Gantner, ex rel., J.J., a minor v. Colvin

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 11/27/2017. Mailed notice. (dm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANNETTE GANTNER, ex. rel. J.J.,
a minor,
Plaintiff,

No. 17 C 00066

v.

Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 1
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Annette Gantner filed this action on behalf of minor, J.J., seeking
reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his
application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act (Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1381 et. seq. The parties have consented to
the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c), and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated
below, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 26, 2013, an application for SSI was filed on behalf of a minor child,
J.J., by his legal guardian, Annette Gantner. (R. at 153–58). 2 J.J. was born on
On January 23, 2017, Nancy A. Berryhill became Acting Commissioner of Social Security
and is substituted for her predecessor as the proper defendant in this action. Fed. R. Civ. P.
25(d).

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November 13, 2003 and his application alleged that he became disabled on
November 13, 2003. (Id. at 153). The application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration, after which Ms. Gantner filed a timely request for a hearing. (Id. at
20). On May 13, 2015, J.J. and Ms. Gantner testified at a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Id. at 38–63).
On June 5, 2015, the ALJ denied J.H.’s request for benefits. (R. at 20–33).
Applying the three-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found at step one
that J.J. has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his application date.
At step two, the ALJ found that J.J.’s speech and language delay is a severe
impairment. At step three, the ALJ determined that J.J. does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the
severity of any of the Listings of Impairments (Listings). The ALJ then determined
that J.J. does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
functionally equal the severity of any of the Listings.
On November 16, 2016, the Appeals Council denied J.J.’s request for review. (R.
at 1–4). J.J. now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, which stands as the
final decision of the Commissioner. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561–62 (7th Cir.
2009).

The ALJ decision states that the application date was June 6, 2013 (R. at 20), but the
correct date is June 26, 2013 (id. at 153).

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is authorized under 42
U.S.C. 405(g). On review, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether
the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations.
Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it “reweigh
evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in
general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Id. The
Court’s task is “limited to determining whether the ALJ’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Evidence is considered substantial “if a
reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.” Indoranto v.
Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118,
1120–21 (7th Cir. 2014). “Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but
may be less than a preponderance.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir.
2007). The ALJ must “explain his analysis of the evidence with enough detail and
clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart,
425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).
Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ’s determination, it “must
do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d
589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “[T]he ALJ must identify the relevant
evidence and build a ‘logical bridge’ between that evidence and the ultimate
determination.” Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014). Where the
Commissioner’s decision “lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to
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prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded.” Steele v. Barnhart, 290
F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
“A child qualifies as disabled and therefore may be eligible for SSI if he has a
‘medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked
and severe functional limitations’ and the impairment ‘has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.’” Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v.
Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i)). To
decide whether a child meets this definition, the Social Security Administration
(SSA) employs a three-step analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). First, if the child is
engaged in substantial gainful activity, his or her claim is denied. Id. Second, if the
child does not have a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments,
then his or her claim is denied. Id. Finally, the child’s impairments must meet, or be
functionally equivalent, to any of the Listings contained in 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P,
app. 1. Id. To find an impairment functionally equivalent to one in the Listings, an
ALJ must analyze its severity in six age-appropriate categories: “(i) acquiring and
using information; (ii) attending and completing tasks; (iii) interacting and relating
with others; (iv) moving about and manipulating objects; (v) caring for yourself; and
(vi) health and physical well-being.” Id. § 416.926a(b)(1). To functionally equal the
Listings, the ALJ must find an “extreme” limitation in one category or a “marked”
limitation in two categories. An “extreme” limitation occurs when the impairment
interferes very seriously with the child’s ability to independently initiate, sustain or
complete activities. Id. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). A “marked” limitation is one which
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interferes seriously with the child’s ability to independently initiate, sustain, or
complete activities. Id. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i).
III. DISCUSSION
J.J. raises four arguments in support of his request for reversal of the ALJ’s
determination that he is not disabled: (1) the ALJ failed to properly consider his
teachers’ reports; (2) the ALJ failed to weigh the opinion evidence as required; (3)
the ALJ failed to properly assess the credibility of J.J. and Ms. Gantner; and (4) the
ALJ’s domain findings lacked support in the record. (Dkt. 18). After reviewing the
record and the parties’ briefs, the Court is persuaded that the reasons provided by
the ALJ for finding that J.J. had less than marked limitations in two domains in
particular—attending and completing tasks and acquiring and using information—
are legally insufficient and not supported by substantial evidence. See Hopgood ex
rel. L.G., 578 F.3d at 697 (remanding where the ALJ “made conclusory statements
that contradicted the evidence presented and failed to address portions of medical
and school records that were favorable to [the child].”). The Court will discuss the
ALJ’s errors regarding these two domains and will address J.J.’s arguments
regarding the teachers’ reports and opinion evidence. The Court need not address
credibility.
A. The ALJ’s Domain Finding in Attending and Completing Tasks
The attending and completing tasks domain considers “how well you are able to
focus and maintain your attention, and how well you begin, carry through, and
finish your activities, including the pace at which you perform activities and the
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ease with which you change them.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(h). Attention involves
regulating levels of alertness and initiating and maintaining concentration; the
ability to filter out distractions and focus on an activity or task at a consistent level
of performance; focusing long enough to initiate and complete an activity or task,
and changing focus once it is completed; and if you lose or change focus in the
middle of a task, you are able to return to the task without other people having to
remind you frequently to finish it. Id. § 416.926a(h)(1)(i).
The ALJ explained her finding that J.J. had a less than marked limitation in
attending and completing tasks as follows:
It is noted that the claimant does well when working at a task by
himself. When in groups, he has a hard time staying focused. His
attention is best for subjects he is excited about (Ex. 12E/3). I note the
claimant’s limitations, but I find they are less than marked.
(R. at 29).
This perfunctory explanation fails to provide a logical bridge between the
evidence and the ALJ’s conclusion. See Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 648 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“We have repeatedly held that an ALJ must provide a logical bridge
between the evidence in the record and her conclusion.”); Giles ex rel. Giles v.
Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 488 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is unclear what evidence the ALJ
relied upon in finding that [the child] was not markedly limited in this domain [of
attending and completing tasks]. We require an explanation of why strong evidence
favorable to the plaintiff is overcome by the evidence on which an ALJ relies.”).

