Jackson v. Harvey Park District et al

Filing 58

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 3/26/2019. Mailed notice. (mgh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
PAUL JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARVEY PARK DISTRICT, et
al.,
Defendants.

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No. 17-cv-2567

Memorandum Opinion and Order
Plaintiff Paul Jackson worked as a park maintenance employee
for the Harvey Park District (“HPD” or “District”) from 2008 until
he left the District’s employment in 2016. The reasons for and the
circumstances surrounding his departure are the subject of this
lawsuit. Jackson charges his former employer, as well as HPD
executive director Kisha McCaskill, HPD Board of Commissioners
(“Board”) president Anthony McCaskill, and HPD commissioner Eric
Patterson, with unlawfully terminating his employment in violation
of the Illinois Whistleblower Act (“IWA”), 740 ILCS 174/1 et seq.
and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He further
contends that HPD breached an individual employment contract he
had with the District when it fired him without just cause, and he
charges defendants Anthony and Kisha McCaskill (together “the
McCaskills”)

with

tortiously

interfering

with

his

contract.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Jackson’s

claims. For the following reasons, I grant in part and deny in
part their motion.
I.
The

Harvey

Park

District

is

a

local

governmental

unit

organized under the Illinois Park District Code, 70 ILCS 1205/1 et
seq., that manages twenty-two parks throughout the City of Harvey,
Illinois. Pursuant to the Park District Code, the District’s
authority

is

vested

in

a

five-member

elected

Board

of

Commissioners, which is led by a board president, 70 ILCS 1205/41, 4-8, 4-9, and, in accordance with the District’s bylaws, the
Board

delegates

certain

day-to-day

responsibilities

to

an

executive director.
In 2008, the Harvey Park District hired Jackson as a park
maintenance
maintenance
landscaping

employee.

Jackson

superintendent,
and

building

was

which
and

eventually

meant

vehicle

that,

in

promoted
addition

maintenance,

he

to
to
was

responsible for supervising and scheduling three to six other
maintenance workers depending on the season. He also regularly
attended Board meetings and worked closely with the HPD executive
director.
In 2013, word of a unionization effort spread throughout the
District. Jackson and some of his coworkers were in discussions
with a local union about organizing HPD staff. Concerned about the
union effort, the Board, which at the time consisted of then2

president
McCaskill,1

Barbara

Moore,

commissioner

newly-elected
Stafford

Owens,

commissioner
commissioner

Anthony
Brenda

Thompson, and departing commissioner Annette Turner, discussed
potential alternatives at a closed executive session meeting on
May 16, 2013. According to the minutes from that meeting, McCaskill
stated that the employees’ collective demands would bankrupt HPD.
He suggested that the executive director Dionne Cooper speak with
Jackson to see if there could be “some type of accommodation, i.e.,
a contract or written agreement.” Pl.’s Exh. C. at 6. The meeting
apparently adjourned without a vote on the issue.
There are different accounts of what happened next. According
to Jackson, he and three other full-time HPD employees were offered
individual employment contracts, which the Board voted to approve.
According to defendants, there was no such vote. If board meeting
minutes reflecting such a vote exist, they are not before me. But
commissioners Moore and Thompson both recall the contracts being
presented to the Board, and Thompson recalls giving her approval.
Despite the lack of agreement about how the contracts came about,
no

one

disputes

that

Jackson

signed

a

purported

employment

agreement with the District on August 1, 2013, and that president

Anthony McCaskill disputes this, arguing at his deposition that
he was not yet elected to the Board at the time. Board meeting
minutes, however, reveal that McCaskill was sworn in on May 2,
2013. HPD 000557.
3
1

