Board of Forensic Document Examiners et al v. American Bar Association et al

Filing 81

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, Defendants' motion 61 to dismiss the amended complaint is granted, and the case is dismissed with prejudice. A separate AO-450 judgment shall be entered on the docket. Status hearing of 03/06/2018 is vacated. Civil case terminated. Emailed notice(slb, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
BOARD OF FORENSIC DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT EXAMINERS, INC., and
M. PATRICIA FISHER,
LYNDA HARTWICK, ANDREW SULNER,
J. MICHAEL WELDON,
EMILY J. WILL, VICKIE L. WILLARD,
and ROBIN D. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
THOMAS VASTRICK, STEPHANIE
DOMITROVICH, and THE AMERICAN
BOARD OF FORENSIC DOCUMENT
EXAMINERS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 17 C 01130
Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Board of Forensic Document Examiners, and seven of its members,
allege that Thomas Vastrick defamed them by making various statements in an
article appearing in The Judges’ Journal. The Plaintiffs brought this case against
Vastrick, as well as the publisher (the American Bar Association) and the article’s
editor (Stephanie Domitrovich).1 Specifically, the Plaintiffs bring claims for
defamation per se, false light invasion of privacy, false advertising under the
Lanham Act, deceptive advertising under various state consumer protection

1This

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case in light of the federal law
claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the accompanying state law
claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

statutes, and civil conspiracy. R. 52, Am. Compl. The Defendants move to dismiss
all counts, arguing (among other things) that the challenged statements do not
identify the Plaintiffs as the target of the criticism, and that the statements are
mere expressions of opinion, rather than assertions of fact. R. 61, Def. Mot. Dismiss;
R. 65, Def. Supp. Br. For the reasons discussed in the Opinion, the motion to
dismiss is granted.
I. Background
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations in the
Amended Complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Documents
attached to a complaint are considered part of the complaint for all purposes. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 10(c).
The Board of Forensic Document Examiners, Inc. (the Board) certifies experts
in the forensic specialty of document examination. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. Specifically,
certified document examiners—“diplomates” as they are called—examine and
compare handwriting, primarily for purposes of litigation. Id. ¶¶ 3, 30. The Board
currently has twelve certified diplomates, including each of the individual Plaintiffs:
Patricia Fisher, Lynda Hartwick, Andrew Sulner, J. Michael Weldon, Emily Will,
Vickie Willard, and Robin Williams. Id. ¶¶ 3-10.
The American Bar Association (ABA) is a national association of legal
professionals, counting among its members many attorneys, judges, law students,
and other para-professionals. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13. It publishes The Judges’
Journal, a quarterly publication distributed nationally both in print and online. Id.

2

¶¶ 14-15. Members of the Judicial Division of the ABA receive a complimentary
subscription to the Journal. Id. ¶ 63.
In August 2015, Plaintiff Andrew Sulner received, as a member of the
Judicial Division of the ABA, a pre-publication copy of the Summer 2015 edition of
The Judges’ Journal. Am. Compl. ¶ 73. He later received the print copy in the mail.
Id. The issue, titled Forensic Sciences – Judges as Gatekeepers, focused on various
subjects of forensic science that judges might encounter when qualifying experts. Id.
¶ 74; id. Exh. E. It included an article about handwriting comparisons done by
forensic

document

examiners,

titled

Forensic

Handwriting

Comparison

Examination in the Courtroom, written by Thomas Vastrick. Id. ¶ 76. Vastrick is a
forensic document examiner certified by a different board, namely, Defendant
American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (The American Board). Id. ¶ 17.
Vastrick also sits on the board of the American Board and is one of its past
presidents. Id. ¶ 17. The article was edited by Stephanie Domitrovich, who authored
an introductory foreword to the issue. Id. Exh. E.
The article discussed what Vastrick believes are the preferred qualifications
of forensic document examiners. Am. Compl., Exh. E. The Plaintiffs point to four
statements that they allege are defamatory to them, based on their certifications by
and affiliations with the Board. Vastrick wrote:
[1] An appropriately trained forensic document examiner will have
completed a full-time, in-residence training program lasting a minimum of 24
months per the professional published standard for training. Judges need to
be vigilant of this issue. There are large numbers of practitioners who do not
meet the training standard.

