Lentz v Burke

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Gary Feinerman on 7/18/2018.Mailed notice.(jlj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTY LENTZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
MAGGIE BURKE, Warden,
Respondent.

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16 C 9516
Judge Gary Feinerman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Christy Lentz, an Illinois prisoner convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 50
years’ imprisonment, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Doc. 1. Lentz claims that: (1) the introduction at trial of a videotaped statement she
made to the police violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (2) her trial attorney was
ineffective in failing to investigate and call certain witnesses. The petition is denied, and the
court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
Background
A federal habeas court presumes correct the factual findings made by the last state court
to adjudicate the case on the merits, unless those findings are rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Coleman v. Hardy, 690 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“We give great deference to state court factual findings. After AEDPA, we are required to
presume a state court’s account of the facts correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Appellate Court of Illinois is the last state court to have adjudicated Lentz’s
criminal case on the merits. People v. Lentz, 2015 IL App (2d) 140888-U, 2015 WL 6128590

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(Ill. App. Oct. 16, 2015); People v. Lentz, 2011 IL App (2d) 100448-U, 2011 WL 10452300 (Ill.
App. Aug. 30, 2011). Following are the facts as described by that court.
On June 9, 2006, Lentz and her sister informed the Villa Park, Illinois police that their
father, Michael Lentz, had been missing since late May. 2015 IL App (2d) 140888-U at ¶ 4. On
June 21, the police went to Michael’s business, where Lentz also worked. Ibid. A handwritten
sign said that the business was closed due to a family emergency. Ibid. The officers noticed a
smell of decomposition and obtained a search warrant. Ibid. Inside, they found a wrapped and
taped bundle containing Michael’s body. Ibid. The body was in a plastic bin, and it appeared
that someone had unsuccessfully attempted to burn the body in the bin. Ibid.
The police went to the house of Chuck Minauskas, Lentz’s boyfriend, where they found
Lentz, Minauskas, and their seven-year-old daughter, Taylor. Ibid. The police brought all three
to the station, where they questioned Lentz on videotape for several hours. Ibid. Lentz
eventually told the police that Michael came at her with a gun and accidentally shot himself after
she pushed him away. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6. Lentz was arrested for murder. Id. at ¶ 4. She moved to
suppress her videotaped statement, but the motion was denied. Id. at ¶ 7. The prosecution
played the videotaped statement during its case in chief. Id. at ¶ 9.
Contrary to what she had told the police at the station, Lentz’s defense at trial was to
admit that she killed Michael but to argue that the killing was in self-defense. Id. at ¶ 33. Four
witnesses testified that they had seen Michael act violently in the past; at least two testified that
he abused alcohol and “had a reputation for being violent and physically and verbally abusive.”
Id. at ¶¶ 21-24. Lentz testified that she saw Michael assault her mother on multiple occasions
during her childhood. Id. at ¶ 25. Lentz added that Michael always verbally abused her, and

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began physically abusing her between the Summer and Fall of 2005, while she was working at
his business. Id. at ¶ 27.
Lentz further testified to the following. On the day of the killing, May 19, 2006, Michael
became angry after reading a letter from the IRS and walked into her office with a gun. Id. at
¶ 28. Lentz knocked the gun out of Michael’s hands and he fell backwards on the desk. Ibid.
When he started to lift himself up, Lentz became terrified that he was going to kill her, so she
shot him twice and fled. Ibid. Lentz returned a few days later, hid Michael’s body in a garbage
can, and ripped up some bloody carpeting. Id. at ¶ 29. On June 9, she drove Michael’s pickup to
Kenosha, Wisconsin and abandoned it. Ibid. On June 13, Lentz tried to mask the smell of
decomposition with air fresheners, and then attempted to burn the garbage can that held the
body. Ibid. When that did not work, she wrapped the garbage can in layers of clothing and tape.
Ibid. Lentz claimed to still be terrified of her father and afraid that he was going “to get up and
come back out.” Ibid.
Seven prosecution witnesses testified that, as far as they knew, Lentz and Michael had a
good relationship. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15, 18, 19. In closing arguments, the prosecution maintained that
Lentz would not have gone to such great lengths to cover up the killing if she believed it was
justified, and observed that, contrary to her testimony as to how the shooting occurred, the
ballistics evidence showed that she shot Michael while he was sitting down. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. The
prosecution further observed that Lentz’s trial testimony was inconsistent with her videotaped
statement to the police, in which she claimed that Michael accidentally shot himself after she
pushed him. Id. at ¶ 32. The defense responded that Lentz told the police that story “because
she was scared and afraid.” Id. at ¶ 33.

