Matthews v. Lamb et al

Filing 335

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the reasons in the accompanying Opinion, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant Kelly McCastland-Gallagher's summary judgment motion 242 . The Court denies the motion as it relates to Plaintiff J oshua Matthews' deliberate indifference to medical care claims based on the treatment of his spider bite that led to a MRSA infection. It grants the motion as it relates to all other medical conditions, including bug bites and mouse bite/scratch and roaches in his ears. The Court will rule on the other pending summary judgment motions via separate orders. Signed by the Honorable Franklin U. Valderrama on 2/29/2024. Emailed notice (axc).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSHUA L. MATTHEWS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

No. 16-cv-11214
Judge Franklin U. Valderrama

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Joshua Matthews (Matthews), a prisoner incarcerated at the
Stateville Correctional Center (Stateville), in the custody of the Illinois Department
of Corrections (IDOC), brings this suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against various
Defendants, asserting claims of deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment. R. 35, First Amended Complaint (FAC). 1 Specifically, Matthews alleges
that Defendants Warden Nicholas Lamb (Lamb), Psychologist Dr. Bridgette
Lanktree, Psychologist Dr. Catherine Larry, Psychologist Dr. Mirsky, Medical
Director Saleh Obaisi, Nurse Kelly McCastland-Gallagher (McCastland), 2 Mental
Health Professional Sara Cheshareck, and Warden of Programs Victor Calloway were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, and that Defendants Lamb,
Warden Randy Pfister, Director John Baldwin, Warden of Programs Nicholson, and

1Citations

to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket number or filing name,
and where necessary, a page or paragraph citation.
2McCastland

was incorrectly sued as “Nurse Kelly McCasklind.”

Major Nina Watts (collectively, IDOC Defendants) were deliberately indifferent to
hazardous prison conditions. Id. Defendants have moved for summary judgment in
five separate summary judgment motions. R. 242, McCastland MSJ; R. 243, Obaisi
MSJ; R. 249, Cheshareck MSJ; R. 256, Larry MSJ; R. 269, IDOC MSJ. The Court
addresses only McCastland’s motion for summary judgment in this Opinion and will
address the remaining Defendants’ summary judgment motions in separate orders.
For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part McCastland’s
motion.
Background
I.

Local Rule 56.1 Statements and Responses and Matthews’
Declaration
Before considering the merits of the motion, the Court first addresses some

Local Rule 56.1 and preliminary evidentiary issues.
Local Rule 56.1 governs summary judgment briefing in the Northern District
of Illinois. When “a party moves for summary judgment in the Northern District of
Illinois, it must submit a memorandum of law, a short statement of undisputed
material facts [(Local Rule 56.1 Statement)], and copies of documents (and other
materials) that demonstrate the existence of those facts.” ABC Acq. Co., LLC v. AIP
Products Corp., 2020 WL 4607247, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2020) (citing N.D. Ill. Local
R. 56.1)). The Local Rule 56.1 Statement must cite to specific pages or paragraphs of
the documents and materials in the record. Id. (citing Ammons v. Aramark Unif.
Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 818 (7th Cir. 2004)). Under Local Rule 56.1(b) and (e), the
nonmovant must counter with a response to the separate statement of facts, and
2

either admit each fact, or, “[t]o dispute an asserted fact, a party must cite specific
evidentiary material that controverts the fact and must concisely explain how the
cited material controverts the asserted fact.” N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(e)(3). “Asserted
facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to
evidentiary material.” Id.; see Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“When a responding party’s statement fails to dispute the facts set forth
in the moving party’s statement in the manner dictated by the rule, those facts are
deemed admitted for purposes of the motion.”); see also Daniels v. Janca, 2019 WL
2772525, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2019). If the non-moving party asserts additional
facts not included in the moving party’s statement of facts, the non-moving party is
to file a statement of additional facts “that attaches any cited evidentiary material
not attached to the [moving party’s statement of facts] or the non-moving party’s
response [thereto].” N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(b)(3). The Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly
held that district judges are entitled to insist on strict compliance with local rules
designed to promote the clarity of summary judgment filings.” Stevo v. Frasor, 662
F.3d 880, 887 (7th Cir. 2011).
McCastland objects to nearly all of Matthews’ statements of additional facts as
unsupported by citations to evidentiary material pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(d)(2).
See Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶¶ 1–6, 8–9, 11–13, 15, 18–20. 3 A court need not consider any

3Citations

to the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements of material facts are identified as follows:
“DSOF” for McCastland’s statement of facts (R. 255-1); “Pl.’s Resp. DSOF” for Matthews’
response to McCastland’s statement of facts (R. 286); “PSOAF” for Matthews’ statement of
additional facts (R. 294); and “Def.’s Resp. PSOAF” for McCastland’s response to Matthews’
statement of additional Facts (R. 311).

3

statement of fact not supported by evidence. Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632. However, the
aforementioned statements of additional facts are supported by specific citations to
evidentiary material. McCastland’s responses to each statement, however, argue that
the cited evidence does not support the statement of additional fact. To the extent
that any such statement of additional facts is material to the Court’s analysis, the
Court has reviewed the evidence cited both in the statement of additional facts and
by McCastland in response. If the Court agrees with McCastland that the evidence
cited by Matthews in the statement of additional facts does not support the asserted
fact, the Court so notes in the Opinion. If the evidence is merely conflicting, then, as
described below, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in Matthews’, the
non-movant’s, favor. See, e.g., Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 805 F.3d 278, 281
(7th Cir. 2015).
McCastland also objects to many of Matthews’ statements of additional facts
as containing legal argument in violation of Local Rule 56.1(d)(4). Def.’s Resp. PSOAF
¶¶ 6, 8–9, 11–13, 15, 18, 20. Matthews also objects to one of McCastland’s statements
of fact as an improper legal conclusion. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 74. True, “[i]t is
inappropriate to make legal arguments in a Rule 56.1 statement of facts.” Judson
Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 382 n.2 (7th
Cir. 2008); Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (collecting
cases disregarding or affirming the decision to disregard argumentative statements
of fact). However, the Court sees few legal arguments or conclusions in the statements
of facts or additional facts. To the extent that any statement of facts or additional

