Britton v. Williams et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. The Court grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss 30 . Plaintiff shall file a brief, one-page notice to confirm to the Court whether he concedes that the claims against Defendant West should be dismissed , or whether he intends to pursue his claim against Defendant West, by November 1, 2017. Defendants West, Durrett, Brown, Baldwin, and Pfister shall file their answer by November 1, 2017. Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 10/4/2017. Notice mailed by judge's staff(ntf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
THOMAS BRITTON (#B-62376),
Plaintiff,
v.
TARRY WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 16 C 11180
Judge Jorge L. Alonso

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff sues Defendants for their alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at Stateville Correctional Center. Defendants
have filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss some of the
claims against some of the Defendants. (Dkt. 30). For the reasons contained in this opinion and
order, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Facts
Plaintiff alleges that he was placed by Correctional Officer West in cell 228 of F House at
Stateville Correctional Center on July 23, 2014. (Dkt. 6, p. 11.) He alleges that the cell smelled
of mildew, there were pieces of brick on the floor, the ceiling was leaking, and there was black
mold all over the walls and ceiling. (Id.) Plaintiff complained to Correctional Officer West who
told him that the last inmate to inhabit the cell was almost electrocuted because of water running
down the wall and into the electrical socket, and the cell had been “condemned”. (Id.) Plaintiff
also alleges that Lieutenant Brown and Sergeant Durrett were aware of the conditions on the cell
but did nothing to assist him. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the conditions in cell
228. (Id. at p. 12.)

Plaintiff was placed in cell 142 on April 20, 2015. (Id. at p. 14.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants Brown, Durrett, and Correctional Officers Williams and Taylor (also Defendants)
knowingly placed Plaintiff in cell 142, which was infested with insects and rodents, covered in
mold, and had a broken window. (Id. at pp. 12-13.) The window in the cell had exposed,
broken glass in it. (Id. at p. 15.)
On May 1, 2015, Plaintiff injured his left arm on the broken glass in the window of cell
142. (Id. at p. 16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Montoya refused to provide him with
medical assistance for his injury because he was leaving for the day and did not want to take the
time to write an incident report. (Id.) Plaintiff and his cellmate shouted for assistance and
Defendant Baker came to the cell, promising to call a nurse. (Id. at p. 18.)

Plaintiff alleges that

due to the injury he was feeling faint and began to lose consciousness. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
Baker informed Sergeant Warden of his injury but that that forty minutes later the shift changed
and Baker never returned and Warden did nothing to assist him. (Id. at p. 19.) The next morning
Plaintiff spoke to Defendant DeYoung to ask for medical assistance because he was in terrible
pain. (Id. at p. 20.) Defendant DeYoung looked at Plaintiff’s injury and instead of calling for
medical assistance, continued with his morning count. (Id.) An hour passed before Defendant
DeYoung returned to Plaintiff’s cell with a med-tec. (Id.) The med-tech reported to Plaintiff
that she had been in the building for some time but was only just told that he required assistance.
(Id. at p. 21.) Plaintiff submitted a grievance about his injury, regarding the delay in medical
treatment, and regarding the conditions in cell 142, including mold, mildew, and insect and
rodent infestation. (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that the grievance was not answered for the entire six

months he was in segregation in cell 142.

(Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that on July 4, 2015, he was on the yard when he felt the need to relieve
himself. (Id. at pp. 22-23.)

The John Doe correctional officer told him to hold it. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that denial of the use of a bathroom violated his rights.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges he submitted more than ten grievances to Defendant Warden Tarry
Williams regarding the untenable conditions of confinement in F House at Stateville. (Id. at p.
26.) Plaintiff also alleges he wrote a grievance to Defendant Warden Pfister on June 26, 2016,
regarding the conditions of confinement in F House, including insect and rodent infestation,
birds and bird feces, and mold, but Warden Pfister did nothing to assist him.

(Id. at pp. 28-33.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Baldwin, Acting Director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections is aware of the deplorable conditions in F House at Stateville but does nothing to
remediate the conditions.

(Id. at pp. 47-48.)

On June 27, 2016, Plaintiff complained of not being able to sleep and of feeling
something moving in his right ear. (Id. at p. 34.) Plaintiff was taken to the healthcare unit
where a nurse poured peroxide and pumped water in his ear. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that three

cockroaches were removed from his ear. (Id. at p. 35.)
Standard
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief
may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a
complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must
“give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (ellipsis
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omitted). Under federal notice-pleading standards, a plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

Stated differently, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “In reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts must] accept the well-pleaded
facts in the complaint as true, but [they] ‘need[ ] not accept as true legal conclusions, or
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.’” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brooks
v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)).