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The jury found Lentz guilty of first degree murder, and the court sentenced her to 50
years’ imprisonment. Id. at ¶ 35. On direct appeal, Lentz argued that the introduction at trial of
her videotaped statement to the police violated her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
2011 IL App (2d) 100448-U at ¶ 6. The state appellate court rejected that argument and
affirmed, holding that the police did not coerce Lentz’s statement and that they did not need to
give her Miranda warnings because she was not in custody. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 37. The Supreme Court
of Illinois denied leave to appeal. People v. Lentz, 962 N.E.2d 486 (Ill. 2011).
Lentz brought a state postconviction petition for relief, arguing that her trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to call three additional witnesses (Taylor, Minauskas, and Minauskas’s
father Charles) to support her self-defense argument and an expert witness to introduce a
battered-woman-syndrome theory. 2015 IL App (2d) 140888-U at ¶ 37. The trial court
dismissed the petition on the merits, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at ¶¶ 64-65. The
appellate court held that trial counsel’s decision not to call Taylor, Minauskas, and Minauskas’s
father was reasonable because their testimony would have carried little weight, and that counsel
reasonably decided not to pursue a battered-woman-syndrome defense because it had little
chance of success. Id. at ¶¶ 52, 58. The state supreme court again denied leave to appeal.
People v. Lentz, 48 N.E.3d 1095 (2016).
Having exhausted her state remedies, Lentz timely filed this federal habeas petition.
Discussion
Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) unless
the state court’s decision “was contrary to” or “involved an unreasonable application of” federal
law then clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court, § 2254(d)(1), or “was based

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on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court,
§ 2254(d)(2).
I.

Introduction at Trial of Lentz’s Videotaped Statement
Lentz contends that the state judiciary unreasonably applied federal law in holding that

the introduction at trial of her videotaped statement to the police did not violate the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal
law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s determination that a claim
lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the
correctness of the state court's decision.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another
way, to obtain relief under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), “a state
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was
so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 102. Significant here, “[t]he
more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
determinations.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
“The relevant decision for purposes of [the court’s] assessment under [§ 2254(d)] is the
decision of the last state court to rule on the merits of the petitioner’s claim … .” Eichwedel v.
Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 671 (7th Cir. 2012). The last state court decision to rule on the merits
of Lentz’s claim regarding her videotaped statement was the state appellate court’s opinion on
direct review. Lentz claims that decision was mistaken in two respects, which are considered in
turn.

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A.

