McNeil v. Obaisi et al
Filing
105
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, the motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 86 ) jointly filed by Randy Pfister, Nicholas Lamb, and John Baldwin, is granted. Judgment is entered in favor of the defendants and against Demario McNeil. Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on November 2, 2020. (For further detail see attached order.) Civil case terminated. Mailed notice. (dm, )
Case: 1:16-cv-11256 Document #: 105 Filed: 11/02/20 Page 1 of 18 PageID #:941
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DEMARIO McNEIL,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-cv-11256
v.
Judge Mary M. Rowland
ESTATE OF SALEH
OBAISI, M.D. et al,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
Demario
McNeil
(McNeil),
was
incarcerated
at
Stateville
Correctional Center (Stateville) between 2012 and 2016. During that time, he
suffered multiple painful infections associated with recurrent ingrown toenails. He
was treated by several medical professionals, including Dr. Saleh Obaisi, M.D. (“Dr.
Obaisi”) a co-defendant in this case.1 McNeil complained about delays in treatment
to several administrators, including Randy Pfister, the Warden of Stateville
Correctional Center (Warden Pfister), John Baldwin, the acting Director of the
Illinois Department of Corrections (Director Baldwin), and Nicholas Lamb, the
Assistant Warden at Stateville Correctional Center (Assistant Warden Lamb).
McNeil contends that Warden Pfister, Director Baldwin, and Assistant
Warden Lamb acted with deliberate indifference towards his medical condition in
Dr. Obaisi has since passed away, but his estate was substituted as a party on September 29, 2020.
(Dkt. 101). The estate filed a motion for summary judgement (Dkt. 73), and the Court has issued a
separate order granting that motion. (Dkt. 104).
1
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violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. Warden Pfister, Director Baldwin and Assistant Warden Lamb have
filed a joint motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 86). For the reasons stated below,
the motion is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (1986).
After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quotation omitted). A genuine dispute
as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Court
“consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). Moreover, the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable
inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [their] favor.” White v.
City of Chi., 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The
controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the
non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the
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motion for summary judgment.” White, 829 F.3d at 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation
omitted).
BACKGROUND
I. Local Rule 56.1
Both the motion for summary judgment and McNeil’s response included Local
Rule 56.1 statements. Local Rule 56.1 statements “serve to streamline the resolution
of summary judgment motions by having the parties identify undisputed material
facts and cite the supporting evidence.” Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Innovation
Landscape, Inc., No. 15 CV 9580, 2019 WL 6699190, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019)
(citation omitted). “For litigants appearing in the Northern District of Illinois, the
Rule 56.1 statement is a critical, and required, component of a litigant’s response to
a motion for summary judgment.” Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394, 398
(7th Cir. 2012).
Local Rule 56.1 requires that the party moving for summary judgment file “a
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine
issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law.” L.R.
56.1(a)(3). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment must then file “a
response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement, including, in
the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record,
and other supporting materials relied upon.” Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d
625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In addition, the opposing party may submit
a statement of additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, to which
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the movant may respond. See Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643−44 (7th
Cir. 2008).
Local Rule 56.1 provides that “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement
required of the moving party will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the
statement of the opposing party.” Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., 368 F.3d 809,
817 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing L.R. 56.1(b)). In order to be deemed admitted, an
uncontested fact to which an opponent does not adequately respond must also be
supported by the evidence in the record. See Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d
877, 880 (7th Cir. 2012).
However, one party’s failure to comply with L.R. 56.1, does not automatically
result in judgment for their opponent. See Keeton, 667 F.3d at 884 (citation omitted).
The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must still demonstrate that they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the Court will still view all
uncontested facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, drawing all
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Id.
The defendants submitted fifty-two (52) L.R. 56.1 statements. (Dkt. 87). Aside
from the introductory facts describing jurisdiction, venue and the parties, all of which
were admitted, (Dkt. 94, Exhibit 2), McNeil failed to respond to the statements of
uncontested fact. (Dkt. 87; Dkt. 94, Exhibit 2). McNeil did submit twelve (12)
additional statements of undisputed fact. (Dkt. 94, Exhibit 2). The defendants
responded to these statements of fact in their reply. (Dkt. 102). Accordingly, the Court
treats the parties’ L.R. 56.1 statements as follows:
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i.