3

[2] The American Board of Forensic Document Examiners … is the
only certification board recognized by the broader forensic science
community, law enforcement, and courts for maintaining principles and
training requirements concurrent with the published training standards. Be
wary of other certifying bodies.
[3] In a section captioned, “What to look out for,” the statement,
“Certified by board other than the American Board of Forensic Document
Examiners.”
[4] In the section captioned, “What to look out for,” the statement,
“Member of American Academy of Forensic Sciences but not the Questioned
Document Section.”
Am. Comp. ¶¶ 78-90; id. Exh. E at 33-34.
The Plaintiffs claim these statements misled readers—that under the guise of
helping judges objectively evaluate forensic document examiners, Vastrick made
false and misleading statements about how to differentiate between “‘true
professionals’ and ‘unqualified’ or ‘lesser qualified practitioners.’” Am. Compl. ¶ 77.
As discussed more fully later in this Opinion, the Plaintiffs characterize the
statements as false based on the required training standards for certification, the
specific backgrounds of the Plaintiffs, and the courts’ previous acceptance of
practitioners certified by the Board. See, e.g., id. Exh. A; id. Exh. B. Both Vastrick
and Domitrovich knew that the statements in the article were false, because both
knew that the Board and the American Board were each certified by the same
accrediting entity, the Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board, and that the Board
did abide by the published training standards for certification. Am. Compl. ¶ 91.
After reading the pre-publication copy of the article, Sulner called
Domitrovich and Lisa Comforty, the managing editor of The Judges’ Journal, to

4

voice his concerns about the alleged defamatory content. Am. Compl. ¶ 109. Several
days later, the ABA’s general counsel, Jarisse Sanborn, called on Sulner to explain
in writing what he believed was defamatory. Id. ¶ 110. What followed was an
extended letter and e-mail exchange among Sulner, Sanborn, Comforty, and Jessica
Perez Simmons, who was an assistant general counsel of the ABA. During the
discussions, Sulner demanded changes to the article, but the ABA refused, offering
only to publish a rebuttal. Id. ¶¶ 110-118. Sulner did write a rebuttal article, but
the ABA declined to publish it, instead returning a severely edited and diluted
version to Sulner, who rejected it out of hand. Id. Finally, the ABA published the
print-side Vastrick article with no changes and without a rebuttal. Id. In February
2016, the ABA published the electronic version of the article to its website with a
couple of revisions to the alleged defamatory statements. Id. ¶ 120. It then emailed
Sulner and the Board’s attorney about the revisions—which it did not concede were
necessary—and alerted them that the article was now posted online. Id.; id. Exh. M.
The ABA did not publish any other clarifications or retractions regarding the
article. Id. ¶¶ 123, 125. The Plaintiffs also contend that, sometime in Fall 2015,
both Domitrovich and Vastrick separately circulated the article to members of the
American Academy of Forensic Sciences, even though they knew that the ABA had
promised to put a temporary “hold” on the publication in August 2015. Id. ¶¶ 109,
149-53.
The Plaintiffs also allege that there was a relevant behind-the-scenes dispute
between Domitrovich and the Board. Specifically, Domitrovich was a Director on the

5

Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board, which had accredited both the Board and
the American Board in the past. Am. Compl. ¶ 21. The Board was up for
reaccreditation in 2015, and Domitrovich served as one of three members on the
Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board’s annual review committee. Id. ¶ 22. The
committee recommended that the Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board deny the
Board’s reaccreditation application. Id. ¶¶ 22, 225. According to the Plaintiffs, the
ABA, Domitrovich, and Vastrick were emboldened to publish the Vastrick article as
written—despite Sulner’s vocal objections—because they believed that deaccreditation was imminent and would render Sulner’s complaints toothless. Id.
¶ 226.
On the basis of those allegations, the complaint sets out ten counts. Counts 1
and 3 assert claims for defamation per se and false light invasion of privacy on
behalf of all Plaintiffs against all Defendants (Count 1) and on behalf of Sulner
against all Defendants (Count 3). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 166, 190. In Counts 2 and 4, all
Plaintiffs allege a false advertising claim, under the Lanham Act, against all
Defendants (Count 2), and Sulner separately alleges the same type of claim against
all Defendants (Count 4). Id. ¶¶ 182, 200. In Count 5, Fisher alleges violations of
California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., and its
False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq. Id. ¶ 209. In Count 6,
Sulner alleges a violation of New York’s Consumer Protection from Deceptive Trade
and Practices Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 et seq. Id. ¶ 212. In Count 7, Will
alleges a violation of North Carolina’s statute against deceptive business practices,