Miranda Custody Issue

First, Lentz argues that the state court unreasonably held that because her interrogation at
the police station was not custodial, the police did not violate the Fifth Amendment by failing to
give her Miranda warnings until well into the interrogation. “[T]he prosecution may not use
statements … stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of [Miranda warnings] effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Miranda warnings need not be given if the interrogation is
not custodial. See United States v. Patterson, 826 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2016). For Miranda
purposes, an interrogation is considered custodial if, given the totality of the circumstances, “a
reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). Relevant factors include: “whether the
encounter occurred in a public place; whether the suspect consented to speak with the officers;
whether the officers informed the individual that he was not under arrest and was free to leave;
whether the individual was moved to another area; whether there was a threatening presence of
several officers and a display of weapons or physical force; and whether the officers’ tone of
voice was such that their requests were likely to be obeyed.” United States v. Littledale, 652
F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2011).
The state court’s discussion of the Miranda/custody issue reads as follows:
[T]he majority of the relevant factors favor a finding that the defendant
was not in custody during the pre-Miranda portion of the interview. The first
factor is the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the questioning.
[People v. Slater, 886 N.E.2d 986, 994-95 (Ill. 2008).] The questioning took
place at a police station, in a conference room in a portion of the building not
open to the general public. However, given that the defendant knew that the
police wanted to talk to Minauskas at the same time and would want to do so
separately, the location of the questioning would not be especially suggestive
of custody to a reasonable person. The questioning took place during the late
evening and early morning hours. There is no indication, however, that the
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police chose the time in an attempt to make the defendant more vulnerable;
rather, they picked up the defendant for questioning as soon after the
discovery of the body as practicable, and commenced the interview within an
hour after the defendant arrived at the police station. As for the mood and
mode of the questioning, the trial court placed great weight on these factors,
and we agree that both the tone of the questions being asked and the
defendant’s relaxed demeanor demonstrated a cooperative and voluntary
interview rather than a custodial interrogation.
The second factor, the number of police officers present during the
interrogation, was neutral in that three officers, a usual number for interviews,
were present, and they were in civilian clothes with their weapons secured in
their customary holsters. Two of the officers questioned the defendant while
the third officer operated the videotape recorder. The fourth factor favors a
finding that the defendant was not in custody, as none of the indicia of a
formal arrest were involved, such as the show of weapons or force, physical
restraint, booking or fingerprinting. The sixth factor, the age, intelligence, and
mental makeup of the accused, likewise favors finding of a noncustodial
interview, in that the defendant was not a minor and does not appear to have
had any difficulty in understanding the nature of the questioning. The
defendant argues on appeal that the defendant was tired, having been awake
since 4:45 a.m. the previous morning, and she also told police that she and
Minauskas had been in the bar for some hours that afternoon. Nevertheless,
we agree with the trial court's determination that on the videotape the
defendant, while occasionally appearing tired, was alert and oriented
throughout the questioning and did not show any impairment to her ability to
understand the proceedings.
The defendant argues that the manner by which she arrived at the place
of questioning would have led a reasonable person to believe that she was in
custody. In addition, Minauskas testified that the police told him that he had
to come with them. This second point, what the police told Minauskas, is
irrelevant because there is no evidence that the defendant was aware of it, and
thus it could not have affected her perception of whether she was free to
decline the request to come to the police station. See People v. Alfaro, 386 Ill.
App. 3d 271, 291 (2008) (generally, the personal thoughts of the police officer
or others involved are irrelevant unless the officer’s belief that the interviewee
is a suspect is communicated in some manner to him or her). However, we
agree that the presence of six police officers at Minauskas’ home, four of
whom accompanied the defendant back to the station, might lead a reasonable
person in the defendant's position to conclude that he or she did not have a
choice whether to go with the police officers. The State, drawing on police
testimony, argues that not all of these officers were assigned to bring the
defendant in: some of the officers were originally assigned to pick up
Minauskas, and others came to Minauskas’ address when they learned that the

