Martin v Cook County, Illinois et al
Filing
90
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Gary Feinerman on 4/25/2018.Mailed notice.(jlj, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CLAUDIA S. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, a municipal corporation
within the State of Illinois, THE OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK
COUNTY, ILLINOIS, as the employer directing
personnel of the COOK COUNTY ADULT
PROBATION DEPT., LAVONE HAYWOOD,
MATTHEW SOBIESKI, DARRYL GRAY, and
NOREEN LARSON,
Defendants.
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17 C 2330
Judge Gary Feinerman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Claudia Martin, a probation officer employed by the Cook County Adult Probation
Department, sues Cook County, the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, and several Probation Department employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and state law for allegedly discriminating
against and harassing her due to her religious beliefs and union activities. Doc. 46. Cook
County and the Probation Department employees move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for partial dismissal of the operative complaint. Doc. 50. Specifically, Cook County
moves to dismiss all claims against it—save a state law indemnification claim—on the ground
that it is not Martin’s employer and thus not liable for the misconduct she alleges, while
Probation Department employees Lavone Haywood, Matthew Sobieski, Darryl Gray, and
Noreen Larson move to dismiss Martin’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on the
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ground, among others, that it is preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”), 775 ILCS
5/8-111(D). The motion is granted.
Background
In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the truth of the operative
complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions. See Zahn v. N.
Am. Power & Gas, LLC, 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must also consider
“documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred
to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice,” along with additional facts set
forth in Martin’s brief opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts “are consistent with
the pleadings.” Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 2013).
The facts are set forth as favorably to Martin as those materials allow. See Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc.,
818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). In setting forth those facts at the pleading stage, the court
does not vouch for their accuracy. See Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610
F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 2010).
Martin is a probation officer for the Cook County Adult Probation Department. Doc. 46
at ¶ 14. In 2006, she became a steward for Local 3468 of the American Federation of County,
State, and Municipal Employees (“AFCSME”), the union that represents Probation Department
employees, and she was promoted to chief steward in 2012. Id. at ¶¶ 17, 21, 29, 177-178. A
practicing Muslim, Martin typically wears a hijab. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. During the relevant time
period, Martin’s supervisors favorably reviewed her work. Id. at ¶¶ 32-36.
At some point in 2013 or 2014, Martin filed a discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that her then-supervisor had an
“issue” with her hijab. Id. at ¶ 72. Larson, the Probation Department’s director of human
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resources, pressured Martin to drop the charge. Id. at ¶¶ 73-74. The Probation Department
otherwise took no action regarding Martin’s complaint. Id. at ¶ 75.
On January 20, 2015, Martin received an anonymous letter expressing anti-union
sentiment. Id. at ¶ 20. The letter stated in relevant part: “The Union’s tjme [sic] is up!!!!!!!!
You don’t work for ASFSCME [sic]! You work for the Adult Probation Department! You need
to decide[] if you want to risk your children not eating, because you are defending people who
don’t do their work and lie about and justify their actions.” Ibid. (emphasis omitted). The
president of Local 3468, James Dunaway, wrote to Cook County Chief Judge Timothy Evans,
asking him to address the letter. Id. at ¶ 21. Chief Judge Evans did not respond. Id. at ¶ 22.
Beginning in October 2015 and continuing for the next several months, Gray, a Deputy
Chief Probation Officer, told Martin on several occasions that unidentified coworkers had
complained about her wearing a hijab and cautioned her that wearing a “hat” in the workplace
was against Probation Department policy. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 26, 28, 31, 37-38. Martin felt bullied by
these interactions, and consulted with Dunaway, who contacted the Probation Department’s
human resources department on her behalf. Id. at ¶¶ 39-41.