4

facts is material to the Court’s analysis, the Court will not consider legal conclusions
or argument and will note in the Opinion if it disregards any statement on this basis.
McCastland advances several additional arguments as to why the Court should
not consider certain of Matthews’ statements of additional material facts.
Specifically, she argues that the Court cannot consider Matthews’ grievances
submitted to prison officials, as the contents are inadmissible hearsay. Def.’s Resp.
PSOAF ¶¶ 1–2 (citing, among other cases, Taybron v. Baker, 2018 WL 4489602, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2018); Rankin v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2019 WL 3554543,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2019)). True, prison grievances are hearsay statements. See
Rankin, 2019 WL 3554543, at *6. But as the court in Rankin noted, “at the summaryjudgment stage, a court may consider any evidence that would be admissible at trial;
it need not be admissible in form, but it must be admissible in content”; accordingly,
“while [the plaintiff’s] grievances are hearsay, the statements contained therein are
matters within his own personal knowledge, to which he can testify at trial” and could
be considered at summary judgment. Id.; see also Taylor v. Dart, 2022 WL 4483908,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2022), appeal dismissed sub nom. Taylor v. Pretty, 2023 WL
7279288 (7th Cir. June 1, 2023) (citing Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918,
921 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1994)). Here, the statements contained in the at-issue grievances
relate to roaches in Matthews’ cell, including Matthews’ complaints that roaches were
crawling on him and waking him up. PSOAF ¶¶ 1–2 (citing R. 288-3, Grievances at

5

PageID 9036–9039 4). Like the statements in the grievances in Rankin, Matthews’
statements about the roaches are matters within his own personal knowledge, to
which he can testify to at trial. Rankin, 2019 WL 3554543, at *6. Accordingly, the
Court will not disregard the grievances as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings.
Next McCastland argues that much of the evidence cited by Matthews in
support of his statements of additional facts is “self-serving” and supported only by
his declaration or deposition testimony. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶¶ 3, 5–6, 8, 11–12, 13,
15. McCastland cites no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff’s own “selfserving” statements are not valid evidence, nor could she, as the law is clear in this
Circuit that such evidence is competent evidence that can defeat a motion for
summary judgment. See Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We
begin by noting that the district court discredited [plaintiff’s] testimony about his
interactions with coworkers because of its ‘self-serving’ nature. This was error.
Deposition testimony, affidavits, responses to interrogatories, and other written
statements by their nature are self-serving. As we have repeatedly emphasized over
the past decade, the term “selfserving” must not be used to denigrate perfectly
admissible evidence through which a party tries to present its side of the story at
summary judgment.”) (cleaned up) 5; Snow v. Obaisi, 2021 WL 4439421, at *10 (N.D.

4Because

the bates numbers on Matthews’ grievances are somewhat inconsistent and hard
to read, for ease of reference, the Court cites to the CM/ECF PageID found at the top of the
filed document. So too with Matthews’ medical records, found in R. 290-1.

5This

Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations, and
citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations, 18
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

6

Ill. Sept. 28, 2021) (“It is well-established that a plaintiff’s ‘first-hand account’ of a
conversation ‘is competent evidence,’ even if a trier of fact could reasonably infer from
the ‘lack of mention’ in a record of a note ‘that the issue was not raised.’”) (quoting
Thomas v. Martija, 991 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2021)). Therefore, “while [McCastland]
remain[s] free to attack the credibility and weight of [Matthews’] uncorroborated
testimony at trial, [she] cannot dispute that Matthews’ testimony constitutes
admissible evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Id.
As to McCastland’s argument, raised in reply, as to the inadmissibility of
Matthews’ declaration for failure to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746, R.
312, Reply at 2–3, the concerns raised by McCastland have been addressed by the
filing of Matthews’ updated signature page, R. 318, which the Court authorized by
granting Matthews’ motion to supplement the record, R. 319. Accordingly, the Court
considers Matthews’ declaration.
Finally, McCastland also argues that some of Matthews’ statements of
additional facts relate to Matthews’ hazardous prison conditions claims brought
against Defendants other than McCastland. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶¶ 1–3, 10.
McCastland also points out in reply that Matthews’ response brief cites to his
statements of additional facts directed at different Defendants in support of
arguments relating to McCastland’s summary judgment motion, and conversely cites
to his statements of additional facts directed at McCastland in support of arguments
relating to different Defendants. Reply at 11–12. As McCastland states, the Court
previously denied Matthews’ request to file an omnibus statement of additional facts,

7

instead requiring Matthews to file statements of additional facts specific to each
distinct summary judgment motion. Id. at 11 (citing R. 292). Therefore, the Court will
not consider statements of additional facts directed at Defendants other than
McCastland when resolving her motion. And the Court does not read Matthews’
response to attempt to assert hazardous prison condition claims against McCastland,
nor could it, as he did not allege such claims in the FAC. See Insolia v. Philip Morris
Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A plaintiff may not amend his complaint
through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.”)
(cleaned up). So, to the extent the response cites to Matthews’ statement of additional
facts directed at McCastland in relation to an argument as to hazardous prison
conditions, the Court does not consider it for purposes of resolving McCastland’s
summary judgment motion.
With those preliminary matters out of the way, the Court turns to the material
facts relating to Matthews’ claims against McCastland.
II.

