Bental & Company, LLC v. Schraubenwerk Zerbst GmbH
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 8/2/2017:Mailed notice(wp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
BENTEL & COMPANY, LLC, a
Texas Limited Liability
Company,
Plaintiff,
Case No.
v.
16 C 11479
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
SCHRAUBENWERK ZERBST GmbH, a
Foreign Limited Liability
Company,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(3) [ECF No. 10].
stated
herein,
the
Motion
under
forum non conveniens grounds.
Rule
12(b)(3)
For the reasons
is
granted
on
The Court will issue an Order of
Dismissal upon receipt of Schraubenwerk Zerbst GmbH’s written
statement agreeing to the conditions enumerated herein.
I.
A.
Plaintiff
management
and
Bental
Factual Background
&
consulting
business in Toledo, Ohio.
(“Pl.’s Br.”) at 2.)
BACKGROUND
Company,
company
LLC
with
(“Bental”)
a
is
principal
a
Texas
place
of
(ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 1; ECF No. 15
Bental’s sole member and owner, Lothar
Bauerle (“Bauerle”), resides in the Toledo, Ohio area.
(Pl.’s
Br., Ex. B (“Bauerle Decl.”) ¶ 3.)
Early in 2010, Bauerle
contacted several component and subsystem manufacturers in the
wind
power
industry,
including
Defendant
Schraubenwerk
Zerbst
GmbH (“SZ”), to see if they would be attending an upcoming wind
power exhibition in the U.S. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13; Bauerle Decl.
¶¶ 7-8.)
and
SZ is a German company that manufactures forged bolts
hot-formed
fasteners
for
use
including the wind power industry.
Ex. A (“Schmidt Decl.”) ¶ 10.)
in
various
industries,
(ECF No. 11 (“Def.’s Mem.”),
One of SZ’s principals informed
Bauerle that no SZ representative would be attending but that SZ
was
willing
to
follow
up
with
him
after
the
exhibition
discuss the state of the American wind power market.
to
(Bauerle
Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.)
At some point after the exhibition and during the summer of
2010, Bauerle proposed to SZ that he scout for new potential SZ
customers in the three NAFTA countries – Mexico, the U.S., and
Canada.
(Schmidt
Decl.
traveled
to
place
negotiating
SZ’s
an
¶¶
agreement
14-15.)
of
business
that
would
In
in
July
2010,
Germany
govern
to
the
to
Ohio,
engaged
in
additional
telephone
begin
Bental-SZ
relationship. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19; Bauerle Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.)
returned
Bauerle
Bauerle
and
email
discussions with SZ, and ultimately signed an August 1, 2010
final version of the agreement (“the Commission Agreement”) upon
- 2 -
its
transmission
from
SZ’s
German
office
to
him
(Schmidt Decl. ¶¶ 19-20; Bauerle Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.)
the
Commission
immediate
Agreement
effect
act
provided
as
that
representative
in
Ohio.
As relevant,
“Bental
of
shall
[SZ]
the
in
with
Nafta
states (USA, Canada, Mexico), in the fastener product groups
‘Wind
Power,’
‘Rail
Applications’.”
duties
were
customer
Track,’
and
other
‘Industrial
(Pl’s Br., Ex. B at Att. 1 ¶ 1.)
“perform[ing]
contacts,
market
receiv[ing]
analyses,
relevant
establish[ing]
client
inquiries
subsequent projects, and forward[ing] them to [SZ].”
see, Schmidt Decl. ¶ 22.)
support
to
Bental
and
provided
bear
commission
of
that
SZ
5%
after
and
(Id. ¶ 3;
SZ agreed to provide informational
travel
costs
carrying out his duties. (Id. ¶ 4.)
also
Bental’s
would
“pay
Bauerle
incurred
in
The Commission Agreement
Bental
conclusion
of
a
each
performance-based
quarter
of
the
calendar year” but, because no commissionable projects existed
at the time of execution, SZ agreed to pay “Bental monthly a
retainer of 1,000.00 US Dollars” to be adjusted based on SZ’s
prospects
for
successful
projects
and
Bental’s
“acquisition
expenses.” (Id. ¶ 5.)
The $1,000 payment along with travel
reimbursements
cease
were
to
once
SZ
commenced
commission
payments on eligible projects – that is, once Bental’s efforts
bore fruit in the form of SZ sales to new clients. (Ibid.)
- 3 -
Each
party
had
the
right
to
terminate
“subject
to
a
three-month
period of cancellation,” and in such a scenario, Bental was to
receive
commission
provided
they
termination
lead
date
payments
to
of
a
“for
contract
the
the
worked-on
projects,
24
from
within
agreement.”
(Id.
months
¶¶
the
6-7.)
The
Commission Agreement did not specify a governing law or choice
of forum.
In furtherance of Bental’s responsibilities, SZ printed and
provided Bental with business cards containing SZ’s logos, its
website
address,
reachable
Att. 3.)
at
and
Bental’s
SZ
Representation”
also
on
titling
Ohio
Bauerle
address.
listed
as
(Bauerle
designated
letterhead
and
“Project
in
materials. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22 & Atts. 4-5.)
Manager”
Decl.
¶
as
its
Bental
certain
20
&
“US
presentation
Other than as detailed
below, SZ has never had any contacts with Illinois.
(See, e.g.,
Schmidt Decl. ¶¶ 5-9.)
Bental proposed to SZ several potential Illinois targets,
and SZ approved its approaching Nordex USA, Inc., a Chicagoheadquartered division of Nordex Global.
(Bauerle Decl. ¶¶ 23-
24 (According to Bauerle, SZ also entered into non-disclosure
agreements
(“NDAs”)
with
two
Illinois
entities
governed
by
Illinois law, but with whom SZ did not ultimately establish a
relationship. (Id. ¶ 25.))
Since 2006, SZ has had a business
- 4 -
relationship with Nordex Global, to whom it supplies various
hardware and fastener components.
(Schmidt Decl. ¶¶ 25, 27.)
On August 16, 2010, Bauerle sent a letter to Nordex USA’s
purchasing
manager,
acknowledging
SZ’s
gratitude
for
Nordex
Global’s business and that “[t]hrough my diligent work Zerbst
would like to become an approved direct supplier to Nordex USA,
Inc.” (Bauerle Decl. ¶¶ 26-27 & Att. 6.)
He requested a meeting
to determine the feasibility of SZ directly supplying Nordex
USA,
whose
Arkansas.
letter,
production
(Ibid.;
Bental
see,
and
SZ
facility
Schmidt
were
was
located
Decl.
¶
granted
in
24.)
access
Jonesboro,
Following
to
Nordex
the
USA’s
“electronic ‘ShareFile’ folder maintained in Chicago, Illinois
containing
the
necessary
information
for
SZ
to
compete
for
Nordex business in the U.S.” (Pl.’s Br. at 4-5 (citing Bauerle
Decl.
¶
28).)
proposals,
Bental
and
then
submitted
(Bauerle Decl. ¶ 29.)
prepared
them
to
SZ-approved
Nordex
USA
quotes
in
and
Chicago.