Courts construe pro se complaints liberally. See

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
Discussion
Defendants make multiple arguments that various Defendants and claims should be
dismissed.

For the reasons contained in this order, the Court grants in part and denies in part

the motion to dismiss.
A.

Plaintiff’s claims as pleaded are not time-barred.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant West is time-barred because he
placed Plaintiff in cell 228 in F House on July 23, 2014, more than two years before Plaintiff
filed suit. They also argue that Plaintiff’s claims regarding the conditions of confinement in cell
142 are time-barred.

“Section 1983 claims in Illinois are [] governed by a two-year limitations
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period.” Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Ashafa v. City of
Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that because “Section 1983 does not
contain an express statute of limitations . . . a federal court must adopt the forum state’s statute of
limitations for personal injury claims,” which “in Illinois is two years as set forth in 735 ILCS
5/13-202”). However, a federal court relying on the Illinois statute of limitations in a § 1983 case
must toll the limitations period while a prisoner completes the administrative grievance process.
Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521-22 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis original; certain parenthetical
comments omitted); Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2002).
Although Plaintiff pleads that he was placed in cell 228 on July 23, 2014, which is
outside of the statute of limitations, it is unclear from the complaint how long he was held there.
Additionally, he pleads he filed grievances about the conditions in the cell and attaches a
communication from the administrative review board dated October 7, 2014, indicating that the
grievance had not been resolved at that point. (Dkt. 6, p. 57.) Plaintiff’s complaint is dated
November 13, 2016, and the Court received it on December 7, 2016. “A district court’s dismissal
on statute-of-limitations grounds constitutes dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) if the claim is indisputably time-barred.” Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d
714, 716 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). While the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense, a plaintiff who “pleads facts that show his suit is time-barred or otherwise
without merit . . . has pleaded himself out of court.” Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc’ns Co., 12
F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1993).

While the claim against Defendant West may be time-barred, it

is not “indisputable” based on Plaintiff’s pleading and the law governing tolling while the

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exhaustion process is ongoing. 1 Thus, the Court cannot conclude at this point that Plaintiff’s
claim against Defendant West is time-barred.
With respect to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim regarding the time he spent in
cell 142, Plaintiff pleads that he was placed in the cell on April 20, 2015 (Dkt 6, p. 14), that the
conditions were ongoing, and that he complained to the Defendants repeatedly that he was being
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

Based on the date pleaded, Plaintiff’s

claim regarding the conditions of confinement he endured in cell 142 are clearly timely.
B.

Plaintiff has stated a claim against Defendants Pfister, Baldwin, Durrett and
Brown.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has insufficiently pleaded personal involvement on behalf
of Defendants Baldwin (acting IDOC Director) and Pfister (Stateville Warden).

They further

argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a conditions of confinement claim against Defendants
Durrett and Brown.

In order to state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement,

Plaintiff must allege that (1) there was an objectively serious deprivation “result[ing] in the
denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) the defendant prison
officials were “deliberately indifferent to this state of affairs.” Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000,
1005 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Deliberate indifference to an unconstitutional prison condition may be found
where an official knows about the condition and “facilitates, approves, condones, or turn[s] a
blind eye to it.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
1

The Court notes that Plaintiff concedes that Defendant West should be dismissed from the
complaint in his response to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 32, p. 2.) However, according to the
complaint and supporting materials, the claim against Defendant West is not “indisputably”
time-barred. Thus, upon receipt of this order, Plaintiff should confirm to the Court whether he
wishes to proceed on his claim against Defendant West by the date stated below.
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marks omitted).
A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim against a defendant in his individual capacity “may
not rely on a theory of respondeat superior” to establish culpability and “must instead allege that
the defendant, through his or her own conduct, has violated the Constitution.” Id. at 781. In
evaluating a deliberate indifference claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “the personal involvement of
senior [prison] officials, such as [Baldwin and Pfister], can be inferred [when] . . . the plaintiff
alleges ‘potentially systemic,’ as opposed to ‘clearly localized,’ constitutional violations.” Smith
v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,
1428-29 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Although no bright-line test determines when a condition is “potentially systemic” rather
than “clearly localized” for purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss, precedent provides
guidance on this issue. For instance, the Seventh Circuit has indicated that allegations of pest
infestations may be sufficient to state a claim based on systemic conditions, because such
conditions are unlikely to affect only one inmate in isolation. See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1427-29;
Smith, 803 F.3d at 312-13. District courts have applied similar logic in concluding that
inadequate access to toilet facilities and inadequate heating should be treated as “potentially
systemic” conditions at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Moghaddam v. Godinez, No. 14 C
7275, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6992, 2015 WL 300468, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2015); Lieberman
v. Budz, No. 00 C 5662, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8068, 2010 WL 369614, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28,
2010). In still other decisions, courts have inferred the existence of systemic conditions based
upon allegations of generally unsanitary conditions, Burton v. Dart, No. 14 C 10297, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 118107, 2015 WL 5175143, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2015).
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Plaintiff pleads in various places in his complaint that he was subjected to insect and
rodent infestation, birds and bird feces, mold, mildew, a broken window with jagged glass
sticking out, leaky ceilings and walls, in multiple cells in F House between 2014 and 2016.