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defendant was there. Regardless of the reason for the number of officers,
however, this factor favors a finding that the defendant was in custody.
Nevertheless, viewing all of the factors together, we conclude that the
defendant was not in custody during the pre-Miranda portion of the
questioning. The defendant emphasizes that she was never told that she was
free to leave, and argues that this case is like People v. Fitzpatrick, 107 Ill.
App. 3d 876 (1982), in which the appellate court reversed the trial court’s
denial of the motion to suppress the defendant’s statement because the police
never told the defendant that he was free to leave. In that case, the parties
disputed whether the defendant had agreed to come to the police station or
whether he had been forced to come. Id. at 877-78. In this case, by contrast,
the videotape shows the defendant agreeing with [Officer] Kubish that she had
voluntarily consented to come to the station and answer questions. This
acknowledgment demonstrates that the police did not need to reassure the
defendant that she was free to go: the defendant clearly viewed herself as
being in control of her own presence at the station. See People v. Eyler, 132
Ill. App. 3d 792, 805 (1985) (a voluntary consent to accompany police to the
police station for interrogation distinguishes permissible station house
interrogation from illegal custodial interrogation). Similarly, as the trial court
found, the defendant’s comment to the police immediately before the first
break that she needed to take her daughter home soon was delivered in a tone
indicating that she was telling the police that she could not stay all night and
would eventually have to leave-a communication that was consistent with a
belief that she remained free to terminate the interview. Indeed, her manner
throughout the pre-Miranda portion of the question was that of someone
voluntarily cooperating with the police in an effort to locate her missing
father … .
Finally, we do not view the fact that Kubish and [Officer] Wayda
accompanied the defendant outside while she smoked to be suggestive of
custody; the police testified that otherwise the defendant could have gotten
lost or locked out. The defendant’s demeanor remained relaxed and
cooperative even after the break, suggesting that she was not intimidated by
Kubish’s and Wayda’s presence outside while she smoked. In sum, we find
that taking all of the circumstances into account, a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would not have believed that she was not free to
terminate the questioning and leave during the pre-Miranda portion of the
interview. As the defendant was not in custody during this portion, the failure
of the police to warn her of her constitutional rights at the outset of the
questioning did not violate Miranda and her statements were not subject to
suppression on that basis.
2011 Ill App (2d) 100448-U at ¶¶ 26-29.

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Lentz’s habeas challenge to this ruling is without merit. Lentz asserts that the interview
was custodial because the police confronted her late in the evening, drove her to the station,
separated her from her daughter and boyfriend, and accompanied her outside on a smoke break.
Doc. 1 at 29-32. She also emphasizes that six officers came to Minauskas’s house to contact her,
and three were present for her interview. Id. at 31. Yet the appellate court acknowledged those
circumstances and reasonably concluded that, in the overall context of the interview, they did not
indicate that the interview was custodial. That conclusion is particularly reasonable given
Lentz’s videotaped admission that the police had asked her if she was willing to come to the
station and did not force her to do so. 2011 Ill App (2d) 100448-U at ¶ 14.
Lentz objects that the court improperly relied on certain “subjective” factors, such as the
tone of the officers’ questions and Lentz’s relaxed demeanor. Doc. 1 at 32-33. But the tone of
the questions was an objective feature of the interrogation, and the court’s reference to Lentz’s
“relaxed demeanor” simply confirmed what the objective facts suggested—that Lentz knew she
was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time. The state court thoroughly applied the
general, multifactor Miranda custody test to Lentz’s case. At the very least, its decision was
reasonable. See Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664 (in holding that the state court reasonably ruled that
the petitioner was not in custody for Miranda purposes, noting that “[t]he more general the rule,
the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations”).
B.

Voluntariness Issue

Second, Lentz argues that her videotaped statement, even if not custodial, was
inadmissible because the police coerced her into confessing by repeatedly telling her she could
not see Taylor, her seven-year-old daughter, until they finished the interview. “The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the admission of an involuntary confession in

