Jain et al v. Butler Illinois School District 53 et al

Filing 283

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 3/12/2019: Defendants' motion for summary judgment 233 is granted as to Count I of the Fifth Amended Complaint. The Court will enter judgment in favor of the Adminis trators and against A on the § 1983 claim. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts III and IV, the remaining state-law claims, and dismisses those claims without prejudice. All pending motions and schedules are stricken as moot. Civil case terminated. [For further details see Background]. Mailed notice(is, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
S. JAIN, for herself and on behalf of her son,
MINOR “A,”
Plaintiffs,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BUTLER
SCHOOL DISTRICT 53, HEIDI
WENNSTROM, KELLY VOLIVA, and
LISA OWEN,
Defendants.

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No. 17 C 0002
Judge Ronald A. Guzmán

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons explained below, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as
to Count I of the Fifth Amended Complaint, and Counts III and IV are dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
In this action, plaintiff, S. Jain, asserts for herself and on behalf of her minor son, “A,”
claims that arise from Butler School District 53’s (the “District’s”) actions and investigation
stemming from a report that Jain had engaged in deception in order to provide A with unfair
advantages in academic competitions (the National Geographic Bee (the “GeoBee”) and the
WordMasters Challenge (“WordMasters”)). In the current complaint, plaintiffs allege that District
employees interrogated A about cheating in those competitions and “coerced a false confession from
him that he participated in the GeoBee contest after studying the actual contest questions.” (ECF
No. 170, 5th Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57, 87.) They further allege that, following a “biased” investigation
of the purported cheating, A was prohibited from participating in future academic competitions

while a student in the District, and Jain was not permitted to serve as a parent volunteer in any
school-related contests. (Id. ¶ 121.)
Plaintiffs sued the District; the District’s Board of Education (the “Board”) and its members
at the relevant time; District Superintendent Heidi Wennstrom; Kelly Voliva, the former Principal
of the District’s Brook Forest Elementary School (“Brook Forest”); and Brook Forest Assistant
Principal Lisa Owen. Plaintiffs also sued two attorneys who performed relevant work for the
District, but the Court dismissed the claims against those defendants on March 22, 2018, as well as
several other claims. (ECF No. 208, Mem. Op. & Order.)
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law for A’s unlawful
seizure, against Wennstrom, Voliva, and Owen (the “Administrators”) (Counts I and III), and under
Illinois law for willful and wanton conduct by both plaintiffs against the Board (Count IV).1
Defendants move for summary judgment on the remaining claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.
MATERIAL FACTS2
In January 2016, A was a fifth-grade student at Brook Forest, a public elementary school in
Oak Brook, Illinois. On January 15, 2016, Wennstrom received information from a District parent
who alleged that other District parents had obtained in advance the examination questions for the

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Count IV was originally asserted against all defendants, but the parties recently agreed to
dismiss with prejudice from that claim the District and the individual defendants, leaving the Board
as the sole defendant to Count IV.
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The Court has disregarded several immaterial statements contained in the parties’ Local
Rule 56.1 statements of fact.
2

GeoBee.3 On January 19, 2016, the first round of the GeoBee took place, in which A participated.
Later that day, around 2:00 p.m., Owen, who was A’s homeroom teacher, came to A’s desk in his
homeroom and told him that they needed to go to the principal’s office so that “they” could ask A
some questions. (ECF No. 253-3, Dep. of A, at 27.) A had never been to the principal’s office
before.
For purposes of their motion for summary judgment, defendants are crediting A’s account
of the ensuing meeting. (ECF No. 253, Defs.’ LR 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) After A arrived at Voliva’s
office, he sat in a chair on one side of a table, with Wennstrom directly across the table from him,
Owen across the table and to the left, and Voliva across the table and to the right. Wennstrom and
Voliva proceeded to question A (A characterizes this questioning as an “interrogat[ion]”). (Id. at
16.) They asked A dozens of questions. Initially, the Administrators spoke very kindly to A and
told him he was not going to be in trouble, but after a few minutes, they used “mean voice[s]” to
“say[] things” that, according to A, he had not done. (Id. at 32.) They “yelled” and “glar[ed]” at
him. (Id. at 32, 34.) A felt scared and very nervous and was shaking and sweating. The
Administrators said things to him that did not make sense, such as “Do you know why you’re
here?,” “We know the truth,” “Don’t lie,” and “You don’t need to cry.” (Id. at 34, 36.) A does not
remember whether he cried, but he says that he was “very teary and upset.” (Id. at 35.)
Wennstrom turned her laptop screen toward A, showed him questions that were asked during
the GeoBee that morning, and asked him about those questions. Wennstrom asked A to read the
questions out loud to see if he recognized them. At his deposition, A denied having seen those