6

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. Id. ¶ 215. In Count 8, Willard alleges a violation of Ohio’s
Deceptive Trade Practices law, Ohio Rev. Code § 4165.01 et seq. Id. ¶ 218. In Count
9, Williams alleges violations of Illinois’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS
510/1 et seq., and its Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. Id. ¶ 221. Finally,
in Count 10, all Plaintiffs allege civil conspiracy to defame the Board against all
Defendants. Id. ¶ 228.
II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need
only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give
the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). The
Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading
regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on
technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of
Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above

7

the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to
the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal
conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
III. Analysis
A. Choice of Law
The threshold question is to figure out which state’s law applies to which
claim, and indeed, which issue. But this case was transferred from the Western
District of Tennessee, R. 30, 02/09/17 Order on Mot. to Transfer, so there is a step
even before that threshold: which forum’s choice-of-law rules apply, Tennessee or
Illinois? The transfer order in this case explains that Tennessee’s choice of law rules
might apply, because the transferee court (Illinois in this case) generally applies the
choice of law rules of the transferor jurisdiction (Tennessee) if the case had proper
venue there to start with. Id. at 35; see Dobbs v. DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 842 F.3d
1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 2016). But if venue was improper in the transferor district,
then it makes sense to apply the transferee forum’s choice-of-law rules, because the
case should not have started out in the transferor district in the first place. And
there is a risk that litigants will forum-shop for a favorable choice-of-law rule by
filing in an improper venue, so to avoid that, the transferee district’s choice-of-law
rule should trump that of the rule of the improper venue.
Here, the Western District of Tennessee held that venue in Tennessee was
improper for the Plaintiffs’ claims. 02/09/17 Order on Mot. to Transfer at 2 (noting
none of the venue scenarios applied under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)). Because the

8

Western District of Tennessee Court transferred the case for improper venue under
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),2 and only discussed a transfer for convenience under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404 “[o]ut of an abundance of caution,” 02/09/17 Order on Mot. to Transfer at 28,
this Court will apply Illinois’s choice-of-law rules.
Illinois has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145,
which says the law of the state with the “most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties” will apply when a conflicts-of-law issue arises. See also
Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1970). Typically in tort actions, the state
with the most significant relationship is the place where the injury occurs. For
defamation claims, an alleged victim’s home state usually has the most significant
relationship to the claim, because that is where a person will suffer the most
damages arising from reputational harm. See, e.g., Kamelgard v. Macura, 585 F.3d
334, 341, 344 (7th Cir. 2009). Because each of the Plaintiffs live in different states,
R. 62, Def. Br. at 2 n.3, in the event of a conflict of laws, the Court must apply the
law of that Plaintiff’s domicile to his or her claims. Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322,
329 (7th Cir. 1998) (“in multistate defamation cases, Illinois cases indicate that the
applicable law is that of the victim’s domicile, period”) (cleaned up). In determining
whether a conflict exists, the Court looks at the problem on an issue-by-issue basis,
because Illinois follows the doctrine of dépeçage. See Restatement (Second) of

2It

is true that, in its conclusion, the Western District of Tennessee stated that it
transfers the action “to the Northern District of Illinois under either 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) or
§ 1404(a).” 02/09/17 Order on Mot. to Transfer at 36. But it is clear that the § 1404(a)
analysis was only conducted out of an abundance of caution.

9

Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. d (1971). Where no conflict exists, the Court will apply
the law of the forum state, that is, Illinois.
B. Counts 1 and 3: Defamation and False Light
All Plaintiffs allege defamation and false light invasion of privacy against all
Defendants based on four specific statements made by Vastrick in the article. A
statement is defamatory if it causes reputational harm, lowering that “person in the
eyes of the community.” Bryson v. News American Publ’ns, Inc., 672 N.E. 2d 1207,
1214 (Ill. 1996). To successfully state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must “allege
facts establishing that the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff,
that the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that statement to a third
party, and that this publication caused damages.” Bianchi v. McQueen, 58 N.E.3d
680, 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (citing Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Publ’g Co., 852
N.E.2d 825, 838 (Ill. 2006)). A publication that is defamatory on its face is
actionable as defamation per se.3 Only certain types of statements are actionable per
se, and plaintiffs alleging per se defamation do not need to plead actual damage to
their reputations. See Solaia, 852 N.E.2d at 839 (citing Owen v. Carr, 497 N.E.2d
1145, 1147 (1986)). Under Illinois common law, those categories of statements
include “words that impute an inability to perform or want of integrity in the
discharge of duties of office or employment,” and “words that prejudice a party, or
impute a lack of ability, in his or her trade, profession, or business.” Bryson, 672