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In explaining her finding in this domain, the ALJ relied solely on Jeri Klemenc’s
May 4, 2015 Teacher’s Report (hereafter, “2015 Teacher’s Report”). Ms. Klemenc
was J.J.’s teacher five days a week for two years in the special education program.
(R. at 329). Of the three sentences the ALJ cited from the 2015 Teacher’s Report,
one was that “in groups, [J.J.] has a hard time staying focused.” (Id. at 29). The ALJ
did not explain how this evidence, favorable to J.J., was overcome by unfavorable
evidence. Earlier in her opinion, the ALJ observed that the 2015 Teacher’s Report
identified “serious” problems in a few areas and no “very serious problems” in any
domains. (Id. at 26–27). But the ALJ did not discuss how the “serious” problems
factored into her analysis. Nor did she discuss how she weighed the findings that
J.J. had daily, obvious problems with refocusing to task when necessary, waiting to
take turns, and completing work accurately without careless mistakes. (Id. at 331).
See Hopgood ex rel. L.G., 578 F.3d at 700 (finding ALJ’s analysis deficient where he
“failed to explain why he did not credit portions of the record that were favorable to
LG, including the teachers’ reports that found LG had serious or obvious problems
in this domain.”) (emphasis added).
The ALJ relied on the 2015 Teacher’s Report, but did not identify or explain the
weight she gave that report. Indeed, the ALJ did not identify a weight for any
opinion of any teacher, speech and language pathologist, doctor, or psychologist. See
Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n ALJ must weigh all the
evidence and may not ignore evidence that suggests an opposite conclusion.”)
(internal citations and quotations omitted); see also SSR 06-3p, 2006 SSR LEXIS 5
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(“Evaluations from school personnel are considered ‘other source’ opinions.”); 20
CFR § 416.927 (evaluating opinion evidence); id. § 404.1527(c)(1) (“Generally, we
give more weight to the medical opinion of a source who has examined you than to
the medical opinion of a medical source who has not examined you.”).
The only weights the ALJ gave were for the original state agency consultant
opinion (no weight) and March 19, 2014 state agency consultant opinion on
reconsideration (R. at 72–81) (“Reconsideration Opinion”) (great weight). Even then,
the ALJ did not give a rationale for the “great weight” placed on the
Reconsideration Opinion except to state that “little evidence” had been submitted
since reconsideration and the evidence submitted “does not support worsening in
condition.” (R. at 27). The Reconsideration Opinion itself was sparse on details
about why the consultants believed J.J. had less than marked limitation in
attending and completing tasks. (Id. at 72–81). The explanation consisted of one
paragraph which referred only to a 2013 medical examination and the 2013
psychological evaluation by J.B. Goebel, Ph.D (“Goebel Evaluation”). (Id. at 76).
Missing from the Reconsideration Opinion is any mention of J.J.’s Individualized
Education Program (“IEP”) reports, the 2013 Teacher’s Report, and the speech and
language assessments.
There are also problems with the ALJ’s statement acknowledging that J.J. had
“some attention and focusing problems and difficulty not blurting out answers,” but
finding “no significant behavioral problems and although [J.J.] is somewhat behind,