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evidence in a criminal prosecution.” Dassey v. , 877 F.3d __, 303 (7th Cir. 2017). Lentz does
not dispute that the appellate court identified the correct legal standard—that the voluntariness of
a confession is determined by analyzing “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances[,] both
the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation,” Murdock v. Dorethy, 846
F.3d 203, 209 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973))—
but maintains that the court applied that standard unreasonably.
The appellate court’s discussion of the voluntariness issue reads as follows:
During the pre-Miranda portion of the questioning, Taylor [Lentz’s
daughter] was mentioned three times. The first mention occurred shortly after
questioning began, when Kubish asked whether the defendant needed food,
water, a bathroom break, or anything else. At that point, the defendant told
Kubish that Taylor would need to go to bed soon. Her tone of voice on the
videotape indicates that she was advising the detectives that she was willing to
cooperate and answer questions regarding her missing father but she would
eventually need to get Taylor home to bed. The second mention occurred an
hour and a half later, after Kubish said that they would need to take a break to
change the tape. The defendant asked whether she could take Taylor home
“soon” to put her to bed, indicating that she would like to wrap up the
questioning at some point in the near future although not necessarily right
then. Kubish did not respond directly, stating that they were “just trying to get
through all this now.” The defendant did not say anything further about
Taylor. The police and the defendant then went outside for a half-hour break.
Immediately after the break, Kubish made a record of the break, noting that
while she was outside the defendant saw her daughter asleep and other family
members nearby. The defendant agreed, but voiced a concern that Taylor was
being bitten by mosquitos. Wayda reassured her that the other family
members would bring Taylor back inside when they were done smoking.
Kubish read the Miranda warnings to the defendant less than five
minutes after that, and the defendant signed the waiver. A little over a half
hour later, at 1:39 a.m., there was a one-minute break. A few minutes after
that, the police first told the defendant that they had been inside the business
earlier in the day and began confronting her with the fact that the defendant
had not told them the truth on various points. There was another one-minute
break for the tape to be changed at 1:47 a.m. A few minutes after that, the
defendant stated that her father had pulled a gun on her a few weeks ago. A
few minutes later (approximately 45 minutes after receiving the Miranda
warnings), the defendant stated, “You know, I'm probably never going to be
able to see my daughter again.” Kubish and Wayda both immediately
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responded, “that’s not true.” The defendant then stated that her father had
come at her with a gun and she had pushed him away and that he had shot
himself as he fell. Between the time that the defendant received the Miranda
warnings and the time she expressed concern about seeing Taylor as she was
preparing to tell the police how her father was shot, the defendant did not
indicate that she was concerned about Taylor in any way or wished to see her.
After the defendant first told the officers that her father had accidentally
shot himself after she pushed him away, she provided more details about how
the incident unfolded, and what she did with her father’s body and his truck
afterwards. Kubish and Wayda repeatedly suggested that the defendant, who
was small in stature, had help from others, possibly her brother or Minauskas,
in handling her father’s body and disposing of the truck near Kenosha. The
defendant was adamant that she had done all of it herself and that no one else
knew of her father’s death. The officers continued to press the defendant hard
on this point, urging her to tell them the full story and be truthful. It was at
this point that the defendant asked Kubish what would happen with her
daughter and Kubish responded that they would take care of her daughter and
do the right thing, but that he could not tell her what was going to happen with
Taylor long-term until she told him what happened with her father. After that,
Kubish and Wayda referred to the defendant’s concern for Taylor more
often—a total of eight more times—in urging the defendant to give them a full
and truthful account. Although the defendant appeared increasingly tired and
stressed during the remaining questioning, at no point did she change her
account of any of the significant details of the story that she had told the
officers.
This record does not support the defendant’s argument that her statement
was the product of police coercion relating to whether she could see Taylor or
take her home. The defendant’s initial comments about Taylor having to go to
bed were not used by the officers to pressure the defendant; rather, the police
reassured the defendant that Taylor was being cared for. When, immediately
before she told the police how her father had been shot, the defendant
expressed fear that she would never see Taylor again, the officers
unanimously told her that was not true. Thus, there was no coercive use of
Taylor’s presence or the defendant’s concern for her prior to her confession
that she was involved in her father’s shooting and attempted to cover up his
death. The circumstances here contrast with those used by the police
in Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963), in which the police told the
defendant that her children would be taken from her if she did not cooperate,
and she did not give a statement until after this threat had been made.
Moreover, although we do not condone the officers’ later statements that they
could not tell the defendant what would happen to Taylor until the defendant
had provided a full and truthful statement, the defendant has not identified any
manner in which those statements caused her to change her story or provide
any substantial new information. Thus, whatever pressure those statements
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placed on the defendant, they were not the cause of her decision to tell the
police about how her father had died or what she had done with his body and
his truck after his death. See People v. Anderson, 225 Ill. App. 3d 636, 641
(1992) (statement was not the product of police coercion where defendant
decided to confess prior to use of coercive tactics). Accordingly, we find that
the defendant’s statement was voluntarily and freely given, and therefore
affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
2011 Ill App (2d) 100448-U at ¶¶ 32-37.
This ruling was not an unreasonable application of federal law. Lentz protests that the
state court did not sufficiently appreciate that the questioning went on for several hours after the
officers began casting doubt on her ability to see or retain custody of Taylor, and emphasizes that
the prosecution played the full videotape of her interview at trial. But Lentz does not argue that
she divulged any information material to her confession due to the officers’ threats (implicit or
explicit) regarding Taylor. The length of the questioning thus does not undermine the state
court’s conclusion that Lentz confessed that she killed Michael before the officers made those
threats and that she did not “change her story or provide any substantial new information” after
the threats commenced.
“Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.”
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986); see also United States v. Sturdivant, 796 F.3d
690, 695 (7th Cir. 2015). Because Lentz does not argue, let alone show, that the officers’
allegedly coercive threats regarding Taylor caused her to confess, this court cannot conclude that
the state court unreasonably rejected the voluntariness challenge to her confession. See United
States v. Cabrera, 2012 WL 2238023, at *9 (S.D. Cal. June 15, 2012) (rejecting a habeas
petitioner’s claim that certain statements were involuntary where “they were made prior to [the