3A

statement can be actionable even if it is not defamatory on its face. If extrinsic
facts prove that a statement is defamatory, and the plaintiff is able to prove actual
damages, then the statement qualifies as defamation per quod. See Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at
1214.

10

N.E.2d at 1214-15. Publications that defame someone’s ability to do her job are
considered “so obviously and materially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to her
reputation may be presumed.” Id. at 1214.
The Plaintiffs allege that Vastrick’s article contained four sets of statements
that, according to the Plaintiffs, identifiably defamed the Board, each individual
Plaintiff by implication, and Sulner personally. As described by the Plaintiffs, the
four sets of statements are as follows (the bold-face emphases are supplied by the
Plaintiffs):
[1] An appropriately trained forensic document examiner will have
completed a full-time, in-residence training program lasting a minimum of
24 months per the professional published standard for training.
Judges need to be vigilant of this issue. There are large numbers of
practitioners who do not meet the training standard.
[2] The American Board of Forensic Document Examiners … is
the only certification board recognized by the broader forensic science
community, law enforcement, and courts for maintaining principles and
training requirements concurrent with the published training
standards. Be wary of other certifying bodies.
[3] In a section captioned, “What to look out for,” the statement,
“Certified by board other than the American Board of Forensic
Document Examiners.”
[4] In the section captioned, “What to look out for,” the statement,
“Member of American Academy of Forensic Sciences but not the
Questioned Document Section.”
Am. Comp. ¶¶ 78-90; id. Exh. E at 33-34; see R. 66, Pl. Resp. Br. at 8 (boldface in
original).
In their motion to dismiss, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs cannot
sustain defamation per se claims for those four sets of statements because (1) the

11

allegedly defamatory statements are not “of and concerning” the Plaintiffs (that is,
the statements do not sufficiently identify the Plaintiffs as the subject of the
criticisms); (2) the statements are constitutionally protected opinion, and not
assertions of fact; and (3) to the extent the statements are factual, they are
substantially true. Def. Br. at 3.
1. “Of and concerning” the Plaintiffs
To qualify as actionable defamation, a statement must sufficiently identify
the person who is being criticized. See Vantassell-Matin v. Nelson, 741 F. Supp. 698,
710 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (applying Illinois law).4 The measuring stick is the law’s
ubiquitous “reasonable” person: a “reasonable individual” reading the statement
must be able to “identify” the particular plaintiff as the subject. Id. So if a
statement can be reasonably interpreted as referring to someone else, it fails to
qualify as even being a statement targeting the plaintiff. Solaia, 852 N.E.2d at 839;
see also Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 2003).
And if “extrinsic facts and circumstances” are needed to show that a statement
refers to a particular plaintiff, it is not “injurious to him on its face”—and thus does
not qualify as defamation per se. Schaffer v. Zekman, 554 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990); Lansing v. Carroll, 2015 WL 3962345, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2015).

4With

one exception, Illinois law applies on the identification issue because no
conflict exists amongst the various state laws. As discussed later in the Opinion, the
exception is Sulner, because New York common law allows for extrinsic facts in proving
whether a statement is “of and concerning” a particular person. Under the doctrine of
dépeçage, see Curtis v. TransCor Am., LLC, 2012 WL 1080116, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,
2012) (citing Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ill. 2007)), Sulner
gets the benefit of that feature of New York law.

