Sandefur v. Thomas J. Dart et al

Filing 23

ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 8/3/2017: Defendants' motion to dismiss, 16 , is granted. Counts I and II are dismissed without prejudice, as are the claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. Pl aintiff has leave to file an amended complaint by August 25, 2017. Defendants' response to the amended complaint is due September 15, 2017. A status hearing is set for September 21, 2017 at 9:30 a.m. [For further detail see attached order] Notices mailed. (psm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
BRAD SANDEFUR,
Plaintiff,

No. 17 CV 2048

v.

Judge Manish S. Shah

THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook
County, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [16], is granted. Counts I and II are dismissed
without prejudice, as are the claims against the individual defendants in their
individual capacities. Plaintiff has leave to file an amended complaint by August 25,
2017. Defendants’ response to the amended complaint is due September 15, 2017. A
status hearing is set for September 21, 2017 at 9:30 a.m.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff Brad Sandefur worked in the Department of Corrections for over 25
years and then enrolled in the police academy. He was harassed and discriminated
against at the academy due to his age and a physical disability, and he complained to
the EEOC. He was reassigned to the Department of Corrections and, in retaliation
for complaining, his requests for promotion were denied. He brings claims against
Thomas J. Dart in both his individual and official capacities as Sheriff of Cook
County, Cook County, and four individuals: Robert Egan, Nathan Camer, Dana
Wright, and Jeffrey Lange.* Defendants Dart, Egan, Camer, Wright, and Cook
County move to dismiss the claims against them for failure to state a claim.
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
factual allegations that plausibly suggest a right to relief. Virnich v. Vorwald, 664
F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557
*

Defendant Jeffrey Lange has not yet appeared in this action.

(2007)). “The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint,
not to decide the merits.” Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Authority, 892 F.2d
583, 586 (7th Cir. 1989). When analyzing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must
accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor, but a court need not accept legal conclusions or conclusory
allegations. Virnich, 664 F.3d at 212 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–82
(2009)). In addition to the allegations set forth in the complaint itself, a court may
consider “documents that are attached to the complaint, documents that are central
to the complaint and are referred to in it, and information that is properly subject to
judicial notice.” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013).
Facts
Sandefur began working for the Sheriff of Cook County in the Department of
Corrections in 1990. [1] ¶ 16. In 2011, he was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his
right knee and degenerative disc disease. [1] ¶¶ 2, 64. Due to intermittent pain from
knees, he requested from the State of Illinois and was given a handicap placard,
which he displays in his car at all times. [1] ¶¶ 67–70. In 2015, after decades of
successful employment, Sandefur gained admission to the Cook County Sheriff’s
Police Department Training Academy to train as a police officer. [1] ¶¶ 23–24. But
throughout the ten weeks he spent at the Academy, Sandefur was treated differently
from the other recruits, who were all approximately twenty years younger than
Sandefur. [1] ¶¶ 25–26. On his first day, defendant Jeffrey Lange, an instructor,
noticed Sandefur’s handicap placard. [1] ¶ 27. From that moment on, Lange and
other instructors belittled Sandefur and made disparaging remarks related to his age
and disability. [1] ¶¶ 29–30.
A couple of weeks later, defendant Nathan Camer, a lieutenant working for
the Sheriff, forced Sandefur to sign a HIPAA release form. [1] ¶ 32. Sandefur
assumed the release was merely a formality, but it was actually used to obtain
medical records as part of an investigation into Sandefur’s handicap placard. [1]
¶¶ 32–33. But that collection was incomplete—Camer failed to obtain certain
relevant medical records that documented Sandefur’s disabling condition. [1] ¶ 35.
Sometime later, three unnamed investigators interrogated Sandefur, without a
union representative or attorney present, and accused him of faking his disability. [1]
¶ 35.
On September 10, 2015, the day before Sandefur’s graduation from the
Academy, a human resources representative told him he was being reassigned to
work as a correctional officer based on the results of an investigation by management
and was not permitted to graduate. [1] ¶¶ 38–39, 41–42. Defendant Dana Wright,
First Deputy Chief of Police and a final decision-maker regarding employee
promotion decisions, approved of the reassignment, effectively denying Sandefur’s
2