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Although plaintiffs do not dispute the content of this fact statement, they argue that it should
be stricken as inadmissible hearsay. It is not. Defendants are not offering the statement to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that District parents had obtained the examination questions for
the GeoBee, but to establish that such a complaint was made to Wennstrom and its effect on her.
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specific questions before the GeoBee, but acknowledged that he had told Wennstrom that his mother
had had access to those questions. A stated in his deposition, however, that what he had told
Wennstrom was not “accurate” in that he had “only said that so [he] would get out of the room
faster,” and that he had agreed with what the Administrators “wanted [him] to say” because
otherwise, they would not move on to the next question. (Id. at 47-48, 50-51.) A also stated:
“[Wennstrom] . . . put words in my mouth and I was very scared and nervous so it wasn’t the actual
thing what I said. It wasn’t the truth.” (Id. at 53.) Wennstrom and Voliva also asked A about
WordMasters and another test and about how A had studied for them. Nothing else was discussed
at the meeting. Owen did not ask A any questions. The meeting lasted between an hour and fifteen
minutes and an hour and a half, and afterward, Owen walked A back to his classroom. A’s parents
were not present during the meeting, they were not notified in advance about it, and plaintiff Jain
had not previously been contacted about the topics that were discussed with A.
In their Local Rule 56.1 fact statements, the parties also set forth a number of additional facts
pertaining to the ensuing events—Wennstrom’s and the Board’s investigation of the cheating
allegations, the sanctions imposed on plaintiffs, and the effects on A. Because these facts are not
material to the disposition of defendants’ motion, the Court does not discuss them.
DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standards
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658,
661 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court must construe the evidence and all inferences that reasonably can
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be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Kvapil v. Chippewa Cty., 752
F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2014). Under Rule 56, the movant has the initial burden of informing the
court why a trial is not necessary. Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013).
Where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on a particular issue, the movant’s
initial burden may be discharged by pointing out to the court that there is an absence of evidence
to support the nonmovant’s case. Id. Upon such a showing, the nonmovant must then “make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The nonmovant need not produce evidence in a
form that would be admissible at trial, but he must go beyond the pleadings to demonstrate that there
is evidence upon which a jury could find in his favor. Id. at 1168-69 (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986)).
B.

Section 1983 Unconstitutional Seizure
Count I is A’s claim against the Administrators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful seizure

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary

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judgment on the merits and because qualified immunity shields them from liability.4 The qualifiedimmunity ground is dispositive, so the Court need not reach the merits.5
In general, qualified immunity shields public officials from liability for civil damages
“‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The goal of qualified immunity is to
“avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims
on summary judgment.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Thus, qualified immunity is both a liability
defense and a limited entitlement not to stand trial. Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir.
2018). “Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Mullenix v. Luna, --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citation and
internal punctuation omitted).

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Based on the same arguments, defendants also contend that they are entitled to summary
judgment on Count III, A’s unlawful-seizure claim against the Administrators under Article I,
Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. (ECF No. 234, Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 2.) As
to qualified immunity, however, defendants have not asserted it as a defense to Count III; they have
asserted it solely with respect to Count I, the § 1983 claim. (ECF No. 223, Defs.’ Am. Affirmative
Defenses ¶ 2.) It does not appear that qualified immunity for federal claims extends to state-law
claims under Illinois law, in any event. Horton v. City of Chi., No. 13 CV 6865, 2018 WL 4699790,
at *14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018). But ultimately, Count III may be a nonstarter; courts in this district
have concluded that Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution does not create a private right
of action for damages. See, e.g., Lee v. Vill. of Glen Ellyn, No. 16 CV 7170, 2017 WL 2080422, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2017) (citing cases).
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There is one matter pertaining to the parties’ merits arguments that the Court must discuss.
Plaintiffs cite Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009), and provide the following
explanatory parenthetical: “two-hour interrogation of 9-year[-]old girl in a private office at school
constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (ECF No. 263, Pls.’ Resp. Defs.’ Mot. at 4.) But
plaintiffs’ counsel neglects to inform the Court that the Supreme Court vacated as moot the very
portion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that addressed the Fourth Amendment issue. See Camreta v.
Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 714 (2011). Counsel should be more careful with subsequent history.
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“Qualified-immunity analysis usually entails a two-step inquiry: we ask (1) whether the facts
alleged or shown by the plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) if so, whether
that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Dockery v.
Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). “This order of
inquiry is not rigid, however; we may address the second question first if it simplifies the analysis.”
Id. Assuming for the sake of argument that plaintiff A has established a genuine issue of material
fact as to the first prong, the Court turns to the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis,
because a plaintiff’s failure to establish either prong is dispositive. See Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d
629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017).
To show that a right was clearly established, a plaintiff must demonstrate that existing case
law at the time of the challenged conduct “‘placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.’” Dockery, 911 F.3d at 466 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
“Qualified immunity cannot be defeated simply by ‘alleging a violation of extremely abstract
rights.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting White v. Pauly, --- U.S. ----, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017));
see also City of Escondido v. Emmons, --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (“This Court has
repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”) (internal
punctuation and citation omitted). “[T]o place the constitutional question beyond debate, the
precedent must be ‘particularized to the facts of the case.’” Dockery, 911 F.3d at 466 (quoting
White, 137 S. Ct. at 552); see also Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 504 (“While there does not have to be a
case directly on point, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular action beyond
debate.”) (brackets omitted). Alternatively, a plaintiff may overcome qualified immunity by
persuading the court that the conduct in question is so egregious and unreasonable that,
notwithstanding the lack of an analogous decision, no reasonable public officer could have thought
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she was acting lawfully. Dockery, 911 F.3d at 466-67 (quoting Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., 705 F.3d
706, 723-24 (7th Cir. 2013)). Such “obvious cases” are “rare.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, --U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018).
Plaintiffs contend in a single sentence “[a]s an initial matter” that the defendants’ conduct
was so egregious and unreasonable that no reasonable official could have believed it would not
violate the law. (ECF No. 263, Pls.’ Resp. Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) The argument is undeveloped and
therefore waived. See Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016). It is also unpersuasive.
As for case law existing at the relevant time, plaintiffs fail to point to analogous authority. They
simply cite one decision, Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia School District 101, 68 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir.
1995), for the proposition that “school officials may be subject to constitutional claims for Fourth
Amendment violations when they are unreasonable under the circumstances then existing and
apparent.” (Pls.’ Resp. Defs.’ Mot. at 11 (internal punctuation omitted).) This is an assertion of a
decision that reaffirms the right to be free from unreasonable seizures in a general sense. Plaintiffs’
argument is not sufficiently particularized to the circumstances of A’s questioning by the
Administrators. See Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs fail to
identify any factually-similar case that would have alerted the Administrators that their conduct
violated a clearly-established right. Moreover, plaintiffs do not discuss the facts of Wallace, which
are inapposite because they involved a teacher grabbing the arm of a sixteen-year-old student in
order to prevent a fight. Because plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of showing the existence