Bauerle alleges that his overtures to
Nordex USA convinced it to partner with SZ, resulting in the
placement
of
its
February 2011.
USA,
SZ
never
entity.”).)
first
purchase
orders
for
SZ
products
in
(Id. ¶¶ 30, 32 (“Prior to my contact with Nordex
sold
any
of
its
products
directly
to
that
Although ostensibly beyond the ambit of Bental’s
duties under the Commission Agreement, Bauerle also translated
- 5 -
emails
from
English
communications
between
to
SZ
German,
and
its
and
U.S.
vice
versa,
customers,
for
including
Nordex USA. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.)
When Nordex USA placed purchase orders for SZ products, it
emailed them to Bental’s Ohio office, and Bauerle then forwarded
them
to
SZ
along
with
Nordex
USA’s
qualifications,
specifications, and drawings. (Bauerle Decl. ¶ 31.)
supplied
products;
Nordex
no
USA’s
SZ
product
(Schmidt Decl. ¶ 24.)
SZ
and
Bental
Arkansas
was
facility
ever
with
shipped
SZ then
the
requested
into
Illinois.
Thanks to Nordex USA’s purchase orders,
amended
the
Commission
Agreement
effective
February 14, 2012 through a course of dealing shorter than but
otherwise similar to that characterizing its initial negotiation
– in-person discussions in Germany and subsequent Ohio-Germany
communications, with each party signing the final agreement from
its home office.
(Id. ¶¶ 32-34; Bauerle Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.)
Gone
were the $1,000 monthly retainer and travel reimbursements, in
favor
of
a
fixed
schedule
of
commissions
under
which
Bental
received 5 percent of sales per calendar year up to €400,000,
4 percent of sales in the €400,000-500,000 range, and 3 percent
of sales in excess of €500,001.
(Pl.’s Br., Ex. B at Att. 2.)
When Bental’s commission payments came due, SZ initiated wire
transfers to Bauerle’s Ohio bank account – sometimes paying him
- 6 -
in
Euros
and
other
times
in
U.S.
Dollars.
(Compare,
Bauerle
Decl. ¶ 19; with, Schmidt Decl. ¶ 36.)
Nordex USA’s purchases from SZ were governed by General
Purchasing Conditions (“GPC”), which applied “in relations with
companies, public law bodies and any other third party entity
providing Services (‘Supplier’).”
¶ 1.1.)
(Pl.’s Br., Ex. B at Att. 8
The terms of the GPC were “governed by and construed in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
state
of
Illinois,”
and
initially the parties agreed to “submit to exclusive personal
jurisdiction in Illinois” and “waive any and all personal right
under
the
law
of
any
jurisdiction
to
object
on
any
basis
(including inconvenience of the forum) to jurisdiction or venue
within Illinois for the purpose of litigation to enforce these
GPC.” (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.)
However, on March 22, 2011 - six weeks
after initial execution of the GPC – SZ and Nordex USA replaced
the forum selection clause with language mandating that disputes
exceeding $1,000,000 “shall be submitted by either Party to the
American
Arbitration
Chicago, Illinois.”
Association
for
binding
arbitration
in
(Id. ¶ 16.1 (Revised).)
In September 2012, Nordex USA informed Bental of missing
parts it had purchased from SZ related to installation of wind
turbines
for
¶¶ 48-50.)
a
project
in
Beebe,
Michigan.
(Bauerle
Decl.
SZ prepared a letter to Nordex USA confirming that
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Bental “was acting as an ‘agent’ of SZ and that SZ was ‘directly
and exclusively liable for all activities’ performed” by Bental
related to this issue. (Id. ¶ 50.)
SZ
terminated
April 2015.
least
the
Commission
Agreement
(as
amended)
in
By then, Bauerle had traveled to Chicago “on at
eight
(8)
separate
occasions
on
behalf
of
SZ”
initiating contact with Nordex USA in August 2011.
Decl. ¶ 40.)
since
(Bauerle
SZ sold approximately $2.3 million of products to
Nordex USA between 2011 and 2013, paying Bental an estimated
€42,000 and over $10,000 in commissions on those sales. (Id.
¶¶ 41-42.)
However, Bental claims that SZ still owes it some
$50,000 in commissions on sales to Nordex USA (and over $100,000
on sales to Florida-based Siemens). (Id. ¶¶ 43-47.)
B.
To
recover
at
Procedural Background
least
some
of
these
allegedly
unpaid
commissions, Bental retained German counsel to issue a demand
letter
on
May
21,
2015,
provisions of German law.
In
a
June
22,
2015
making
claims
on
SZ
under
specific
(See, generally, Pl.’s Br. at Ex. A.)
response
letter,
SZ’s
counsel
asked
for
substantiation of Bental’s claims and asserted that SZ had in
fact remitted unearned commission payments to Bental in 2013 and
2014.
(See,
id.
§
2.)
SZ
thus
- 8 -
sought
repayment
of
those
commissions
under
German
“tort
law”
and
“law
of
unjust
enrichment.” (Ibid.)
Bental then filed suit against SZ on September 9, 2015 in
the
Northern
District
of
Ohio.
See,
Bental
&
Co.,
LLC
Schraubenwerk Zerbst GmbH, No. 3:15 C 1833 (N.D. Ohio).
v.
The
parties fully briefed the issue of SZ’s personal jurisdiction,
and on September 21, 2016, the court dismissed the case for lack
of personal jurisdiction under Ohio’s long-arm statute.
See,
generally, Bental, 2016 WL 5173327 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2016).
The court found that Bental failed to demonstrate that “SZ’s
contacts with Ohio, either directly or through Bental as its
alleged agent, give rise to its cause of action for failure to
pay commissions.” Id. at *3.
The court noted the absence of
evidence that Bental’s “activities were commissionable under the
parties’
contract,
and
(2)
if
so,
that
its
cause
of
action
‘arises from’ those activities as required per Ohio Revised Code
§
2307.382(C).”
Ibid.
(“[E]ven
if
I
found
SZ
transacted
business in Ohio, [Bental] does not show its causes of action
‘arise from’ those contacts.”) (citation omitted).
Bental filed its Complaint in this case on December 20,
2016,
asserting
the
same
four
causes
of
action:
breach
of
contract, violation of the Ohio and Illinois statutes governing
sales commissions, and unjust enrichment.
- 9 -
SZ seeks dismissal of
these
claims
for
lack
of
personal
jurisdiction
under
Rule 12(b)(2) or, in the alternative, pursuant to the forum non
conveniens doctrine under Rule 12(b)(3).
II.
A.
ANALYSIS
SZ’S Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss
The issue presented is whether SZ’s business relationship
with
Chicago-based
Nordex
USA
and
its
other
contacts
with
potential customers headquartered in Illinois – alone or through
Ohio-based Bental as its putative agent – subject SZ to personal
jurisdiction
in
this
case
for
breach
of
the
Commission
Agreement, under which allegedly unpaid commissions are keyed to
SZ’s sales to Nordex USA.
The Court finds that SZ indeed has
minimum contacts in Illinois sufficiently related to the conduct
giving
rise
to
the
alleged
breach
exercising specific jurisdiction.
of
contract
to
justify
Doing so is not inconsistent
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
1.