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allegedly coercive officer] entering the interrogation room” and thus were “not caused by
coercive conduct”).
II.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Lentz contends that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in rejecting her ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Under
§ 2254(d)(1), the “bar for establishing that a state court’s application of the Strickland standard
was ‘unreasonable’ is a high one.” Murrell v. Frank, 332 F.3d 1102, 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
“[O]nly a clear error in applying Strickland would support a writ of habeas corpus … because
Strickland calls for inquiry into degrees, thereby adding a layer of respect for a state court’s
application of the legal standard.” Ibid. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations
omitted). Put another way, a federal court must deny habeas relief if the “state court [took] the
rule [of Strickland] seriously and produce[d] an answer within the range of defensible positions.”
Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000). “The question is not whether a federal
court believes the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but
whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A.

Failure to Call Taylor, Chuck Minauskas, and Charles Minauskas

Lentz first contends that the appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland in rejecting
her claim that her trial attorney’s failure to call Taylor (her daughter), Chuck Minauskas (her
boyfriend), and Charles Minauskas (Chuck’s father) to testify about Michael’s violent nature
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. For Lentz to have prevailed in state court on this
issue, she first had to show that her attorney’s failure to call those individuals constituted
deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In evaluating an attorney’s

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performance, the court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Second, Lentz had to show
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
Taylor, Chuck, and Charles averred in affidavits that they would have supported Lentz’s
self-defense theory by corroborating her testimony that Michael had behaved violently towards
her in the past. 2015 IL App (2d) 140888-U at ¶ 54. Taylor would have testified that she saw
Michael hit Lentz’s arm or shoulder, shove her, or pull her ear on five to ten occasions, and that
she heard him tell Lentz, “I am going to kill you” and “I swear to God, if you do this again things
are going to happen.” Doc. 1 at 54-55. Chuck would have testified that Michael abused alcohol
daily and regularly abused Lentz verbally. Id. at 55. On one occasion, Chuck heard Michael
say, “I’ll kill her the next time” after yelling at Lentz over the phone. Ibid. Charles would have
given similar testimony. Ibid.
As to the first prong of Strickland, the appellate court held that Lentz “failed to overcome
the presumption that not introducing their testimony was sound trial strategy since testimony
from these witnesses likely would have carried little weight with the jury due to their relationship
with the defendant.” 2015 IL App (2d) 140888-U at ¶ 56. The court added that Charles’s and
Chuck’s testimony would not have corroborated Lentz’s position that her father had become
physically abusive in the Summer or Fall of 2005 because they did not “g[i]ve any time frame as
to when such [abusive] behavior occurred.” Id. at ¶ 57. And the court observed that, even if
Lentz’s attorney had acted unreasonably by failing to call Taylor, Chuck, and Charles, Lentz
could not show prejudice under the second prong of Strickland: “The evidence in this case was
not closely balanced: the defendant’s testimony that she shot her father in self-defense was

