Jackson v. Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, Ltd. et al

Filing 75

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 8/1/2017: Defendants' motions to dismiss, 43 , 45 , 51 , and 57 , are granted. The complaint is dismissed. Enter judgment and terminate civil case. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed. (psm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
STEPHEN JACKSON,
Plaintiff,

No. 16 CV 10499

v.
KLEIN, THORPE AND JENKINS, LTD., et
al.,

Judge Manish S. Shah

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Stephen Jackson lives across the street from a property that the
Village of Western Springs rezoned from mixed residential use to other, more
commercial uses. Jackson has tried to challenge the development of this property
for many years, and he now brings this action against the Village of Western
Springs, Village staff members (Patrick R. Higgins and Martin Scott), current or
former volunteer Village officials (Jeanine M. Jasica, William T. Rodeghier,
Suzanne Glowiak, Edward Tymick, Alice Gallagher, James Horvath, Sheila
Hansen, Patrick Word, Berry Allen), the current owner of the subject property
(WSMC Partners, LLC), the contract purchaser and developer of Lot 2 of the subject
property (Al. Neyer, LLC), and the Village’s attorney (Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins,
LTD, and Michael Jurusik). Count I alleges a civil RICO action under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) and (d). Count II alleges violations of the equal protection and due process
clauses. Counts III through V allege violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and
1986, respectively. The complaint includes a variety of state-law claims. Defendants

move to dismiss the complaint. For the following reasons, those motions to dismiss
are granted.
I.

Legal Standards
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges jurisdiction in federal court, and the

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the elements necessary for jurisdiction.
Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2012). With a 12(b)(1) motion,
a court may look beyond the complaint’s allegations and consider any evidence that
has been submitted on the issue of jurisdiction. Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897
(7th Cir. 1995). By contrast, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “tests whether the complaint
states a claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635,
637 (7th Cir. 2012). The complaint must contain factual allegations that plausibly
suggest a right to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). A court may
consider only allegations in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint,
documents that are both referred to in the complaint and central to its claims, and
matters of public record. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013).
When analyzing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construes all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Scanlan, 669 F.3d at 841. The court does not accept legal
conclusions or conclusory allegations, however. Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206,
212 (7th Cir. 2011).
II.

Background
Two years ago, Jackson filed a lawsuit in federal court against eighteen

defendants—seven of which are also defendants in this case. See Jackson v. Vill. of
2

W. Springs, No. 14 C 3414, 2014 WL 5543844 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2014) aff’d 612 Fed.
App’x. 842 (7th Cir. 2015). The defendants in that earlier federal lawsuit moved to
dismiss Jackson’s complaint and Judge Leinenweber granted their motion. [43-3] at
2.1 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision. [43-4] at 3. The complaint from that
lawsuit was similar to the complaint in this action—the claims stemmed from the
decisions to rezone the property across the street from Jackson’s house, and they
included violations of equal protection, procedural and substantive due process
under § 1983, the Illinois Open Meetings Act, the Freedom of Information Act,
common law conspiracy, and common law torts.2
In this action, Jackson continues to argue that the rezoning of the subject
property has devalued his property and that he has suffered consequential
damages; but, he also makes a new argument that defendants engaged in a “pay to
play” scheme in which they conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights and
liberties. [1] at ¶ 36. The “pay to play” scheme seems to be about the link provided
by certain KTJ attorneys between property developers and the Village. See, e.g., id.

1

Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket.

Jackson purchased a home in February 2000. At that time, the property across the street
from his home was zoned for “mixed residential” use and he believed it would be developed
into a townhome. In March 2001, the Board of Trustees for the Village approved a
conditional-use permit for a retail center on the subject property. He attended public
meetings and hired counsel to oppose the development. When that was unsuccessful, he
sued the Village in the Circuit Court of Cook County in March 2001. Counsel for the
developers wrote Jackson to say they would move for sanctions against Jackson and ask the
state judge to require him to post a $5 million bond to protect their investment because
they thought he brought the lawsuit in bad faith. Jackson subsequently dismissed the state
action. During the thirteen years that followed, Village officials made other zoning
decisions about the subject property, including amending the Village’s Land Use Plan to
authorize commercial use of the subject property. Commercial use of the subject property
increased the traffic and noise on Jackson’s street and reduced his privacy and safety.
2