A
complaint
jurisdiction
but
Rule 12(b)(2) Legal Standard
need
when
not
a
include
facts
defendant
alleging
challenges
personal
personal
jurisdiction under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.
Purdue Res.
Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir.
2003).
Where, as here, the Court rules on a motion to dismiss
- 10 -
for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the submission of
written materials – and not based on evidence presented at an
evidentiary hearing – the plaintiff “need only make out a prima
facie case
of
personal
jurisdiction.”
Hyatt
Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002).
Int’l
Corp.
v.
In evaluating whether
the prima facie standard has been satisfied, the plaintiff “is
entitled
to
the
resolution
in
its
favor
of
all
concerning relevant facts presented in the record.”
disputes
Purdue, 338
F.3d at 782 (citations, quotation, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
A district court may exercise jurisdiction only if both the
state
and
federal
constitutional
requirements
are
satisfied.
Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 2010).
Where subject matter jurisdiction rests on diversity under 28
U.S.C. § 1332, personal jurisdiction turns on the law of the
forum state.
statute
Hyatt, 302 F.3d at 713.
authorizes
permitted
by
the
Stat. 5/2-209(c).
personal
jurisdiction
federal
The Illinois long-arm
However,
to
the
full
extent
Constitution.
735
Ill.
Comp.
because
permits
Illinois
personal
jurisdiction if it would be authorized by either the Illinois or
United
States
Constitutions,
the
constitutional requirements merge.
state
statutory
federal
uBID, Inc. v. The GoDaddy
Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010).
- 11 -
and
There are two variants of personal jurisdiction:
and “specific.”
General jurisdiction is proper only when the
defendant
has
state
question
in
personal
“continuous
such
jurisdiction
neither
arise
contacts.
“general”
out
that
over
of
and
systematic”
a
the
nor
contacts
district
court
defendant
relate
to
even
the
with
may
in
the
exercise
cases
defendant’s
that
forum
Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, is a more
limited assertion of state power in which personal jurisdiction
exists for controversies that arise out of or are related to the
defendant’s forum contacts.
See, Hyatt, 302 F.3d at 713.
Finally, even if a court finds that the minimum contacts
and specific jurisdiction requirements have been met, its due
process inquiry does not end.
It must also consider whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with “fair play and
substantial justice.”
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 476 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
2.
Bental
Specific Jurisdiction over SZ
concedes
that
jurisdiction over SZ.
application
and
this
Court
analysis
Bental
not
have
general
(See, Pl.’s Br. at 9 (“BENTAL suggests
of
only
necessary in the present case.”).)
concession,
does
could
not
specific
is
Even if it didn’t make this
advance
- 12 -
jurisdiction
a
colorable
general
jurisdiction argument.
that
the
plaintiff’s
See, Hyatt, 302 F.3d at 713 (explaining
only
option
is
to
establish
specific
jurisdiction where a defendant’s contacts with the forum state
are more limited).
If jurisdiction inheres in this controversy,
it is on the basis of specific jurisdiction such that the harm
to Bental must have arisen out of SZ’s contact with Illinois.
Exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate where (1)
the defendant has purposefully directed its activities at the
forum state or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting business in that state, and (2) the alleged injury
arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities.
Tamburo
v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2010).
a.
Minimum Contacts and Purposeful Availment
The Court takes as its starting point the guiding principle
that “an out-of-state party’s contract with an in-state party is
alone not enough to establish the requisite minimum contacts”
with the forum State in a breach of contract action.
RAR, Inc.
v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478).
This means that neither
SZ’s contracting with Nordex USA, nor its execution of NDAs with
two
other
establish
particularly
Chicago-based
minimum
potential
contacts
justified
where
here.
the
- 13 -
customers,
Such
contract
suffices
to
restraint
seems
with
forum
the
resident is
Other
not
links,
the
such
contract
as
prior
alleged
to
have
negotiations,
been
breached.
contemplated
future
consequences, the terms of the contract, and the parties’ actual
course
of
dealing,
may
demonstrate
that
the
purposefully availed itself of the forum.
defendant
has
Philos Techs., Inc.
v. Philos & D, Inc., 802 F.3d 905, 913 (7th Cir. 2015).
And, of
course, the defendant need not have been physically present but
only to have acted indirectly within the forum state.
See,
Heritage House Rests., Inc. v. Continental Funding Group, Inc.,
906 F.2d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 1990).
That said, “a physical
presence in the forum State may satisfy the requisite contacts
for
jurisdiction,
especially
when
a
representative
of
the
foreign corporation is directing marketing efforts at the forum
State.” Tile Unlimited, Inc. v. Blanke Corp., 47 F.Supp.3d 750,
762 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citations omitted).
The non-party contracts are not SZ’s only contacts with
Illinois.
Minimum contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident entity may be established through an agent of
the entity.
(2014)
See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1122
(“[P]hysical
entry
into
the
State
–
either
by
the
defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some
other
means
–
is
certainly
a
relevant
contact.”)
(emphasis
added) (citation omitted); Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant
- 14 -
Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676, 677-78 (7th Cir. 1980) (visits by
defendant’s agents to forum state in order to negotiate with
plaintiff were “significant in the formation of the contract”
and
constituted
process);
sufficient
CapGain
Props.
contact
Inc.
v.
so
as
to
Landmaster
satisfy
Partners,
due
LLC,
No. 15 C 9234, 2016 WL 3035534, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May 29,
2016).
To establish agency, the alleged agent must have either
actual
or
apparent
authority
from
the
principal,
or
the
principal must “ratify” the unauthorized agent’s actions through
later conduct.
Anetsberger v. Metro, Life Ins. Co., 14 F.3d
1226, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994); see, ABN AMRO, Inc. v. Capital Int’l
Ltd., 595 F.Supp.2d 805, 821 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
A principal
ratifies an action that the agent lacked authority to take by
later
retaining
the
benefits
flowing
from
the
action.
See,
e.g., Advance Mortg. Corp. v. Concordia Mut. Life Ass’n, 481
N.E.2d 1025, 1030-31 (Ill. App. 1985) (“[E]ven if we were to
find that Advance, as an agent for Concordia, acted outside its
authority, Concordia retained the benefits of Advance’s action
such as to constitute a ratification thereof.”).
The Court finds that Bauerle acted with actual authority
sufficient for his Illinois contacts to inure to SZ when, for
example, he made initial overtures to Nordex USA about doing
business with SZ and drove to Chicago at least eight times to
- 15 -
meet with Nordex USA personnel regarding its relationship with
SZ.
In addition, Bental has adduced sufficient evidence of its
apparent authority to bind SZ to commitments regarding Nordex
USA, given its status as SZ’s U.S. representative on business
cards and in other outward statements to which Nordex USA was
likely
exposed.
(Bental
even
adduced
evidence
that
SZ
made
statements specifically to Nordex USA designating Bauerle as its
agent with respect to certain problems attending Nordex USA’s
Beebe,
Michigan
wind
farm
project.)
At
the
very
least,
SZ
ratified the benefits of Bental’s efforts when it entered into
and maintained a business relationship with Nordex USA on these
terms until 2013 – a relationship pursuant to which it sold over
$2 million worth of product to Nordex USA.
