Charles Stokes v. City of Chicago et al

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 5/22/2017:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES STOKES,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 16 C 10621

P.O. EWING #8653, P.O. ORTIZ
#9748, and the CITY OF
CHICAGO, a Municipal
Corporation,

Judge Harry D. Leinenweber

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant City of Chicago’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim [ECF No. 16].

For the reasons

stated herein, the Motion is denied.
I.
Plaintiff
under

42

U.S.C.

constitutional
Officers

Charles

Ewing

§§

Stokes
1983

violations
and

BACKGROUND

Ortiz

(“Stokes”)
and

visited
(the

1988
upon

filed
to

him

“Defendant

this

lawsuit

address
by

Chicago

Officers”).

alleged
Police
The

following facts are drawn from Stokes’ Complaint and are, for
purposes of this Motion, accepted as true, with all inferences
drawn in his favor.

See, e.g., Adams v. City of Indianapolis,

742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2015).

On September 2, 2015, Stokes was leaving the home of his
mother-in-law when Defendant Officers searched his car without
cause and falsely arrested him for possessing a firearm.
No.

1

(“Compl.”)

¶¶

5-10.)

Stokes

claims

that

they

(ECF
and

Defendant City of Chicago (the “City”) proceeded with baseless
charges,

which

¶¶ 14-17.)

were

ultimately

resolved

in

his

favor.

(Id.

On November 21, 2015, Stokes was again leaving his

mother-in-law’s home when Defendant Officers stopped him without
cause.

(Id., Count III, ¶¶ 5-7.)

They searched his person,

took his car keys, and then searched his car.
¶¶

9-10.)

Despite

Officers

claimed

somewhere

near

finding

they

the

had

house,”

nothing

in

discovered
and

(Id., Count III,

his

car,

“some

subsequently

Defendant

weed/marijuana

arrested

Stokes.

(Id., Count III, ¶¶ 11-12.)
After arresting Stokes, Defendant Officers informed him and
a

co-arrestee

that

they

were

going

to

possession “unless they came up with a gun.”
¶

13.)

Both

Stokes

and

his

jail

for

narcotics

(Compl., Count VI,

companion-in-misfortune

Defendant Officers that they did not have or own a gun.
Count VI, ¶ 14.)

told
(Id.,

At that point, “[o]ne or both” of Defendant

Officers told them that they could only avoid jail by furnishing
the police with a gun. (Id., Count VI, ¶ 15.)

Because neither

of them had a gun, Stokes’ co-arrestee “arranged to obtain a
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gun.”

(Id., Count VI, ¶¶ 16-17.)

Once “a gun was tendered” to

Defendant Officers, Stokes was released and requested that the
other individual be released as well.
19.)
be

(Id., Count VI, ¶¶ 18-

Defendant Officers replied that Stokes’ co-arrestee would
released

only

if

Stokes

found

them

another

gun.

(Id.)

Because he did not have a gun, “Stokes was ordered to hit the
streets and obtain or buy an illegal gun and turn it over.”
(Id., Count VI, ¶¶ 20-22.)
gun

was

found

and

Both were released once this second

presented

to

Defendant

Officers.

(Id.,

Count VI, ¶ 27.)
With

respect

Defendant

Officers

employment
arrest

and

people

conduct

to

the

were

pursuant
on

illegal

false

City,

acting
to

“a

and

policy

was

done

and

acts

(Compl., Count VI, ¶¶ 22-23.)
[sic]

within

custom

charges

felonious

Stokes

the

in

the

that

scope

practice

then

for

alleges

both

of

and

their

policy

turn,

have

Chicago

to

them

Police.”

This “unwritten practice, customs
to

keep

a

point/score

for

police

officers in certain districts and reward officers accordingly
for bringing in illegal guns off the street(s).” (Id., Count VI,
¶ 24.)

Ultimately, Stokes attributes his false arrest to this

“custom, practice and policy,” which “promoted illegal arrests
of innocent individuals.”

(Id., Count VI, ¶¶ 25-26.)

- 3 -

The City now seeks to dismiss Stokes’ Monell claim under
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint
“must state a claim that is plausible on its face.”

Adams, 742

F.3d at 728 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,, 550 U.S. 544,
570

(2007)).

plaintiff

A

pleads

claim

enjoys

sufficient

“facial

factual

plausibility

content

the

allows

that

when

the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the alleged misconduct.”
(quoting
plaintiff

Ashcroft
must

v.

