Earl v. Howard et al

Filing 67

ORDER Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 6/27/2017: The Court grants in part without prejudice and denies in part without prejudice Defendants' joint motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 21 . The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in accordance with this ruling by no later than 7/18/17. Status hearing remains set for 7/13/17 at 8:30 a.m. [For further details, see Order.] Mailed notice(kef, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CLYDE EARL,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHNATHAN HOWARD, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17 C 0243
Judge Amy St. Eve

ORDER
The Court grants in part without prejudice and denies in part without prejudice
Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). [21]. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in
accordance with this ruling by no later than July 18, 2017.
STATEMENT
On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit against employees of the Cook
County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”), Cermak Health Services of Cook County
(“Cermak”), and Cook County Sheriff’s Office employees, including Sheriff Thomas Dart, as
well as Cook County, pursuant to the Court’s original and supplemental jurisdiction.1 Before the
Court is Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the
following reasons, the Court grants in part without prejudice and denies in part without prejudice
Defendants’ motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the
viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); see also
Hill v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, 850 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2017). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a
complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pursuant to the federal pleading standards, a
plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
Put differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1

By leave of Court, on June 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint voluntarily
dismissing Defendant Daniel Rinewalt from this action and naming Defendant Lakesha Morales
as a Defendant.

1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). When determining
the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, courts must “accept all wellpleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.” Roberts v. City of
Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). Ordinarily, district courts will not dismiss a
complaint based on a statute of limitations affirmative defense unless the action is clearly timebarred. See Cannon v. Newport, 850 F.3d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 2017); Khan v. United States, 808
F.3d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015).
BACKGROUND
In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that since the early 1990s, he has
suffered from mental illness causing him to experience severe symptoms, including psychosis,
hallucinations, depression, and paranoia, when he is not taking his psychotropic medication. (R.
65, First Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff further alleges that his symptoms were well-controlled with
psychotropic medication in the years prior to the events giving rise to this lawsuit, and, at times
when he did suffer from symptoms of his mental illness, he either went to the hospital on his
own or called to have an ambulance take him to the hospital. (Id. ¶ 17.) On January 12, 2015,
Plaintiff was experiencing severe symptoms of his mental illness, so he attempted to go to a
hospital to seek treatment. (Id. ¶ 18.) While on his way to the hospital, Chicago Police Officers
arrested him. (Id. ¶ 19.) On January 14, 2015, officers placed him into the custody of the
CCDOC. (Id. ¶ 20.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that his bond was set at $10,000, which he
could not afford to pay. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff remained in custody until June 17, 2015. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Plaintiff asserts that while he was a detainee during this time period, Defendants did not
provide him psychotropic medication even though his prescriptions for these medications were
current and active. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff asserts that while he was detained, his mental illness was so
obvious that even a lay person would have easily recognized that immediate treatment, including but
not limited to psychotropic medication, was necessary. (Id. ¶ 24.) He states that while he was
detained he behaved bizarrely, refused to talk to people, refused to come out of his cell, refused to
eat, displayed poor hygiene, and spoke incomprehensibly. (Id.) He also posits that Defendants knew
of his mental illness because he previously had been hospitalized and treated with prescribed
psychotropic medications. (Id. ¶ 25.) Also, Plaintiff alleges that representatives of the Sheriff’s
Office and Cook County discussed his illness and treatment during multi-disciplinary team meetings
and that he was housed in Cermak’s psychiatric infirmary. (Id. ¶ 26.) During his interactions with
the individual Defendants, he directly requested psychiatric evaluations, stated that he needed
psychiatric care, informed Defendants that he was prescribed specific psychotropic medications,
stated that he was hearing voices, submitted written requests for medication/mental health care,
and demonstrated his amenability to further treatment. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Plaintiff alleges that on May 22, 2015, a Cook County judge declared him unfit for trial
due to his mental illness, and, consequently transferred him to the custody of the Department of
Mental Health. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff states that despite being found unfit for trial, Defendants
took no further actions beyond simple checkups and continued to deny his psychotropic
medications until June 17, 2015, at which time he was transferred to the Chester Mental Health
Center. (Id. ¶ 31.)