See, Walden, 134
S.Ct. at 1122 (“[W]e have upheld the assertion of jurisdiction
over defendants who have purposefully ‘reached out beyond’ their
State and into another by, for example, entering a contractual
relationship
that
‘envisioned
continuing
and
wide-reaching
contacts’ in the forum State . . . .”) (quoting Burger King, 471
U.S. at 479-80) (brackets omitted).
The situation here is not
one in which “the unilateral activity of the plaintiff or some
other entity” is being imputed to SZ.
Purdue, 338 F.3d at 780.
On the contrary, Bauerle directed his activities to Nordex USA
and Illinois with SZ’s approval, at its behest, and in order to
- 16 -
benefit it - with no shortage of representations that this was
the case.
The Court therefore finds that SZ has minimum contacts with
Illinois.
b.
Relatedness
Establishing minimum contacts is only the first part of the
inquiry, and alone they are insufficient to support exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction.
Rather, it is essential that
the plaintiff’s claim arise out of or relate to the defendant’s
minimum contacts with the forum state.
uBID, 623 F.3d at 429.
As the RAR court noted, “[w]e cannot simply aggregate all of a
defendant’s contacts with a state – no matter how dissimilar in
terms of geography, time, or substance – as evidence of the
constitutionally required minimum contacts.”
1277.
RAR, 107 F.3d at
The action “‘must directly arise out of the specific
contacts between the defendant and the forum state.’” Id. at
1278 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70
F.3d 1381, 1389 (1st Cir. 1995)).
In this case, SZ argues strenuously that its contacts with
Illinois
are
Commission
jurisdiction.
is
only
the
unrelated
Agreement,
to
Bental’s
and
thus
suit
cannot
for
breach
ground
of
the
specific
SZ is correct that, per the Seventh Circuit, “it
‘dealings
between
the
- 17 -
parties
in
regard
to
the
disputed
contract’
analysis.”
(quoting
RAR,
that
107
Vetrotex
are
F.3d
relevant
at
Certainteed
1278
Corp.
to
minimum
(emphasis
v.
Consol.
Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1996)).
in
contacts
original)
Fiber
Glass
But the parties’
dealings in regard to the disputed agreement – that is, the
respective
conduct
allocating
SZ’s
of
Bental
liability
and
under
SZ
the
to
be
adjudicated
Commission
in
Agreement
–
“lie[] in the wake of [SZ’s] commercial activities in Illinois”
and Florida.
Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726
F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he discussions that took
place in Illinois between [a manufacturer’s representative] and
[the
defendant’s
sole
shareholder]
played
a
part
in
the
subsequent [out-of-state] negotiations between [the latter] and
the
plaintiff,
which
led
to
the
contract
between
[the
manufacturer] and the plaintiff.”).
Whether Bental can recover under the Commission Agreement
turns not just, for example, on that contract’s construction and
enforceability, but also crucially on the timing, nature, and
extent
of
Siemens.
SZ’s
sales
to
and
payments
from
Nordex
USA
and
Unlike the situation in RAR where “[t]he outcome of
this particular breach of contract action . . . will not turn on
any facts developed from RAR’s prior forum contacts,” 107 F.3d
at 1279, facts developed from SZ’s prior Illinois contacts will
- 18 -
indeed determine a large part of Bental’s claimed contractual
entitlements.
Instead
of
the
defendant’s
“prior
Illinois
contacts tell[ing] the court nothing about RAR’s cause of action
and shed[ding] little light even on the contract generally,”
ibid.,
Bental’s
significantly
recovery
indebted
under
to
SZ’s
the
Commission
Illinois
Agreement
contacts,
which
is
shed
light on Bental’s potential entitlements under that agreement
and on the agreement’s “economic substance.” Id. at 1278.
For
example,
SZ’s
provision
in
securing
the
Nordex
original
USA’s
Commission
business
triggered
the
Agreement
scotching
the
monthly retainer and travel expense reimbursements in favor of
the
commission
schedule
negotiated
in
the
amendment.
In
addition, the GPC governing Nordex USA’s purchase of products
from SZ –which, incidentally, chooses Illinois law and initially
contained
an
Illinois
forum-selection
clause
–
expressly
designates “third party entities providing services” related to
Nordex USA’s purchases as the “Supplier” counterparty.
This
provision plainly seems to contemplate Bental, given all the
services
Bauerle
supplied
for
every
Nordex
USA
purchase.
Whereas the “primary similarity between the disputed contract”
and the prior forum contacts in RAR was the identity of parties,
ibid., here the primary difference between the disputed contract
- 19 -
and the prior Illinois contacts is the lack of complete identity
of parties.
Indeed,
crediting
SZ’s
position
requires
reading
“in
regard” out of the Vetrotex court’s holding, which the Seventh
Circuit expressly adopted in RAR.
Had either court wished, it
could have easily limited the dealings relevant to the minimum
contacts
analysis
in
a
contract
case
parties to the disputed contract.”
court did.
the
those
“between
the
Needless to say, neither
As such, the dealings of SZ and Bental in regard to
Commission
Agreement
properly
contacts with Nordex USA.
under
to
which
it
was
implicate
SZ’s
Illinois
By putting in place an agreement
obligated
to
pay
commissions
on
sales
resulting from its agent’s successful efforts, SZ knew when it
subsequently
Illinois
and
relationship
directed
its
initiated
with
Nordex
agent
a
to
solicit
successful
USA,
that
it
Nordex
years-long
might
be
USA
in
business
suable
in
Illinois should either contractual relationship sour.
The Court feels compelled to say a few words about the Ohio
litigation.
As
an
initial
matter,
this
case
might
well
be
consonant with the outcome there on the Ohio court’s own terms.
The court took pains to note that Bental had failed to show
commissionable Ohio activities – that is, a relation between
SZ’s sole contacts with Ohio as a contractual counterparty and
- 20 -
Bental’s own activities in the state.
Here, however, Bental’s
account (which the Court must credit at this stage) speaks of
commissionable activities in Illinois that were related to SZ’s
contacts with the state.
In any event, to the extent the Ohio
court’s personal jurisdiction conclusion might bump up against
this Court’s, that may well flow from two outcome-determinative
facets of Ohio law that do not apply here.
First, unlike Illinois’s long-arm statute, the Ohio longarm statute is not coextensive with – and confers jurisdiction
more narrowly than - due process under the Constitution.
Schneider
v.
Hardesty,
669
F.3d
693,
699
(6th
Cir.
See,
2012);
Calphalon Corp. v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he
Ohio
Supreme
Court
has
ruled
that
the
Ohio
long-arm
statute does not extend to the constitutional limits of the Due
Process Clause.”) (citation omitted).
As such, the court did
not collapse the state into the federal due process inquiries,
as Illinois federal courts do, but instead ended its analysis
when it found application of the Ohio long-arm statute wanting.
See,
2016
present
a
WL
5173327
prima
facie
at
*2-3
showing
(“I
that
find
this
Plaintiff
Court
jurisdiction pursuant to Ohio’s long-arm statute.
failed
has
to
personal
Whether this
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction would offend the limitations of
- 21 -
federal
due
process
requirements
is,
therefore,
nugatory.”)