12

In this case—at the risk of stating the obvious—none of the statements at
issue specifically identify any of the Plaintiffs by name. Remember that this is the
first statement, which describes Vastrick’s view of minimum training standards:
An appropriately trained examiner will have completed a full-time, inresidence training program lasting a minimum of 24 months per the
professional published standard for training. Judges need to be vigilant of
this issue. There are large numbers of practitioners who do not meet the
training standard.
Pl. Resp. Br. at 8 (boldface removed). This passage does not identify any particular
person by name, let alone any of the Plaintiffs. It would take outside evidence
beyond the face of the statement to connect any of the Plaintiffs to it, so the
statement does not qualify as defamation per se. See Schaffer, 554 N.E.2d at 991.
In response, the Plaintiffs argue that this statement (and the other three)
qualifies as “group” defamation. Pl. Resp. Br. at 13. Under this theory, a statement
that refers to a group—rather than to a specific person by name—still qualifies as
identifying the persons in the group if the group is “sufficiently small and the words
may reasonably be understood to have personal reference and application to any
member of the group.” Missner v. Clifford, 914 N.E.2d 540, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1977)). The
Plaintiffs argue that their group, at around 12 diplomates certified by the Board,
Am. Compl ¶ 52, is sufficiently small for actionable group defamation, Pl. Resp. Br.
at 13.
The problem with applying the group-defamation identification theory to the
first statement is that the passage can reasonably be interpreted to refer to any

13

forensic document practitioner who has not completed the specified training
program—not just the twelve examiners certified by the Board. The statement does
not target only the Board’s diplomates as inappropriately trained. Indeed, the
passage even goes on to say, “There are large numbers of practitioners who do not
meet the training standard.” Am. Compl., Exh. E at 33 (emphasis added). The group
defamation theory falls short of solving the identification problem.
The second statement suffers from the same flaws. When describing the
American Board, Vastrick wrote:
The American Board of Forensic Document Examiners … is the only
certification board recognized by the broader forensic science community, law
enforcement, and courts for maintaining principles and training
requirements concurrent with the public training standards.
Pl. Resp. Br. at 8 (boldface removed). Once again, Vastrick does not explicitly name
any Plaintiff. Instead, this statement promotes the American Board while
refraining from explicitly naming the Board of Forensic Document Examiners. In
response, the Board argues—in its response brief—that the statement must be
referring to the Board, because it is the only other organization that certifies
document examiners. Pl. Resp. Br. at 10 (“There are only two certification boards
for forensic document examiners …”). The problem with this contention is that, in
fact, the Amended Complaint does not actually allege it. In reality, the Amended
Complaint alleges only that the American Board and the Board are the two (and
only two) organizations accredited by the Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 49. Nowhere does the Amended Complaint allege that the
American Board and the Board are the only two organizations that certify document
14

examiners.5 So the Amended Complaint does not justify an inference that the group
defamation theory of identification apples.
That reason disqualifies the third statement as well. Remember that, in a
section entitled, “Gatekeeping Tips from a Practitioner,” the article tells readers
“What to look for” in “the true professional” versus “What to look out for” in
catching a “lesser-qualified practitioner.” Am. Compl., Exh. E at 34. In the “What to
look out for” list, the article says, “Certified by board other than American Board of
Forensic Document Examiners.” Id. Once again, the Board itself is not explicitly
identified. And because the Amended Complaint fails to allege that the Board is the
only other certifying board (as discussed just above), the group defamation theory of
identification is inapplicable.
On the fourth and final statement, Sulner complains that he is the specific
target. This statement is on the “What to look out for” list: “Member of American
Academy of Forensic Sciences but not the Questioned Documents Section.” Am.
Compl., Exh. E at 34. Taking all the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true,
Sulner is the only certified forensic document examiner “known to be” a member of
the American Academy of Forensic Sciences but not a member of the Questioned

5In

its reply brief, the defense attached exhibits comprising websites of other
organizations that, according to the defense, also issue certifications to document
examiners. R. 67, Def. Reply Br., Exhs. A-G. The Plaintiffs argue that the exhibits cannot
be considered at the dismissal motion stage, R. 70, Pl. Am. Mot. Strike, but that is beside
the point. There is no need to refer to the reply’s exhibits because it is the Amended
Complaint that fails to affirmatively allege that the American Board and the Board are the
only two certifying boards. (As a practical matter, even if the dismissal motion had been
denied, the reply’s exhibits might have reasonably formed the basis for a request to limit
discovery to the existence of other certifying boards, and then considering an early
summary judgment motion on the identification issue.)