2

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights while
he was a pretrial detainee (Count I). Further, Plaintiff brings a claim against the Sheriff and
Cook County for indemnification (Count II). Plaintiff also alleges a Monell claim against the
Sheriff’s Office and Cook County (Count III). Last, Plaintiff alleges a state law intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim and a willful and wanton conduct/aggravated negligence
claim (Counts IV and V).
ANALYSIS
I.

Personal Involvement

Although Plaintiff has generally alleged detailed facts raising his right to relief above a
speculative level as to his Fourteenth Amended due process deliberate indifference medical care
claim, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, Defendants argue that he has failed to alleged sufficient
facts as to their personal involvement or responsibility. When bringing constitutional claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individual liability requires personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional violation. See Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017);
Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2010). In other words, under § 1983, an
individual is only liable for his or her own misconduct. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768,
781 (7th Cir. 2015). Also, a “defendant will be deemed to have sufficient personal responsibility
if he directed the conduct causing the constitutional violation, or if it occurred with his
knowledge or consent.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
Put differently, to “show personal involvement, [a] supervisor must ‘know about the conduct and
facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.’”
Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Here,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations do not adequately connect each specific Defendant
to the alleged unconstitutional acts. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009).
In response, Plaintiff argues that under the circumstances “group pleading” is appropriate
because he has alleged that each Defendant knew of his mental illness, each Defendant was
directly involved in his treatment or monitoring him, and that each Defendant failed to take
adequate action to provide him with the necessary treatment. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-27, 3132, 45.) To clarify, in Brooks, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an allegation directed at
multiple defendants can adequately plead personal involvement or responsibility in the context of
an alleged constitutional deprivation in certain circumstances. See id. at 582; Rivera v. Lake
Cty., 974 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 2013). More specifically, courts in this district have
concluded that:
Rule 8(a) is not so rigid that it requires a plaintiff, without the benefit of discovery, to
connect every single alleged instance of misconduct in the complaint to every single
specific officer. Such a pleading standard would effectively allow police officers to
violate constitutional rights with abandon as long as they ensured they could not be
individually identified, even if liability for acting in concert (or for aiding and abetting
each other) would otherwise apply.

3

Koh v. Graf, No. 11 C 2605, 2013 WL 5348326, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2013); see also Starks
v. City of Waukegan, 946 F. Supp. 2d 780, 787 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“the court perceives nothing
problematic in [plaintiff’s] use of collective references to ‘the Defendants’ to refer to all of
them.”).
That being said, Plaintiff asserts his claim against approximately 77 County Defendants
and six Sheriff’s Office Defendants – not nine Defendants as in Starks and Koh. Although
Plaintiff may not be able to specify which individuals did exactly what in connection with his
constitutional allegations before the parties conduct discovery, Plaintiff must narrow and group
together the individual Defendants’ alleged misconduct in a more particularized way. In other
words, Plaintiff must do more than name the individual Defendants in the complaint’s caption.
See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against
a defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). In his Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff must include some details about each Defendant, including, for example,
whether each individual Defendant is a supervisor, provides security as a Sheriff’s Office
employee, or is on the medical staff. As it stands, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to adequately put
each individual Defendant on notice of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims because it is implausible
that approximately 85 Defendants are liable for the same conduct based on the current
allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.”). The Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count I without prejudice, and also grants Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint.
II.

State Law Claims

Next, Defendants argue that the one-year limitations period in Section 8-101(a) of the
Illinois Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act bars Plaintiff’s
state law claims. Section 8-101(a) states that “[n]o civil action...may be commenced in any court
against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one
year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.” 745 ILCS 10/8101(a). “A limitations defense is not often resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because ‘a
complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses, such as the statute of
limitations.’” Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Village of Oak Lawn, ___ F.3d ___, 2017 WL
2627819, at *2 (7th Cir. June 19, 2017) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, “dismissal at this early
stage is appropriate when the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish that the suit is indeed
tardy.” Id.
In response, Plaintiff agrees that he filed this lawsuit more than one year after the alleged
misconduct. He further maintains that Defendants’ reliance on Section 8-101(a) is misplaced
because his lawsuit arises out of “patient care” under Section 8-101(b), which allows for a twoyear limitations period as follows:
No action for damages for injury or death against any local public entity or public
employee, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of
patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in
4