(internal citations omitted).
Second,
cause
the
Ohio
relationship
long-arm
between
the
statute
requires
defendant’s
forum and the plaintiff’s cause of action.
at *2.
a
contacts
proximate
with
the
See, 2016 WL 5173327
No such onerous requirement obtains under either the
Illinois or federal constitution, and indeed the Seventh Circuit
has expressly disapproved of such an approach, noting that the
“precise causal relationship between contacts and claim” should
not be dispositive.
See, uBID, 623 F.3d at 430 (“[R]equiring
proximate causation between contacts and claim would exclude too
many claims. . . .”).
While this Court does not impermissibly
swing the pendulum to the other amplitude, see, RAR, 107 F.3d at
1278 (rejecting but-for causation), it finds that the contacts
alleged and the wrongs alleged “are so intimately related that
[SZ] cannot reasonably have been surprised to find itself sued
in Illinois.”
uBID, 623 F.3d at 431.
Therefore, Bental’s lawsuit sufficiently arises out of and
is
related
to
SZ’s
minimum
contacts
with
Illinois
such
that
specific jurisdiction is proper.
3.
Finally,
specific
the
Court
jurisdiction
Fairness Analysis
must
over
SZ
satisfy
would
- 22 -
itself
not
that
offend
exercising
“traditional
notions
of
fair
play
and
substantial
justice.”
Asahi
Metal
Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
examination
account
of
fair
burden
“‘the
play
on
and
substantial
defendant,’
the
justice
‘the
takes
forum
An
into
State’s
interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the interstate
judicial
system’s
interest
in
obtaining
the
most
efficient
resolution of controversies,’ and ‘the shared interest of the
several
States
policies.’”
in
furthering
fundamental
substantive
social
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
The
ultimate
and
constitutional
reasonable
to
call
the
lodestar
defendant
answer the plaintiff’s claim.”
a.
The
first
is
whether
into
the
it
is
state’s
“fair
courts
to
finding
of
uBID, 623 F.3d at 426.
The Burden on the Defendant
factor
weighs
slightly
against
a
fairness, as traveling to Illinois from Germany does burden SZ.
Worth keeping in mind, however, is the fact that “out-of-state
defendants always face such a burden,” Felland v. Clifton, 682
F.3d 665, 677 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original), and the
extent
to
which
communication
defending
have
suit
in
“modern
methods
significantly
a
forum
of
transportation
ameliorated
other
- 23 -
than
[the]
one’s
burden”
and
of
residence.
Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 632 (11th
Cir.
1996)
1050,
(citation
1060
(9th
transportation
omitted);
Cir.
and
see,
2007)
Menken
(“[W]ith
telecommunications
v.
Emm,
the
and
503
F.3d
advances
the
in
increasing
interstate practice of law, any burden [of litigation in a forum
other than one’s residence] is substantially less than in days
past.”); see also, Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos. Reis Jr. Ind.
Com
de
Equip.
(same).
Medico,
563
F.3d
1285,
1299
(Fed.
Cir.
2009)
Further, the burden on SZ personnel to travel from
Germany to any other potential U.S. forum – for example, Florida
- is effectively the same, and if the action were to proceed in
Germany,
Bental
would
bear
an
analogous
travel
burden.
See,
e.g., Innovation First Int’l, Inc. v. Zuru, Inc., No. 3:11 C
2726,
2012
WL
12897157,
at
*6
(N.D.
Tex.
Apr.
10,
2012)
(“Requiring Plaintiff to travel to a foreign forum to pursue a
remedy would merely shift travel burdens from the Defendant to
the Plaintiff.”).
A few other considerations warrant a mention.
parties
did
Commission
not
include
Agreement,
a
forum
suggesting
selection
that
SZ
did
For one, the
clause
not
in
the
devote
any
resources ex ante in reliance on a particular forum.
SZ
retained
U.S.-based
counsel
in
the
Ohio
action
Moreover,
and
has
retained a Chicago-based law firm in this case, both of whom
- 24 -
appear to have ably represented SZ’s interests.
to
some
extent
international
conventional
defendants
concerns
navigating
See, Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
SZ
weighs
against
a
a
about
This alleviates
the
foreign
travails
legal
of
system.
Therefore, although the burden on
finding
of
fair
play
and
substantial
justice, it does so only slightly.
b.
Illinois’s Interest in Adjudicating the Dispute
The second factor weighs moderately against a finding of
fairness.
Illinois’s interest in adjudicating this breach-of-
contract action between an Ohio LLC and a German company – even
if it involves some evidence located in Illinois - is minimal.
The only minor interest Illinois has in this case is application
of its state law, under which Bental has brought a claim.
While
Chicago-based Nordex USA may have an interest in the outcome of
this case, it is not a party, nor is it alleged to be a victim
in any way of SZ’s conduct.
c.
The Plaintiff’s Interest in Obtaining
Convenient and Effective Relief
The third factor, however, weighs significantly in favor of
a fairness finding.
This forum is much more convenient for
Bental to pursue its claims than Florida or Germany would be,
and it has already incurred costs in filing the unsuccessful
Ohio action.
In light of this procedural history, the statute
- 25 -
of limitations on Bental’s claim might expire – undermining the
effectiveness of relief elsewhere – if it is forced to re-file
this lawsuit again in a third forum.
d.
The Interstate Judicial System’s Interest
in Obtaining the Most Efficient
Resolution of Controversies
The fourth factor weighs moderately in favor of a fairness
finding.
Although Bental claims more commissions on SZ’s sales
of products to Florida-based Siemens than on sales to Nordex
USA, litigating the action here is a more efficient allocation
of interstate judicial resources.
Assuming equal amounts of
evidence in the possession of Nordex USA in Illinois and Siemens
in Florida, it will nonetheless be easier for all involved to
obtain written and oral discovery from Ohio if this Court is
home base for the action.
Discovery will thus take less time,
and this dispute can be more quickly purged from the federal
docket.
(The Court also notes that it enjoys a comparative
advantage, however slight, in applying Bental’s claims under the
Illinois sales commission statute, and that Bental in neither
its
Ohio
nor
Illinois
Complaints
asserted
Florida
state-law
claims.)
*
*
*
In sum, the first factor slightly weighs against personal
jurisdiction, and the second factor does so moderately.
- 26 -
The
third factor significantly and the fourth factor moderately cut
in favor of personal jurisdiction.
the
States’
inapplicable.)
overwhelmingly
fundamental
(The fifth factor concerning
substantive
social
policies
appears
Although the fair play considerations do not
favor
Bental,
they
do
support
characterizing
exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case as consistent
with “fair play and substantial justice.” Exercising personal
jurisdiction over SZ is convenient to Bental and efficient from
the perspective of interstate judicial resources, even if it
implicates matters of little interest to Illinois and imposes a
travel burden on SZ.
B.
SZ
advocates
for
under Rule 12(b)(2):
Forum Non Conveniens
an
alternative
to
dismissing
the
case
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.
SZ proposes that trial in a German forum will best serve the
convenience of the parties.