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contradicted by her videotaped statement, and the evidence showed that the defendant had taken
extraordinary measures to conceal the crime.” Id. at ¶ 58.
The state court’s ruling reasonably applied Strickland, for regardless of whether counsel’s
alleged failure to investigate Taylor’s, Chuck’s, and Charles’s memory of Michael’s violent
behavior and to call them at trial was within the range of professional competence, the court
reasonably concluded that Lentz was not prejudiced because their testimony would have added
little to her defense. The jury already heard evidence from several witnesses that Michael was a
violent, abusive alcoholic, and trial counsel focused on that testimony in closing argument to
support the view that Michael had abused Lentz her whole life. Id. at ¶¶ 21-27, 33.
Corroborating testimony from Taylor, Charles, and/or Chuck that Michael had been violent
towards Lentz in the past could not possibly have made the difference between conviction and
acquittal. And even if their testimony would have convinced the jury that Michael regularly
assaulted her, the evidence at trial undermined Lentz’s submission that he was the initial
aggressor on the night in question: the ballistic evidence showed that Lentz shot Michael while
he was sitting down; Lentz went to great lengths to conceal the murder, which she would not
likely have done if she truly felt the killing was justified; and her account of the killing at trial
was inconsistent with her videotaped statement to the police. In the face of that evidence, the
state court reasonably concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that the result of
Lentz’s trial would have been different if Taylor, Charles, and Chuck had testified. See Mitchell
v. Enloe, 817 F.3d 532, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Mitchell … fails to show that he was prejudiced
… . To convict for second degree murder under either self-defense or provocation, the jury
would have had to believe Mitchell’s version of events. But the forensic evidence contradicts
Mitchell’s story.”).

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B.