3

¶ 41 (“Village Defendants sanctioned, approved, and ratified KTJ’s enterprise and
pay-to-play scheme when granting KTJ a franchise allowing the improper ‘sale’ of
re-zoning relief, and Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and statutory protections, by
allowing the Village to serve as KTJ’s ‘bagman’ to assist in the enforcement and
collection KTJ’s monies and to provide a veil of legitimacy for the enterprise.”); id. ¶
46.
Jackson’s theory is that the Village “used, or caused to be used, or acted with
the reckless indifference to allow the use of” municipal monies and credit, as well as
public resources and employees, for non-public purposes. Id. ¶¶ 37–39. He says that
KTJ, Jurusik, Rhoads, WSMC, and Neyer were recipients of the municipal monies
and credit, id. ¶¶ 40, 42, and that KTJ represented private developers in the 2011
and 2014 rezoning of the subject property, while at the same time posing as the
Village’s attorney. Id. ¶¶ 46, 49, 212–213. Jackson says KTJ ensured that the
developers’ applications would be accepted by providing “material misstatements of
fact,” as well as “contrived expert opinions and biased legal conclusion[s].” Id.
¶¶ 46–47, see also id. ¶ 103. These actions circumvented local procedures, thereby
preventing Jackson and other stakeholders from reviewing competent analysis and
testimony regarding the subject property. Id. ¶¶ 46–47, 103. “Plan Commission
Members” rubber-stamped the applications and did not consider the applications’
compliance with the “Illinois statute and Village Code.” Id. ¶ 48. According to
Jackson, defendants “manufactured facts and advanced the logical fallacies to enact
the preferential re-zoning legislations,” before they brought the issues to the public,

4

as required by law, thereby “barr[ing], or effectively barr[ing], Plaintiff his rights as
a U.S. citizen in favor of private developers where Jurusik, KTJ, and its attorneys
and others benefitted for 16 years at the direct cost to and peril to Plaintiff and his
family.” Id. ¶ 54.
Additionally, defendants allegedly used their association with the Village to
engage in a pattern of racketeering activities to advance their enterprise and to
further their fraudulent scheme against Jackson under a “veil of legitimacy.” Id.
¶¶ 123, 125. Defendants created a sixteen-year “turf war” amongst themselves, with
Jackson “trapped” in the middle—they “improperly overturn[ed] the then existing
codified Official Land Use Plan and repeatedly eviscerate[ed] Village Code for the
benefit of Defendant Developers, Village Defendants, KTJ, and Jurusik from 2000
to 2016.” Id. ¶ 61; see also id. ¶ 131. WSMC and Neyer joined the battle in 2011 and
2016, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 62–65. Jackson also says that “[d]efendants acted in
concert” to retaliate against him by bribing Mark Henning, Esq., a Village Plan
Commissioner, to send Jackson a letter notifying Jackson that his petition for
injunctive relief and declaratory judgment in the previous state court action was not
filed in good faith and that the defendants in that action would move the court to
sanction Jackson if he did not withdraw the lawsuit. Id. ¶ 52; see also id. ¶ 136.
For a time during the rezoning decisions, the subject property was vacant and
it attracted “criminal elements” into the neighborhood, such as drugs, graffiti, and
break-ins. Id. ¶¶ 69–70. The rezoning decisions harmed Jackson in other ways, too:
(1) elevated high-intensity parking field lighting shining into
Plaintiff’s home and bedrooms day and night; (2) vehicle
5

headlights shining directly into Plaintiff’s home; (3) high volume
commercial auto, truck, and daycare bus traffic generation along
the codified residential street; (4) elevated noise levels; (5)
frequent auto alarms and car horns; (6) illuminated commercial
signage directed at Plaintiff’s home; (7) loss of privacy and
invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy; (8) numerous periods of
construction, demolition, reconstruction, flood plain earthwork,
and deforestation totaling about (5) years; (9) overall commercial
blight; and (10) public nuisance.
Id. ¶ 79. As a result, Jackson suffered from chronic sleep deprivation for years. Id.
¶ 120. In response, Jackson had to spend thousands of hours defending his
property, business, and civil rights; and he was forced to study state and federal
law. Id. Despite Jackson’s efforts to sell his home, real estate brokers avoided
showing prospective buyers his home and Jackson never succeeded in making a
sale. Id. ¶ 88. As a result, Jackson had to withdraw from Harvard University,
“where he was to expand his business platform, procure investors/partners, and hire
contractors.” Id. ¶ 89. The negative impacts of the rezoning also injured Jackson “in
his role as a qui tam relator prosecuting recovery of monies on behalf of government
and government pension plan agencies which also effects interstate commerce.” Id.
¶ 90.
III.

