Thurman v. Stavaru Academy, et al

Filing 58

OPINION and Order. Signed by the Honorable Charles R. Norgle, Sr on 2/26/2019. Mailed notice (rp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
THERESA THURMAN,

Plaintiff,
No. l:16-cv-10889
Hon. Charles R. Norgle

STAVARU ACADEMY, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This action is an employment dispute claiming violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.

("FLSA"); Illinois Minimum Wage Law,820ILCS 1l5ll

Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS
are the parties' cross-motions

ll5ll

et seq.

for summary judgment. Plaintiff

s

et seq.

("IMWL");

("IWPCA"). Before the Court

motion for summary judgment is

denied in part and granted in part. Defendants motion for summary judgment is denied.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Theresa Thurman ("Plaintiff') is a mother of ten children, some of whom,
beginning in2012, participated in Defendants' soccer training academy. During the relevant time,
Defendant Stavaru Academy was an unincorporated entity, which trained youth soccer players in

Naperville and Plainfield, Illinois; Defendant Stavaru Soccer Academy LLC provided similar
youth soccer training and was created in August 2015; Defendant Ciprian Stavaru is the soccer
coach who organized and created the unincorporated Stavaru Academy and Stavaru Soccer
Academy LLC; Silviya Stavaru is Ciprian Stavaru's wife (referred to collectively as "Defendants"

or individually).

As

a

threshold matter, when parties seek summary judgment they must comply with Local

Rule 56.1, which requires the parties to include with their motion, "a statement of material facts
as

to which...party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the...party to a judgment

a matter

of law." LR

56. 1 (a)(3

as

). If the moving party fails to comply with the rule, the motion can

be denied without further consideration. Id. On the other hand,

if

the responding party fails to

comply, its additional facts may be ignored, and the properly supported facts asserted in the
moving party's submission are deemed admitted. LR 56.1(b)(3XC). Litigants must strictly comply

with LR 56.1, and district courts do not abuse their discretion when they disregard facts presented

in a noncompliant manner. Cracco v. Vitran Exp.. Inc., 559 F.3d 625,632 (7th Cir.2009). "The
court is not required to scour the record for evidence that supports a party's case if the party fails
to point it out; that is the counsel's job." Dominguez v. Ouigley's Irish Pub. Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d

803, 805 (N.D. Ill. 201 I ) (citing F.T.C. v. Bay Area Business Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 633
(7th Cir. 200s)).
The parties' LR 56.1 submissions present many contested and unsupported facts. Because
of the discrepancies between the asserted facts and the record, and for the reasons explained below,

there are numerous genuine issues of material fact, preventing summary judgment for both

parties-namely on the issue of whether Plaintiff was an employee. After reviewing the LR

56.1

submissions, the following facts are properly before the Court.

Plaintiff worked with Stavaru Academy and during this time she performed various tasks

for the Academy's benefit. Plaintiffs tasks included: organizing tryouts, scheduling practice
facilities, ordering clothing and uniforms, conducting interviews for new-hire coaches, reconciling
parents' complaints, building a website, attending league meetings, and maintaining liability
waivers. At no point, while Plaintiff was engaged in these tasks did she: sign an employment

agreement with Stavaru Academy; receive compensation in the form of wages; or submit time
cards.

Although Plaintiff and Defendants did not sign a wage compensation agreement, there was
an oral agreement between the parties in which Plaintiff would receive payment for recruiting
youth players to the Academy. Ciprian Stavaru agreed to pay Plaintiff twenty-five dollars for every

player she recruited into the soccer academy. In total, Plaintiff was paid $11,000 in recruitment
commissions. In July 20i5, Plaintiff decided to part ways with Defendants.

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review
"Summary judgment is appropriate when 'the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124,

of law."'

ll28 (7th Cir.2012) (quoting

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986). "A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could retum a verdict for the
nonmoving party;' Wells v. Coker,707 F.3d 756,760 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). "On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations,

weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for

a

factfinder." Payne v. Pauley,337 F.3d767,770 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby.

Inc.,477 U.5.242,255 (1986)). The court must view "the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant and [avoid] the temptation to decide which party's version of the facts is more

likely true." Id. The same standard applies to cross-motions for summary judgment. See. e.g.,Int'l
Bd. Of Elec. Workers. Local 176 v. Balmoral Racine Club" Inc.,293F.3d402,404 (7th Cir. 2002).

'oEach motion is to be evaluated independently, and denial of one does not necessitate the grant

of

the other." Dominguez v. Quigle),'s Irish Pub. Inc.,790F. Supp. 2d 803, 810 (N.D. Ill. 2011).

