Ramzan v. Kelly et al
Filing
59
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Steven C. Seeger on 2/6/2020. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dckt. No. 42 ) is hereby granted. Mailed notice. (jjr, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JON WALLI RAMZAN,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
)
Defendant.
)
____________________________________)
Case No. 1:17-cv-01361
Hon. Steven C. Seeger
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case involves a traffic-related encounter between an officer of the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection and a fellow citizen on the roadways in the Chicago suburbs. Everyone agrees
that Officer Joseph Jablonski turned on the emergency lights of a CBP vehicle and pulled over
Jon Ramzan, the Plaintiff. But the two motorists disagree about why the officer pulled him over.
The officer’s story is that he believed that Ramzan was having a medical issue. Ramzan, for his
part, tells a story that is decidedly less friendly. He claims that the officer honked and screamed
at him. And then put a gun to his head.
Ramzan ultimately sued, claiming that the officer had committed a tort under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. The United States (the sole Defendant) now moves for summary judgment,
arguing that the officer did not act within the scope of his federal employment. The government
basically argues that a local traffic stop was not within his range of responsibilities as a CBP
officer, so the United States cannot be liable. The issue boils down to whether the United States
is responsible for their encounter on the roadways of suburbia.
The two drivers have strikingly different versions of what took place. But whatever
version is true, the result is the same. Defendant did not act within the scope of his employment,
and thus the United States is entitled to summary judgment.
Background
The pleadings tell different stories about their encounter. Officer Jablonski paints
himself as somewhat of a Good Samaritan, trying to help a fellow citizen in need. Ramzan
depicts Jablonski as something closer to a menace to society. The pleadings reflect a
fundamental disagreement about what took place, and the difference is night and day.
But the facts before the Court at the summary judgment stage are narrower, and
undisputed. In its summary judgment motion, the United States doesn’t offer Officer Jablonski’s
version of the story at all. Instead, the government offers Plaintiff’s version of events, and
argues that he has no claim as a matter of law. That is, the government argues that under
Plaintiff’s story, he loses, because the officer went rogue and harassed a motorist for reasons of
his own.
Ramzan does not deny that, under his own version of the encounter, the officer acted
outside the scope of employment. Instead, Plaintiff argues that under Officer Jablonski’s story,
he gets a trial. Plaintiff contends that Officer Jablonski acted within the scope of employment if,
as the officer claims, he was simply trying to help.
So, the government doesn’t seek summary judgment based on Officer Jablonski’s story,
and Ramzan doesn’t oppose summary judgment based on his own story. Instead, they do the
opposite. The United States puts forward Ramzan’s version, and Ramzan points to a few lines of
testimony from Officer Jablonski’s investigative interview.
2
Collectively, the parties put undisputed facts on the table. The government filed a Rule
56.1 Statement of Facts that adopted Plaintiff’s version of the encounter, and Plaintiff admitted
all of those facts. See Dckt. Nos. 44, 47. Plaintiff, in turn, offered a few additional facts of his
own, based on Officer Jablonski’s testimony, and the government admitted them, too. See Dckt.
Nos. 48, 50. So, the question is whether the undisputed facts require a trial, or entitle the United
States to exit the courthouse.
The run-in took place almost ten years ago. At that time, Officer Jablonski was a Canine
Enforcement Officer for the CBP. See Plaintiff’s Response to the United States’s 56.1 Statement
of Facts (“Plaintiff’s Response”), at ¶¶ 2, 9 (Dckt. No. 47); Dckt. No. 44-1, at 35. He worked in
the foreign mail unit near O’Hare airport. See Dckt. No. 44-1, at 37. His duties included
“overseeing the flow of trade and travel entering the United States.” See Plaintiff’s Response, at
¶ 9. He “enforced customs, immigration, and agricultural laws and regulations at United States
ports of entry to prevent the illegal trafficking of people, narcotics, and other contraband into the
United States.” Id.