In mid-December 2015, after Martin came to work on several occasions without her
hijab, Gray conveyed to her an anonymous complaint about her “apparent inconsistency” in
wearing the hijab. Id. at ¶¶ 42-43. Martin explained that she had chosen not to wear her hijab at
certain times due to a scalp condition. Id. at ¶ 44. Gray asked Martin to provide a doctor’s note
about her scalp condition, which prompted Martin to email Larson to ask why the documentation
was necessary. Id. at ¶¶ 45-46. Larson responded: “The Office of Human Resources has
approved your wearing of [a] head covering. Though it is against policy and procedure, this
exemption will be allowed as it is for religious reasons. You are now, however, indicating that it
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will be intermittent due to medical reasons. Therefore, we are requesting medical
documentation.” Id. at ¶ 48. Martin provided a doctor’s note, and on the day that she received
Larson’s response, she filed a discrimination charge with the Illinois Department of Human
Rights (“IDHR”). Id. at ¶¶ 47, 49.
On December 18, Martin discovered an anonymous note on her desk chair, written in
printed cutout letters and stating: “What R U an Isis Muslim no bombs allowed.” Id. at ¶ 50.
Martin immediately sought out Dunaway. Id. at ¶ 51. Later that day, Gray intercepted Martin
when she was on her way to speak with her direct supervisor about the note. Id. at ¶¶ 53-56.
After leaving Gray’s office, Martin stopped to talk with her supervisor. Id. at ¶¶ 57-59. Gray
walked over to join the pair, and then “raised his voice, and embarrassed, insulted, humiliated,
and berated” Martin in front of her supervisor. Id. at ¶ 60. Martin attempted to file a police
report, but was instructed to instead report the incident to the IDHR. Id. at ¶¶ 62-64.
On December 22, Martin emailed Chief Judge Evans as well as Haywood, the Chief
Probation Officer, and Sobieski, a Deputy Chief Probation Officer, to inform them of the hijabrelated incidents, including Gray’s conduct after learning of the anonymous note. Id. at ¶¶ 6566. Martin’s email stated that after she received the “hateful and humiliating letter, Mr. Gray …
publicly humiliated [her] by speaking to [her] in a very hostile and aggressive tone and in an
unprofessional manner in front of other coworkers.” Id. at ¶ 66. Martin received no response.
Id. at ¶ 67.
Martin also prepared a formal incident report. Id. at ¶ 76. Sobieski later spoke with
Martin, insisting that she remove references to Gray’s harassment and promising that the Cook
County Sheriff’s Office would investigate. Id. at ¶¶ 76-77. At Sobieski’s direction, Martin
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revised the incident report several times. Id. at ¶ 78. Neither the Sheriff’s Office nor the
Probation Department investigated the note. Id. at ¶¶ 79-82.
Martin experienced additional harassment beginning on June 14, 2016. Id. at ¶¶ 84-85.
Another probation officer, David Neeley, alleged that Martin had interfered with his official
duties in the courtroom where the case of a probationer assigned to Neeley was scheduled to be
heard. Id. at ¶¶ 86-91. On September 14, 2016, Martin was suspended based on Neeley’s
allegations. Id. at ¶ 97. The suspension letter was prepared before Martin received the
opportunity to respond. Id. at ¶¶ 96, 103-104.
After Chief Judge Evans authorized and approved the suspension, the union filed a
grievance, charging that the suspension constituted retaliation for Martin’s union activity and the
agency charges she had filed. Id. at ¶¶ 107-108. The day of her suspension, Martin filed a
second charge with the IDHR. Id. at ¶ 109. Martin’s workstation was then reassigned, forcing
her to sit next to a probation officer who had sought to have her removed as a union official. Id.
at ¶¶ 111-112, 117. In addition, Gray shared with other Probation Department employees the
details of a confidential factfinding conference held at the IDHR in January 2017; those
employees later demonstrated hostility to Martin. Id. at ¶¶ 113, 115, 121.
At some point before February 8, 2017, Martin contacted Larson to “request … a location
within the workplace in which to exercise [her] religious beliefs,” including prayer. Id. at ¶ 120.