Adams, 742 F.3d at 728

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

that

all

elements

allege

662,

678
of

(2009)).

his

claim

A
are

satisfied, but cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
by alleging only legal conclusions.

Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar,

Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 2010).
of

the

elements

of

a

cause

of

action,

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Specific

to

Monell

claims

for

“Threadbare recitals
supported

by

mere

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
municipal

liability,

the

plaintiff must allege “that an official policy or custom not
only caused the constitutional violation, but was the moving
force behind it.”

Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cnty. of

Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
- 4 -

marks omitted); accord, Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d
829, 833 (7th Cir. 2012).
must allege that:

To state such a claim, the plaintiff

(1) he suffered a deprivation of a federal

right (2) as a result of either an express municipal policy,
widespread custom, or deliberate act of a decision-maker with
final policy-making authority for the city, which (3) was the
proximate cause of his injury.

See, Monell v. New York City

Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); accord,
Gonzalez v. Vill. of West Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 664 (7th Cir.
2012).

The plaintiff must also plausibly point to the existence

of an underlying constitutional violation.

Houskins v. Sheahan,

549 F.3d 480, 493-94 (7th Cir. 2008).
III.

ANALYSIS

In essence, Stokes is suing the City for instituting an
implicit policy, custom, or practice that rewards officers in
proportion to the number of guns confiscated and licenses the
arrest of individuals on false charges unless they can obtain
and turn over a gun.

(ECF No. 23 (“Pl.’s Br.) at 3-4.)

This

policy, as applied to him, allegedly violated his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

(Compl. ¶ 28.)

The City contends that Stokes’ Complaint fatally lacks the
requisite
Conclusory

specificity
and

to

boilerplate

allege

a

plausible

allegations,
- 5 -

the

Monell

City

claim.

points

out,

leave

a

complaint

stranded.

Further,

the

City

argues

that

Stokes has not provided facts permitting an inference that the
alleged policy was the driving force behind his injury – “that a
widespread

reward

system

directed

or

even

influenced

the

Defendant Officers’ actions” – or that the City was deliberately
indifferent to the effects of its policy.
at 5-6.)

(ECF No. 24 (“Reply”)

In addition, the City maintains that the Complaint

fails to elevate what happened to Stokes and his co-arrestee
above

a

“random

event,”

because

it

does

not

identify

instances of the conduct claimed to be “widespread.”
4.)

other

(Id. at 3-

(The City does not claim that Stokes fails to allege an

underlying

constitutional

violation.)

Stokes,

on

the

other

hand, warns against applying a heightened pleading standard to
Monell claims and notes that his Complaint sufficiently puts the
City on notice of the factual basis for his suit.
Three of the City’s arguments can be quickly put to the
sword.

First, the Complaint does not make merely conclusory or

boilerplate
content
reciting
Stokes’

allegations,

sufficient
by

rote

Complaint

to
the

but

put

instead

the

elements

details

City
of

both

a
the

pleads
on

specific

notice.

Monell
nature

cause
of

factual

Rather

than

of

action,

the

alleged

unconstitutional policy and the circumstances of its application
to him and his co-arrestee.

Cf., e.g., Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d
- 6 -

574, 582 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a “formulaic recitation
of the cause of action and nothing more” fails to “put the
defendants on notice of what exactly they might have done to
violate

[the

plaintiff’s]

rights”);

Annan

v.

Village

of

Romeoville, No. 12 C 3577, 2013 WL 673484, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 25,

2013)

(finding

allegations

conclusory

where

they

alleged only that the municipality was liable under Monell for
officers’ excessive force because it “maintain[ed] a policy by
which officers use excessive force to arrest individuals with no
probable cause or reasonable suspicion warranting such”); Travis
v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 3011, 2012 WL 2565826, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. June 29, 2012) (“The court thus disregards the allegations
of

‘customs

‘inadequate

or

policies

supervision

of

and

deliberate
training,’

indifference’
as

this

is

and
mere

boilerplate Monell language.”); Sheppard v. Village of Glendale
Heights,

No.

11

Dec. 5,

2011)

C

1044,

(finding

2011

WL

6102012,

allegations

at

*4

insufficient

(N.D.

Ill.

boilerplate

where they claimed sex and race discrimination “pursuant to a
wide-spread practice at the Village of Glendale Heights which
was so permanent and well-settled as to constitute custom or
practice”).