Material Facts
The following undisputed facts are set forth as favorably to Matthews, the non-

movant, as the record and Local Rule 56.1 permit. See Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d
683, 691 (7th Cir. 2012); Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir.
2003). While the Court draws all reasonable inferences from the facts in Matthews’
favor, the Court does not “necessarily vouch[] for their accuracy.” Arroyo, 805 F.3d at
281 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Knopick v. Jayco, Inc., 895 F.3d 525, 527 (7th Cir. 2018)
(cleaned up) (“Given this summary judgment lens, we do not vouch for the objective

8

truth of all of these facts.”). This background section details all material undisputed
facts relating to Matthews’ claims against McCastland and notes where facts are
disputed, to the extent the disputed facts are supported by record evidence.
Matthews, at all relevant times, was an individual in the custody of the IDOC
housed at Stateville. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 1. McCastland was employed by Wexford
Health Sources, Inc. (Wexford), the health care contractor for Illinois prisons, as a
corrections nurse at Stateville for approximately a year and a half, starting in the fall
of 2016. Id. ¶ 2.
McCastland saw Matthews on November 4, 2016 for a complaint of roaches in
his ears. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 10. Another nurse extracted a dead roach from Matthews’
ear and McCastland sent Matthews to the healthcare unit for an ear lavage. Id.
McCastland saw Matthews again the next day, November 5, 2016 for an earache
related to the bugs in his ears. Id. ¶ 11. McCastland’s November 5, 2016 progress
note states that she saw Matthews for earwax and that she gave him ear drops. DSOF
¶ 11. Matthews saw a nurse other than McCastland on November 8, 2016 for
complaints relating to his ear, and was encouraged to use ear drops and was
scheduled for a doctor appointment. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 12.
On November 4, 2016, Matthews also complained to McCastland about bug
bites on his back and legs, but McCastland did not address those complaints nor chart
them. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 10. McCastland does not recall Matthews complaining of
bug bites on that date. DSOF ¶ 10. Matthews followed up with McCastland about
medicated cream to treat the bug bites several times, including on November 15 and

9

November 23, and eventually received medicated cream, which helped alleviate the
skin irritation. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 9.
Matthews saw McCastland on December 5, 2016 and told her that he had a
spider bite on his toe and that his foot had an open wound and was swollen to the
point where he could not put on shoes. PSOAF ¶¶ 11–12. Matthews testified that
McCastland responded with something to the effect of “you know what? I’m done with
him. Get him out of here.” Id. ¶ 13. McCastland disputes that she said this to
Matthews, and disputes that Matthews’ foot was swollen or had an open wound, as
the December 5 progress note does not say anything about a spider bite. Def.’s Resp.
PSOAF ¶¶ 11–13. On December 7, 2016, Matthews saw Nurse Kim, at which time
she charted that he complained of a spider bite and gave him antibiotic ointment
packets, writing in her progress note, “Small papule on dorsal surface of left 4th toe.
No erythema, no drainage. Abx (antibiotic) ointment packets given; advised to keep
clean with soap and water.” Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 62; Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 14.
The parties disagree about the next two visits Matthews had with McCastland.
Matthews states that he attended sick call on December 8 and 9, 2016, at which times
he showed McCastland the spider bite again, complaining of pain and requesting
treatment or antibiotics. PSOAF ¶ 15. He states that McCastland responded,
“[n]othing’s wrong with your foot,” and walked away. Id. McCastland relies on her
progress notes from those days, which report that Matthews refused treatment both
days and told McCastland, “I’m straight[,] I don’t need to see you, I got medicine for
my toe yesterday” and “I don’t want to see you!” on December 8 and 9, 2016

10

respectively. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 15; DSOF ¶¶ 63–64. The parties agree that
neither progress note mentions anything about a spider bite. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF
¶ 15.
On December 10, 2016, Matthews was taken to the emergency room due to
swelling, redness, bleeding, and heat on his foot and he was seen by a nurse other
than McCastland. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 18. The medical records reflect that the
symptoms were caused by a spider bite on Matthews’ toe and that he reported the
pain as “10/10.” Id.; R. 290-1, Medical Records at PageID 9008. The same day,
Matthews saw a doctor, who prescribed at 10-day antibiotic. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 66.
Matthews presented to sick call for a dressing change on December 13, 2016 and
requested supplies to dress the wound himself. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 19; Pl. Resp.
DSOF ¶ 67. Matthews saw McCastland for another dressing change on December 14,
2016. Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 18. McCastland testified that he became argumentative, so
she was unable to see the condition of Matthews’ toe to make an assessment, but she
does not recall seeing any signs of infection. DSOF ¶ 18. Matthews of course denies
that he was argumentative, testifying that he was asking McCastland questions
about her treatment of the wound, and she left halfway through addressing the
wound and another nurse took over. Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 18.
On December 16, Matthews was diagnosed with Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in the fourth toe on his left foot and had to receive
treatment and additional medication off-site at University of Illinois at Chicago
Medical Center. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 19.

11

Legal Standard
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment has the
initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute and that they are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460
(7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Wheeler v.
Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the adverse party
must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material
fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Id. at 256. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Parker v. Brooks Life Sci.,
Inc., 39 F.4th 931, 936 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). In evaluating summary judgment
motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The court
may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, Omnicare,
Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011), and must consider
only evidence that can “be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

12

Analysis
Matthews claims that McCastland was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical conditions including a mouse bite/scratch, bug bites on his body, roaches in
his ears, and a spider bite that caused a MRSA infection, all of which caused
Matthews unnecessary pain and suffering. FAC ¶¶ 5, 27, 58, 65, 66, 82. McCastland
argues that she is entitled to summary judgment, as most of Matthews’ alleged
medical conditions are not objectively serious and the evidence shows that
McCastland was not subjectively indifferent to any of Matthews’ alleged conditions.
R. 254, Memo. SJ at 4–9.
“The Eighth amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious
medical needs because it constitutes an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Walker v. Wexford, 940 F.3d 954, 964 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical
condition; and (2) the individual defendant was deliberately, that is subjectively,
indifferent to that condition. Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019)
cert denied, ---U.S.----, 140 S. Ct. 50, 205 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2019). A medical condition is
objectively serious if “a physician has diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or the need
for treatment would be obvious to a lay person.” Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016,
1023 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)). It
“need not be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it could be a condition that would