It was a slow work day on February 17, 2010, so he decided to take his government
vehicle for a checkup at a local dealership. See Dckt. No. 49-3, at 1 ¶ 1. He was driving a fullymarked CBP vehicle (an SUV). See Plaintiff’s Response, at ¶ 2 (Dckt. No. 47). After service, he
drove to the kennel, which took him through Carol Stream, Illinois, a suburb about 30 miles west
of Chicago. See Dckt. No. 44-1, at 37.
That’s where he crossed paths with Plaintiff Jon Ramzan. See Plaintiff’s Response, at ¶ 1
(Dckt. No. 47). Ramzan stopped at a yellow light “due to the presence of traffic cameras.” Id.
So Jablonski “honked at him.” Id.
3
At the “next light,” Jablonski upped the ante. Id. at ¶ 3. Jablonski got out of the SUV,
walked up to his car, and “began pounding on [Ramzan’s] driver side door window with his fist.”
See Dckt. 44-1, at 10. He “asked Ramzan if he knew how to drive.” See Plaintiff’s Response, at
¶ 3 (Dckt. No. 47). Jablonski then instructed him to pull over into a parking lot. Id. at ¶ 4.
Ramzan did not oblige. Instead, he kept driving, and went through a yellow light to get away.
Id. “I just thought it was some security guy,” he later explained. See Dckt. No. 49-1, at 4,
12:20-21.
Jablonski wouldn’t let it go. Things began to escalate. He caught up to Ramzan and
turned on the emergency lights of his CBP vehicle. See Plaintiff’s Response, at ¶ 5 (Dckt. No.
47). This time, Ramzan pulled over, driving into a nearby parking lot. Id. For the second time,
Jablonski got out of his vehicle. Id. He approached Ramzan’s car, “drawing his gun and yelling
at him.” Id.
Fortunately for everyone, two Carol Stream police officers happened to be at the scene.
Id. at ¶ 6; Dckt. No. 44-1, at 14 (stating that the police officers arrived “within fifteen seconds of
the initial stop”). They saw Jablonski pull Ramzan over, and they witnessed Jablonski exit his
SUV and approach Ramzan’s vehicle. See Plaintiff’s Response, at ¶ 6 (Dckt. No. 47). But they
did not see Jablonski brandishing a weapon.1 Id. at ¶ 7.
The police officers defused the situation. They asked Jablonski why he had pulled
Ramzan over. He gave an explanation that is a common denominator of all-too-many trafficrelated run-ins: Ramzan had “flipped him off.” See Plaintiff’s Response, at ¶ 8 (Dckt. No. 47).
1
As an aside, in his interview with investigators, Jablonski denied pulling out his gun. See Dckt. No. 493, at 2-3 ¶ 3. Even so, the parties do not include his denial in their Rule 56.1 Statements of Facts, or in
their Responses. No one argues that his denial moves the needle and creates a genuine dispute of material
fact. See Dckt. Nos. 44, 47, 48, 50. The Court mentions his denial as background only.
4
Jablonski offered a more charitable explanation of his conduct a few weeks later during
an interview with an investigator from CBP’s internal affairs unit. He “worried that Ramzan was
in trouble, as he was behaving abnormally.” Id. at ¶ 8; see also Dckt. No. 44-1, at 37. Jablonski
claimed that he “thought the driver was in need of help or medical attention.” Dckt. No. 44-1, at
36. “I was asking the gentleman if he was alright and if he need[ed] any help.” Id.; see also
United States’s Resp. to Plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1 Additional Statement of Facts, at ¶ 3 (Dckt.
No. 50); id. at ¶ 5 (“The vehicle was stopped because the driver was having abnormal behavior,
and I wanted to know if he needed any assistance.”).
The situation deescalated. The police officers talked with each of the two drivers. See
Dckt. No. 49-3, at 2 ¶¶ 4-6; Dckt. No. 44-1, at 10, 2:39-41; Dckt. No. 44-1, at 26, 2:51-52; Dckt.
No. 44-1, at 31, 2:43-52. The police reports say nothing about a driver with a medical issue.