Failure to Call an Expert to Testify Regarding Battered-Woman Syndrome

Lentz next contends that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a mental
health expert to contend that she suffered from battered-woman syndrome. The state appellate
court held that counsel acted reasonably because “[t]here is no precedent in [Illinois] for
applying battered woman syndrome to a father-daughter relationship” as opposed to an
“intimate, marital-like relationship,” and counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue
a novel or unrecognized legal theory. 2015 IL App (2d) 140888-U at ¶¶ 51-52 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court added that, because “the defendant’s testimony did not
demonstrate that she suffered physical abuse over an extended period of time,” a batteredwoman-syndrome defense would have failed in any event. Id. at ¶ 52. The court concluded that
“[i]t was sound trial strategy for counsel to rely on the theory of self-defense rather than risk
hurting the self-defense theory by stretching it to include” testimony about battered-woman
syndrome. Ibid. Lentz argues that the state court’s decision rests on three unreasonable
determinations of fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
First, Lentz claims that the state court misinterpreted the expert report from Dr. Ruth
Kuncel submitted to support her postconviction petition; in Lentz’s view, the state court
“wrongly concluded that her opinions were based on a diagnosis of battered-woman syndrome
alone,” when in fact Dr. Kuncel “opined in her report that [Lentz] exhibited thought and
behavior patterns consistent with battered woman syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder.”
Doc. 1 at 50-51. According to Lentz, battered-woman syndrome is merely a “subset of PTSD.”
Doc. 29 at 9.
Lentz’s real quarrel is not with the appellate court’s reading of Dr. Kuncel’s report, but
with its understanding of Illinois law. Lentz does not explain how the label given to her alleged
condition affected the state court’s conclusion that Illinois has not recognized the defense that
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Lentz says her trial counsel should have advanced. Regardless of whether an expert would have
testified that Lentz was suffering from battered-woman syndrome or PTSD more generally, the
form of the defense would have been the same: that a pattern of abuse by Michael (Lentz’s
father) produced a psychological condition in her that made her believe he was threatening her
life. The state court determined that this defense was unavailable under Illinois law in the
context of a father-daughter relationship. A federal habeas court cannot call that state law ruling
into question. See Miller v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a habeas
petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim because state court determined that, “as a matter of state
law, it would have been futile” for counsel to have made the argument that the petitioner
maintained counsel should have made).
Second, Lentz contends that the state court ignored the record when it determined that
trial counsel reasonably abandoned the battered-woman-syndrome theory because she suffered
only three instances of physical abuse by Michael. Doc. 1 at 53-54. Again, Lentz’s real issue is
with the state court’s reading of state law, not its understanding of the facts. Lentz correctly
notes that Dr. Kuncel’s report documents verbal and emotional abuse by Michael stretching back
to her childhood. But the court was clearly aware of that non-physical abuse, as it noted those
findings in its summary of the report. 2015 IL App (2d) 140888-U at ¶ 38. Rather than ignoring
the record, the state court was, as Lentz herself puts it, “implicitly h[olding] that the toxic
familial environment in which [she] grew up, including the physical and verbal abuse inflicted
on other family members,” could not support a battered-woman-syndrome defense. Doc. 29 at
11. That is a conclusion about state law, which, as noted, a federal habeas court cannot secondguess. See Miller, 820 F.3d at 277.

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Third, Lentz argues that the state court improperly assumed that trial counsel made a
“strategic decision” not to call a mental health expert, while the record in fact shows that counsel
simply failed to investigate the matter. Doc. 1 at 54. But the state court was not finding a fact
when it made that remark; rather, it was applying a legal presumption. Strickland instructs
courts to “presum[e] that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy.” 466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden is on
Lentz to show that her attorney acted outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.
She cannot meet that burden because the state court determined that the theory her trial counsel
failed to pursue was unavailable under Illinois law. Counsel did not make “the sort of
inexplicable omission that renders even an apparently sturdy defense so deficient that the
representation as a whole fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Bland v. Hardy,
672 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The omission is easily
explained: the argument would not have worked.
Finally, the court denies Lentz’s request for an evidentiary hearing to investigate trial
counsel’s reasons for not calling an expert to testify about battered-women syndrome. As a
general rule, a federal court cannot supplement the state record when reviewing a habeas petition
under § 2254(d). See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 185 (2011) (“[W]e … hold that
evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review.”); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2) (providing that a habeas petition may be granted if a state court decision “resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding”) (emphasis added). As noted, the appellate court’s
decision on this matter rested on an application of state law. Because Lentz has not shown that
the state court’s resolution of her ineffective assistance claim was contrary to or unreasonably

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applied federal law, or that it involved an unreasonable determination of the facts before the state
court, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Lentz’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. Habeas
Rule 11(a) provides that the district court “must issue or deny a certificate of appealability
[(‘COA’)] when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” See Lavin v. Rednour, 641 F.3d
830, 832 (7th Cir. 2011). Regarding Lentz’s claims, the applicable standard is:
To obtain a COA under § 2253(c), a habeas prisoner must make a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a demonstration that …
includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Lavin, 641 F.3d at 832.
This court’s denial of Lentz’s habeas claims relies on settled precedents and principles.
The application of those precedents and principles to Lentz’s petition does not present difficult or
close questions, and so the petition does not meet the standard for granting a certificate of
appealability. The court therefore denies a certificate of appealability.

July 18, 2018

_________________________________
United States District Judge

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