Larson granted the request that day, telling Martin that she would be given access to a
“designated … temporary quiet space” that Gray would show her. Ibid. Approximately a month
later, Martin emailed Larson because neither Gray nor Larson had shown her the designated
space. Id. at ¶ 127. Larson responded, indicating again that Gray would show Martin the space
so that she could begin using it “immediately.” Id. at ¶ 128. Gray did show Martin the space,
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but instructed her to inform her supervisor, or him, before using it for prayer. Id. at ¶¶ 129-131.
Martin found this rule “unsettling.” Id. at ¶ 135. Given that the space was next to Gray’s office
and had been empty since late December 2016, Martin believed that Larson and Gray were
“disingenuous” in accommodating her religious practice. Id. at ¶¶ 134, 136-137, 139.
On March 16, 2017, Martin noticed the following anonymous message written on a wall
of the Probation Department’s employees-only women’s restroom: “County Stank Bitch C
Martin.” Id. at ¶ 142. Discovering the note caused Martin “tremendous emotional anxiety and
mental discomfort.” Ibid. Martin fears that she will be transferred to a work location that is
farther away from her son’s school and that she will lose her position as Interstate Compact
Compliance Officer, a highly sought-after position within the Department. Id. at ¶¶ 145-148.
Discussion
I.
Non-Indemnification Claims Against Cook County
Cook County contends that all of Martin’s claims against it, save her state law
indemnification claim, should be dismissed, reasoning that because neither Chief Judge Evans
nor the other individual defendants are Cook County employees, the County is not liable for their
conduct. Doc. 50 at 3-6; Doc. 61 at 1-2. In response, Martin indicates that she has “little more
to offer on the subject than has been suggested” in the motion to dismiss. Doc. 54 at 2. This
concession amounts to a forfeiture. See Firestone Fin. Corp v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 825 (7th
Cir. 2015) (“[A] party generally forfeits an argument or issue not raised in response to a motion
to dismiss.”); G&S Holdings LLC v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We
have repeatedly held that a party waives an argument by failing to make it before the district
court.”). Cook County is correct on the merits in any event.
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“[F]ederal courts look to state law to determine if a defendant is amenable to suit.”
DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage Cnty., 209 F.3d 973, 976 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 17(b)). Under Illinois law, the Probation Department “has no legal existence apart from the
Office of the Chief Judge.” Flanagan v. Cook Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep’t, 2016 WL 1595065, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2016); see also Cobb v. Cnty. of Cook, 179 F.R.D. 222, 223 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (noting that the Cook County Adult Probation Department is “not a legal entity”). Illinois
law instead provides that “[t]he chief judge of each circuit shall make provision for probation
services for each county in his or her circuit.” 705 ILCS 405/6-1(1); see also 705 ILCS 405/63(1) & (2) (providing that “[a]ny county having more than 1,000,000 inhabitants shall maintain a
Court Services Department, which shall be under the authority and supervision of the chief judge
of the circuit,” and that the “functions and duties of probation personnel of the Court Services
Department include, but are not limited to, those described in Section 6-1”). Accordingly, the
chief judge of each circuit appoints that circuit’s chief probation officer and “all other probation
officers.” 730 ILCS 110/15(2)(b).
In Moy v. County of Cook, 640 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1994), in holding that the Cook County
Sheriff was an officer rather than a Cook County employee, the Supreme Court of Illinois
explained that courts look to the “following characteristics” as “indicia of an office, as contrasted
with simple employment”:
(1) the positions are created by law; (2) their compensations are required to be
fixed by the county board and paid out of the county treasury; (3) they
exercise some portion of the sovereign power of the State; (4) their duties are
not prescribed by contract or agreement, but by law; and (5) they are not
engaged to perform a special act, the completion of which ends their duty, but
the duties of the positions are continuous, without regard to the particular
person who holds the office.
Id. at 930. Each factor is satisfied here. The state constitution provides for a chief judge to be
selected from among the ranks of circuit judges and specifies the position’s duties. See Ill.