Jablonski didn’t call for medical attention for Ramzan, and he didn’t ask the police officers to
make that call, either. See Dckt. No. 49-3, at 2 ¶ 6. Apparently, no one at the scene – three law
enforcement professionals, counting Jablonski – thought that Ramzan actually needed medical
attention. (Otherwise, presumably someone would have called for some.)
The police told Ramzan that Jablonski was with the CBP, and they said that he could file
a complaint. See Dckt. No. 44-1, at 10. Ramzan ultimately gave a statement to investigators
from the CBP, and to the local police department. Id. at 9-11, 15-16.
A few years later, after an investigation, the CBP reprimanded Jablonski for “Use of
Position for Other than Official Purposes.” See Dckt. No. 49-2, at 1. According to the letter,
“Officer Zalak [from the Carol Stream Police Department] stated the reason you gave him for the
traffic stop was because you were given the ‘finger.’” Id.
5
Meanwhile, Ramzan advanced a timely claim to the CBP under the Federal Torts Claim
Act. He brought this action after exhausting his administrative remedies. See Plaintiff’s
Response, at ¶ 10 (Dckt. No. 47); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
Summary Judgment Standard
A District Court “shall grant” summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Jajeh v. County of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2012). The
Court’s role is “to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572
U.S. 650, 656 (2014). The Court should not “weigh conflicting evidence . . . or make credibility
determinations.” Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted). The Court must “constru[e] the facts and mak[e] reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmovant.” H.P. by & Through W.P. v. Naperville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #203, 910
F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
If the party moving for summary judgment shows that there is no disputed issue of
material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show more than “some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact.” Scott, 530 U.S. at 380 (emphasis in original, citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
6
Analysis
The dispute boils down to whether the United States can be held liable for the actions of
Officer Jablonski. The United States “cannot be sued without its consent.” United States v.
Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289 (2009). Congress consented to some suits against the United
States in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The FTCA “was designed primarily to remove
the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort and, with certain specific
exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like
circumstances.” See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).
The FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity for civil suits seeking money
damages “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). As the plain text reveals, the waiver does not cover all
misconduct. It only covers malfeasance by a federal employee “while acting within the scope of
his office or employment.” Id.
Congress has carved out a number of exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity,
including certain intentional torts. See Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (2013)
(explaining the intentional tort exception). The United States retains sovereign immunity for
“[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). But Congress later enacted a “law enforcement proviso”
– an exception to the exception – for claims against “investigative or law enforcement officers”
7
involving six intentional torts, including “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse
of process, or malicious prosecution.” Id.; see also Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 54-55. So the waiver
of sovereign immunity applies to those types of claims.
The text of the statute points to the “law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In other words, the FTCA “incorporates the substantive law of the state
where the tortious act or omission occurred.” Midwest Knitting Mills, Inc. v. United States, 950
F.2d 1295, 1297 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992)
(“[T]he extent of the United States’ liability under the FTCA is generally determined by
reference to state law.”); Parrott v. United States, 536 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2008); Mann v.
Harvey, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“Federal law governs whether a federal
employee was acting within the scope of his employment . . . but a federal court looks to the law
of the state where the alleged acts took place, in this case Illinois.”).
Here, the incident took place in Illinois. So Illinois law governs whether Officer
Jablonski was “acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1);
Snodgrass v. Jones, 957 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Under Illinois law, where the essential
facts are undisputed, whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment presents a
question of law.”) (cleaned up). “Plaintiff has the burden of showing the contemporaneous
relationship between the tortious act and the scope of employment.” Bagent v. Blessing Care
Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154, 165, 308 Ill. Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985 (2007).
Illinois defines the scope of employment by drawing upon the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. See Snodgrass v. Jones, 957 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1992); Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d
351, 359-60, 135 Ill. Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304 (1989) (“No precise definition has been
accorded the term ‘scope of employment,’ . . . but broad criteria have been enunciated.”)
8
(adopting 228 of the Second Restatement); Duffy v. United States, 966 F.2d 307, 314 (7th Cir.