Analysis
A.

Collateral Estoppel

The Village moves to dismiss Jackson’s claims concerning the zoning
decisions in part because those issues are collaterally estopped by Judge
Leinenweber’s decision, which the Seventh Circuit affirmed. “Collateral estoppel
[. . .] has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an
identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy
6

by preventing needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326
(1979). The doctrine applies only when (1) the issues raised in both proceedings are
identical; (2) the issues were actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issues
were essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) the party against
whom estoppel is invoked had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the
first action. Washington Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. Bell, Boyd & Lloyd LLC, 383 F.3d 633,
636 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
In the earlier federal case, which involved several of the same defendants in
this case, Judge Leinenweber held that the court had no jurisdiction over Jackson’s
equal protection or due process claims because Jackson did not satisfy the “special
ripeness doctrine.” [43-3] at 5–6. This doctrine applies to constitutional property
rights claims and it precludes federal courts from adjudicating such land use
disputes until: “(1) the regulatory agency has had an opportunity to make a
considered definitive decision, and (2) the property owner exhausts available state
remedies for compensation.” Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir.
2000) (citing Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 193–94 (1985)). Judge Leinenweber concluded that Jackson’s
due process claims were subject to Williamson because “a property owner may not
avoid Williamson by applying the label ‘substantive due process’ to the claim. So too
with the label ‘procedural due process.’” [43-3] at 7 (citing Forseth, 199 F.3d at 368).
In reaching a similar conclusion regarding Jackson’s equal protection claims, Judge
Leinenweber explained:

7

The equal protection allegations are that Defendants received
large sums of money and favorable zoning decisions while
violating various Illinois laws in zoning and rezoning the nearby
property. There are no allegations to support Jackson’s
conclusory statement that the zoning decisions were in some
way done out of spite specifically directed toward him. To the
contrary, the Complaint shows that all surrounding property
owners were damaged in the exact same way as him — that is,
Jackson alleges that all the homes along his street were
devalued in the exact same amount by the most recent zoning
decision.3
Id. at 9. Judge Leinenweber rejected Jackson’s attempt to label the takings claims
as equal protection claims and dismissed those claims for Jackson’s failure to
exhaust. Id. at 7, 10 (citing Forseth, 199 F.3d at 371). Judge Leinenweber concluded
that the complaint failed to state a claim under the First Amendment, id. at 10–13;
and he declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, id.
at 13–15.
Jackson

appealed,

arguing

that

Judge

Leinenweber’s

decision

mischaracterized his claims as takings claims, when he was actually alleging that
he was denied procedural due process because the Village disregarded local
procedures and engaged in delay tactics. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment
because “applying the label ‘procedural due process’ does not absolve a litigant’s
obligation to first seek compensation in state court before turning to federal court.”
[43-4] at 5 (citing Forseth, 199 F.3d at 368; River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland
Park, 23 F.3d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1994)). Since Jackson’s claim about the Village’s

Independent equal protection claims do exist in the land use context, but they typically
involve regulations or zoning decisions that target or affect only the plaintiff’s land, which
was not the case in Jackson’s situation. See Forseth, 199 F.3d at 371.
3

8

unfair processes in making zoning decisions was “merely ancillary to, and not
independent of” his takings claim, the court reasoned that Williamson applied to his
due process claim and that exhaustion was required. [43-4] at 5. Likewise,
Williamson applied to Jackson’s equal protection claim because his claims boiled
down to “an accusation that a government entity greatly diminished the value of his
property” out of spite,4 which is, in essence, a takings claim. Id. at 6. The Seventh
Circuit also concluded that Jackson’s First Amendment rights were not violated,
that Jackson failed to state a claim under § 1985 because he did not allege a racial
or class-based animus, and that Judge Leinenweber did not abuse his discretion in
declining to exercise jurisdiction for the state-law claims. Id. at 7.
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion outlined Jackson’s flawed approach and
referenced what he would need to do in order to bring a federal case in the future:
Because Jackson did not appeal the Board’s decisions to the
zoning board of appeals, see 65 ILCS 5/11-13-12, and then to the
state courts on administrative review, see 65 ILCS 5/11-13-13, or
pursue other remedies that Illinois has provided for property
owners challenging excessive zoning regulation, see Peters v.
Vill. of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2007), we agree
with the district court that Jackson’s claim of a violation of
procedural due process is unripe and subject to dismissal.