For the reasons explored below, the
Court agrees.
1.
Legal Standard
The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a
trial court to dismiss a suit over which it would normally have
jurisdiction if it best serves the convenience of the parties
and the ends of justice.
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 420
F.3d 702, 703 (7th Cir. 2005).
Federal courts have discretion
- 27 -
to
dismiss
available
a
case
forum
based
exists
on
and
this
“trial
doctrine
in
the
when
chosen
an
adequate
forum
would
establish oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant out of all
proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or the chosen forum is
inappropriate
because
of
considerations
affecting
own administrative and legal problems.”
Malaysia
Int’l
Shipping
Co.,
549
the
court’s
Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
U.S.
(alterations omitted) (quotation omitted).
422,
429
(2007)
The defendant bears
the burden of persuasion on all issues related to forum non
conveniens.
for
Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430.
improper
allegations
venue,
in
the
the
district
complaint
as
court
the
decision, but may look beyond them.
On a motion to dismiss
need
exclusive
not
basis
view
the
for
its
Deb v. SIRVA, Inc., 832
F.3d 800, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2016).
The analysis thus proceeds in two parts.
First, the Court
examines whether the proposed alternative forum is “available”
and “adequate.”
n.22 (1981).
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254
If so, then the Court proceeds to examine the
private and public interest factors set forth in Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
2.
An
Germany Is an Available and Adequate Forum
alternative
forum
is
“available”
if
all
parties
are
amenable to service of process and are subject to jurisdiction
- 28 -
in that forum.
Stroitelstvo Bulgaria Ltd. v. Bulgarian-American
Enterprise Fund, 589 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 2009).
The forum
is
offers
“adequate”
if
it
provides
a
fair
hearing
that
a
potential remedy for the subject matter of the dispute. Ibid.
The remedy need not be as comprehensive or as favorable as the
American claims; they need only offer some avenue of redress.
Ibid.
In support of an availability and adequacy determination,
SZ offers the affidavit of Professor Hans-Eric Rasmussen-Bonne,
an attorney who practices in Germany and is a member of the New
York bar in good standing; holds a Ph.D. from the University of
Illinois
in
conflicts
and
jurisdictional
issues;
and
has
researched and taught at Emory University, Dresden University,
and the University of Illinois.
in
the
Complaint
and
other
After analyzing the allegations
submissions,
Professor
Rasmussen-
Bonne concluded that Bental would be able to assert jurisdiction
over SZ in Germany.
international
He came to this conclusion by noting that
personal
jurisdiction
of
German
courts
in
this
case would be governed by European Union and German national
law.
On the reasonable assumption that SZ is only domiciled in
Germany,
Professor
Rasmussen-Bonne
concluded
that
European
Community Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
- 29 -
(as amended) would govern jurisdiction over SZ, meaning that
“German
courts
jurisdiction
to
would
have
adjudicate
general
claims
international
against
[SZ]
including
claims brought by the plaintiff in this case.”
Ex. B at 2.)
personal
the
(Def.’s Mem.,
Given his obvious expertise in these areas and his
detailed declaration on this score, the Court accepts and adopts
his conclusions.
Germany is “available” to Bental.
The Court additionally notes that SZ consents to personal
jurisdiction
in
Germany.
(See,
e.g.,
ECF
No.
16
(“Def.’s
Reply”) at 11 (“As referenced in SZ’s Memorandum, as a condition
to
a
forum
willing
non-conveniens
to
submit
to
dismissal,
the
SZ
has
it
of
jurisdiction
indicated
German
the
is
courts. . . .”).)
SZ’s willingness to do so bolsters a finding
that
an
Germany
is
available
forum.
See,
e.g.,
Barcode
Informatica Limitada v. Zebra Techs. Corp., No. 08 C 2021, 2011
WL 1100449, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2011).
With respect to adequacy, Professor Rasmussen-Bonne opines
that
“German
law
provides
adequate
remedies
for
claims
for
damages and for unjust enrichment.” (ECF No. 11, Ex. B at 1.)
These approximate the remedies Bental seeks in its breach of
contract,
state-law
commission,
and
unjust
enrichment
counts.
(Specific to Germany’s adequacy for unjust enrichment claims,
recall
that
SZ
responded
to
the
- 30 -
initial
demand
letter
from
Bental’s German counsel by making demands under German unjust
enrichment
law
professor’s
for
return
affidavit
goes
of
on
commission
to
note
payments.)
that
The
principal-agent
commercial cases are routine in German courts, governed by a
body of extensive literature and case law.
To the extent that
the penumbra of potential redress in Germany may nonetheless
fall
short
dispositive
of
that
available
the
adequacy
to
in
U.S.
courts,
this
determination.
Stroitelstvo, 589 F.3d at 421.
See,
is
not
e.g.,
So too if Bental cannot pursue
in Germany one of its specific causes of action asserted here.
See, e.g., ibid. (“[F]ederal courts have routinely held that the
loss
of
a . . . claim
does
conveniens
dismissal.”)
clear
this
in
potential
avenue
case
for
not
by
(citation
that
itself
preclude
omitted).
It
Germany
redress
for
provides
the
subject
at
is
forum
non
therefore
least
matter
“some
of
the
dispute.” Ibid. (citing Kamel v. Hill-Rom Co., Inc., 108 F.3d
799, 802 (7th Cir. 1997)).
As such, the Court similarly accepts
and adopts Professor Rasmussen-Bonne’s conclusion that Germany
is “adequate” to redress Bental’s claims.
While the Court would prefer a more detailed enumeration of
precisely what German causes of action Bental could pursue, this
is not a situation like that in Deb where “to the extent the
defendants offered any evidence at all, it was evidence that
- 31 -
would not, in fact, be subject to jurisdiction” in the foreign
forum.
meet
832 F.3d at 810-813 (finding that defendants did not
their
burden
where
they
argued
for
adequacy
“without
evidence, without expert testimony, and without a concession to
jurisdiction”).
Further,
Bental
itself
submitted
documents
indicating that it initially retained German counsel to make
claims on SZ under German law.
Ex. A.)
(See, generally, Pl.’s Br.,
If Germany is an inadequate forum, it is difficult to
understand why Bental’s first inclination – even before filing
suit in federal court in Ohio – was to make such demands on SZ.
Therefore, the Court finds that Germany is an available and
adequate forum – and hence provides an “alternative” forum for
purposes of forum non conveniens analysis.
3.
The Public and Private Interest Factors Favor Dismissal
Because Germany is an available and adequate forum, the
Court turns to examining the private and public interests at
stake.
a.
The
include
private
“the
Private Interest Factors
interest
relative
factors
ease
of
that
access
a
to
court
may
sources
consider
of
proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling,
and
the
cost
of
obtaining
attendance
of
willing,
witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
- 32 -
the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of
a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”
at 508.
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S.
The enforceability of a judgement, if one is obtained,
is also a private interest factor. Ibid.
The Court finds that the private interest factors favor
dismissal.
proof”
Both the “relative ease of access to sources of
and
the
“availability
of
compulsory
process
for
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing,
witnesses”
forum.