The defendants’ first six statements (discussing parties, jurisdiction,
and venue) are admitted by the plaintiff.
ii.
The defendants’ forty-six (46) remaining statements are deemed
admitted to the extent that they are supported by the record and do not
include improper arguments or legal conclusions. See Cady v. Sheahan,
467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006) (A party’s statement of facts does
not comply with Rule 56.1 if it contains “irrelevant information, legal
arguments, and conjecture”).
iii.
The plaintiff’s twelve (12) additional statements of fact are deemed
uncontested where admitted by the defendants and are deemed
contested facts where denied by the defendants.
II. Medical Treatment
The Court assumes familiarity with the order granting summary judgment to
the Estate of Dr. Obaisi and describing McNeil’s long medical history in detail. (Dkt.
104). In brief, McNeil arrived at Stateville in early 2012 and was diagnosed with
ingrown toenails almost immediately. (Defendants’ L.R. 56.1 Statement of Facts
(DSOF), ¶¶ 7−8).2 From January through August he was treated by various
clinicians. He received multiple courses of antibiotics (January 25, 2012, June 1,
2012, July 5, 2012, and August 14, 2012, February 4, 2013), several bilateral nail
resection and excision surgeries, (February 2, 2012, March 15, 2012, August 28,
2
The Court will refer to the defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts at DSOF.
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2012), and two rounds of daily foot soaks (June 1, 2012, August 14, 2012). (DSOF, ¶
9; Dkt. 87, Exhibit 6 at 2).
Dr. Obaisi first treated McNeil’s ingrown toenails on March 27, 2013,
prescribing him a sixth round of antibiotics and scheduling him for another bilateral
nail resection surgery the following week. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 6 at 2). Dr. Obaisi
performed this surgery (McNeil’s fourth) on April 4, 2013 and gave him a prescription
for crutches as well as a “lay-in permit.” (Id.). On May 5, 2013, Dr. Obaisi performed
a fifth resection surgery, and once again prescribed crutches, a lay-in permit, and a
permit to use shower shoes for one week. (Id.). At a follow-up visit McNeil received a
permit to sleep in the lower bunk in a cell on the lower floor of the building.
Between May 13, 2013 and July 12, 2015, McNeil received no treatment for
ingrown toenails or secondary infections. (DSOF, ¶ 9). In July of 2015, McNeil had a
resurgence of his ingrown toenail condition and visited the Health Care Unit
complaining of an ingrown toenail once again. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 6 at 2). On September
9, 2015, after several more appointments, Dr. Obaisi performed a sixth bilateral nail
wedge resection surgery. (Id.). Dr. Obaisi also submitted a request for a referral to a
podiatrist, which was discussed and approved at a “collegial review” meeting on
September 15, 2015. (Id.). Neither the parties’ statements of uncontroverted facts nor
the supporting exhibits are clear as to when the podiatry appointment was made for
McNeil, but on some date subsequent to September 15, 2015, a podiatry appointment
was set for July 20, 2016. (Id.).
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McNeil continued to receive treatment for his ingrown toenails while he waited
for a podiatry appointment (including appointments on September 27, 2015, October
1, 2015, January 5, 2016, March 29, 2016, April 18, 2016), and was prescribed more
foot soaks (October 1, 2015), antibiotics, (January 5, 2016), and pain medications
(March 29, 2016). (Id.).
On July 20, 2016, McNeil was seen by a podiatrist. (Id.). He received an
ablation procedure, in which chemicals are used to damage the nail matrix,
preventing the future growth of toenails. By all accounts it was a success,
permanently preventing McNeil from growing toenails on the afflicted toes and
preventing ingrown toenails. (Id.).