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he is making progress…in special education [and] has not been referred for
outpatient therapy or counseling.” (R. at 27).
First, the ALJ did not discuss how (and if) she accounted for evidence favorable
to J.J. in this domain. In contrast to the ALJ’s vague reference to a lack of
“significant behavioral problems,” the Regulations provide specific examples of
limited functioning in attending and completing tasks, including being easily
startled, distracted, or overreactive; repeatedly becoming sidetracked from activities
or frequently interrupting others; being easily frustrated and giving up on tasks;
and requiring extra supervision to stay engaged in an activity. 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(h)(3). The record contains many references to J.J. being easily distracted,
frustrated, and inattentive, having a tendency to interrupt others, and needing
supervision. (e.g., R. at 208–19, 295, 299–301, 330, 382). The 2013 teacher’s report
by special education teacher Bonnie Mattson and speech pathologist Terri Schulte
(“2013 Teacher’s Report”) stated that J.J. “functions best in highly structured
setting.” (Id. at 196). The February 2014 assessment by speech and language
pathologist Michele Worden (“Worden Assessment”) reported that J.J.’s speech and
language delay frequently adversely affected his educational performance and
ability to socialize. (Id. at 284–87). The March 2014 assessment by speech and
language pathologist Melanie Boyd assessment (“Boyd Assessment”) observed J.J.’s
“spontaneous utterances” and difficulty understanding directions. (Id. at 391–95).
Second, the ALJ erred by comparing J.J. to himself and by using his perceived
“improvement” as a reason to find him not disabled. The ALJ’s focus on J.J.’s
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“progress” was both legally flawed and factually inaccurate. Defendant makes the
same error by arguing that J.J. had “shown improvement” and “made progress on
his goals.” (Dkt. 20 at 1).
The Regulations require an ALJ to “compare your functioning to the typical
functioning of children your age who do not have impairments.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(f)(1) (emphasis added). Social Security Ruling 09-2p requires specific
attention to the special education a child receives and how that impacts the child’s
ability to independently initiate, sustain, and complete activities. 2009 SSR LEXIS
2 (emphasis added). 3 See also Taylor ex rel. T.L. v. Colvin, No. 15 CV 3176, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157477, at *56 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2016) (“Nor do the regulations
and Rulings that govern the six functional domains ask if a child has ‘improved’
without also considering the context within which such improvement occurred.”);
A.H. v. Astrue, No. 09 C 6981, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54124, at *35 (N.D. Ill. May
18, 2011) (“Presumably, a child with serious limitations could show a measure of
progress and still fall within the marked or extreme functional categories compared
to other children her own age.”); Edwards v. Colvin, No. 12 C 7639, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106104, at *33–34 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2013) (“The fact that a child’s
functioning has improved does not explain why the child has reached a specific
“This information about supports children receive can be critical to determining the extent
to which their impairments compromise their ability to independently initiate, sustain, and
complete activities. In general, if a child needs a person, a structured or supportive setting,
medication, treatment, or a device to improve or enable functioning, the child will not be as
independent as same-aged peers who do not have impairments. We will generally find that
such a child has a limitation, even if the child is functioning well with the help or support.
The more help or support of any kind that a child receives beyond what would be expected
for children the same age without impairments, the less independently the child functions,
and the more severe we will find the limitation to be.” SSR09-2p, 2009 SSR LEXIS 2, *17.