Related
support
factors,
dismissal
such
as
in
favor
translation
of
a
German
expenses
and
Bauerle’s fluency in German, also buttress dismissal. (Bental
has not argued that any judgment it would receive in Germany
would be unenforceable.
The possibility of viewing the premises
seems inapt in this case.)
Most of the relevant evidence – including all SZ’s original
documents and witnesses – is located in Germany.
¶¶ 39-40.)
deposited
Clerides
(Schmidt Decl.
This typically suggests that the first factor be
on
v.
the
dismissal
Boeing
Co.,
side
534
of
F.3d
the
623,
ledger.
See,
e.g.,
629
Cir.
2008)
(7th
(noting that most of the evidence and witnesses were located in
the foreign forum).
While Bental claims that several potential
witnesses who are Nordex USA and Siemens employees reside in
Illinois,
Florida,
and
Kansas,
the
- 33 -
Court
is
not
willing
to
prioritize
the
convenience
of
third-party
exigencies of first-party discovery.
discovery
over
the
For one, the extent to
which such third-party discovery will be necessary is unclear,
notwithstanding Bental’s claim that these are “key witnesses.”
(Pl.’s Br., Ex. B ¶¶ 51-52.)
As far as the Court can discern,
besides Bauerle, no one in the U.S. participated in negotiating
the Commission Agreement or amending it – and much of his own
participation was in Germany.
For another, the damages evidence
is more likely to be in Germany than in Ohio, Illinois, or
Florida.
The
commissions
payable
to
Bental
were
to
be
calculated in Euros, per the Commission Agreement, and these
commissions were to be calculated based on the Euro value of
SZ’s
sales
–
the
original
records
of
which
reside
with
SZ.
(Schmidt Decl. ¶¶ 36-38.)
Further, with respect to first-party discovery, Bental is
comprised of one individual who would need to travel and give
testimony
abroad,
and
he
speaks
both
German
and
English.
(Indeed, SZ alleges without objection that Bauerle has or had
German citizenship.
(Schmidt Decl. ¶ 16.)
And he is fluent
enough in the language to have translated documents for Nordex
USA’s and SZ’s benefit, further supporting the notion that he
enjoys a comparative linguistic advantage over SZ personnel.)
Simply
put,
both
parties
can
transact
- 34 -
in
German,
but
only
Bauerle appears to have English-language skills.
It will be
easiest in terms of access to evidence and cheaper in terms of
translation
testimony
original
expenses
in
German,
have
to
a
travel
German
documents
to
Germany,
interpret
court
(including
give
the
the
Commission
The fact that Bauerle traveled to Germany several
during
executives
Bauerle
and
German-language
Agreement).
times
for
are
the
not
parties’
course
alleged
to
of
have
dealing
–
traveled
whereas
to
the
SZ
United
States, and indeed could not attend the U.S. trade show that
spawned the parties’ affiliation – further suggests that he is
the more convenient bearer of these burdens.
This dovetails with document-specific complications of the
case remaining here – such as the need to translate documents
and testimony into English.
See, e.g., Stroitelstvo, 589 F.3d
at 425 (upholding the district court’s dismissal and noting that
“[t]ranslating
all
of
the
Bulgarian
discovery
documents
English for a U.S. court would also be costly”).
into
This problem
is exacerbated in breach of contract cases such as this one in
which
entitlement
to
relief
might
well
turn
on
particular
wording in the contract (both the Commission Agreement and its
amendment were drafted and executed in German).
While the Court
appreciates Bental’s earnest offer to help mitigate expenses by
having Bauerle translate documents, out of impartiality concerns
- 35 -
the Court would require a second translation of such documents
anyway.
Moreover, to obtain testimony of involuntary witnesses, the
Court
would
be
required
to
navigate
the
Rube
Goldberg
contraption of the Hague Convention, which governs the taking of
evidence abroad.
Pursuant to that process, this Court would
write letters rogatory requesting evidence to the United States
Department of Justice, Civil Division, who would then forward
them to the competent German authority, who would then process
them
and
transmit
individual.
them
to
the
relevant
Germany
entity
or
Based on Professor Rasmussen-Bonne’s experience, it
“takes between three and six months until the Letter of Request
reaches
the
defendant.”
(Def.’s
Mem.,
Ex.
B
at
3.)
Such
obstacles suggest that information is much more easily obtained
in the foreign forum.
court
concluded
See, Clerides, 534 F.3d at 629-30 (“[T]he
reasonably
that
the
superiority
of
live
testimony and the inconvenience of taped depositions obtained by
letters rogatory favored dismissal.”); Vivendi SA v. T-Mobile
USA Inc., 586 F.3d 689, 696 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Moreover, the
district
court
concluded,
based
on
its
experience,
that
the
ability of the court to compel unwilling witnesses to testify
slightly favors dismissal because the Hague Convention’s letters
rogatory process, which would be necessary to produce proof for
- 36 -
an American trial, is more cumbersome than European Commission
Regulations for taking evidence within Europe, which would be
necessary to produce proof for a European trial.”).
Therefore, the private interest factors favor dismissal.
b.
The
Court
must
Public Interest Factors
also
weigh
the
public
interest
factors,
including “the administrative difficulties stemming from court
congestion;
the
local
interest
in
having
localized
disputes
decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity
case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern
the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts
of laws or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness
of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.”
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
Unfortunately for Bental, the
public interest factors also make a convincing case for forum
non conveniens dismissal.
First,
to
the
extent
the
“court
congestion”
factor
is
worthy of consideration here, it does not support maintenance of
the case in this Court.
In 2015, this District was the busiest
in the Seventh Circuit in terms of cases filed (and the fourthbusiest in the entire United States).
Statistics 2015:
U.S. Courts, Caseload
Table C-5, U.S. District Courts – Median Time
Intervals From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases, available
- 37 -
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/c05mar15_0.pdf
(last visited July 13, 2017).
The median time from filing to
trial in civil cases was 28.8 months.
Ibid.; see also, In re
Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 484 F.3d 951,
958
(7th
Cir.
2007)
(“To
the
extent
that
court
congestion
matters, what is important is the speed with which a case can
come to trial and be resolved.”) (citation omitted).
parties
have
not
furnished
the
Court
with
While the
information
about
court congestion in Germany, other federal courts to consider
such evidence have found that “German courts generally are able
to
dispose
of
cases
more
quickly,
and
have
less
crowded
dockets[,] than either American courts generally or courts in
[this district] in particular.”
F.Supp.2d
717,
734
(W.D.
Tex.
Blum v. Gen. Elec. Co., 547
2008)
(crediting
defendant’s
evidence that case duration in German courts was “4.4 months for
district courts and 7.2 months for the regional courts” and that
there were “64 pending cases per judge in Germany compared to
1,164 pending cases per judge in the United States”).
In any
event, the Court doubts that tribunals in the State of SachsenAnhalt, Germany (where SZ has its principal place of business)
face congestion comparable to that prevailing in this District.
Because, given the sheer traffic in this District, it is likely
that
the
case
could
proceed
much
- 38 -
more
quickly
to
trial
in
Germany and also impede fewer other plaintiffs’ suits, this Gulf
Oil factor favors dismissal.