III. Grievances
The grievance process begins when a prisoner submits a form to his counselor
describing the situation and requesting relief. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 2 at 133−34). Once
the counselor has researched the grievance and responded, an inmate has the option
to appeal. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 3 at 14). The grievance appeals process varies based on
whether the prisoner marked the grievance as an “emergency.” (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 2 at
134). After getting an initial response to a non-emergency grievance from the
grievance officer, a prisoner can “send it to Springfield” and appeal to the Illinois
Department of Corrections’ “Administrative Review Board.” (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 3 at 15;
Dkt. 87, Exhibit 2 at 135).
Alternatively, if a prisoner checked the “emergency” box on their grievance
appeal, it goes straight to the warden of their facility. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 2 at 135). If
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the warden agrees that the grievance constitutes an emergency, he will attempt to
resolve it; if the warden does not find it to constitute an emergency, he will return the
grievance to the prisoner, so that he can appeal it to the Administrative Review
Board. (Id.)
On September 18, 2015, McNeil filed a grievance marked as an “emergency,”
requesting a podiatry appointment. (DSOF, ¶ 12). Although McNeil had been
approved for a podiatry visit on September 15, 2015, he did not know about this
approval (DSOF, ¶ 12; Dkt. 87, Exhibit 2 at 137−38). Neither party has presented
evidence that an appointment was scheduled when this grievance was filed. The
September 18 grievance was reviewed on October 9, 2015 by someone in the Warden’s
office at Stateville and designated a non-emergency. (DSOF, ¶¶ 12−13). The signature
on that non-emergency determination reads “N. Lamb.” (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 2 at 139).
However, Assistant Warden Lamb stated in his deposition that “somebody signed off
for me” on the September 18 grievance. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 4 at 12−13). And as Warden
Pfister described in his deposition, “it looks like a designee signed that because there
is initials over here, which is a requirement if someone other than Mr. Lamb signs.”
(DSOF, ¶ 12; Dkt. 87, Exhibit 3 at 24). After his grievance was deemed a nonemergency, McNeil appealed that non-emergency designation to the Administrative
Review Board but apparently failed to attach the grievance itself and the grievance
officer’s response. (DSOF, ¶ 14). At that time Director Baldwin had appointed
designees to review grievances that were appealed to the Administrative Review
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Board and to sign Director Baldwin’s name on grievance dispositions. (DSOF, ¶¶
50−51).
McNeil resubmitted his grievance to the Stateville grievance officer. This
officer made the determination that no additional administrative action was
necessary because, as of October 28, 2015 “according to medical records [McNeil is]
approved to go to an outside treatment for this and the [Health Care Unit] is awaiting
a phone call to schedule from the outside hospital. On 10/1/15 [McNeil] was treated
by Dr. Williams as well.” (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 3 at 24). On February 17, 2016 the lifecycle of this grievance was concluded when a designee of Warden Pfister concurred
with the grievance officer’s findings. (Id., ¶ 16).
On November 2, 2015, while this first grievance was making its way through
the appeals process, McNeil wrote a letter to Assistant Warden Lamb requesting an
expedited podiatry appointment and describing how his feet “constantly bleed, swell,
and leak a pus-like [sic] fluid.” (Plaintiff’s L.R. 56.1 Statement of Facts, ¶ 6). During
discovery McNeil provided a hand-written copy of this letter. Assistant Warden Lamb
has no recollection of receiving such a letter. (DSOF, ¶ 35). Lamb did not have a
designee review his mail and testified in his deposition that such a letter, properly
addressed to him “should have come directly” to him and “usually came directly” to
him. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 4 at 35).
Additionally, McNeil stated in his deposition that on an unknown date he
spoke with Assistant Warden Lamb in person about his ingrown toenails. (DSOF, ¶
33). According to McNeil, he voiced this complaint while Assistant Warden Lamb was
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walking through 3 Gallery, E House, and McNeil was in cell 318. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 2
at 158−59). McNeil elaborated that Lamb did not respond to McNeil’s verbal
complaint on this occasion, but that a correctional officer who was accompanying him
advised McNeil to sign up for a sick call. (Id.).