Regardless of Stokes’ prospects for success, his

Complaint is not so replete with boilerplate or short on unique

- 7 -

facts that the City can be said to lack notice of its alleged
unconstitutional conduct.
Second, Stokes sufficiently pleads facts that, when viewed
in the light most favorable to him, make it plausible that the
challenged policy was the “driving force” behind his injury.

It

is a clear enough inference to draw at this stage that, absent
the City’s policy, Stokes and his co-arrestee would not have
been forced to choose between procuring guns off the streets and
getting

“arrested

on

false

charges.”

(Compl.

¶¶

22,

25.)

Rather than positing misconduct divorced from any specific City
policy or supported only by generic Monell language, Stokes’
Complaint links the alleged policy to an unambiguous incentive
for

Defendant

Officers

to

engage

in

precisely

egregious acts with which he charges them.

the

sort

of

Taken together with

the Complaint’s further allegations as to Defendant Officers –
for example, that they released Stokes and his co-arrestee once
two

guns

were

tendered

–

Stokes’

story

“holds

together.”

McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
There is no good reason to flunk the Complaint based on the
“driving force” requirement.
Third,
“deliberate

the

Complaint

indifference.”

need

not

Contrary

plead
to

facts
the

concerning

City’s

facile

assertion, “deliberate indifference” is not an absolute pleading
- 8 -

requirement for Monell claims.

Rather, the Seventh Circuit has

typically regarded it as an alternative to an implicit policy of
the

sort

alleged

Sheriff’s

Dept.,

plaintiff

must

rather

than

a

here.
604

See,

e.g.,

Thomas

F.3d

293,

303

demonstrate

that

there

random

event.

This

(7th
is

may

v.

Cir.
a

Cook
2010)

policy

take

the

County
(“[T]he

at

issue

form

of

an

implicit policy or a gap in expressed policies, or ‘a series of
violations

to

lay

the

premise

of

deliberate

(quotation and internal citations omitted).

indifference.’”)

This jibes with the

treatment of “deliberate indifference” in other situations, such
as claims of inadequate police training.

See, e.g., Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (“To satisfy the statute, a
municipality’s

failure

to

train

its

employees

in

a

relevant

respect must amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of
the

persons

with

whom

the

[untrained

employees]

come

into

contact.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Matthews
v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 709 (7th Cir. 2012).
Here,

by

contrast,

participation

in

Stokes

maintaining

unconstitutional conduct.

charges
a

the

policy

City

that

with

itself

active
licenses

As such, “deliberate indifference” is

conceptually superfluous to the implicit policy alleged here,
and

Rule

8(a)

does

not

require

Stokes’ Complaint.
- 9 -

corresponding

allegations

in

The

City’s

most

substantial

attack

on

the

Complaint

concerns the absence of allegations beyond those relating to
Stokes (and, ostensibly, his co-arrestee).

This argument merits

more consideration but is ultimately rejected in view of White
v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2016).
plaintiff

alleged

that

the

City’s

In White, the

widespread

practice

of

securing arrest warrants on the basis of conclusory complaint
forms resulted in one Officer O’Donnell falsely arresting him
without probable cause.

The district court dismissed the Monell

claim under Rule 12(b)(6), faulting it for being “based upon the
sole

allegation

widespread
Chicago

practice

when

Brandishing
163,

164

intact,

that

O’Donnell

of

seeking

a

Leatherman

(1993),
the

the

police

warrant.”
v.

which

Seventh

acted

Tarrant
survives

Circuit

in

accordance

department
White,
County
the

rejected

of

829

the
F.3d

Narcotics,

Twombly
the

line

district

with
City

a
of

at

843.

507

U.S.

of

cases

court’s

analysis on the grounds that federal courts may not apply a
heightened
liability

pleading
under

42

standard
U.S.C.

§

in

cases

1983.

alleging

Ibid.

The

municipal
following

allegations sufficed to satisfy the “short and plain statement
of the claim” required by Rule 8(a):
In accordance with a widespread practice of the police
department of the City of Chicago:
O’Donnell
requested the judge to issue a warrant on the basis of
- 10 -

O’Donnell’s conclusory allegation that other law
enforcement officers claimed or believed plaintiff had
committed an offense, and O’Donnell did not present
the
judge
with
an
affidavit
setting
out
any
affirmative allegation of facts that would indicate
that plaintiff had committed an offense.
Id. at 844.

