Young v. Universal Security Corp

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 7/25/2017: Mailed notice (mw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES YOUNG,

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Plaintiff,
v.
UNIVERSAL SECURITY CORP.,
Defendant.

No. 17 C 2524

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. For the
reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff James Young (Young) was hired by Universal Security Corporation
(Universal) in January 2011. Young alleges that Universal began to discriminate
against him in May 2014. Young alleges that he was not receiving proper break time
and includes in his complaint a description of several alleged conversations he had
with supervisors and other Universal employees regarding his break times. On
February 4, 2016, Young’s employment was terminated. Young alleges that
Universal terminated him, failed to promote him, failed to stop harassment against
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him and retaliated against him because he asserted rights protected under the ADEA.
On December 27, 2016, Young filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging age discrimination in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The
EEOC dismissed the charge because it was not timely filed and issued a right to sue
notice on January 24, 2017. Young filed the instant action on April 3, 2017. Young
includes in his pro se complaint one claim brought against Universal alleging age
discrimination in violation of the ADEA. Universal now moves to dismiss the instant
action.

LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court
must draw all reasonable inferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations
of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all
well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012);Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l
Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff is required to include
allegations in the complaint that “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to
relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level’ ” and “if they do not, the
plaintiff pleads itself out of court.” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496
F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)(quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

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S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)); see also Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d at
622 (stating that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” and that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged”)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009))(internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION
Universal argues that Young failed to timely file his ADEA claim. ADEA
claims filed in Illinois must be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act
or unlawful practice. 29 U.S.C. §626(d)(1)(b); See Riley v. Elkhart Community
Schools, 829 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2016)(finding that any ADEA violation related
to an incident occurring before 300 days before the filing are time-barred). In the
instant action, the only allegation of age discrimination Young includes in his
complaint allegedly occurred on October 1, 2014. (Compl. 11). Young was allegedly
terminated on February 4, 2016, but did not file his charge of discrimination with the
EEOC until December 27, 2016, 326 days later. (Compl. 7). Furthermore, Young
offers no legal basis to support his cause of action. See County of McHenry v.
Insurance Co. of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 2006)(stating that “when
presented with a motion to dismiss, the non-moving party must proffer some legal

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basis to support his cause of action”)(quoting Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51
F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1995)). Young’s response to the instant motion to dismiss
does not address Universal’s arguments under Rule 12(b)(6) concerning the untimely
filing of the ADEA charge. Young’s response does not answer or oppose
Universal’s motion and offers no facts that would suggest the ADEA claim is timely.
Nor has Young alleged facts that indicate the equitable tolling doctrines would apply
in this case. Based on the above, the motion to dismiss is granted.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Universal’s motion to dismiss is granted.

_______________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: July 25, 2017

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