Wiggins v. Lake County Sheriff's Dept. et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM Order: For the reasons stated in this memorandum order, attorney Lupo must in the first instance determine what authorities support his position as to handling Wiggins' claim in this case, unless of course the situation is one callin g for Lupo's filing of the civil equivalent of an Anders brief. And that means Lupo must confer with his client, Wiggins, sufficiently to evaluate Wiggins' claim on the merits. Hence this Court reserves judgment on Lupo's motion to withdraw pending his exposition of the matter in the terms called for here. Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 7/21/2017:Mailed notice(clw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CALVIN WIGGINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT., et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 17 C 1352

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Thomas Lupo ("Lupo") of the Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP law firm has moved to
withdraw as the designated counsel for prisoner plaintiff Calvin Wiggins ("Wiggins") in this
action in which Wiggins seeks to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Lupo
acknowledges that neither he nor his law firm has a disqualifying conflict of interest (as his
motion states, "appointed counsel's law firm, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, does not currently
represent the Lake County Sheriff's Office") -- instead Lupo asserts:
5.

While appointed counsel's law firm, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, does not
represent the Lake County Sheriff's Office, it does represent numerous
Sheriffs' offices, individual Sheriffs and their employees, and numerous
other law enforcement agencies throughout the State of Illinois and
elsewhere in similar matters.

6.

Thomas D. Lupo and the Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP law firm are in good
faith and from experience concerned that the representation will
necessarily require taking of legal positions contrary to those otherwise
frequently taken by Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP in its representation
[sic -- the word "of" was inadvertently omitted by Lupo here] law
enforcement clients.

That position ignores the responsibility of lawyers to advance the interests of their clients
to the best of their professional ability, which in this instance means calling into play the relevant

caselaw under Section 1983. 1 Accordingly Lupo must in the first instance determine what
authorities support his position as to handling Wiggins' claim in this case, unless of course the
situation is one calling for Lupo's filing of the civil equivalent of an Anders brief. And that
means Lupo must confer with his client, Wiggins, sufficiently to evaluate Wiggins' claim on the
merits. Hence this Court reserves judgment on Lupo's motion to withdraw pending his
exposition of the matter in the terms called for here.

__________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date: July 21, 2017

1

Indeed, lawyers who customarily represent clients who occupy one side of frequent
legal disputes -- say employers or labor unions -- often find that such representation equips those
lawyers with insights that make them better able to provide knowledgeable and more effective
representation to clients on the other side of the fence.

-2-