13

result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not
treated.” Palmer v. Franz, 928 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
Prevailing on the second prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official
has subjective knowledge of the risk to the inmate’s health, and then the official must
disregard that risk. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). In other
words, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (cleaned up). A plaintiff may establish
deliberate indifference by showing that the defendant “knew of a substantial risk of
harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d. 645, 653
(7th Cir. 2005). “The standard is a subjective one: the defendant must know facts
from which [s]he could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [s]he
must actually draw that inference.” Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2016).
“When a prison medical professional is accused of providing inadequate
treatment (in contrast to no treatment), evaluating the subjective state-of-mind
element can be difficult.” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662
(7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original). Evidence of medical negligence is not enough
to prove deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“Medical malpractice does
not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”).
However, a doctor who provides some treatment may still be held liable if [s]he
possessed a sufficiently culpable mental state. Zaya, 836 F.3d at 805 (citing Petties v.
Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2016)).

14

The Seventh Circuit has emphasized the deference owed to the professional
judgment of medical personnel. McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 481 (7th Cir. 2013);
see also Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing the standard
for “professional judgment”). “By definition a treatment decision that’s based on
professional judgment cannot evince deliberate indifference . . . A [medical
professional] who claims to have exercised professional judgment is effectively
asserting that [s]he lacked a sufficiently culpable mental state, and if no reasonable
jury could discredit that claim, the [medical professional] in entitled to summary
judgment.” Zaya, 836 F.3d at 805. But deference does not mean that a defendant
automatically escapes liability when the defendant invokes professional judgment as
a basis for a treatment decision. Id. Where evidence exists that the medical
professional “knew better than to make the medical decision that [s]he did,” then
summary judgment is improper. Whiting, 839 F.3d at 664 (citing Petties, 836 F.3d at
730–31).
I.

Objectively Serious Medical Conditions
McCastland first argues that two of Matthews’ conditions—the mouse

bite/scratch and bug bites and the spider bite that caused MRSA—are not objectively
serious conditions. The Court addresses each type of bite in turn.
A. Spider Bite
The parties dispute whether the spider bite on Matthews’ toe, which led to his
MRSA infection, was objectively serious. McCastland cites to several cases finding
that “routine” spider bites, even those that become infected, do not constitute “serious

15

medical needs.” Memo. SJ at 4–5 (citing Fryer v. Ledvora, 2017 WL 36445, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 4, 2017); Jellis v. Hulick, 422 F. App’x 548, 550 (7th Cir. 2011), among outof-Circuit cases). On the other hand, Matthews cites to numerous cases finding that
MRSA constitutes an objectively serious medical condition. R. 293, Resp. at 5–6
(citing Myrick v. Anglin, 496 F. App’x 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2012); Peters v. Bailey, 2020
WL 5593754, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2020); Bilik v. Hardy, 2019 WL 4735394, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2019); Moore v. Williams, 835 F. App’x 143, 144 (7th Cir. 2021)).
None of the cases cited by either party is on all fours with the facts here; however,
the Court agrees with Matthews that there is at least a question of fact as to whether
the spider bite and resulting MRSA infection constitute a serious medical condition.
Starting with the cases cited by McCastland, in Fryer, the plaintiff-pretrial
detainee visited the infirmary for a bump on his chest that he believed to be a spider
bite. 2017 WL 36445, at *2. Three days after the plaintiff initially raised the concern,
a doctor gave him antibiotics and wound care, after which his symptoms resolved a
day later. Id. at *3, 6. Even though the plaintiff presented evidence that the wound
had become infected, the court found that such an infected bite does not rise to the
level of a serious medical need where the pustule resolved promptly following
antibiotics and did not cause any ongoing health issues, and “[a]t most, [the plaintiff]
experienced discomfort when his shirt touched the affected area of his chest.” Id. at
*6. In Jellis, the plaintiff-inmate was bitten by a spider and asked to go the infirmary
as he was allergic to spider bites. 422 F. App’x at 549. The guard refused to take the
inmate to the infirmary as the prison was on lockdown at the time and the guard did

16

not believe the inmate’s condition warranted emergency treatment. Id. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit, finding that a “two-centimeter, day-old [spider]
bite” did not constitute a serious medical need that would have been obvious to a
layperson, in contrast to a “‘purulent draining infection’ accompanied by extreme pain
and high fever.” Id. at 550 (citing Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir.
1997)).
Unlike in Fryer and Jellis, where the plaintiffs presented evidence of or alleged
the presence of relatively minor bumps that they alleged were objectively serious,
here Matthews has presented evidence that, when he saw McCastland on December
5, 2016, his foot had an open wound and was swollen to the point where he could not
put on shoes. PSOAF ¶ 12 (citing R. 288-15, Matthews’ Dep. at 89:17–91:5). Although
McCastland disputes those facts, Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 12, as stated above, see supra
Section Background I, the Court credits Matthews’, the non-movant’s, deposition
testimony regarding his symptoms, which he is competent to testify about. See, e.g.,
Snow, 2021 WL 4439421, at *10; Armbruster v. Shah, 2019 WL 5874335, at *12 (S.D.
Ill. July 23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4200601 (S.D. Ill.
Sept. 5, 2019) (“[A] jury could still conclude [plaintiff] had a serious medical need
based on his reported symptoms alone.”). There is at least a question of fact as to
whether these symptoms accompanying the reported spider bite alone “is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Peters, 2020 WL 5593754, at *4 (cleaned up).