B.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

1.

Fair Labor and Standards Act and Illinois Minimum Wage Lawr

Plaintiff brings two claims under the FLSA, the first for overtime wages and the second for
minimum wages. Plaintiff also brings a claim under the ILMW, for minimum wages. Defendants
seek summary judgment on these claims. For the FLSA to apply, the onus is on Plaintiff to show

either (1) Stavaru Academy is a covered enterprise, or (2) she, as an individual, was engaged in
interstate commerce as an employee of Stavaru Academy (individual coverage). See 29 U.S.C. $$

206(a),207(a).
Defendants' arguments provide several grounds that create issues of material fact regarding
whether the FLSA is applicable in this case. According to Defendants, "[Plaintiffl organized team

schedules, coordinated conferences and meetings

with coaches, attended league meetings,

maintained liability waivers and medical information, responded to parent inquires, maintained
player cards for team members, and was involved in selecting and ordering uniforms." Def.'s Mot.

Summ. J. 4. Defendants, however, argue that PlaintifPs undertakings did not amount to an
employment relationship. Id. at 6. Defendants also argue in the altemative that Plaintiff was an
owner in the academy, which exempts her from coverage under the statute. Id. at 8; see also 29

C.F.R. 541.101 ("The term employee employed in a bona.fide executive capacity in section

l3(a)(l ) of the IFLSA] also includes any employee who owns at least a bona fide 2O-percent equity
interest in the enterprise in which the employee is employed, regardless of whether the business is

' "[B]ecause the IMWL parallels the FLSA," courts generally use the same analysis to decide FLSA and IMWL
claims. See Villareal v. El Chile, Inc., 776 F.Supp.2d 778,784 (N.D. Ill. 201 l); see also Ill. Admin. Code tit. 56, pt.
21O.2lO (2009) (FLSA regulations are to be used as guidance in interpreting the IMWL). For expediency, the Court
refers to the two statutes collectively throughout this opinion.

a corporate or other type of organization, and who is actively engaged in its management.").
Finally, Defendants argue, again in the alternative, that Plaintiff was either a volunteer or an
independent contractor during the period she was involved with the academy.
Nonetheless, the record is rife with issues of material fact precluding summary judgement.
See Nassis

v. LaSalle Exec. Search. Inc., No. l6 C 9445,2018 WL 2009502, at *5 Q.{.D. Ill. Apr.

30,2018) (stating even though questions on the status of an employer-employee relations

are

matters of law, disputes over material facts may preclude summary judgment) (citations omitted).

According to both parties, an agreement wherein that Plaintiff would be paid on a commissions
basis by the Defendants for recruiting athletes. Def.'s

LR 56.1 fl 119. Neither party disputes that

Plaintiff received compensation. Id. The discrepancy here, which is not substantiated by the record,

is the extent to which the implied agreement operated as an employment agreement.
Mclnerney_v. Charter Golf. Inc., 176

lll. 2d 482, 487 (1997)

See

(stating that under Illinois law an

employment agreement can be expressed or implied and is governed by contract law). Defendants
cite to a Department of Labor white sheet to show the "FLSA permits an individual who volunteers

to perform services to not be classified as an employee so long he or she receives no compensation

[for] such services and does not contemplate receipt of compensation." Def.'s Mot.

Summ . J.

7.

(citation omitted). Yet, Defendants admit Plaintiff did receive compensation when she recruited
players for the academy. Def.'s LR 56.1

11

119.

Moreover, Defendants' argument that Plaintiff was an owner of the soccer academy raises
factual questions as to whether Plaintiff did contemplate receiving compensation. For example,

Plaintiff stated, "I also thought I was owner of the club too. He's like, the owner, 50/50. He said
owners, he said 50/50," and "We had thousands of conversations where yes. On a daily

-

like

every time he saw me: 50/50." Def.'s Reply LR 56.1 lffl 107-08; Pl. LR 56.1, Ex. 3, Tr. 53:l-4,9-

13. Plaintiff also stated, "The way

I understood it was that we were 50/50 partners." Id. at !i 109;

Pl. LR 56.1, Ex. 3, Tr. 90:10- I 1 . Generally, partnerships are entered into with the motive of making
money. 805 ILCS 2061101(f) (A partnership is defined as "an association of two or more persons

to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.") (emphasis added). Therefore, when considering

Plaintiffs

statements and Defendants'argument (i.e., Plaintiff was a co-owner)

it is conceivable

Plaintiff contemplated getting paid at some point for her work with the soccer academy.
Even though Defendants now argue, post hoc, that Plaintiff was an owner during the
relevant period, the record does not indicate that during this time there was "a meeting of the minds

of the parties to create partnership." Malone), v. Pihera,2l5lll. App. 3d 30,43,573 N.E.2d 7379,
1388 (1991). That said, without facts demonstrating Defendant Cipiran's intention, Plaintiffs

belief that she was a fifty-fifty partner is insufficient to show a partnership existed. See id. ("The
intention of one party cannot create a partnership.").
Next, Plaintiff argues that she was not a volunteer and should be classified as an employee.