1992). The Second Restatement sets the following boundaries for the scope of employment:
(1)
Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a)
it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b)
it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
[and]
(c)
it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master . . . .
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958). Illinois courts apply a three-part test, and a
plaintiff must satisfy all three parts to show that an employee acted within the scope of
employment. See Adames v. Sheahan, 233 Ill. 2d 276, 303, 330 Ill. Dec. 720, 909 N.E.2d 742
(2009) (“[A]ll three criteria of section 228 must be met in order to find that an employee was
acting within the scope of employment.”).2
“[I]t is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized,
far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the
master.” Duffy v. United States, 966 F.2d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at
360). When deciding whether an employee acted within the scope of employment, “courts often
look to whether the action furthered the purpose of employment and whether the employee
encountered the plaintiff only as a result of conducting official business.” Chambers v. Cross,
2018 WL 5904461, at *4 (S.D. Ill. 2018); see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 70, at 502 (5th ed. 1984) (“[The scope of employment] refers to those acts
2
In Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 360-62, 135 Ill. Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304 (1989), the Illinois
Supreme Court looked to the Second Restatement of Agency when defining what it means to act within
the scope of employment. The American Law Institute released the Third Restatement of Agency in
2006. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07 (2006). Neither party cites the Third Restatement, let
alone argues that it would make a difference. Illinois courts continue to look to the Second Restatement,
so this Court follows suit.
9
which are so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and
reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper
ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment.”).
An employee who acts with “malice, bad faith, or self-interested motivation” does not
necessarily act outside the scope of employment. See Taboas v. Mlynczak, 149 F.3d 576, 582
(7th Cir. 1998) (citing Illinois cases); Javier v. City of Milwaukee, 670 F.3d 823, 829-30 (7th Cir.
2012); Copeland v. County of Macon, 403 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2005). Even actions
“motivated primarily by ill will” can be within the scope of employment if they are “actuated, at
least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.” Taboas, 149 F.3d at 583 (cleaned up); see also
Randi F. v. High Ridge YMCA, 170 Ill. App. 3d 962, 967, 120 Ill. Dec. 784, 524 N.E.2d 966
(1988) (“[I]f an employee commits an intentional tort with the dual purpose of furthering the
employer’s interest and venting personal anger, respondeat superior may lie; however, if the
employee acts purely in his own interest, liability under respondeat superior is inappropriate.”).
Forbidden acts are not necessarily outside the scope of employment, either. See Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 230 (1958) (“An act, although forbidden, or done in a forbidden manner,
may be within the scope of employment.”).
The government traces its aim on the first element only, that is, whether Officer
Jablonski’s conduct was “of the kind he is employed to perform.” See Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 360.
The United States basically argues that the CBP is not in the business of performing traffic stops,
so Officer Jablonski did not act within the scope of his employment. See Dckt. No. 43, at 4. “He
was not a village traffic cop.” Id.
The Court agrees. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection is one of the largest law
enforcement agencies in the federal government, with over 60,000 officers and other employees.
10
See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, About CBP, https://www.cbp.gov/about (last visited
Feb. 6, 2020). Created in 2003 as part of the Department of Homeland Security, the CBP is
“charged with keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the U.S. while facilitating lawful
international travel and trade.” Id.
According to its Mission Statement, the CBP exists to “safeguard America’s borders
thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while enhancing the Nation’s
global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade and travel.” Id. As the nation’s
“first unified border entity,” the CBP “takes a comprehensive approach to border management
and control, combining customs, immigration, border security, and agricultural protection into
one coordinated and supportive activity.” Id.
The statute that created the CBP reflects its outward-facing mission. The CBP performs
“security, trade facilitation, and trade enforcement functions.” 6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(1). The
Commissioner of the CBP is charged with protecting the nation’s borders and facilitating the free
flow of international trade. Among other statutory duties, the Commissioner of the CBP shall:
(2)
ensure the interdiction of persons and goods illegally entering or exiting the
United States;
(3)
facilitate and expedite the flow of legitimate travelers and trade;
(4)
direct and administer the commercial operations of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, and the enforcement of the customs and trade laws of the
United States;
(5)
detect, respond to, and interdict terrorists, drug smugglers and traffickers,
human smugglers and traffickers, and other persons who may undermine
the security of the United States, in cases in which such persons are entering,
or have recently entered, the United States;
(6)
safeguard the borders of the United States to protect against the entry of
dangerous goods;
(7)
ensure the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished
by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; [and]
11
(8)
in coordination with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, enforce and administer
all immigration laws . . . .