writing of the existence of the injury or death for which dama
w
e
o
ages are sought in the ac
ction,
whichever of those dates occurs first[
w
f
[.]
745 ILCS 10/8-101(b
S
b).
“W
While the Ill
linois Tort Im
mmunity Ac carves out a one-year statute of lim
ct
t
mitations for
r
lawsuits against publ entities an employee it creates an exceptio for claims ‘arising out of
lic
nd
es,
on
s
t
patient ca
are.’” Ambr
rose v. Kerr, No. 12 CV 4648, 2013 WL 93175, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8,
2013). The two-year statute of li
T
r
imitations fo actions ari
or
ising out of p
patient care brings “the T
Tort
Immunity Act in line with the typ
y
e
pical two-ye statute of limitations for medical malpractice
ear
f
e
claims, so that patien would not be disadva
nts
antaged beca
ause they hap
ppened to ob
btain treatme at
ent
a public hospital rath than a pri
h
her
ivate one.” Dobrzenieck v. Salisbur No. 11 C 7956, 2012 WL
D
ki
ry,
2
1531278, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27 2012); see also Kaufm
7,
mann v. Schro
oeder, 241 Il 2d 194, 200
ll.
(Ill. 2011 (“by addin subsection (b), a perso who suffe injuries a
1)
ng
n
on
fers
arising out o patient car
of
re
would no be disadva
ot
antaged by a shortened li
imitations pe
eriod simply because he or she happ
y
e
pened
to obtain treatment at a public fac
t
cility rather than a privat one.”). A
ate
Although the Supreme Co
ourt
of Illinois broadly co
onstrues “aris
sing out of patient care,” it is “not so broad as to encompass ‘but
p
”
o
o
s
for’ causation.” Kauf
ufmann, 241 Ill.2d at 201 (citing Bru cker v. Merc
1
cola, 227 Ill. 2d 502, 523
3
s
he
ust
m,
from, [a]
(2007)). Under this standard, “th injury mu originate in, stem from or result f
re.” Dobrzen
niecki, 2012 WL 153127 at *8; see also Kaufm
78,
e
man, 241 Ill.2d.
patient’s medical car
at 200-01 On the oth hand, wh a plainti
1.
her
hen
iff’s injuries arise from t defendan outright
the
nt’s
denial of medical car – rather th the medi care the defendant a
f
re
han
ical
actually prov
vided – the tw
wo
year exce
eption under 8-101(b) do not apply See Ambr
r
oes
y.
rose, 2013 W 93175, a *2.
WL
at
Viewing the allegations and reasonab inference in Plaintiff favor, he alleges that
V
a
a
ble
es
ff’s
e
t
although Defendants provided so medical care, the ca they prov
ome
l
are
vided was de
eficient. Thu
us,
Plaintiff argues he was injured be
ecause of his medical tre
s
eatment. See Kaufman, 241 Ill. 2d. a
e
at
201. Fur
rther muddyi the wate however, is Plaintiff’ lack of specific allega
ing
ers,
,
’s
ations as to w
what
his defici medical treatment en
ient
l
ntailed. Mo
oreover, som of the nam Defenda are not
me
med
ants
medical providers in the first inst
p
tance. See Dobrzeniecki 2012 WL 1531278, at *9. Under t
D
i,
the
circumsta
ances, this is a situation where Plain
s
ntiff’s state la claims ar not clearly time-barred,
aw
re
y
and thus dismissal un
nder Rule 12
2(b)(6) is not warranted a this junctu
t
at
ure. Therefo the Cour
ore,
rt
denies th aspect of Defendants’ motion to dismiss with
his
’
d
hout prejudic On a fina note, if
ce.
al
Plaintiff’s negligence claim alleg in Count V is based on medical m
e
ged
t
malpractice, Plaintiff mu
,
ust
attach a supporting affidavit and report under 735 ILCS 5
s
r
5/2-622 to h Second A
his
Amended
Complain See Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 633 (7th C 2014).
nt.
7
Cir.

Dated: Ju 27, 2017
une
7

__________
__________
___________
__
AMY J. ST EVE
T.
United Stat District Court Judg
tes
ge

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