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of clearly-established law that prohibited the Administrators’ actions, the Court grants summary
judgment to those defendants on Count I on the ground of qualified immunity.6
C.

State-Law Claims for Unlawful Seizure and Willful and Wanton Conduct
The remaining claims are Count III, A’s state-law claim for unlawful seizure, and Count IV,

a state-law claim for willful and wanton conduct, which is considered an aggravated form of
negligence under Illinois law.7 See Sparks v. Starks, 856 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). “The
general rule, when the federal claims fall out before trial, is that the district court should relinquish
jurisdiction over any supplemental . . . state law claims in order to minimize federal judicial
intrusion into matters of purely state law.” Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 252 (7th Cir. 2015).
The Court does not see any reason to continue exercising jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law

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The Court’s conclusion that the Administrators are entitled to qualified immunity should
not be taken as an indication that the Court condones the manner in which A was questioned. The
Court is mindful that defendants have accepted A’s version of the events as true only for purposes
of their motion and that their position throughout this litigation has been that their meeting with A
was much shorter than he asserts and that they did not yell at him or attempt to intimidate him.
However, they have never disputed that three administrators, including the District superintendent,
questioned A outside his parents’ presence and absent exigent circumstances about academic
dishonesty that was allegedly initiated by one of those parents. While the Administrators’ conduct
did not violate clearly-established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, their
response was disproportionate to the circumstances presented. Indeed, there was little or no reason
for the investigation of this incident to be conducted in this manner. Three adults in positions of
authority questioned a nine-year-old child, for whose well-being they were responsible, outside the
presence of his parents about an event that posed no immediate danger to the safety or well-being
of other students or the orderly conduct of school activities. One would expect that in the future,
educators in such situations would devote greater consideration to the welfare of the child entrusted
to their care than the need to connect the child’s parent to scholastic misconduct. It cannot be good
for any nine-year-old child to be pressured into implicating his parent in wrongdoing.
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Plaintiffs allege that all defendants willfully and wantonly did the following: failed to
properly investigate the allegations of academic dishonesty; “targeted the overwhelming weight of
their authority on a 9-year-old boy”; disclosed their “unfounded allegations and unwarranted
punishment” to District families and staff; employed a law firm to conduct an “inherently biased and
flawed investigation”; and “continue to single out” A “for different treatment than his peers.” (5th
Am. Compl. ¶ 176.)
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claims, and, after having considered the factors of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity,” id., the Court in its discretion declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
claims, and dismisses Counts III and IV without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Harvey v.
Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 2011) (when a district court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, the proper course is to dismiss them without
prejudice).
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [233] is granted as to Count I of the Fifth
Amended Complaint. The Court will enter judgment in favor of the Administrators and against A
on the § 1983 claim. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts III and
IV, the remaining state-law claims, and dismisses those claims without prejudice. All pending
motions and schedules are stricken as moot. Civil case terminated.

DATE: March 12, 2019

____________________________________
Ronald A. Guzmán
United States District Judge

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