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functional level…The ALJ’s task was not to point to generalized improvement, but
to explain with some degree of clarity why L.T.’s limitation was - in fact - less than
marked when compared to non-impaired children his age.”).
The ALJ did not explain how J.J.’s limitation in attending and completing tasks
was less than marked compared to non-impaired children his age or in light of all
the supports he received in special education. The ALJ failed to connect the
perceived “progress” to an analysis of J.J.’s functionality in this domain. See
Edwards, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106104, at *34 (“What [the ALJ] could not
do…was to reach his conclusion without accounting for the structure, supports, and
behaviors that were relevant to comparing L.T. to other children.”). In addition, the
ALJ’s heavy reliance on the 2015 Teacher’s Report as evidence of “improvement”
shows that the ALJ did not consider the full longitudinal picture. See Taylor ex rel.
T.L., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157477, at *35 (citing SSR 09-2p, 2009 SSR LEXIS 2)
(“An ALJ is obligated to consider a child’s limitations on a longitudinal basis and
not to decide the issue based on an isolated time frame within the disability
period.”).
Moreover, the ALJ did not weigh the evidence contradicting her conclusion that
J.J. had “improved.” Record evidence showed that J.J. continued to require a highly
structured environment and significant support, cues, and reminders in order to
remain focused and complete tasks. J.J.’s most recent IEP in the record (“2014
IEP”) stated he continued to need “supports to maintain focus to task.” (R. at 347).
The 2015 Teacher’s Report stated that he has a hard time staying focused in groups.
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(Id. at 331). Defendant nevertheless contends, without citation to authority, that
the ALJ’s conclusion regarding J.J.’s limitation in attending and completing tasks
was a “supportable conclusion given the effectiveness of minor interventions.” (Dkt.
20 at 7). But the more the record reflected that J.J. required interventions and
supports, and indeed it did, the more the record contradicted the ALJ’s finding of a
less than marked limitation in this domain.
Third, the ALJ referenced J.J.’s lack of referral for outpatient therapy or
counseling. While the regulations direct ALJs to consider treatment history when
assessing the severity of a claimant’s symptoms, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(v), an
ALJ must not draw negative inferences about a failure to obtain treatment “without
first considering any explanations that the individual may provide, or other
information in the case record, that may explain infrequent or irregular medical
visits or failure to seek medical treatment.” Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F. 3d 631, 638 (7th
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation and citations omitted); Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d
834, 840 (7th Cir. 2014); see SSR 16-3p, *8–9. In this case, the ALJ recognized that
J.J. was in special education classes for the majority of the day, where he received
speech and language therapy every day as well as social work services. (R. at 23).
B. The ALJ’s Domain Finding in Acquiring and Using Information
The ALJ explained her finding of a less than marked limitation in acquiring and
using information as follows:
Speech language testing in April 2014, revealed 103 standard score in
listening comprehension and 82 standard score in oral expression. His
total overall standard score was 91 with 100% intelligible speech (Ex.
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4F). The claimant’s current teacher, Jeri Klemenc reported the
claimant has a language disability and is easily distracted and
impulsive. He loves to learn and try his best. He often interrupts
discussions and blurts out answers due to lack of impulse control. She
stated he has great difficulty regulating his talking but has a good
memory for previously learned information (Ex. 12E/2). The evidence
supports a less than marked limitation in acquiring and using
information.
(R. at 28).
The acquiring and using information domain considers “how well you acquire or
learn information, and how well you use the information you have learned.” 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(g). This includes being able to “use language to think about the
world and to understand others and express yourself; e.g., to follow directions, ask
for information, or explain something.” Id. § 416.926a(g)(1)(ii). Expectations for
school aged children include being able to produce oral and written projects, do
group work, and enter into class discussions, use increasingly complex language to
share information and ideas with individuals or groups, by asking questions and
expressing ideas, and by understanding and responding to the opinions of others.
Id. § 416.926a(g)(1)(iv). Examples of limited functioning in acquiring and using
information include not demonstrating understanding of words about space, size, or
time; difficulty solving mathematics questions or computing arithmetic answers;
difficulty recalling important things learned in school; talking only in short, simple
sentences and having difficulty explaining what you mean. Id. § 416.926a(g)(1).
To conclude that J.J. had less than marked limitation in acquiring and using
information, the ALJ relied on the Boyd Assessment and the 2015 Teacher’s Report.
The 2015 Teacher’s Report stated that J.J. was in the 5th grade but functioning at a
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3–4th grade level in reading, math and written language. (R. at 329). In the
assessment of Acquiring and Using Information, Ms. Klemenc marked that J.J. has
a “serious problem” in providing organized oral explanations and adequate
descriptions, and an “obvious problem” in six other areas including comprehending
oral instructions, expressing ideas in written form, and applying problem-solving
skills in class discussions. (Id. at 330). The ALJ accurately described Ms. Klemenc’s
description in this domain as reporting that J.J. has a language disability; is easily
distracted and impulsive; loves to learn and try his best; often interrupts
discussions and blurts out answers due to lack of impulse control; has great
difficulty regulating his talking; and has a good memory for previously learned
information. (Id. at 28, 330). Given that most of this description is favorable to J.J.,
and that Ms. Klemec found a serious problem in one area and obvious problems in
six areas, it is unclear how the ALJ nevertheless reached the conclusion that he had
a less than marked limitation in this domain.
In addition, the ALJ cherry-picked findings from the Boyd Assessment (R. at
391–94), and overlooked Boyd’s conclusion that J.J. was 10 years old, but functioned
as a 7 year old in terms of his expressive language. The ALJ also ignored Boyd’s
observations that J.J. had difficulty requesting and providing detailed information,
making requests for clarification, and providing arguments. An ALJ “cannot simply
cherry-pick facts that support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence
that points to a disability.” Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010).