Plaintiff further argues that she was employed by Defendants

as a

"club administrator" and played

an integral role while working for the Academy. Pl. Opp'n. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 2. Defendants

admit Plaintiff performed various tasks for the soccer academy (as discussed above), but deny she
completed them as an employee or in exchange for compensation. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 4. Rather,
Defendants assert Plaintiff completed the same type of tasks performed by millions of volunteer
parents across the country-even though at the same time, Defendants concede "[Plaintif!] may
have been more active than other team managers." Id.

Under the FLSA, an "employee" is defined as "any individual employed by an employer."
29 U.S.C. $ 203(eX1). To "employ" is defined as to "suffer or permit to work." Id. $ 203(9). Courts
assess

the "economic realities" when distinguishing employees from volunteers. See Okoro v.

Pyramid 4 Aegis, No.

ll C267,2012WL

1410025, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Apr.23,2012) (citing

Laurrtzen,835 F.2d at 1534); Skokie Maid,2013 WL 3506149, at *6. The test analyzes whether

individuals are "actually dependent upon the business to which they render service." Int'l
Detective, 819 F.Supp.2d at749 (intemal quotation marks and citation omitted). The relevant
factors are: (1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's control of the manner in which the

work is to be performed; (2) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon
his or her managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee's own investment in equipment or materials

required for the work or his or her employment of workers; (4) whether the service rendered
requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship; and

(6) the extent to which the services rendered are an "integral part" of the alleged employer's
business. Skokie Maid,2013

WL 3506149, at*6-7 (quoting Latxitzen,835 F.2d at 1534-35). No

single factor is dispositive. Id. at*6; Perez v. Super Maid. LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1076 (N.D.

ilI.2014).
Addressing the control and supervision factor, the record shows that Defendants did
manage Plaintiffs work through a series of requests.Sgg, e.g., Pl. LR 56.1,E.x.2, Pl. Dep. Tr.
("P1. Tr.") 58:12-18 (asking to meet about registration projections);83:3-9 (asking to organize

tryouts); 100:16-25 (asking to reserve soccer fields); 147:5-20 (asking to supervise coaches);
1

48: I - 1 1 (asking to supervise Coach Rene). However,

it is unclear whether Plaintiff was required

to comply or if she willingly volunteered; therefore, this factor is unsettled.
Generally, with regard to an individual's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon her
managerial skill, courts classify individuals as independent contractors, as opposed to employees,
when the individuals receive payment through commissions. See Strom v. Strom Closures. Inc.,

No. 06 C 7051,2008 WL 4852998, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7,2008) (holding that this factor tilted

toward independent contractor status when the worker was paid commissions, giving the worker
the potential to earn more than a weekly salary). But, again, the record is unclear as to whether

Plaintiff maintained "managerial discretion" to adjust her hours spent recruiting players or when
she was completing many of the aforementioned tasks. See Perez, 55 F. Supp.3d at 1077

.

Plaintiff used her personal computer and phone to do several tasks for the academy. Pl. Tr.
180:7-20. She also worked out of her home at times. Pl. Dep. 8l:21-24;82:1-5. Plaintiff used her

own money to pay for smaller expenses such as copies of fliers made at FedEx. Pl. Dep. 82 l-24.
However, the parties have not indicated either way if Plaintiff

s use

of her personal items and funds

should be considered "large expenditures," which would favor a status other than employee. See
Perez, 55. F. Supp. 3d at 1077.

The facts presented by the parties for the remaining factors have either been cursorily
established, disputed, or contradicted-sometimes by the same party.Sgg, e.g., Pl. Opp'n Def.'s

Mot. Summ. J.17; Pl. LR 56.1 fl 85 (worked for Defendants for over five years); Pl. Reply Def.'s
Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. 12 (worked for Defendants for three years); Def.'s Reply Mot. Summ. J. 2

(highlighting Plaintiffs inconsistencies in years worked); Def.'s LR 56.1 Resp. Pl. Additional
Facts '!1fl 85-86 (denying Plaintiff worked for five years and was an integral part of Defendants
operation); Pl. LR 56.1 flfl 30, 61, 86 (identifying deposition testimony from individuals claiming

Plaintiff had an integral role); Def.'s Resp. LR 56.1 fl 16 (denying Plaintiff had an integral role).