17

And not only was Matthews’ wound more serious than those at issue in Fryer
and Jellis, but Matthews has presented evidence that the spider bite led to a MRSA
infection, which was diagnosed on December 16, 2016. PSOAF ¶ 11 (citing Medical
Records at PageID 9011; R. 248-5, Golden Dep. at 70:6–24; 71:1–11); Def.’s Resp.
PSOAF ¶ 19 (admitting that Matthews was diagnosed with MRSA). True, as
McCastland points out in reply, most of the cases Matthews cites to in response do
not involve disputes about whether MRSA is an objectively serious condition, so the
courts accepted for purposes of the motions that MRSA is objectively serious. Reply
at 5. But that in itself is telling. And in Myrick, cited by Matthews, the Seventh
Circuit found that the plaintiff’s “claim of ‘excruciating pain’ from his skin infections,
including the MRSA infections, presented a sufficiently serious condition to support
an Eighth Amendment claim.” 496 F. App’x at 674. McCastland argues that Myrick
is distinguishable from the facts of this case, because Matthews has not indicated
that he experienced “excruciating pain.” Reply at 5. True, Matthews did not testify
that he suffered such pain, but he testified that he had an open wound on his foot and
it was so swollen that he could not put on a shoe. Matthews’ Dep. at 89:17–25.
Moreover, the medical records show that Matthews was taken to the emergency room
due to swelling, redness, bleeding, and heat on his foot, which was documented as
caused by a spider bite, and documented that Matthews reported the pain as “10/10.”
PSOAF ¶ 18 (citing Medical Records at PageID 9008–9009). As in Myrick, the Court
finds that the evidence presented of Matthews’ symptoms accompanying the MRSA
infection were sufficiently serious to support an Eighth Amendment claim.

18

Accordingly, the Court agrees with Matthews that the spider bite was
objectively serious. The Court address below whether a question of fact exists as to
whether McCastland was deliberately indifferent to that condition.
B. Mouse Bite/Scratch and Bug Bites
McCastland also contends that Matthews’ injuries or skin conditions caused
by a mouse bite/scratch and bug bites were not objectively serious. Memo. SJ at 5–6.
Matthews presents scant evidence as to any injury caused by a mouse. He testified
that a mouse got into his pants while he was sleeping and caused a wound. Pl.’s Resp.
DSOF ¶ 21 (citing Matthews Dep. at 149:3–23). Beyond stating that McCastland
refused to see him for the injury, he does not point to any evidence describing the
injury at all, either in his response to McCastland’s statement of facts nor in his
statement of additional facts.
As to the bug bites, Matthews testified that he was covered in bug bites from
approximately his mid-back to his hamstrings which irritated his skin, which he told
McCastland about on November 4, 2016. PSOAF ¶ 8 (citing Matthews Dep. at 82:15–
24); see also Matthews Dep. at 142:12–13. Matthews followed up with McCastland
about medicated cream to treat the bug bites several times, and eventually received
medicated cream, which helped alleviate the skin irritation. PSOAF ¶ 9 (citing
Medical Records at PageID 9001–02; Matthews Dep. at 85:24–25; 87:6–10; 142:16–
22).
As an initial matter, Matthews admits that he does not allege that McCastland
was deliberately indifferent because he did not receive cream for treatment of his bug

19

bites. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 48. To the extent that he alleges any sort of deliberate
indifference claim against McCastland based on her treatment of the bug bites or the
mouse bite/scratch, the Court agrees with McCastland that Matthews has not shown
that any condition resulting from the bites and/or scratch was an objectively serious
medical need, as he admits the condition resolved after treatment. See Memo. SJ at
5–6 (citing, among other cases, Fryer, 2017 WL 36445, at *5 (“[W]ithout other
repercussions, an uncomfortable skin issue that responds to treatment is not an
objectively serious medical need.”); Smith v. Schwartz, 2011 WL 2115831, at *3 (S.D.
Ill. May 26, 2011) (“[Plaintiff’s] allegations that he suffered chronic itching, athlete's
foot, chafing, peeling skin, and a painful, infected rash on his buttocks due to an
inability to shower and clean his cell while Pinckneyville was locked down do not
show a serious medical condition.”)).
Moreover, Matthews did not respond to McCastland’s argument that any
condition caused by the bug bites and mouse bite/scratch was not objectively serious
and thus has waived any response. See Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466
(7th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to respond to an argument . . . results in waiver.”); Rogan v.
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 2010 WL 1032422, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2010)
(granting summary judgment to defendant where it provided evidence that it had not
breached agreement and plaintiff “waived any argument to the contrary by failing to
respond”).
All in all, even in viewing the evidence in Matthews’ favor, the Court finds that
no reasonable jury could find that the bug bites and mouse bite/scratch are objectively

20

serious conditions and as such enters judgment in McCastland’s favor on Matthews’
claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs based on these conditions.
II.

Subjective Deliberate Indifference
Next, the Court turns to whether McCastland had the requisite state of mind

necessary to establish a claim for deliberate indifference to medical need based on the
spider bite that led to Matthews’ MRSA infection and the cockroaches in Matthews’
ear. Because the Court finds that the bug bites and mouse bite/scratch are not
objectively serious medical conditions, the Court need not address whether
McCastland was deliberately indifferent when treating them.
A. Spider Bite
The parties disagree as to whether Matthews has adduced sufficient
admissible evidence to create a question of fact as to whether McCastland was
deliberately indifferent when treating Matthews’ spider bite that led to MRSA. The
Court finds it to be a close question, but finds that Matthews has done enough to
defeat summary judgment on this claim.
The parties dispute whether Matthews told McCastland about the spider bite
when she saw him on December 5, 2016. Matthews, relying on his own testimony,
states that he showed McCastland his foot, which was swollen and had an open
wound, and that McCastland responded with something to the effect of “you know
what? I’m done with him. Get him out of here.” 6 PSOAF ¶¶ 12–13. McCastland, on
the other hand, disputes that McCastland went to sick call on December 5 for a spider
6Because

this is McCastland’s own statement, it is not hearsay pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(A).