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Const. art. VI, § 7(c) (“Circuit Judges in each circuit shall select by secret ballot a Chief Judge
from their number to serve at their pleasure. Subject to the authority of the Supreme Court, the
Chief Judge shall have general administrative authority over his court, including authority to
provide for divisions, general or specialized … .”). The state constitution also sets forth the
duties, terms of office, and salaries of circuit judges. See Ill. Const. art. VI, §§ 7-14. Indeed, the
Chief Judge “is a step further away [than the Cook County Sheriff] from having an employment
relationship with Cook County because he is a state officer whose office was constitutionally
created under the judiciary article.” Biggerstaff v. Moran, 671 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Ill. App. 1996)
(emphasis added) (holding, based on Moy, that Cook County Assistant State’s Attorneys are not
Cook County employees); see also People ex rel. Landers v. Toledo, St. Louis & W. R.R. Co.,
107 N.E. 879 (Ill. 1915) (same).
Martin does not allege that Cook County itself took any action against her. And because
the County is not the Chief Judge’s employer, the County cannot be held vicariously liable for
the actions of the Chief Judge or of anyone under the Chief Judge’s supervision. See Moy, 640
N.E.2d at 931 (affirming dismissal of vicarious liability claims against Cook County based on
the actions of the Cook County Sheriff, reasoning that because the Sheriff “is not in an
employment relationship with the County of Cook[,] … the county may not be held vicariously
liable for the sheriff’s alleged negligent conduct”); Biggerstaff, 671 N.E.2d at 784 (holding that
“Cook County is not vicariously liable for the negligent actions of an assistant State’s
Attorney”); Kuttner v. Zaruba, 2013 WL 5433291, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2013) (granting
judgment to DuPage County on a Title VII claim against the DuPage County Sheriff, where the
plaintiff “has neither alleged nor shown that the County was responsible for any discrimination
or retaliation against her,” and noting that “there is no respondeat superior liability against the
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County for the acts of the Sheriff, because the Sheriff is an independently-elected officer rather
than an employee of the County”) (citing Moy, 630 N.E.2d at 929), aff’d, 819 F.3d 970 (7th Cir.
2016); French-Fuentes v. Lake Cnty., 2000 WL 1760970, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2000) (same).
Likewise, because Martin identifies no County policies, practices, or procedures that
injured her, Doc. 46 at ¶¶ 198-204, her allegations against Cook County under Monell v.
Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), fail to state a claim
as well. See Conwell v. Cook Cnty., 2015 WL 4973086, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2015)
(dismissing a Monell claim against Cook County brought by a former Cook County Jail detainee
because, under Moy, “it falls within the purview of the Sheriff’s Office, not Cook County, to
implement the policies and procedures within the Jail”). Nevertheless, as Cook County
acknowledges, Doc. 50 at 5-6, because under Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 787 N.E.2d
127, 129 (Ill. 2003), the County “has a duty to pay judgments against” the Chief Judge “for any
official capacity claims,” Cook County must “remain a defendant,” albeit for indemnification
only, “as a necessary party to this case.” Kuttner, 2013 WL 5433291, at *6.
II.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
The Probation Department employees contend that Martin’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim is preempted by the IHRA. Doc. 50 at 8-11. The IHRA makes it a
“civil rights violation … [f]or any employer to refuse to hire, to segregate, or to act with respect
to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or
apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of employment on
the basis of unlawful discrimination or citizenship status.” 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A). The term
“unlawful discrimination” includes “discrimination against a person because of his or her …
religion.” 775 ILCS 5/1-103(Q). In addition, the IHRA makes it a “civil rights violation … to
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… [r]etaliate against a person because [1] he or she has opposed that which he or she reasonably
and in good faith believes to be unlawful discrimination … [2] because he or she has made a
charge … under this Act, or [3] because he or she has requested … a reasonable accommodation
as allowed by this Act.” 775 ILCS 5/6-101(A).
The IHRA contains a preemption provision: “Except as otherwise provided by law, no
court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other
than as set forth in this Act.” 775 ILCS 5/8-111(D). Under this provision, the IHRA “preempts
all state law claims seeking redress for a civil rights violation within the meaning of that statute.”
Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th Cir. 2000) (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted). “However, where a course of conduct states an independent state law claim, that
independent claim is not preempted by the IHRA.” Ibid. A claim is independent of the IHRA
“if the conduct would be actionable even aside from its character as a civil rights violation
because the IHRA did not ‘furnish[] the legal duty that the defendant was alleged to have
breached.’” Id. at 516-17 (quoting Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ill. 1997)); see
also Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 604 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The distinction between
claims that are preempted and claims that are not preempted turns on the legal duty that the
defendant allegedly breached.”); Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2009) (“[P]laintiff here
established a basis for imposing liability on defendants independent of the [IHRA], i.e., without
reference to the legal duties created by the [IHRA].”). Thus, “whether [a] … court may exercise
jurisdiction over a tort claim depends upon whether the tort claim is inextricably linked to a civil
rights violation such that there is no independent basis for the action apart from the [IHRA]
itself.” Maksimovic, 687 N.E.2d at 23 (emphasis added).
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Applying these principles, the Seventh Circuit in Krocka held that the IHRA preempted
emotional distress claim grounded in “several statements made by [Chicago Police Department]
employees that referred to” the plaintiff’s depression. 203 F.3d at 517. Krocka reasoned that the
comments—the basis for a related claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.—“were inextricably linked to [the plaintiff’s] disability discrimination
claim because they were only offensive to the extent that they referred to [his] disability.” Id. at
511, 517. Similarly, in Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, 639 N.E.2d 1273, 1277-78 (Ill. 1994),
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that certain claims against the plaintiff’s employer ostensibly
sounding in negligence—specifically, “negligent hiring” and “negligent retention”—were
“inextricably linked” to “the concept of sexual harassment” and therefore preempted by the
IHRA. As the court explained, “it seems likely that these allegations were actually included for
no reason other than to provide some basis for extending to Phoenix, the employer, responsibility
for the sexual harassment committed by Walthall, one of its supervisory employees.” Id. at
1277. “Absent the allegations of sexual harassment, [the plaintiff] would have no independent
basis for imposing liability on her former employer … .” Ibid.
Maksimovic provides a contrasting case. There, in addition to her sexual harassment
claim, the plaintiff also brought claims against her employer for assault, battery, and false
imprisonment. 687 N.E.2d at 22. As the court summarized:
In the assault count, Maksimovic alleged that Tsogalis threatened to “give her
a stiff one up the ass,” ordered her to perform oral sex on him, made
comments about her breasts and accused her of being too friendly with the
customers. In the battery count, the plaintiff alleged that Tsogalis placed his
hand under her skirt and grabbed her leg, grabbed her buttocks and touched
her while attempting to kiss her. In the false imprisonment count, the plaintiff
alleged that Tsogalis confined her in a walk-in cooler where he made sexual
advances toward her.
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Ibid. Despite the connection between the sexual harassment claim and the assault, battery, and
false imprisonment claims, Maksimovic concluded the two were not “inextricably linked”
because the plaintiff “alleged facts sufficient to establish the elements of” each tort
independently, “without reference to legal duties created by the [IHRA].” Id. at 23. As the court
emphasized, “[a]ssault, battery and false imprisonment … are intended to redress violations of
bodily integrity and personal liberty,” separate from whether those violations independently give
rise to a cause of action for sexual harassment under the IHRA. Id. at 24; see also Naeem, 444
F.3d at 603 n.4 (explaining that an emotional distress claim that “involve[s] sexual elements”
may survive preemption under the IHRA, provided that it does “not depend on the prohibitions
against sex discrimination for its survival”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Blount, 904
N.E.2d at 10 (holding that the IHRA did not preempt a claim that the plaintiff was fired in
retaliation for refusing to commit perjury, reasoning that the “plaintiff need not and does not rely
upon the public policy embodied in the [IHRA] to satisfy the elements of her common law tort
claim”); Benitez v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 714 N.E.2d 1002, 1004, 1008-09 (Ill. App. 1999)
(holding that the IHRA did not preempt the plaintiff’s intrusion upon seclusion and emotional
distress claims, which rested on the defendants’ “systematic spying operation on plaintiffs
through a hole in the ceiling of the KFC women’s bathroom” and taking pictures of plaintiffs and
later distributing them to others, because the “allegations went beyond claims of sexual
harassment as defined by the [IHRA]”).