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The ALJ also did not mention the Worden Assessment at all. Ms. Worden noted
J.J.’s limitations in social communication, receptive language, and expressive
language, and concluded that J.J.’s rate of progress was “fair” and his development
“atypical.” (Id. at 284–88). The ALJ failed to address other evidence as well. For
instance, a 2012 assessment concluded that J.J.’s listening comprehension and oral
expression were “well below average”, and in 2013, J.J.’s principal stated that he
“needed extensive support.” (R. at 293–94, 382). Without explaining what weight he
gave the Goebel Evaluation (R. at 386–88), the ALJ cited portions of the evaluation
but did not discuss findings such as that J.J. “was only a reliable informant with the
aunt’s help.” 4
Regarding J.J.’s IEPs, the ALJ mentioned them but failed to explain how
unfavorable evidence overshadowed the favorable evidence in the IEPs. The IEPs
showed that J.J. spent most of the day in special education environment. (R. at 306,
349). J.J.’s 2014 IEP stated that his math scores in computation and concepts and
applications were below average and that he “continues to have deficits with word
meaning and use.” While “typically developing 5th grade students speak in complete
sentences, and have academic vocabulary at a 5th grade level,” J.J. “continues to
need support with verbal expression, with visual cues or models.” (Id. at 344–45).
While his social/pragmatic skills continued to improve, “he does not always
understand the emotional state related to social situations. He tends to speak
loudly, make comments that are not relevant to the situation he is in and laugh.
The ALJ also stated Dr. Goebel did not make any diagnosis (R. at 24), but he did in fact
diagnose ADHD. (Id. at 388).

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When he relates experiences he has difficulty giving information accurately,
provides too many details and never ends.” (Id. at 346). He also “continues to need
supports to maintain focus to task, interpret social expectations and overall social
adaptive functioning. A typical peer of his age is able to function successfully in his
environment without the need for supports.” (Id. at 347). Numerous modifications
and accommodations were made for J.J. including in motivation/reinforcement, oral
presentation, pacing and timing, presentation, self-management, and test
adaptations. (Id. at 348). Supplementary aids and services for J.J. included
providing enough time for him to process information during instruction,
monitoring for understanding, prompts at times, in testing, presenting directions in
simple steps and group common problems together, and use of visuals and
manipulatives. (Id. at 351).
C. Summary
In sum, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that J.J. had
less than marked restrictions in the domains of attending and completing tasks and
acquiring and using information. The ALJ’s failure to address evidence of
difficulties in these two domains leaves the Court without means to meaningfully
review the ALJ’s decision. See Brindisi ex rel. Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783,
787 (7th Cir. 2003). When reviewing a denial of disability benefits, a court may
“affirm, reverse, or modify the Social Security Administration’s decision, with or
without remanding the case for further proceedings.” Allord v. Astrue, 631 F.3d 411,
415 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). On remand, the ALJ shall reevaluate
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J.J.’s limitations in accordance with this opinion, considering all of the evidence in
the record, and shall explain the basis for her findings in accordance with applicable
regulations and rulings.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [18] is
GRANTED. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [20] is DENIED.
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405, the ALJ’s decision is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Dated: November 27, 2017

E N T E R:

MARY M. ROWLAND
United States Magistrate Judge

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