promotion to police officer. [1] ¶¶ 8, 40. He then filed a complaint with the EEOC,
alleging discriminatory treatment based on his age and disability. [1] ¶ 44.
A few months later, he requested assignment to a “C.O. to P.O. class,” which
trains qualified correctional officers to be police officers. [1] ¶ 45. He was selected to
take an admission test, but after passing the test, he was never informed of the
class’s start date. [1] ¶¶ 47–48. He was then told he was ineligible for the class, first
because he had not reported to class on the start date, and then because of
unidentified disciplinary issues. [1] ¶¶ 49–51. Defendant Robert Egan, Compliance
Officer for the Sheriff, investigated Sandefur’s removal from the Academy, and told
him that the police had conducted a “management inquiry,” but that “it does not rise
to the level of discipline necessary to disqualify you from CO to PO.” [1] ¶ 53.
Sandefur continued seeking promotions, but in December 2016, he received
two letters denying his requests. [1] ¶¶ 55–60. The letters explained that he was
disqualified from the promotional process due to a “Brady violation.” [1] ¶¶ 55–60.
Sandefur told Egan that he objected, and Egan responded by denying authorship of
the letters. [1-4] at 2. Sandefur believes that the reasons given for denying him
promotions are mere pretext, and that his career advancement is being impeded in
retaliation for complaining to the EEOC.
Analysis
Sandefur brings claims against Cook County alone under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Count I), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (Count II). He asserts
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants for the deprivation of his
constitutional rights to due process (Count III) and to equal protection (Count IV).
Defendants first argue that, because the Sheriff of Cook County is an
independently elected official, Cook County cannot be vicariously liable for the
actions of the Sheriff’s office or the individual defendants working for that office. See
Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill.2d 519, 526–30 (1994). They acknowledge, however,
that Cook County has a duty to indemnify judgments against the other defendants.
Sandefur agrees and clarifies that Cook County is named as a defendant only in its
capacity as indemnitor for claims brought against the Sheriff’s office. But Sandefur
did not bring Counts I and II against Sheriff Dart or the Sheriff’s office. The only
named defendant in those counts is Cook County. The motion to dismiss with respect
to Cook County is granted. Counts I and II are dismissed without prejudice. Sandefur
must file an amended complaint naming an appropriate defendant for those claims,
and Cook County may be named for indemnification purposes only.

3

The remaining arguments relate to whether the complaint alleges the
personal involvement of individual defendants Dart, Camer, Wright, and Egan
sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588,
594 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that individual liability under § 1983 requires a
showing of “personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation”).
“Although direct participation is not necessary, there must at least be a showing that
the [individual defendant] acquiesced in some demonstrable way in the alleged
constitutional violation.” Id. Supervisors may be liable if they “know about the
[unconstitutional] conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye
for fear of what they might see.” T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)). Sandefur
concedes that his claims against Sheriff Dart in his individual capacity do not meet
that standard. With respect to those claims, the motion to dismiss is granted. Sheriff
Dart did not move to dismiss any claims filed against him in his official capacity;
those claims remain.
The claims against Camer are dismissed. He forced Sandefur to sign a HIPAA
release form, and that form was later used to access medical forms as part of an
improper investigation into Sandefur’s disability status. Beyond that, Camer is not
alleged to have had any involvement in the investigation itself or in how the results
of that investigation were used to justify Sandefur’s ouster from the Academy or
denials of his promotions. The complaint does not allege that Camer was the cause of
or aware of any unconstitutional conduct. The motion to dismiss is granted with
respect to claims against Camer.
The claims against Wright are dismissed, as well. Wright was a final
decision-maker with respect to employee promotions and approved of Sandefur’s
reassignment, based on the results of the investigation into his handicap placard.
The complaint does not allege that Wright knew that the investigation had been
conducted improperly, but Sandefur argues that her knowledge may be inferred.
Defendants argue that a report of the investigation, which is attached to the
complaint, undercuts such an inference. That report, approved by Wright but written
by a nonparty to this lawsuit, recommends reassignment based on the results of the
investigation, which the report says was conducted by a different nonparty.
According to the report, the investigation revealed that Sandefur had obtained his
handicap placard under false pretenses and had been dishonest in explaining his
need for the placard to investigators. The complaint does not allege that Wright was
aware of any unconstitutional conduct or discriminatory intent when she approved of
the report or Sandefur’s reassignment, and Sandefur does not suggest that the report
itself would have given her cause for concern. It would be unreasonable to infer from
the allegations of the complaint the knowledge and acquiescence required to state a
claim under § 1983. The motion to dismiss is granted with respect to claims against
Wright.
4

Finally, the claims against Egan are dismissed for the same reasons. Egan told
Sandefur that the investigation should not have disqualified him from the C.O. to
P.O. class, and he was unhelpful when Sandefur objected to the notifications of
disqualification that he received. Sandefur argues that Egan was aware of
unconstitutional conduct and failed to take any effective remedial measures to stop
it. “[U]nder certain circumstances a state actor’s failure to intervene renders him or
her culpable under § 1983.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). But the
complaint does not allege that Egan was aware of any unconstitutional conduct, or
that he could have provided a remedy, and such an inference would be unreasonable.
The motion to dismiss is granted.
The complaint alleges the involvement of the individual defendants in the
sequence of events leading to this lawsuit, and defendants do not dispute that it
alleges discriminatory and retaliatory conduct, but the complaint stops short of
alleging the individual defendants’ involvement in the constitutional deprivations at
issue. As a result, the claims against the individual defendants are dismissed
without prejudice. Sandefur has leave to amend the complaint.
ENTER:
Date: August 3, 2017
Manish S. Shah
U.S. District Judge

5