The Seventh Circuit also agreed with Judge Leinenweber on the point that Jackson
pleaded himself out of court with respect to his allegation that the Village acted out of spite
and targeted him. [43-4] at 6. First, Jackson’s complaint admitted that his neighbors also
suffered from the development and that their properties were also devalued. Id. Second,
Jackson’s complaint acknowledged that the Village had a rational basis for its decisions: the
owners of the subject property had financial incentives to develop their property for
commercial use. Id. (citing Miller v. City of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1121 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Third, the complaint stated that negotiations between the Village and developers were
underway before Jackson bought his house, thereby making it impossible for Jackson to be
their target. Id.
4

9

[43-4] at 5. Instead of pursuing administrative or state-court remedies, Jackson
brought this lawsuit involving the same underlying factual circumstances, many of
the same defendants, and which is not based on an allegation that Jackson has, in
the meantime, exhausted his administrative remedies.5
Jackson already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of
whether exhaustion was required for claims that were ancillary to his takings claim
and whether he appropriately exhausted administrative remedies before bringing a
federal action. After concluding that exhaustion was required and that Jackson
failed to exhaust, Judge Leinenweber dismissed Jackson’s claims, and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed both of those conclusions. Thus, those issues were essential to the
final judgment in Jackson’s first federal action. Jackson’s strategy of adding claims
under RICO, §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 does not cure this action from the same
jurisdictional defect of his last action. Consequently, Jackson is collaterally
estopped from bringing due process and equal protection claims against the Village,
KTJ, Jurusik, Higgins, Jasica, Rodeghier, Scott, and Rhoads. Count II is dismissed
as to those defendants.6

In his response brief, Jackson asserts that he “attempted to resolve the matter with the
Village several times since 2000, and often without any feedback whatsoever [. . .], as well
as [with] the Illinois Attorney General’s Office when appealing the Village’s denials of
Plaintiff’s FOIA requests and by seeking AG Office intervention regarding his Writ of Quo
Warranto.” [68] at 15. Those actions, however, do not constitute exhausting administrative
remedies, as a matter of law. See Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir.
2000).
5

Although WSMC joined the Village’s motion and Neyer incorporated by reference the
Village’s arguments about collateral estoppel, neither WSMC nor Neyer were parties to or
privies with any of the parties to Jackson’s first federal action. Accordingly, Jackson is not
collaterally estopped from bringing Count II against WSMC or Neyer.
6

10

B.

Special Ripeness Doctrine

Article III of the Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to “cases” and
“controversies.” U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2. One important element of the “cases” or
“controversies” requirement is satisfying the ripeness doctrine, which determines
when a party may go to court. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, Indiana, 361
F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). The ripeness doctrine
seeks to prevent the court from “abstract disagreements over administrative
polices.” Id. A special ripeness doctrine operates in the context of a constitutional
challenge to a local land use regulation. Id. In Williamson, the Supreme Court held
that before a plaintiff may challenge a local land use regulation in federal court, he
must demonstrate that he has received a “final decision regarding the application of
the [challenged] regulations to the property at issue” from “the government entity
charged with implementing the regulations,” and has sought “compensation
through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.” 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194
(1985); see also Forseth, 199 F.3d at 372. The Williamson exhaustion requirement
applies in suits challenging local land regulation regardless of whether the plaintiff
titles his claims an uncompensated taking, an inverse condemnation, or a due
process violation. Hager v. City of W. Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 1996); River
Park, 23 F.3d at 167.
All defendants move to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on account of Jackson’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In
Illinois, any “person” who is “aggrieved” by a local zoning decision may appeal to a
zoning board of appeals, see 65 ILCS 5/11-13-12, and judicial review of a decision
11

from the zoning board of appeals is available, see 65 ILCS 5/11-13-13. There are no
allegations in the complaint about Jackson exhausting administrative remedies or
attempting to challenge the rezoning decisions before a zoning board of appeals, and
no other evidence of exhaustion of administrative remedies exists in the record.
Like Judge Leinenweber, I find that Counts II through V are subject to
Williamson exhaustion because they stem from a dispute about a land use control.
Although Counts II through V are not labeled as takings claims, they claim injuries
from rezoning decisions or the repercussions from those decisions. Since “[f]ederal
courts are not boards of zoning appeals,” it follows that “[l]itigants who neglect or
disdain their state remedies are out of [federal] court, period.” River Park, 23 F.3d
at 165. This court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over any of Jackson’s
claims that are ancillary to what would be a takings claim. Counts II through V are
dismissed as to all defendants.
C.