See 6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(2)–(8).
Officer Jablonski was no exception. The record includes a declaration from Robert
Harris, a Supervisory U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer and Program Manager for
Border Security in the Chicago Field Office. See Dckt. No. 44-1, at 22-23. He confirmed that
the “primary mission of CBP is to detect and prevent terrorists and terrorists’ weapons from
entering the United States while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.” Id. 44-1, at
22 ¶ 3. Officer Jablonski was a small part of that much larger effort:
As a CBP officer, the scope of Jablonski’s responsibilities would have included
detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States, enforcing customs, immigration, and agricultural laws and regulations at
U.S. ports of entry, preventing the illegal trafficking of people, narcotics, and
contraband into the United States, interacting with carriers, other agencies and
foreign entities to exchange information and provide guidance on
admissibility/compliance, performing inspection, intelligence analysis,
examination, and other law enforcement activities, including the apprehension,
detention and arrest relative to the arrival and departure of persons, conveyances,
and merchandise at ports of entry.
Id. at 22-23 ¶ 3. But “there is no law or policy that would authorize a CBP officer to pull over a
motorist for a traffic incident that did not arise from any border-related inspection, function, or
activity.” Id. at 23 ¶ 4.
Noticeably missing from the CBP’s duties is patrolling the nation’s roadways, looking for
drivers in need. The CBP is not a roving, here-to-help-any-way-we-can government agency.
The CBP seeks out “smugglers,” “traffickers,” and “terrorists,” not needy motorists. See
6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(5). The Customs and Border Protection is charged with protecting the border
and other ports of entry, not run-of-the-mill side streets in suburbia. It does not provide roadside
assistance. The CBP is not AAA.
12
Ramzan’s story cannot give rise to a claim because, under his version of events, Jablonski
did not act within the scope of his employment. Ramzan contends that Jablonski pulled him over
for no apparent reason, screamed at him, and then threatened him with a deadly weapon.
Ramzan doesn’t claim that Jablonski was carrying out his duties as a CBP official by conducting
a search that got carried away. And he doesn’t claim that traffic stops were part of Jablonski’s
line of work.
There is no evidence that Officer Jablonski was looking for contraband, enforcing the
immigration laws, or stopping a potential terrorist. See 6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(2), (c)(5), (c)(8). The
record lacks any facts suggesting that Jablonski was “safeguard[ing] the borders” or otherwise
promoting the “security of the United States.” See 6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(5), (c)(6). Jablonski had no
“purpose to serve the master” by pulling him over, and thus Ramzan has no claim against the
United States. See Taboas v. Mlynczak, 149 F.3d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1998); Bagent v. Blessing
Care Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154, 168, 308 Ill. Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985 (2007) (“[A]n act is outside
of the scope of employment if it has no connection with the conduct the employee is required to
perform.”); Wright v. City of Danville, 174 Ill. 2d 391, 405, 221 Ill. Dec. 203, 675 N.E.2d 110
(1996) (“If the employee’s actions are different from the type of acts he is authorized to perform
or were performed purely in his own interest, he has departed from the scope of employment.”);
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 (1958) (“To be within the scope of the employment,
conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct
authorized.”).
Ramzan does not present any evidence about the CBP’s mission. He also advances no
argument that the CBP employed Officer Jablonski to make local traffic stops. And he does not
deny that, under his story, Jablonski acted outside the scope of his employment. Instead,
13
Ramzan seeks to preserve his case by relying on Jablonski’s interview. He latches on to a
snippet of Jablonski’s testimony, which painted his motives in a more flattering light.