15

Documents Section. Am. Compl. ¶ 122. Rather, because Sulner is an attorney and
members of the Academy can only belong to one section, he is a member of the
Jurisprudence section. Id. ¶¶ 57, 103. Sulner argues that, under New York law, all
of this outside evidence is fair game in identifying him as the target of the
statement. See Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. CBS News, Inc., 132 A.D.3d 82, 89
(N.Y. App. Div. 2015). But the statement is nowhere near as precise as Sulner says
it is. Instead, anyone who is a member of the American Academy of Forensic
Sciences but not the Questioned Documents Section fits into the statement’s
purview, and Sulner does not allege that he is the only person who fits the literal
terms of the statement.
What’s more, the reasonable reader would not undertake the chain of
reasoning that Sulner proposes. See Solaia, 852 N.E.2d at 839 (“a court must
interpret the words of the statement as they appear to have been used and
according to the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader”)
(cleaned up). Yes, under New York law, Sulner may refer to extrinsic evidence to
prove that he is the subject of the statement—but that does not mean that a
reasonable reader somehow has access to all that information and thus would
interpret the statement to target him. Sulner asks too much of the pleading-stage
inferences in his favor by arguing that a reader would know that: the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences limits each person to membership in only one of its
sections; Sulner was an attorney, so he joined the Jurisprudence section; and Sulner
was the only attorney-member also certified in document examination. Even if some

16

extraordinarily enterprising reader of The Judges’ Journal pieced all of that
together, where a “speaker is meticulous enough to preserve the anonymity of an
individual … the speaker should not be exposed to liability for defamation because
someone ferrets out the identity of the individual.” Vantassell-Matin, 741 F. Supp.
at 710. Even giving Sulner the benefit of the pleading-stage standard and of New
York law on extrinsic evidence, the fourth statement (like the first three) is not
sufficiently alleged to identify him as its target. All in all, the defamation claims fail
on the identification element.
2. Non-actionable Opinion
There is another reason why the statements at issue cannot be the premise of
defamation per se claims: the statements are constitutionally protected expressions
of opinion, rather than factual assertions. The First Amendment protects the
expression of opinion. Solaia, 852 N.E.2d at 839 (“Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea.”) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 339-40 (1974)). So defamation claims cannot be premised on an opinion. Id. To
be sure, a speaker cannot just couch a “false assertion of fact” in “terms of an
opinion” and thereby evade liability. Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1220 (citing Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990)). A statement is only protected as an
opinion if it “cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual fact.” Solaia, 852
N.E.2d at 840 (citing Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 208-09 (Ill.
1992)). The Illinois Supreme Court evaluates the opinion-versus-fact dichotomy by
considering several factors: whether the statement has a precise and readily

17

understood meaning; whether the statement is verifiable; and whether the
statement has a literary or social context that shows that it is a factual assertion
rather than an opinion. Solaia, 852 N.E.2d at 840. Mixed expressions of opinion and
fact are actionable. Quality Granite Const. Co., Inc. v. Hurst-Rosche Engineers, Inc.,
632 N.E.2d 1139, 1143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
Here, Vastrick’s statements comprise opinions, not facts. Consider the overall
context of the statements: The Judges’ Journal is, to use the Amended Complaint’s
description, a “scholarly” journal. Am. Compl. ¶ 14. That sets the overall stage for
the article as an opinion piece, because reasonable readers (especially judges) know
that scholarly journals often present one side or the other in opinionated debates.
Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 310 (7th Cir. 1996) (considering the context of a
“work of scholarship” and stating that “judges are not well equipped to resolve
academic controversies”). Not surprisingly for a scholarly journal, a small-print note
at the bottom of the issue’s Table of Contents contains a disclaimer, “Articles
represent the opinions of the authors alone.” Am. Compl., Exh. E at .pdf page 5
(emphasis added). And the statements appear in an article that explicitly presents
itself as offering suggestions for judges to consider in evaluating the expertise of
document examiners. For example, the lead-up introduction for the listing of “What
to look for” and “What to look out for” employs the language of opinion, not hard
facts:
While judges are responsible for being court gatekeepers, I, as a practicing
forensic document examiner, would like to respectfully suggest ways to
differentiate between the true professional and the lesser-qualified
practitioners.
18