21

bite or that she refused to treat it, pointing to the progress note she wrote on
December 5, which does not mention Matthews’ spider bite or related symptoms, but
rather relates to X-rays. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶¶ 12–13. Similarly, the parties dispute
whether Matthews complained to McCastland about pain from the spider bite again
on December 8 and December 9, 2016. Matthews, again relying on his own testimony,
states that he attended sick call and showed McCastland the spider bite again, at
which time he complained of pain and requested treatment or antibiotics. PSOAF
¶ 15. He states that McCastland responded, “[n]othing’s wrong with your foot,” and
walked away. Id. McCastland again disputes that Matthews went to sick call on
either date regarding a spider bite, relying on her progress notes from those days,
which report that Matthews refused treatment both days told McCastland, “I’m
straight[,] I don’t need to see you, I got medicine for my toe yesterday” and “I don’t
want to see you!” on December 8 and 9, respectively. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 15; DSOF
¶¶ 63–64. 7 Neither progress note mentions anything about a spider bite. Id.
McCastland argues that “[i]t is well established that an inmate cannot dispute
the validity of medical records and entries therein without any contrary evidence,
and uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Reply at
9 (Myers v. McAuley, 2003 WL 22232830, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2003); Weeks v.
Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 939 (7th Cir. 1997); Chiaramonte v.
Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., a Div. of Leggett & Platt, Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 401 (7th Cir.
1997)). As stated above, however, a plaintiff’s self-serving testimony can create a
7DSOF

¶ 63 refers to a 12/06/2016 note, but that appears to be a scrivener’s error, as it cites
to a 12/08/2016 note, Medical Records at PageID 9006.

22

material factual dispute, Hill, 724 F.3d at 968 & n.1, even when the testimony
contradicts medical reports, Snow, 2021 WL 4439421, at *10. The cases cited by
McCastland do not dictate otherwise.
In Myers, the court found that the plaintiff did not create a material issue of
fact regarding the sufficiency of his treatment where he presented contradictory
testimony—alternating between stating that he received only over-the-counter
Tylenol and stating that he received prescription pain medicine whenever he saw the
defendant-doctor—where the medical records reflected that he received prescription
pain medications. 2003 WL 22232830, at *11. And although the Seventh Circuit
stated in Weeks that “a plaintiff’s own uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment,” 126 F.3d at 939, in a later decision, the court
later qualified that statement, noting that the testimony at issue in Weeks was not
insufficient because it was “self-serving,” but rather it “fail[ed] to thwart summary
judgment because [it was] not based on personal knowledge as required by both the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure on summary judgment, Rule 56(e),” Payne v. Pauley,
337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003). So, as the court found in Snow, here too the court
finds that Matthews’ testimony and affidavits—regarding matters within his
personal knowledge like his symptoms and whether he told McCastland about them
on various dates—is “admissible evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment.”
2021 WL 4439421, at *10. McCastland “remain[s] free to attack the credibility and
weight of [Matthews’] uncorroborated testimony at trial.” Id.

23

Therefore, at this stage, the Court credits Matthews’ testimony that he did not
refuse to see McCastland on December 8 and 9, 2016, but rather complained about
the spider bite to her on those dates. So, the Court need not engage with McCastland’s
argument that Matthews himself is solely responsible for his lack of medical
treatment based on his refusal to allow her to provide care for his spider bite. See
Memo. SJ at 10–12.
In arguing that McCastland was deliberately indifferent to his objectively
serious spider bite by refusing to provide treatment for it on December 5, 8, and 9,
Matthews points to the IDOC’s Bite Protocol, the operative protocol at Stateville as
evidenced by the Offender Outpatient Progress Notes form, which indicates that “All
reported ‘spider bites’ [are] treat[ed] as MRSA.” Resp. at 23 (citing PSOAF ¶ 17). He
also relies on McCastland’s testimony that she acknowledged that prisoners are more
susceptible to MRSA than the general population, and that it is possible that someone
can be infected with MRSA if a wound is left untreated. Id. ¶ 16.
McCastland cites to her expert, Dr. Golden’s, report, which states that
implementation of the Bite Protocol was not required before December 10, 2016, as
he found that there were no clinical signs of infection before this date and, because
antibiotic resistance is a concern with all patients, administration of antibiotics
without clinical evidence of infection is contraindicated. Memo. SJ at 8 (citing DSOF
¶ 40). And McCastland contends that at all times, she complied with the applicable
community standard of care in deferring to Dr. Aguinaldo for treatment of the spider
bite. Id. (citing DSOF ¶ 45). Dr. Aguinaldo saw Matthews on December 10, 2016 and

24

prescribed a 10-day antibiotic. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 66. This is the same day Matthews
was taken to the healthcare unit’s emergency room due to the swelling, redness, heat,
and bleeding of his foot. Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 18. McCastland points out that, as a
registered nurse, she cannot diagnose an infection such as MRSA or prescribe
appropriate antibiotics. Memo. SJ at 7–8 (citing DSOF ¶ 45).
As the Court has repeatedly indicated above, the Court at this stage must
credit Matthews’ version of events, so long as it is supported by admissible evidence.
So, while Dr. Golden credited the medical records over Matthews’ testimony to form
his opinion, Def.’s Resp. PSOAF ¶ 20 (citing Golden Dep. at 71:5–73:23), the Court
cannot do so. Therefore, the Court accepts for purposes of resolving this motion that,
when Matthews saw McCastland on December 5, 2016, his foot had an open wound
and was swollen to the point where he could not put on shoes. PSOAF ¶ 12. The
IDOC’s Bite Protocol states that when an inmate reports a bite, “Refer to MD: All
reported ‘spider bites’ treat as MRSA. If . . . local changes at site of bite, Refer to MD
stat.” Medical Records at PageID 9008. According to the information Matthews
testified that he told McCastland on December 5, 2016, McCastland should have
initiated the Bite Protocol and referred Matthews to a doctor instead of sending him
away.
And it matters not that McCastland was not qualified to diagnose or treat
MRSA. Pursuant to Bite Protocol, she should have referred Matthews to a doctor,
who could have diagnosed MRSA or prescribed antibiotics upon seeing Matthews, as
Dr. Aguinaldo did on December 10, 2016. Instead, McCastland refused to do anything