McNeil testified at his deposition that he sent another letter containing
substantially similar complaints directly to Warden Pfister. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 2 at
155). Warden Pfister does not recall ever having received or read such a letter.
(DSOF, ¶ 31). When asked whether he personally reviewed mail from inmates,
Warden Pfister responded that “the ladies out front always handled it.” (Dkt. 87,
Exhibit 3 at 46).
On January 3, 2016, McNeil filed his second grievance. (DSOF, ¶ 18). This
grievance was denied, based on the fact that despite not yet having seen a podiatrist,
McNeil was still being seen by Stateville’s own medical staff and had been approved
to see a podiatrist. (Id.). McNeil once again appealed this denial to the Administrative
Review Board. (DSOF, ¶ 19). This appeal was rejected, and the response indicated:
“Concurred, John R. Baldwin.” (Id.). Director Baldwin’s affidavit indicates that he
does not “recall personally receiving or reviewing any correspondence from [McNeil]
while [he] was the Director of IDOC” including any grievances appealed to the
Administrative Review Board. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 5 at 1−2). This is likely because he
“appointed designees to review and sign ARB responses to inmate grievances on [his]
behalf.” (Id.).
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On March 31, 2016, McNeil filed a third emergency grievance requesting a
podiatry appointment. (DSOF, ¶ 20). A grievance officer designated by Warden
Pfister once again determined that this was not in fact an emergency. (DSOF, ¶ 21).
McNeil submitted a third appeal to the Administrative Review Board, but when he
was asked to submit additional information he did not respond. (DSOF, ¶ 22).
On May 31, 2016, McNeil filed a fourth grievance once again requesting a
podiatry appointment. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 3 at 36). This grievance was signed with
Warden Pfister’s name, but when deposed he stated that the signature was “not
personally mine.” (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 3 at 36, 45−46). Warden Pfister stated in his
deposition that his “designee, whoever it was, determined it [was] [sic] not an
emergency.” (Id., at 36). With regard to designees, Warden Pfister further stated that
at this time he had “four or five of them that did grievances”, and it was customary
for them to sign on his behalf without consulting him. (Id., at 37).
In the months between his transfer on April 20, 2016 and his podiatry
appointment on July 20, 2016, McNeil filed additional grievances requesting that his
podiatry appointment be expedited. (Plaintiff’s L.R. 56.1 Statement of Facts, ¶ 11).3
On August 5, 2016, after attending his podiatry appointment, McNeil mailed
one final hand-written letter to Director Baldwin. In this letter he requested an
McNeil was transferred to Western Correctional Center on April 20, 2016. (DSOF, ¶ 23). After
arriving at Western Correctional Center, McNeil was transferred back the Northern Reception Center
at Stateville for several weeks while he continued receiving medical treatment for his infected toes.
(Dkt. 87, Exhibit 3 p. 128). McNeil returned to Western Correctional Center in May of 2016 and was
residing there when he saw a podiatrist on July 20, 2016. (Id.). These additional grievances were
directed towards the administration of Western Correctional Center.
3
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answer to an earlier grievance that had been submitted to the ARB. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit
2 at 167).
ANALYSIS
I. Deliberate Indifference
Claims can be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against any person who, under
color of state law, “subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The constitutional right at issue in this case is the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.” A prisoner
“must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs,” and because “denial of
medical care can result in pain and suffering” that serves no penological purpose,
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes unnecessary
and
wanton
infliction
of
pain
[which
is]
proscribed
by
the
Eighth
Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103−04 (1976) (quotations and citations
omitted).
McNeil argues in his motion opposing summary judgment that the
“[d]efendants – themselves and through their designees – knew about and
disregarded his grievances related to his foot issues.” (Plaintiff’s Motion Opposing
Summary Judgment at 1). In order to survive summary judgment, McNeil must
demonstrate both that (1) he suffered an objectively serious medical condition; and
that (2) the defendant was (subjectively) deliberately indifferent to that condition. See
Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016). Defendants do not dispute that
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McNeil suffered an objectively serious medical condition.4 The second prong of the
test for deliberate indifference requires that the defendant (a) actually knew of and
(b) consciously disregarded a substantial risk to an inmate’s health. See Petties v.
Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016).
A. Actual Knowledge
In order to satisfy the subjective part of the deliberate indifference test, a
showing of what amounts to criminal recklessness must be made. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 839–40 (1994) (“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law is a
familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause as interpreted in our cases, and we adopt it as the test for
‘deliberate indifference’ under the Eighth Amendment.”). A “showing [of] mere
negligence is not enough.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 728; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 836 (1994). And “even objective recklessness—failing to act in the face of an
unjustifiably high risk that is so obvious that it should be known—is insufficient to
make out a claim.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 728 (citation omitted). The requisite mental
state “approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th
Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (emphasis added), but McNeil does not need to show that
the defendants “intended harm or believed that harm would occur” Petties, 836 F.3d
at 728.
The defendants correctly argue that prison officials are “entitled to relegate to
the prison’s medical staff the provision of good medical care.” (Dkt. 86 at 3, citing
For a more detailed treatment of this prong of the deliberate indifference test, see the Opinion and
Order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by co-defendant, Dr. Obaisi. (Dkt. 104).
4
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Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009)). In addition, prison officials
may delegate bureaucratic duties to their inferiors, and their “liability depends on
each defendant’s knowledge and actions, not on the knowledge or actions of persons
they supervise.” Burks, 555 F.3d at 595; see also Pacelli v. deVito, 972 F.2d 871, 878
(7th Cir. 1992) (“Supervisors are not liable for the errors of their subordinates”)
(citations omitted).
Based on the summary judgment record and drawing all inferences in McNeil’s
favor, the personal knowledge of each defendant is summarized below:
i.
Warden Pfister
McNeil filed grievances with Warden Pfister and sent him a letter. However,
Warden Pfister testified that at the time McNeil was filing grievances they were being
reviewed by designees, who were authorized to sign on his behalf. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 3
at 36, 45−46). He has no recollection of ever reviewing a grievance from McNeil.
Warden Pfister also testified that he did not receive or review mail that was sent to
his office by prisoners. He delegated that duty as well. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 3 at 46).
Drawing all reasonable inferences in McNeil’s favor (i.e. that the letter was sent and
that it was received) there is no evidence to suggest that Warden Pfister was
personally aware of McNeil’s condition.
ii.
Director Baldwin
Likewise, Director Baldwin has submitted an affidavit indicating that his
designees always reviewed and signed grievance appeals like McNeil’s on his behalf.
McNeil has not submitted any evidence indicating that Director Baldwin himself
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reviewed those appeals, and Director Baldwin contends that he has no memory of
them.
This leaves only the letter to Director Baldwin. Director Baldwin has no
recollection of receiving a letter from McNeil, but there is no evidence in the record
suggesting that Director Baldwin was not receiving and reading his own mail. A
reasonable jury could find that McNeil actually sent a letter to Director Baldwin, that
the letter turned over during discovery was a true copy of that letter, that the letter
reached Director Baldwin, and that he read it. However, McNeil wrote the letter in
question on August 5, 2016, after he had already attended his podiatry appointment.
Moreover, the letter did not describe McNeil’s ingrown toenail condition (which in
any case had been resolved by that point) so it could not have given rise to actual
knowledge of a substantial risk to McNeil’s pain regarding his ingrown toenails.
iii.
Assistant Warden Lamb
Based on all the evidence in the summary judgment record, a reasonable jury
could conclude that Assistant Warden Lamb had actual knowledge of McNeil’s
grievances. Such knowledge could not have come from the grievances, which were
reviewed and initialed by Assistant Warden Lamb’s designees.
