Sroga v. Williams et al

Filing 73

ORDER: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 67 is granted with prejudice. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 11/4/2019. Mailed notice. (ym, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KEVIN SROGA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLES WILLIAMS, Chicago Department of
Streets and Sanitation Commissioner, STEVE
SORFLEET, ROBERT DYCKMAN, ALL JOHN
AND JANE DOE ABANDON AUTO FIELD
INVESTIGATORS WHOM WORK FOR THE
CITY OF CHICAGO’S STREETS AND
SANITATION DIVISION, ALL JOHN AND
JANE DOE DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
OFFICERS, the DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS DIVISION,
PATRICIA JACKOWIAK, KAREN BRAZIL
BREASHERS, ALO #21 individually, and the
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendants.

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Case No. 17-cv-1333
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

ORDER
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [67] is granted with prejudice. Civil case terminated.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff Kevin Sroga initially brought his Complaint on February 21, 2017, and defendants
were served in May 2019. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Sroga alleges that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated in conjunction with the tow of several vehicles pursuant to Section 9-80-11(a) of
the Municipal Code of Chicago (“MCC”), which allows for any vehicle that appears to be deserted
and is not moved or used for more than seven days to be towed. Sroga states that he parked several
cars on North Homan Avenue in Chicago. City officials towed Sroga’s cars on February 18, 2015;
several days before, his cars had received City stickers stating that they were abandoned pursuant to
MCC Section 9-80-110 and that they could be towed. Along with related state law claims and
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alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, Sroga contends that towing the vehicles was an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment because snow blocked his
cars, making them impossible to move. Further, Sroga asserts that towing the cars violated his right
to due process because the City towed them on the seventh day, rather than more than seven days,
after he saw the tow notices on the cars.
Although Sroga failed to appear at Court hearings on June 3, 2019 and June 11, 2019 (Dkt.
54, 60), he did appear at the July 11, 2019 hearing and orally moved for leave to file an amended
complaint, which this Court granted. (Dkt. 63.) The Court allowed Sroga until August 12, 2019 to
file his amended complaint, noting that this was a final extension. Sroga did not comply. Instead,
Sroga filed a motion for an extension of time to file his amended complaint two days after the
deadline, which the Court denied for failure to demonstrate excusable neglect for not complying
with the Court’s deadline. (Dkt. 64, 66.) Defendants moved to dismiss Sroga’s complaint for a lack
of standing and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), respectively. Sroga
did not file a brief in response, despite multiple orders from the Court confirming the briefing
schedule. (Dkt. 66, 70.) Defendants filed a reply brief in compliance with the Court’s schedule. To
date, Sroga has not filed anything further with the Court.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion seeks dismissal of an action over which a court allegedly lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Standing is a threshold requirement in every
federal claim and must be present at the time the lawsuit is filed. See Groshek v. Time Warner Cable,
Inc., 865 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 740, 199 L. Ed. 2d 617 (2018).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all of the plaintiff’s allegations
as true and views them “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park,
734 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2013). A complaint must contain allegations that “state a claim to relief

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that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009).
It is a longstanding rule that a plaintiff waives his claims when he fails to develop arguments
or fails to respond to alleged deficiencies in a motion to dismiss. Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d
715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that a complaint is subject to dismissal where a plaintiff does not file a response
supporting the legal adequacy of the complaint). Sroga’s silence in response to defendants’ motion
to dismiss operates as abandonment of any argument against dismissing the claims. See Bonte v. U.S.
Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to respond to an argument . . . results in
waiver.”). The Court is therefore compelled to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss on all claims.
Even if Sroga had not waived his arguments on all of his claims, however, the Court would
dismiss the complaint in full because Sroga lacks standing. To establish the threshold requirement
of Article III standing, Sroga must plausibly allege facts demonstrating that: (1) he suffered an injury
in fact, (2) are fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of defendants, and (3) are likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d
635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Sroga bears the burden of establishing the elements of
standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
Defendants contend that Sroga has not alleged ownership of a single vehicle. Although
Sroga refers to several vehicles that he parked within the City of Chicago, he does not allege that he
holds title to any of the vehicles at issue. Further, Sroga has not identified the vehicles in any
manner or specified how many vehicles are even at issue. Thus, Sroga’s allegations fail to satisfy the
first element, the existence of an injury in fact. See Perry v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 186 F.3d 826, 830
(7th Cir. 1999). This Court does not have jurisdiction over Sroga’s claims. Given Sroga’s waiver of

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his claims and this Court’s lack of jurisdiction, the Court does not address defendants’ additional
arguments in support of dismissal.
Sroga has been allowed multiple opportunities to prosecute his case and given many
warnings regarding the importance of complying with Court set deadlines. Thus, the Court grants
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [67] with prejudice. Civil case terminated.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 11/4/2019
Entered: _____________________________
SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN
United States District Judge

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