Ramzan hangs his hat on the smallest of hooks. He argues that Officer Jablonski acted
within the scope of his employment based on one word used in his investigative interview: duty.
Officer Jablonski testified that he pulled over Ramzan because he thought he had a “duty” to
help those in need:
Q:
Is it part of your official duties as a CBP Canine Officer to conduct traffic
stops?
A:
No, but it is my duty to help any people in need.
See Dckt. No. 44-1, at 38. Based on that word, Ramzan argues that his case lives to fight another
day.3 See Dckt. No. 46.
The government responds by undercutting Officer Jablonski’s testimony, saying that his
self-serving explanation was unbelievable. It was an “obviously unreliable, after-the-fact
rationalization by CPB [sic] officer Jablonski for his motive for pulling Ramzan over.” Dckt.
No. 49, at 1. It “contradicts Jablonski’s statement at the time of the incident,” when Jablonski
said that Ramzan had flipped him off. Id. And the original story, in the government’s view, is
the “obviously true version.” Id.
That strategy won’t work. A party can’t obtain summary judgment by arguing that one
set of testimony is more credible than another set of testimony. The whole point of trial is to
figure out what facts are more believable. See U.S. v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.
Ramzan’s argument requires some mental gymnastics (but the Court’s analysis doesn’t turn on the
internal tension). He has a claim only if officer Jablonski acted within the scope of employment. Under
his argument, his claim survives because Jablonski was trying to help him. But that theory sits
uncomfortably with his theory of the case, to wit, that the officer put a gun to his head. Apparently the
notion is that the officer was trying to help, but then got carried away. A Good Samaritan gone rogue.
3
14
2000). The jury at trial, not the Court at summary judgment, makes credibility determinations.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Even so, the use of the word “duty” is too slender of a reed to support a genuine issue for
trial. “Duty,” like “jurisdiction,” is a “word of many, too many, meanings.” Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998). There are all sorts of duties, in all sorts of
contexts. What type of “duty” was Jablonski referring to? A civic duty? Religious duty? Moral
duty? Philosophical duty? Humanitarian duty? Legal duty? Something else? Read generally
Cicero, On Duties (Loeb Classical Library 1913); Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals 4:398, 4:399-4:400 (Mary Gregor & Jens Timmermann, eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press rev. ed. 2012) (1785) (“To be beneficent where one can is one’s duty . . . . The
second proposition is: an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose that is to be
attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is resolved upon.”) (emphasis in original).
A free-floating “duty to help” is at a much too high level of generality. It’s not much
better than a duty to “make the world a better place.” Illinois requires more granularity when
defining the scope of employment, lest it become all-encompassing and thus meaningless. See,
e.g., Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154, 165, 308 Ill. Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985
(2007) (defining the “kind [of conduct] [s]he is employed to perform” as “draw[ing] blood,
perform[ing] drug screens, conduct[ing] filing and billing, and deliver[ing] medical records”);
Copeland v. County of Macon, 403 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the notion that law
enforcement officers have a general duty “to report, to help prevent, and to punish child
abusers”); Klingler v. City of Chicago, 2017 WL 4742192, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (rejecting the
notion that a police officer acted within the scope of his employment because he had a general
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duty to “protect people who are at risk of harm regardless of where he is or what he is doing at
the time”). In any event, the CBP did not employ Officer Jablonski to help anyone in his path.
Conclusion
In the end, Ramzan has no claim under either side’s story. If Ramzan’s story is true, and
Officer Jablonski threatened him after pulling him over for no reason, then Plaintiff has no claim.
Jablonski wasn’t employed to patrol the roads and pull people over (let alone threaten them).
But if Officer Jablonski’s story is true, and he was trying to help Ramzan when he was acting
abnormally, then Plaintiff still has no claim. Helping motorists wasn’t in his job description.
Officer Jablonski was not hired to pull people over or be a guardian angel on the roadways.
The motion for summary judgment filed by the United States is hereby granted.
Date: February 6, 2020
Steven C. Seeger
United States District Judge
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