Am. Compl., Exh. E at 34 (emphases added). Indeed, this entire section of the
article is entitled, “Gatekeeping Tips from a Practitioner.” Id. (emphasis added). So
the overall context is an author engaged in a scholarly presentation of his viewpoint
on document examiners.
Next, examining each specific statement in turn, take the pertinent part of
the first one: “An appropriately trained forensic document examiner will have
completed a full-time, in-residence training program lasting a minimum of 24
months per the professional published standard for training.” Am. Compl, Exh. E at
33 (emphasis added). The key word is “appropriately.” That word signals to the
reader that Vastrick is describing his opinion of what is the appropriate training for
a document examiner. To resist this characterization, the Plaintiffs focus on the
latter half of the statement, arguing that Vastrick is saying that the professional
published standard requires a “full-time, in-residence training program lasting a
minimum of 24 months.” Am. Compl, Exh. E at 33. In reality, the Plaintiffs contend,
the standard (published by ASTM International, formerly known as the American
Society for Testing and Materials) actually says that the training program “shall be
the equivalent” of 24 months full-time training. Am. Compl., Exh. A, ASTM E238811, § 6.1 (emphasis added). But Vastrick’s omission of the word “equivalent” does
not somehow transform the opinion into a defamatory fact against the Plaintiffs.
First, the most natural interpretation of the statement still remains that
Vastrick is opining on what he believes is the “appropriate[]” level of training for a
document examiner. Second, the Plaintiffs are packing a lot of meaning into the
19

word “per” when arguing that Vastrick’s phrase, “per the professional published
standard” meant that the standard exclusively requires 24 months full-time
training. Nothing in the statement actually makes that assertion. A reader
reasonably could interpret Vastrick as saying that the 24 months full-time training
meets the published standard—which it does—without taking the extra step that he
was saying it is the exclusive way to meet the standard. Third and last, even if the
statement were interpreted as saying that the ASTM standard requires 24 months
full-time training, that statement says nothing about the Plaintiffs. It would just be
a mistaken (or, more precisely, incomplete) assertion about the ASTM standard—
not about the Plaintiffs.
Moving on to the second statement, remember that here Vastrick was
promoting the American Board’s standing in the community:
The American Board of Forensic Document Examiners … is the only
certification board recognized by the broader forensic science community, law
enforcement, and courts for maintaining principles and training
requirements concurrent with the published training standards. Be wary of
other certifying bodies.
Am. Compl., Exh. E at 33 (emphasis added). Again, this is just an expression of
Vastrick’s opinion, rather than a verifiable, objective fact. The key word this time is
“recognized.” There is really no way (and the Plaintiffs offer none) to verify—as a
factual matter—the American Board’s “recognition” in the community. What’s more,
the statement’s breadth—saying that the “scientific community, law enforcement,
and courts” recognize the American Board—is so sweeping that the lack of
specificity makes the statement even more difficult to verify as if it were a fact. To

20

the extent that the Plaintiffs contend that Vastrick is implying that the Board’s
certification is not “concurrent” with published training standards, Am. Compl, Exh.
E at 33, it is not even clear what “concurrent” means in this context, let alone that it
levels a defamatory accusation against the Board (which the statement does not
refer to by name).
Finally, the third and fourth statements also comprise opinions. These
statements appear in the “What to look out for” list. Am. Compl., Exh. E at 34. Even
that prefatory title—“What to look out for”—speaks in the language of an opinion.
Plus, as discussed earlier, the list appears in a section entitled, “Gatekeeping Tips
from a Practitioner.” Id. (emphasis added). And the sentence immediately leading
up to the list merely says that Vastrick “suggests” that judges look for (or look out
for) certain characteristics to distinguish between a “true” professional and “lesser”qualified practitioners. Id. “Suggests,” “true,” and “lesser” all signify that Vastrick is
expressing his opinions in offering the lists. When viewed through the lens of the
pertinent factors, the statements are Vastrick’s opinions, and judges can take them
or leave them.6
3. False Light Invasion of Privacy
The false light invasion of privacy claims also fail for the same reason as the
defamation claims. First, false light claims also require the same “of and
concerning” element as defamation claims. Muzikowski, 477 F.3d at 907. So the

6The

defense also argues that the statements are substantially true, but there is no
need to address that argument in light of the Court’s holding that the Amended Complaint
fails to allege that the statements are about the Plaintiffs and that the statements are mere
expressions of opinion.