That said, McNeil testified that he approached Assistant Warden Lamb to
explain his condition in person. Although the defendant currently has no recollection
of that encounter, a reasonable jury could credit the testimony of both men and
conclude that Assistant Warden Lamb at one time had actual knowledge of McNeil’s
toenail condition. In addition, McNeil has provided a copy of a letter that he testified
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he sent to Assistant Warden Lamb. Although Assistant Warden Lamb currently has
no memory of receiving this letter, he acknowledges that (unlike Warden Pfister) he
routinely opened his own mail and might have received it. (Dkt. 87, Exhibit 4 at 35).
Drawing all reasonable inferences in McNeil’s favor (i.e. that he actually wrote and
sent such a letter, and that Assistant Warden Lamb actually received and read it) a
jury could conclude that Assistant Warden Lamb had actual knowledge that McNeil
suffered from ingrown toenails and was requesting a podiatry appointment. This does
not, however, settle the matter.
B. Disregarding the risk
In addition to actually knowing about a substantial risk to a prisoner’s health,
a defendant must disregard that risk. In the Seventh Circuit, a prison official cannot
be found to have disregarded a risk merely because they denied a grievance or other
complaint. See, for example, Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2006)
(Prison officials whose interactions with plaintiff were “limited to dealing with his
grievances and other complaints about the hernia treatment [. . .] were not
deliberately indifferent to that need because they took [the plaintiff’s] medical
complaints seriously and reasonably relied upon the doctors’ recommendations in
handling [the plaintiff’s] condition”). So long as prisons officials were making sure
that “medical care was available” while these grievances were processed, their actual
ruling on a grievance or complaint does not constitute deliberate indifference.
Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1011 (7th Cir. 2006). Even if a prison official had
actual knowledge of a substantial risk to a prisoner’s health based on information
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contained in grievances or other complaints, denial of a grievance based on a doctor’s
reassurances that reasonable care was being administered does not constitute
disregard. Id. As the defendants correctly argue in their brief, a claim of deliberate
indifference cannot rest on an incarcerated person claiming he was denied “specific
care” or the “best care possible.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2011).
McNeil claims to have sent Assistant Warden Lamb a letter on November 2,
2015. In November of 2015, McNeil had been waiting a little over a month for a
podiatry appointment. His first grievance was still being processed by the
Administrative Review Board, and he was continuing to receive care for his condition
at the Medical Unit. These facts closely mirror the facts of Johnson, wherein the
Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of several prison
officials. Even assuming Assistant Warden Lamb read McNeil’s letter and failed to
take any action, no reasonable jury could find his decision to entrust McNeil’s care to
the professionals in the Medical Unit at that point and allow the grievance process to
run its course was deliberate indifference.
McNeil cannot remember the date on which he made a verbal complaint
regarding his ingrown toenails to Assistant Warden Lamb. The Court may (indeed
must) credit McNeil’s testimony and assume that this interaction occurred, but it was
still a “grievance or complaint” and is therefore governed by Johnson, 433 F.3d. at
1005. McNeil acknowledges that the correctional officer accompanying Assistant
Warden Lamb acknowledged his verbal complaint and instructed him to make a sick
call. Without more evidence, no reasonable jury could find that Assistant Warden
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Lamb did anything other than “[take the plaintiff’s] medical complaints seriously and
reasonably rel[y] upon the doctors’ recommendations in handling [the plaintiff’s]
condition” while making sure that “medical care was available.” 433 F.3d 1001, 1005
(7th Cir. 2006). The lack of evidence about this interaction does not create a question
of whether Assistant Warden Lamb had actual knowledge of a substantial risk to
McNeil’s health and disregarded it as McNeil argues; rather, that lack of evidence
means that McNeil has failed to raise such a question.5
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. 86) is granted. Judgment is granted in favor of Randy Pfister, John
Baldwin, and Nicholas Lamb and against Demario McNeil. Civil case terminated.
E N T E R:
Dated: November 2, 2020
MARY M. ROWLAND
United States District Judge
Having found that there is insufficient evidence of defendants’ actual knowledge and disregard, the
Court need not decide whether McNeil suffered a detriment by being forced to wait 10-months for a
podiatry appointment.
5
18
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