25

about the bite on December 5, 8, and 9 when Matthews complained about it to her.
See Saintignon v. Wexford of Indiana, LLC, 2023 WL 5177252, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Aug.
11, 2023) (even though nurse was not authorized to diagnose plaintiff “or order
specific treatment, . . . as a member of the medical staff, she could have communicated
[plaintiff’s] medical distress to one of the facility’s multiple onsite physicians,” but
instead told plaintiff “all the physicians were too busy to see him.” The court found
that the evidence supported “reasonable conclusion that there was more she could
have done, even without being a licensed physician,” and denied summary judgment).
Finally, the Court turns to McCastland’s argument that Matthews has not
presented verifying medical evidence that any delay in treatment had a detrimental
effect. Memo. SJ at 13–14. In cases like this—where the plaintiff alleges the
defendants delayed, rather than denied, medical treatment—the Seventh Circuit has
required that the plaintiff “present verifying medical evidence” that the delay, and
not the underlying condition, caused some harm. Walker, 940 F.3d at 964 (citing
Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013)). “Clearly, expert testimony that
the plaintiff suffered because of a delay in treatment would satisfy the requirement.
On the other hand, evidence of a plaintiff’s diagnosis and treatment, standing alone,
is insufficient if it does not assist the jury in determining whether a delay exacerbated
the plaintiff’s condition or otherwise harmed him.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d
763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up).
The Court finds Grieveson, cited by both parties, instructive. In Grieveson, the
plaintiff did not introduce expert testimony that his medical condition worsened

26

because of a delay in treatment, but rather “supplied medical records indicating that
he had a nasal fracture, that he could experience further bleeding, and that he may
need to see a specialist. [The plaintiff] later underwent painful nose surgery.” 538
F.3d at 779. The Seventh Circuit found that the evidence produced by the plaintiff
“could certainly help a jury determine whether the delay unnecessarily prolonged and
exacerbated [the plaintiff’s] pain, and thus qualifie[d] as verifying medical evidence
that supports a genuine issue of material fact regarding the seriousness of [the
plaintiff’s] medical condition.” Id. He also provided evidence that the defendantofficers knew that he was in pain but did not secure medical treatment for him for at
least one-and-a-half days until after they knew about the injury. Id. The Seventh
Circuit found that the plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs
survived summary judgment. Id. at 780. In so holding, the Seventh Circuit relied on
Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2007), which McCastland also cites in
reply.
The Court also finds Williams instructive. In that case, the plaintiff-inmate
presented non-medical record evidence that he woke up around 6:30 a.m. on the day
in question experiencing chest pain, numbness in his arm, dizziness, nausea, and
vomiting. 491 F.3d at 716. The plaintiff complained multiple times about his
symptoms and pain to three different correctional officers, all of whom refused his
requests for medical treatment. Id. at 712–13. Around 1:00 p.m., the plaintiff was
carrying a heavy box containing his belongings up a flight of stairs when he blacked
out and fell backwards down the stairs, at which time medical technicians responded

27

and sent him to the prison emergency room. Id. at 713. In the emergency room, the
plaintiff received medication that quickly relieved his pain. Id. He rated his pain an
8/10 and had high blood pressure, an elevated pulse, and an abnormal heart rate. Id.
Although his blood pressure decreased after about an hour, the plaintiff remained in
the infirmary for six days. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the delay in treatment
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 714.
The parties disputed whether the plaintiff had offered sufficient verifying
medical evidence. Williams, 491 F.3d at 715. The defendants’ medical expert
“testified that any delay in treatment [did not] appear to have had any significant
adverse effect” on [the plaintiff’s] condition.” Id. at 714 (cleaned up). The plaintiff did
not present expert testimony, but rather relied on the medical records from when he
arrived at the hospital, which showed that he “had elevated blood pressure, had an
abnormal EKG, was sweating, and complained of severe pain. The medical records
also showed that with treatment, [the plaintiff’s] symptoms, including his pain and
high blood pressure, quickly subsided.” Id. at 715. The Seventh Circuit found that,
“[a]lthough no jury could determine, based on this record, whether it was the delay
in care or the underlying condition that necessitated [the plaintiff’s] treatment or
affected his ability to work, a reasonable jury could have concluded from the medical
records that the delay unnecessarily prolonged and exacerbated [his] pain and
unnecessarily prolonged his high blood pressure.” Id. at 715–16. It therefore rejected
the defendants’ argument that plaintiff had presented insufficient verifying medical

28

evidence and affirmed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law. Id.
at 716.
Although McCastland cites both Grieveson and Williams for general legal
propositions regarding the need verifying medical evidence, and Matthews relied on
Grieveson in support of his argument that the medical evidence he presented was
sufficient, Resp. at 24, McCastland does not distinguish the facts or holdings of
Grieveson or Williams in either of her briefs, Memo. SJ at 13–14, Reply at 10–11.
As in both Grieveson and Williams, here Matthews has not provided expert
testimony that the delay in treatment of his spider bite harmed him. But Matthews
has presented evidence that he informed McCastland of the spider bite as of
December 5, 2016 and there is a medical record dated December 7 documenting the
bite. PSOAF ¶ 14 (citing Medical Records at PageID 9006). And, the medical records
reflect that on December 10, 2016 he was taken to the healthcare unit’s emergency
room due to swelling, redness, bleeding, and heat on his foot, which was documented
as caused by a spider bite, and at which time he reported the pain as “10/10.” Id. ¶ 18
(citing Medical Records at PageID 9008–9009). Like in Williams, there are no medical
records documenting Matthews’ reported pain until the emergency room records. See
Williams, 491 F.3d at 713, 715 (plaintiff told multiple correctional officers he was
experiencing symptoms including chest pain in the morning, but first medical record
is from his emergency room visit in the afternoon). Finally, on December 16, 2016
Matthews was diagnosed with MRSA in his toe and had to receive treatment and
additional medication off-site at University of Illinois at Chicago Medical Center. Id.