White was not required to “identify every other or

even one other individual who had been arrested pursuant to a
warrant obtained through the complained-of process.” Ibid.

To

be sure, at summary judgment, impropriety from a single incident
may not give rise to liability on the sort of Monell claim at
issue.

See, e.g., Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 742 F.3d 775, 780 (7th

Cir. 2014).

But that was not the procedural posture in White,

and it is not the situation presented here.
Post-White

courts

analyzing

Monell

suits

have

scotched

motions to dismiss premised on the same arguments as the City’s.
For example, in Kerlin v. Chicago Board of Elections, No. 16 C
7424, 2017 WL 1208520, (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2017), the court held
that White mandated denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss
where

the

plaintiffs

identified

a

specific

constitutional

deprivation of their right to vote on March 15, 2016 and alleged
a

“pervasive

and

widespread

de

facto

policy,

practice,

and

procedure of willfully disregarding citizens’ right to vote.”
Id. at *6-7.

At the pleading stage, plaintiffs “‘need only

plead that the alleged incident is one of many’ occurring in

- 11 -

Chicago

and

‘that

incidents.”

a

widespread

practice’

gave

rise

to

those

Id. at *7 (quoting Barwicks v. Dart, No. 14 C 8791,

2016 WL 3418570, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2016)).

Similarly,

in Zinn v. Village of Sauk Village, No. 16 C 3542, 2017 WL
783001 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2017), the court applied White to deny
a

motion

to

dismiss

where

the

plaintiff

alleged

a

Fourth

Amendment violation arising out of a single automobile seizure
“‘pursuant to [Sauk Village’s] widespread practice of illegally
and

unconstitutionally

seizing

private

property’

and

charging

monetary fees for its return ‘in an effort to raise money for
the Village.’”

Id. at *7 (quoting the complaint).

Apart from

applying White in relevant fashion, Kerlin and Zinn involved
factual allegations plainly apposite to those at the heart of
this lawsuit.
And if White and its progeny leave any doubt, cases of
more mature vintage, such as Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d
151 (7th Cir. 1995), should dispel it.

There, the plaintiff

brought a Monell claim arising out of two distinct policies or
practices:
misconduct

first, a policy or custom of failing to prevent
by

subordinate

officers;

and

second,

a

policy

or

custom of conspiring with officers “to cover up and/or slant the
facts to achieve an outcome not consistent with the duties of
said office.”

Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d at 152.
- 12 -

The

district court dismissed the complaint on the basis that “there
was no explicit allegation of a custom or policy, but only an
allegation of an isolated instance of misconduct.” Ibid.

The

Seventh Circuit’s review of the dismissal was bifurcated.

With

respect to the county’s alleged failure to prevent misconduct,
the court noted that “proof of a single act of misconduct will
not

suffice”

when

the

government

entity

is

alleged

to

have

notice of “what was going on and by failing to do anything must
have

encouraged

or

at

adopting,

the

(citations

least

omitted).

municipality

misconduct

“with

condoned,

of

directly . . . [such

subordinate

However,
having
as]

when

a

engaged

made

thus

the

in

either

officers.”

complaint
in

county

event
Ibid.

charges

improper
complicit

a

conduct
with

the

officers, then the drawing of an inference from a series of bad
acts by subordinate officers is not required.”
(citations omitted).
complicity

not

in

Id. at 152-53

In this case, Stokes alleges the City’s
failing

to

train,

supervise,

or

prevent

misconduct, but in establishing a widespread custom or implicit
policy that licenses unconstitutional conduct.

A “series of bad

acts” is not required to state such a claim. Ibid.
Thus,

Seventh

course here.
plead

the

Circuit

precedent

clearly

maps

the

proper

Pursuant to White and Jackson, Stokes need not

factual

circumstances
- 13 -

of

additional

instances

of

misconduct pursuant to the alleged policy.

Of course, the Court

does not opine on Stokes’ chances on the merits, but is merely
content

that

Stokes’

Complaint

requirements of Rule 8(a).

adequately

meets

the

pleading

Presented with no sound basis for

dismissing Stokes’ Monell claim, the Court denies the City’s
Motion to Dismiss.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendant City of Chicago’s
Motion

to

Dismiss

Plaintiff’s

Monell

Claim

is

denied.

[ECF

No. 16].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: May 22, 2017

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