Under these authorities, whether the IHRA preempts Martin’s emotional distress claim
depends on whether the “claim rests … [on] behavior that would be a tort no matter what the
motives of the defendant.” Naeem, 444 F.3d at 605. Here, “eliminating the civil rights
component” from Martin’s claim—that is, stripping it of allegations that involve her religious
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beliefs or practices or the Probation Department’s retaliation for her complaints about how it
handled her religious accommodation requests—“takes the air out of the case.” Sanglap v.
LaSalle Bank, FSB, 345 F.3d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 2003). Unlike in Maksimovic, religion-based
discrimination and retaliation are not “merely incidental” to Martin’s emotional distress claim,
687 N.E.2d at 23; rather, they are “the core of [her] theory,” Smith v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of
Trs., 165 F.3d 1142, 1151 (7th Cir. 1999). It follows that the IHRA preempts the claim.
This result follows from Sanglap. Holding that the IHRA preempted an emotional
distress claim for the closure of his bank account by a plaintiff suffering from epilepsy,
schizophrenia, and depression, the Seventh Circuit explained that “[w]hat is arguably
outlandish … is the suggestion that” the bank manager “had a prejudice against customers with
medical conditions and thus closed [the plaintiff’s] account to keep him out of the bank.” 345
F.3d at 519-20 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Sanitized of the allegation that [the bank]
treated him differently because of a disability, [the plaintiff] is left to argue that closing a bank
account for any reason will support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress—a
position that we are confident the Supreme Court of Illinois would reject.” Id. at 520. For that
reason, Sanglap affirmed dismissal of the emotional distress claim—while leaving in place the
plaintiff’s judgment on his ADA claim. Id. at 517, 520.
In this case, what is outlandish is the content of the anonymous messages, insofar as they
express animus directed toward Martin due to her religion. Likewise outlandish are the
Probation Department’s alleged failures to respond appropriately to the hostility directed toward
Martin, evidenced by Gray’s conduct, including allegedly berating and shouting at Martin;
Larson’s and Gray’s allegedly slow response to Martin’s request for a designated worship space;
and the Probation Department’s alleged retaliation for Martin’s complaints, including
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authorizing her suspension after Neeley’s complaint, leaking confidential information from an
IDHR hearing, and transferring her workstation. Put otherwise, just as in Krocka, Defendants’
alleged actions are offensive only to the extent they concern Martin’s religious practices and the
Probation Department’s retaliation against her efforts to obtain appropriate religious
accommodations. See Quantock v. Shared Mktg. Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding the plaintiff’s emotional distress claim was preempted because it “[was] supported by
factual allegations identical to those set forth in her Title VII sexual-harassment claim”); Smith,
165 F.3d at 1151 (“[W]e think it clear that Smith’s state-law theories sound primarily in racial
discrimination and thus are not independent of civil rights law.”); Veazey v. LaSalle Telecomms.,
Inc., 779 N.E.2d 364, 371 (Ill. App. 2002) (holding that the IHRA preempted other state law
claims where the plaintiff’s theory of the case was that his employer “conspired to, and did,
terminate his employment because he was Black,” and thus “no basis independent of the [IHRA]
exist[ed] for imposing liability”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the IHRA
preempts Martin’s emotional distress claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss is granted. Martin’s
claims against Cook County other than the state law indemnification claim are dismissed, as is
her emotional distress claim. Haywood, Sobieski, Gray, and Larson shall answer the surviving
portions of the complaint—which include religious discrimination and retaliation claims under
Title VII, and a First Amendment retaliation claim—by May 16, 2018.
April 25, 2018
United States District Judge
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