RICO Claim

The civil RICO statute provides that “[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue [. . .] in any
appropriate United States district court.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The Seventh Circuit
interprets the “injured in his business or property” and the “by reason of” phrases as
requirements to have standing to sue. Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 924
(7th Cir. 2006) overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 (7th
Cir. 2013). Although the RICO statute must be construed broadly, the Seventh
Circuit has upheld the limitation of cognizable injuries under the statute to those
involving the plaintiff’s business or property. Id. at 926. For example, personal
12

injuries and pecuniary losses that flow from personal injuries do not suffice. Id. The
Seventh Circuit also requires that damages under § 1964(c) be “clear and definite”
in order to confer standing. Id. at 932.
Jackson complains of a host of injuries, but most of his injuries are not
injuries to his business or property. His sleep deprivation, loss of time from
studying the law and preparing to defend his rights and property, light and noise
disturbances, and loss of privacy constitute personal injuries and or pecuniary
losses flowing from those personal injuries. As such, they do not confer standing
under § 1964(c). The remaining injuries that Jackson alleges—devalued property,
inability to sell his home, lost opportunity to expand his business platform at
Harvard University, and hindered role as a qui tam realtor—may constitute
injuries to his business or property, but they are not clear or definite. Since Jackson
does not allege that he sold his house, his calculation of its decreased value remains
speculative and subject to change. Similarly, his allegations about lost business
opportunities caused by his withdrawal from Harvard University lack specificity
and are speculative. Finally, the injuries to his career as a qui tam realtor are not
currently ascertainable. Since Jackson did not suffer the requisite injury to have
standing, his RICO claim, Count I, is dismissed as to all defendants.7

Unlike KTJ and Neyer, the Village did not address Jackson’s RICO violations specifically.
Nevertheless, I dismiss Jackson’s claim against the Village under § 1962(c) and (d) sua
sponte for the same reasons I dismiss that claim against KTJ and Neyer. See Ledford v.
Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Moreover, even
if Jackson had standing to bring a RICO claim, his claim would still fail because he has not
made the required allegation that each defendant “conducts” a criminal RICO enterprise.
He needed to allege that each defendant “participated in the operation or management of
the [RICO] enterprise itself” and that each defendant “played ‘some part in directing the
7

13

D.

State-Law Claims

Since Jackson’s federal claims have been dismissed, this court no longer has
original jurisdiction over any claim in this lawsuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Wright
v. Associated Ins. Companies Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1250 (7th Cir. 1994). “[T]he general
rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court
should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving
them on the merits.” Id. at 1251. This lawsuit is in the early stages of litigation, and
state courts are typically in the best position to decide cases that present only
questions of state law. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966) (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity
and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law” in state court). Thus, I decline to exercise supplemental
enterprise’s affairs.’” Goren v. New Vision Int’l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 727 (7th Cir. 1998)
holding modified by Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). The complaint does not contain those necessary allegations. To state a
conspiracy claim under RICO, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that each defendant agreed to
maintain an interest in or control of an enterprise or to participate in the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and (2) that each defendant further
agreed that someone would commit at least two predicate acts to accomplish those goals.”
Goren v. New Vision Int’l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 732 (7th Cir. 1998) holding modified by
Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Jackson pleads the existence of a conspiracy by reference to the elements of the violation,
see, e.g., [1] ¶ 133 (“Each Defendant agreed to join the conspiracy and to commit predicate
acts with the knowledge that such acts were part of a pattern of racketeering activity.”), but
these conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Absent allegations
that a defendant reached an agreement to maintain any interest in or any control of the
alleged criminal enterprise, and that each defendant agreed that someone would commit a
predicate act (let alone two predicate acts) in furtherance of those aims, the complaint does
not state a RICO conspiracy claim. Finally, I note that Jackson’s complaint establishes that
he was aware of injuries caused by the alleged RICO enterprise and pattern of activity well
over four years before he filed this complaint. He would be barred from pursuing a lawsuit
for any such injuries. See McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452, 1465–66 (7th Cir.
1992), as amended on reh’g in part (Oct. 26, 1992); Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont,
Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 801–02 (7th Cir. 2008).

14

jurisdiction over Jackson’s remaining state-law claims. Counts VI through IX are
dismissed without prejudice as to all defendants.
IV.

Conclusion
Defendants’ motions to dismiss, [43], [45], [51], and [57], are granted. The

complaint is dismissed. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.
ENTER:
___________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge

Date: August 1, 2017

15