See, e.g., In re Air Crash at
Madrid,
2008,
Spain,
on
August
20,
893
F.Supp.2d
1020,
1042
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (“The Court does not have comparable statistics
for Spanish courts, but it is beyond dispute that this Court
faces
significant
contribute
to
the
congestion.
congestion
Hearing
in
the
these
U.S.
cases
would
courts. . . . [and]
impede the ability of local litigants to try their cases in this
district.”) (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Next, in contrast to Germany, Illinois has little to no
localized interest in deciding this dispute.
Agreement
governs
the
past
relationship
The Commission
between
an
Ohio
and
German entity; it is a creature of either Ohio or German law.
The
only
Illinois
player
in
this
case,
Nordex
USA,
is
not
alleged to have done anything wrong, nor is SZ’s conduct alleged
to have wronged any Illinois resident.
not
a
citizen
of
Illinois,
Bental
is
Further, because it is
not
entitled
to
the
presumption in favor of a resident plaintiff’s choice of venue.
See, Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430 (“When the plaintiff’s choice of
forum is not its home forum, however, the presumption in the
plaintiff’s favor ‘applies with less force,’ for the assumption
that the chosen forum is appropriate in such cases is ‘less
reasonable.’”) (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255-56).
- 39 -
In
fact, Bental acknowledges that “because it is not a resident of
the present forum, the strong presumption in favor of its chosen
forum is somewhat lessened.”
832 F.3d at 806).)
(See, Pl.’s Br. at 14 (citing Deb,
That Bental first sued in its home forum
before bringing suit here further belies the notion that this
forum
is
appropriate.
Absent
this
presumption,
both
the
“localized interest” and “unfairness of burdening citizens in an
unrelated forum with jury duty” militate in favor of forum non
conveniens dismissal.
See, e.g., Stroitelstvo, 589 F.3d at 425
(“Since this loan is so unrelated to the local forum, calling
Chicago-area citizens for jury duty on this case would be asking
a lot.”) (citation omitted).
In addition, because all Bental’s claims save the unjust
enrichment
count
expressly
turn
on
the
existence
of
a
valid
contract with SZ, the law in this diversity case that “must
govern the action” is more fairly said to be German or Ohio law,
notwithstanding
Bental’s
commission statute.
interpretation
of
single
claim
under
the
Illinois
Even if the presence of that claim, on an
Gulf
Oil
charitable
to
Bental,
means
that
Illinois law “must govern the action,” “the interest in having
the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with
the law that must govern the action” would not favor an Illinois
forum.
It would at best weigh only neutrally in light of the
- 40 -
other causes of action asserted, including an analogous Ohio
statutory
cause
of
action
and
a
breach-of-contract
count
governed by either Ohio or German law.
In
any
event,
there
still
remains
the
thorny
issue
of
avoiding “unnecessary problems in conflicts of laws or in the
application
contests
of
foreign
application
of
law.”
On
German
the
law,
assumption
then
the
that
Court
Bental
would
be
forced to engage in a choice-of-law analysis without the benefit
of any relevant provision in the contract.
this
analysis
Germany,
Germany
would
their
and
on
be
the
parties’
negotiation
of
Ohio-Germany
the
Facts relevant to
residence
Commission
telephone
calls,
in
Ohio
Agreement
its
and
in
execution
apparently in each country, performance by SZ in Germany and
Bental in the United States, payment by SZ in Euros, and so on.
And even if Bental would not contest application of German law,
this Gulf Oil factor would favor dismissal, as the Court would
nonetheless be tasked with applying unfamiliar German contract
law.
Forum non conveniens is “designed in part to help courts
avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law.” Piper
Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251 (“[T]he public interest factors point
towards dismissal where the court would be required to ‘untangle
problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.’”)
(quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509).
- 41 -
As with the private interest factors, the public interest
factors similarly favor dismissal.
*
In
summary,
the
Court
*
finds
*
that
both
the
private
and
public interest factors support dismissing the case on forum non
conveniens grounds.
Because it is more convenient for a German
court to adjudicate this case, the Court is willing to enter an
order of dismissal subject to the conditions stated below.
4.
Conditions of Dismissal
Because the Court has personal jurisdiction over SZ and
subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity, it has authority
to subject SZ to conditions of forum non conveniens dismissal.
Cf., Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 435 (reserving decision on whether a
court
conditioning
a
forum
non
conveniens
dismissal
on
the
waiver of jurisdictional or limitations defenses in the foreign
forum must first determine its own authority to adjudicate the
case).
First, SZ must agree to consent to personal jurisdiction in
Germany, accept service of process, and waive any statute-oflimitations defense to Bental’s claims that did not exist prior
to
initiation
of
the
instant
lawsuit
(unless
such
a
defense
relies on Bental’s failure to bring suit timely after the date
on
which
the
Court
enters
a
dismissal
- 42 -
order).
See,
e.g.,
Pettitt v. Boeing Co., No. 09 C 3709, 2010 WL 3861066, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2010); Gonzalez v. Ford Motor Co., MDL
No. 1373, 2010 WL 1576831, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 19, 2010),
aff’d,
662
F.3d
931
(7th
Cir.
2011);
In
re
Air
Crash
Near
Athens, Greece on August 14, 2005, 479 F.Supp.2d 792, 805 (N.D.
Ill. 2007).
Second, SZ must agree to advise the German court that it
does not object to the admissibility of depositions taken in the
U.S. or other materials obtained in discovery in the U.S. simply
on
the
basis
that
the
obtained outside Germany.
depositions
or
other
materials
were
See, e.g., In re Factor VIII, 531
F.Supp.2d 957, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2008), aff’d, 563 F.3d 663 (7th
Cir. 2009).
Of course, SZ would retain the right to object on
any other grounds recognized by applicable evidence rules.
Upon the filing of SZ’s statement that it agrees to these
conditions, the Court will enter an Order dismissing this action
on the ground of forum non conveniens.
The statement should be
filed no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this
opinion.
The dismissal of the case will be without prejudice to
its reinstatement in this Court should SZ fail to abide by any
of the above conditions.
F.3d
1374,
1383-84
(11th
See, King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 562
Cir.
2009);
- 43 -
Tarasevich
v.
Eastwind
Transp. Ltd., No. 02 C 1806, 2003 WL 21692759, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
July 21, 2003).
IV.
For
the
reasons
CONCLUSION
stated
herein,
Defendant’s
Motion
to
Dismiss [ECF No. 10] is denied under Rule 12(b)(2) but granted
under Rule 12(b)(3) on forum non conveniens grounds.
The Court
will enter an Order dismissing the case upon receiving within
fourteen
(14)
days
of
the
date
of
this
Opinion
a
written
statement of SZ agreeing to submit to personal jurisdiction in
Germany, accept service of process, waive certain statute-oflimitations defenses to Bental’s claims, and advise the German
court that it does not object to admission of evidence obtained
in the U.S. solely because that evidence was obtained outside
Germany.
The
dismissal
will
be
without
prejudice
to
reinstatement in this Court should SZ fail to abide by these
conditions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: August 2, 2017
- 44 -
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