Aldridge v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Order issued sua sponte regarding defendants' Answer, coupled with three asserted affirmative defenses. Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 12/28/2016:Mailed notice(clw, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHARLES ALDRIDGE,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
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SALEH OBAISI (Medical Director) and
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LATONYA WILLIAMS (Physician Assistant), )
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Defendants.
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Case No. 16 C 9477
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Charles Aldridge (“Aldridge”) has used the Clerk’s- Office-supplied form of “Complaint
Under the Civil Rights Act, Title 42 Section 1983” to charge Wexford Health Services, Inc., its
Medical Director Saleh Obaisi and Physician Assistant Latonya Williams with asserted medical
misconduct that meets the Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) standard of deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs. Aldridge’s submission has admittedly been prepared
under the volunteer auspices of fellow Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”) inmate
Maurice Cannon. This Court’s October 24, 2016 memorandum order explained the terms on
which Aldridge could go forward with this action, for which purpose it designated a member of
this District Court’s trial bar to represent him.
It remains to be seen whether Aldridge’s designated counsel may elect to proceed with
Aldridge’s Complaint, which sets out his asserted claim in detail, or whether it should instead be
supplanted by a lawyer-drafted Amended Complaint. But in the interim defense counsel have
just filed an Answer, coupled with three asserted affirmative defenses (“ADs”) -- a pleading that
contains some problematic aspects that have triggered the issuance of this sua sponte
memorandum order.
By far the bulk of the Answer’s responses to the allegations in Aldridge’s Complaint are
flat-out denials, as to which this Court makes no comment. Whatever disputes of fact are raised
by the allegations and denials will be resolved in the future course of the litigation. But where
defense counsel finds that such denials and a much smaller number of admissions (both of which
types of response are advanced in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 8(b)(1)(B)) are
inappropriate, counsel are entitled to call into play the form of disclaimer permitted by Rule
8(b)(5) -- and they have sought to do so in several instances.
In that respect, however, it must be said that defense counsel have earned a failing grade.
Although a pro se prisoner plaintiff such as Aldridge is entitled under the per curiam opinion in
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 to have his pleadings read through a generous lens, trained
lawyers are not. Here there is simply no excuse for counsel’s having abandoned the
unambiguous road map charted by Rule 8(b)(5) in favor of a distorted revision (see Section III
parts A through I and Complaint ¶¶ 1, 2, 28 and 29), and counsel have compounded that
distortion by their impermissible addition of the clause “and therefore deny the same.” That of
course is oxymoronic -- how can anyone disclaim “sufficient information or belief to respond” to
an allegation but then go on to deny it?
Accordingly all of the paragraphs in the Answer referred to in the preceding paragraph
are stricken. Leave is however granted to file an appropriate amendment to the Answer (not a
fully self-contained Amended Answer) that cures counsel’s errors on or before January 16, 2017.
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On another note, Answer ¶ 3 asserts that the corresponding paragraph of the Complaint
“calls for conclusions of law to which no response is required.” That of course is dead wrong-see, e.g., App’x ¶ 2 to State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill.
2001)) – and that is particularly true as to allegations regarding jurisdiction and venue, both of
which are asserted in Complaint ¶ 3. Accordingly the amendment to the Answer, already
provided for here, must reframe Answer ¶ 3 properly.
There are also problematic aspects of the ADs advanced on defendants’ behalf, as to
which defense counsel would do well to read and comply with the principles stated in App’x ¶ 5
to State Farm. Here are the basic problems with each of the proposed ADs:
1.
AD 1 is in direct conflict with the obligation of a defendant to credit the
allegations of a complaint, together with reasonable inferences in support of those
allegations. That being the case, no qualified immunity defense can be advanced
as a current AD, though such a defense may be raised if it turns out to be
appropriate when the facts of the case (as distinct from allegations) are fleshed
out.
2.
That is true as to AD 2 as well, as to which the Complaint is replete with
allegations as to Aldridge’s unsuccessful efforts to seek medical treatment -allegations as to which this Court of course makes no findings, but which it must
credit for current purposes. Hence AD 2 is stricken as well.
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3.
AD 3 is flawed for exactly the same reason. Although we’re well past the
Chicago Cubs’ World Series victory, defendants’ ADs have sustained three called
strikes, and each of them is “out.”
In short, each of defendants’ ADs is stricken, but without prejudice to their possible resuscitation
if future development of the case justifies their reassertion.
Date: December 28, 2016
__________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
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