that the ALJ erred in
determining that an older age category did not apply to Plaintiff and that the
Appeals Council erred in failing to consider new and material evidence. However, on
remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate Plaintiff’s physical impairments and RFC,
considering all of the evidence of record, including Plaintiff’s testimony and the new
Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 14 of 15

evidence, and shall explain the basis of her findings in accordance with applicable
regulations and rulings. “In making a proper RFC determination, the ALJ must
consider all of the relevant evidence in the record, even limitations that are not
severe, and may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling.” Murphy v.
Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Finally, with the
assistance of a VE, the ALJ shall determine whether there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers that Plaintiff can perform.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse [12] is GRANTED,
and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [14] is DENIED. Pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405, the ALJ’s decision is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Dated: September 26, 2017

E N T E R:

MARY M. ROWLAND
United States Magistrate Judge

Broadnax v. Berryhill, 16 C 9239

Page 15 of 15