21

failure of the identification element on the defamation claims is fatal as to the false
light claims. The same goes for the requirement that a defamation claim be
premised on an assertion of fact, rather than opinion—that too applies to false light
claims. Schivarelli v. CBS, Inc., 776 N.E.2d 693, 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“As in
defamation actions, statements that are expressions of opinion devoid of any factual
content are not actionable as false light claims.”). In light of the holding that the
challenged statements express opinions, not facts, the false light claims must fail.
B. Counts 2 and 4: Violations of the Lanham Act
Counts 2 and 4 encompass all of the Plaintiffs’ claims against all of the
Defendants for violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). The Plaintiffs
allege that the Vastrick article states or implies that the Board’s forensic document
examiners are “unqualified” because they are not certified by the American Board,
and that those are misleading representations under the Act. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17778, 182. Not surprisingly, the defense asks for dismissal because the statements are
constitutionally protected opinion. Def. Supp. Br. at 1-2.
The

Lanham

Act

prohibits

“false

or

misleading”

descriptions

or

representations “of fact.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added). So opinions are
not targeted by the Lanham Act. Just like the analysis that applies to defamation
claims, for a Lanham Act claim, the “meaning of the alleged literal falsehood must
be considered in context and with reference to the audience to which the statement
is addressed.” See Schering–Plough Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586
F.3d 500, 513 (7th Cir. 2009). An opinion cannot be a misleading representation of

22

fact. McDavid Knee Guard, Inc. v. Nike USA, Inc., 2010 WL 3000178, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
July 28, 2010). For the same reasons discussed earlier, the challenged statements
are not assertions of fact, but rather nonactionable opinion. The Lanham Act claims
fail too.
C. Counts 5 through 9: State Law Unfair Competition
Just as the Lanham Act claims fail, so must the claims premised on state
unfair-competition laws. The relevant counts are premised on the laws of Illinois,
California, Ohio, New York, and North Carolina (depending on where each
individual Plaintiff lives). But each unfair competition statute requires that the
allegedly anti-competitive statement be a factual statement, not an expression of
opinion.7 (Each state’s unfair-competition law has that same requirement, so no
conflict of laws exists.) So, again, these claims (Counts 5 through 9) do not
adequately state a claim because Vastrick’s statements are expressions of opinion,
rather than fact.
D. Count 10: Civil Conspiracy
Lastly, Count 10 is for civil conspiracy to defame the Board. Am. Compl.
¶ 228. The Plaintiffs allege that Vastrick, Domitrovich, and the ABA agreed to
publish the article “without regard to the truth of the matter contained therein.” Id.
¶ 226. But civil conspiracy requires an agreement to accomplish “by some concerted
7See

Dyson, Inc. v. Bissell Homecare, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1028-29 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (“Illinois unfair competition claims are generally resolved according to the same
standard as Lanham Act claims.” (citing Neuros Co., Ltd. v. KTurbo, Inc., 698 F.3d 514, 523
(7th Cir. 2012))); Nat’l Servs. Group v. Painting & Decorating Contrs. of Am., 2006 WL
2035465, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2006); Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. Worthington Cylinders
Wis., LLC, 747 F. Supp. 2d 568, 578 (W.D.N.C. 2010); Best v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2015 WL
1125539, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2015).

23

action” an “unlawful purpose” through a “tortious” act. Brooks v. Ross, 2008 WL
5082995, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2008), aff’d, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Ill. Non-Profit Risk Mgmt. Ass'n v. Human Serv. Ctr., 884 N.E.2d 700, 711 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008)). But none of the targeted statements are defamatory, so there is no
premise for a conspiracy claim. This claim is dismissed as well.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim is granted. None of the statements identify the Plaintiffs as the
subject of the criticism, and all of the statements are simply expressions of opinion,
not fact. To be sure, it might have been better for Vastrick to disclose in the article
(or the author’s note) that he is a member of the American Board, so that readers
would know that he was singing the praises of an organization to which he belongs.
As a matter of law, however, the challenged statements are not defamatory. Final
judgment will be entered, because the Plaintiffs have already amended the
complaint once, and there is no reason to think that the allegations can be amended
again to overcome the barriers identified in this Opinion. The status hearing of
March 6, 2018 is vacated.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: February 22, 2018
24