In short, as the current record stands, the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law
which position,

if

any, Plaintiff held with Defendants. Defendants have failed to establish that

Plaintiff was not employed, in an exempt position, or otherwise disqualified from the protections
offered by the FLSA. Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff s claims
under the FLSA and

IMWL is denied.

2. Illinois Wage Payment

and Collection Act

Defendants seek summary judgment on

Plaintifls IWPCA claim. Under the IWPCA,

a

Plaintiff can recover all unpaid wages plus monthly accruing statutory damages. See 820 ILCS
115114. The statute, however, does

not create a standalone cause of action; rather, it permits

employees to collect compensation owed "pursuant to an employment contract or agreement." 820

ICS

115/3. Thus, there must be a separate contract or agreement that forms the basis of an

IWPCA unpaid wages claim.

See

Nat'l Metalcrafters v. McNeil,784F.2dgl7,824 (7th Cir. 1986)

("The only thing the state law at issue in this case requires is that the employer honor his
contract."). "Illinois courts have interpreted the term 'agreement' to be broader than a contract and
to require only a manifestation of mutual assent." Enger v. Chi. Caniage Cab Co., 77 F.Supp.3d
712,716 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citations omitted).

"To state

a

claim under the [WPCA], a plaintiff must plead that

(l)

he had an employment

agreement with the employer that required the payment of wages or final compensation and (2)
that the defendants were employers under the

[WPCA]." Watts v. ADDO Mgmt.. L.L.C.,2018

IL App (lst) 170201,n74,97 N.E.3d 75, 80 (citations omitted). As addressed above, it is unclear
from the record whether an employment agreement existed between the parties. For that reason,
the Court denies summary judgment on this claim because there is a genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether an employment agreement existed between the parties.

3.

Unjust Enrichment

The Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs unjust
enrichment claim. An "unjust enrichment claim . . . will stand or fall with the related claim[s]."
Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 201l). Defendants' sole argument is:
"Because [Plaintiffls] employment claims fail, so must her unjust enrichment claim." Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. 15. As explained above, Plaintifls employment claims survive Defendants'motion for
summary judgment. Accordingly, this issue, along with all of Plaintiff s claims, will be resolved
at trial.

C.

Plaintiff

s

Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff seeks summary judgement on Defendants' affirmative defenses of exemption,
ownership, lack of commerce, res judicata, statute of limitations, waiver, and equitable estoppel.

Addressing the affirmative defense of exemption, Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to
provide any undisputed facts in support, and Plaintiff was exempt because she was a volunteer,
part owner of the Academy, or an independent contractor. Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. 5. Plaintiff
asserts

"it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not receive minimum payments under [the] FLSA

and

IMWL," citing to29 C.F.R.641.600(a). Pl. Mot. Summ. J.2. Therefore, Plaintiffs argument
follows, because Defendants allegedly failed to pay the minimum salary of $455 per week,
pursuant to the federal regulation, Defendants cannot "prove" Plaintiff was exempt under the

FLSA.

Neither the record nor the pleadings establish Plaintiff was ever an employee of
Defendants, the pivotal question in this lawsuit. Plaintiff s argument that she was not paid $455 a
week requires the Court to accept, at a minimum, the assumption that Plaintiff was an employee.

It is insufficient to rely on the

absence

of an employment benefit-that is, receiving a minimum

wage to establish Plaintiff was employed, and therefore not exempt. As it stands now, Plaintiffls

argument fails as a matter

of law

because

it assumes Plaintiff was an employee

and uses

controverted evidence for support.

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the affirmative defense of ownership. Defendants
argue they have established that there remains a dispute over the material facts regarding this issue.

t0

Specifically, Defendants cite Plaintiff

s

own statements, 'oBut I was also owner

-

but I also thought

I was owner of the club too," and "The way I understood it was that [we] were 50/50 partners," to
bolster their position. Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. 6. The Court finds these statements create a

genuine issue

of material fact preventing

summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court denies

Plaintiff s motion regarding this affirmative defense.