29

¶ 19 (citing Medical Records at PageID 9011–9012). Also as in Williams, the only
expert testimony on the issue is from the defense expert, here, Dr. Golden, who
testified that, in his opinion, McCastland did not intentionally delay or withhold
reasonable, necessary medical care to Matthews. Reply at 13 (citing DSOF ¶ 26);
Williams, 491 F.3d at 715 (“The only testimony from a medical expert, Dr. Doughty,
was that the delay did not appear to have adversely affected [the plaintiff’s]
condition.”).
Although a close call, the Court finds that Matthews has presented sufficient
verifying medical evidence to support a finding that the delay in treatment
unnecessarily prolonged Matthews’ pain, given his reported symptoms and MRSA
diagnosis, which, as the Court has indicated above, is an objectively serious medical
condition. 8 See Williams, 491 F.3d at 715–16 (although a jury could not determine
from the records whether a delay in care of the plaintiff’s underlying condition
necessitated his treatment, “a reasonable jury could have concluded from the medical
records that the delay unnecessarily prolonged and exacerbated [the plaintiff’s] pain
and unnecessarily prolonged his high blood pressure”); Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d
556, 563 (7th Cir. 2017) (“‘A delay in treatment may show deliberate indifference if it
exacerbated the inmate’s injury or unnecessarily prolonged his pain,’ and ‘even brief,

8The

Court acknowledges that it somewhat recently granted a summary judgment motion in
favor of a defendant-doctor in part based on the plaintiff-inmate’s failure to provide “verifying
medical evidence suggesting that a delay in receiving a hemorrhoidectomy increased his risk
of substantial harm or other complications.” Barnes v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2022 WL
20288624, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 2022). However, the crux of the finding in Barnes was that
the delays in treatment were outside of the defendant-doctor’s control. Id. Here, McCastland
does not argue that she could not have followed Bite Protocol and referred Matthews to a
doctor for treatment as early as December 5, 2016.

30

unexplained delays in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference.’”) (quoting
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777–78 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original)). That
said, like in Williams, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could not determine
based on the medical records, whether the delay in treatment caused Matthews to
contract MRSA, as opposed to the bite itself; the Court’s holding is limited to whether
the delay caused Matthews to experience several days of additional pain for no good
reason. 491 F.3d at 715–16. Accordingly, the Court denies McCastland’s summary
judgment motion as it relates to the treatment of Matthews’ spider bite.
B. Cockroaches in Ear
Because McCastland does not argue that the roaches in Matthews’ ear was not
an objectively serious medical condition, the Court assumes for purposes of this
motion that it was. McCastland contends, however, that she did not have the state of
mind necessary to support a claim that she acted with deliberate indifference when
treating Matthews for this condition. Memo. SJ at 8–9. Matthews does not respond
to McCastland’s argument relating to her treatment of the roaches in his ear and thus
has waived any response. 9 See Bonte, 624 F.3d at 466; Rogan, 2010 WL 1032422, at
*8. The Court agrees with McCastland that, based on the evidence before the Court,
she was not deliberately indifferent when providing care for the cockroaches in
Matthews’ ear.

9Matthews

touches upon his ear care only in response to the IDOC Defendants’ argument
that Matthews cannot claim deliberate indifferences to inhumane conditions because he
received medical care. Resp. at 32. Matthews argues that “the issue is not whether he
received treatment, but whether the presence of roaches in his ears is evidence of deliberate
indifference to inhumane conditions.” Id.

31

Specifically, McCastland saw Matthews on November 4, 2016, for his
complaint of roaches in his ears, at which time McCastland conducted an otoscope
exam, another nurse extracted a dead roach from Matthews’ left ear, and McCastland
sent Matthews to the healthcare unit for lavage of the ear. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 10,
30, 51. Other roaches were removed from Matthews’ ear in the healthcare unit. Id.
¶ 47. McCastland saw him in follow-up the next day for an earache, at which time
he was given ear drops and told to return if necessary. Id. ¶¶ 11, 52. The parties
dispute whether McCastland saw Matthews putting roaches in his ears and whether
he admitted doing so to her during the appointment. Compare DSOF ¶¶ 20, 52 with
Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 20, 52. At this stage, the Court must credit Matthews’ version,
but it matters not for purposes of this motion, as the Court finds that whether
Matthews was putting roaches in his ears is not material to whether McCastland
provided inadequate care. On November 8, 2016, Matthews was seen by a different
nurse for complaints of irritation of the ear and was encouraged to use ear drops and
scheduled for a doctor appointment. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 12. Matthews reported
roaches in his ears to a physician’s assistant on November 10, 2016 but the parties
do not provide any evidence about whether McCastland was involved in follow-up
care or if Matthews made any additional complaints to her about the roaches in her
ear. Id. ¶ 55.
The above facts relating to McCastland’s treatment of roaches in Matthews’
ear do not support a finding that McCastland knew about a serious medical need but
nevertheless purposefully and deliberately withheld treatment. See Sellers v.

32

Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 110 (7th Cir. 1994). To the contrary, McCastland performed
an exam on Matthews’ ears when he first made the complaint, had another nurse
remove a roach, and sent him to the healthcare unit for a lavage. She also saw him
for follow-up care, when Matthews was provided ear drops. Nothing in the record
showed McCastland’s “total unconcern” for Matthews’ welfare relating to the roaches
in his ears. See Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir.
2020). Accordingly, McCastland is entitled to summary judgment on Matthews’
deliberate indifference to medical care claim based on the treatment of roaches in his
ears.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part
McCastland’s summary judgment motion [242]. The Court denies the motion as it
relates to Matthews’ deliberate indifference to medical care claims based on the
treatment of his spider bite that led to a MRSA infection. It grants the motion as it
relates to all other medical conditions, including bug bites and mouse bite/scratch and
roaches in his ears. The Court will rule on the other pending summary judgment
motions via separate orders.

Dated: February 29, 2024.

____________________________________
United States District Judge
Franklin U. Valderrama

33