He

further pleads that he complained to Defendants Durrett and Brown about his issues with the
conditions of his confinement and they did nothing to assist him.

It is clear to the Court that

Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Durrett
and Brown.

Additionally, Plaintiff has stated a claim against Defendants Baldwin and Pfister as

administrators because the conditions were “potentially systemic.”

Further, courts screen

prisoner litigation claims in the same manner as ordinary Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011).

In its

initial review order of January 13, 2017 (Dkt. 5), the Court, citing Antonelli, found that the
conditions pleaded were clearly systemic and that Pfister and Baldwin were proper Defendants.
Having already addressed this on initial review, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Baldwin, Pfister, Durrett, and Brown.
C.

Defendants Durrett and Brown’s motion to dismiss any claim for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition is granted.

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Durrett and Brown for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition should be dismissed. Prison officials and
employees violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
when they display “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff
must satisfy both a subjective and an objective component. The objective component requires the
prisoner to demonstrate that his medical condition is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Farmer
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v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A serious medical condition “is one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir.
2005).
In its initial review order of January 13, 2017, the Court found that Plaintiff had stated a
conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Durrett and Brown, but that in terms of any
deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, Plaintiff had stated a claim only as to
Defendants Montoya, Baker, Warden, and DeYoung. (Dkt 5).

In his complaint, Plaintiff

alleges “deliberate indifference” on behalf of Defendants Durrett and Brown with respect to the
broken glass in the window of his cell because he told them of the problem and they “had the
authority to move Plaintiff but turned a blind eye.” (Dkt 6, p. 44.) The Court construed this as
part of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim.

In the Court’s reading of the complaint,

Plaintiff makes no mention of Defendants Durrett or Brown in regard to the incident in which he
had cockroaches removed from his ear.
In short, in its initial review the Court did not find a deliberate indifference to serious
medical condition claim against Defendants Durrett and Brown.

In reviewing the pleadings to

decide this motion, the Court does not construe the complaint to state such a claim against these
Defendants.

To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert such a claim against Defendants Durrett

and Brown, he has failed to state sufficient facts to make a plausible claim against them for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition. Defendants’ motion is granted as to any
perceived medical deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Durrett and Brown.

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D.

Plaintiff’s claim for money damages on any official capacity claims is
dismissed.

Defendants’ final argument is that any claim for monetary relief should be stricken
because Plaintiff cannot collect money damages on a claim against them in their official
capacities.

“An official capacity claim against an individual defendant constitutes a claim

against the government entity itself.” Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 494 (7th Cir.
1997). A suit against any Defendant in his official capacity, therefore, is effectively a suit against
the state of Illinois. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“But a suit
against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a
suit against the official’s office.”).

Kroll v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 907-908

(7th Cir. 1991); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984).

Plaintiff

may seek injunctive relief based on an official-capacity claim if he alleges that the governmental
entity’s policy or custom “played a part in the violation of federal law.” Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10.
As discussed throughout this order, Plaintiff has stated individual capacity claims against
Defendants West (provided he has not conceded the untimeliness of this claim), Durrett, Brown,
Baldwin, and Pfister.

Accordingly, should he win a judgment against them on those claims,

money damages would be available to him.

To the extent the complaint can be construed as

seeking money damages against these Defendants in their official capacities, plaintiff’s
allegations are not sufficient to state that sort of claim, and the motion is granted.

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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion and order, the Court grants in part and denies in
part the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 30.) Plaintiff shall file a brief, one-page notice to confirm to
the Court whether he concedes that the claims against Defendant West should be dismissed, or
whether he intends to pursue his claim against Defendant West, by November 1, 2017.
Defendants West, Durrett, Brown, Baldwin, and Pfister shall file their answer by November 1,
2017.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 4, 2017

______________________
HON. JORGE ALONSO
United States District Judge

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