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the affirmative defense of interstate commerce.
Defendants' affirmative defense regarding interstate commerce states: "Defendants state they were

not engaged in interstate commerce as defined in the FLSA and therefore the FLSA does not
apply." Answer fl 18. The issue of interstate commerce is a necessary element of Plaintifls FLSA
claims, the merits of which are disputed and have already been put at issue through Defendants'
denials of Plaintifls allegations. Therefore, this is not a proper affirmative defense under the
Federal Rules. See Champion Labs.. Inc. v. Cent. Illinois Mfg.

Ill. 2016) (stating that affirmative

Co.,l57 F. Supp. 3d759,768 (N.D.

defenses that dispute the merits at issue are improper under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(c)) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court strikes Defendants' affirmative defense

of interstate commerce.

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the affirmative defense of

res

judicala. Def.'s Mot.

Summ. J. 17. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Illinois Department of Labor alleging similar
claims here. An evidentiary hearing was held. Def. LR 56, Ex. 4. Defendants argue that Plaintiffls

claims

in this dispute are precluded under the doctrine of

res judicata because they were

adjudicated in the by the IDL. This argument carries little water. Illinois Department of Labor
proceedings under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act are not judicial in nature and
have no res

judicata effect. Amoroso v. Crescent Private Capital. L.P., No. 02 C 1453,2002WL

1838161, at

*l

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 12,2002) (citing Rekhi v. Wildwood Enterprises. Inc., 579 N.E.2d

11

1189, 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of

Plaintiff regarding Defendants' affirmative defense of

res

judicata.

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the affirmative defense of statute of limitations.
Defendants do not argue that the relevant statutes of limitations preclude Plaintiff s claims under

the FLSA and IMWL. Rather, Defendants assert that Plaintiff s damages under the respective
statutes should be limited to November 28,2014, for recovery under the FLSA, and November 28,

2013 for recovery under the IMWL. Plaintiff states that she, along with her counsel at the time,
requested clarification on her relationship

with the Academy, and that no clarification was

provided by Defendants regarding her status with the Academy. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that
she was misled by Defendants about their ability to pay her, and that she would be paid more

if

she could defer taking payment. The Court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact pertaining

to when Plaintiff s alleged harm occurred, and whether Defendants deterred Plaintiff from seeking
recourse. Accordingly, the Court denies

Plaintiff s motion for summary judgment on Defendants'

affirmative defense of statute of limitations.

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the affirmative defense of waiver. Defendants argue
that Plaintiff waived her unjust enrichment claim, but do not argue she waived the remaining
claims or relief sought. Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Summ. J.14. Defendants rely on Hill v. Cowan, 781

N.E.2d 1065

(lll.

2002) (a criminal case involving the waiver constitutional rights in light of a

guilty plea) and Vaughn v. Speaker, 533 N.E.2d 885
equitable estoppel)

to

(lll.

1988) (distinguishing waiver and

support their argument that once Plaintiff refused her recruitment

commission she was no longer entitled to compensation. Id. Plaintiff argues that the affirmative
defense should not apply to the FLSA and the

IMWA claims. The Court agrees, Plaintiff s rights

under the respective federal and state statutes cannot be waived. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best

12

Freisht S),s." Inc.,450 U.S. 728,740, (1981); Lewis v. Giordano's Enterprises. Inc.,397Ill. App.
3d 581,582,921 N.E.2d 740,741 (2009). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in

Plaintiff s favor regarding waiver of the FLSA and IMWL claims.

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel.
Defendants cite to a Middle District of Florida district court case, McGlothan v. Walmart Stores.

Inc., 2006 WL 1679592, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2006), to support the argument that equitable estoppel
can be a recognized affirmative defense against an FLSA claim. The court in McGlothan, which
dealt with a Rule 12(f) motion to strike, held that in circumstance when an "employee affirmatively
misleads the employer regarding the number of hours worked and the employer had no knowledge

of the employee's actual hours," a valid affirmative defense of estoppel to an FLSA claim can be
pleaded. Id. Here, Defendants claim Plaintiff remained silent. Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. 15.

But, Defendants do not argue, nor have they pleaded that Plaintiff affirmatively misled them;
therefore, the exception to the general rule does not apply and Defendants' affirmative defense

fails. See North v. Bd. of Trustees of IL State Univ.,676F. Srpp. 2d690,696 (C.D. Ill. 2009)
("[T]he party requesting the estoppel must show that the defendants have engaged in 'affirmative
conduct. . .that was designed to mislead or was unmistakably likely to mislead' a plaintiff into

failing to sue in time."). Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintifls motion to strike Defendants'
affirmative defense of equitable estoppel.

l3

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, PlaintifPs motion for summary judgment is granted in part and
denied in part, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED

CHARLES RONALD N
United States District Court

DATE: February 26,2019

t4