Moore and executive director Cooper signed on behalf of the
District.
The terms of Jackson’s purported contract were simple. He
would

receive

an

annual

salary

of

$40,000

and

benefits

for

performing his park maintenance duties. Every year the contract
would automatically renew, so long as Jackson was performing his
duties. The contract could be terminated by mutual agreement, just
cause discharge, permanent disability, or death. Finally, the
contract stated that it contained the “entire understanding and
agreement of the parties” and could only by modified “by an
instrument in writing executed by both parties.”
After the ink dried on Jackson’s purported contract, some
changes occurred in HPD’s leadership. In 2014, commissioner Eric
Patterson

rejoined

the

Board,

Anthony

McCaskill

became

board

president, and executive director Cooper left the District. The
following year Anthony McCaskill’s wife, Kisha McCaskill, took
over as HPD executive director.
For Jackson, the McCaskills’ rise to power in the Harvey Park
District was not a welcome development. Jackson was a longtime
friend and supporter of Keith Price, a city of Harvey alderman and
a political rival of Anthony McCaskill. He was also a supporter of
Harvey mayor Eric Kellogg, who Anthony McCaskill ran against in
2015. Jackson believes that these political affiliations made him
the target of the McCaskills’ ire. In 2014, for example, Jackson
4

says that he twice overheard Anthony McCaskill refer to him as
Keith Price’s “boy” and complain about how Jackson could not be
trusted. According to others in the District, including former HPD
attorney

Christopher

Clark,

commissioner

Owens,

and

former

commissioner Thompson, McCaskill regularly referred to Jackson as
Price’s “boy.” Clark Dep. at 26-32, 35-36; Owens Dep. at 51-54;
Thompson Dep. at 18-20. Clark testified that, in the months leading
up to Jackson’s termination, McCaskill would say that “he was going
to get” Jackson every time he saw him. Clark Dep. at 31-32, 3536. Other HPD employees heard both Anthony and Kisha McCaskill
make similar comments. Wade Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5.2
In October 2015, Jackson received a call from commissioner
Thompson who told him that Anthony McCaskill told her that drugs
were being sold in a maintenance garage on HPD property. Thompson
Dep. at 20.3 Worried that McCaskill was trying to set Jackson up,
Thompson told Jackson to call the Harvey police and have the garage
checked out. Id. Jackson investigated and found no evidence of

Defendants argue that this declaration and the declaration from
Bradley McClain are untimely because they weren’t disclosed until
after the close of discovery. However, defendants do not move to
strike the declarations, nor do they state whether the declarants
were identified in any of plaintiffs’ discovery responses. In any
case, it is clear from the record that defendants were aware that
these declarants had information relevant to Jackson’s claims
before the close of discovery, Jackson Dep. at 73-74; Clark Dep.
at 44; Owens Dep. at 55, and so I will not bar the declarations
from consideration. See Gutierrez v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 382 F.3d
725, 732 (7th Cir. 2004).
3 McCaskill denies saying this. A. McCaskill Dep. at 44.
5
2

drugs being sold, but he made a police report anyway to verify
what he observed. Jackson Dep. at 64-65. This incident, the
comments about his affiliations with Price and Kellogg, and a list
of other grievances prompted Jackson to complain to the Board in
December 2015 that he thought he was being made the “target of
political warfare, retaliation and harassment.” The personnel
committee, headed by Anthony McCaskill, responded a few weeks
later, asking Jackson for more information about several of his
complaints. It is not clear from the record whether Jackson ever
responded to the personnel committee’s request.
On February 23, 2016, Kisha McCaskill informed Jackson at a
meeting that he was being demoted from maintenance superintendent
to a part-time maintenance position. In response, Jackson told her
and HPD attorney Clark, who was also present at the meeting, that
he thought this change would violate his employment agreement.
Because she says she was unaware of Jackson’s agreement, McCaskill
held off on implementing the change that day. After reviewing the
document and determining that it was unenforceable, however, she
decided to move forward with the demotion on February 29, 2016.
She provided Jackson with a notice telling him that, due to
“budgetary cuts,” he would no longer be superintendent, a salaried
full-time position with health insurance, life insurance, and
retirement benefits. He would have to settle for hourly part-time
work without health insurance instead.
6

Three weeks later, Kisha McCaskill delivered more bad news to
Jackson, this time that his job was altogether terminated.4 In a
March 18, 2016, letter, McCaskill wrote:
As you may know, recent changes in the economy have
forced us to make some difficult decisions here at Harvey
Park District (HPD). In order for the HPD to succeed in
the future, we must streamline our organization today.
Therefore, it is with regret that I inform you that we
are eliminating the Grounds Department and terminating
your employment effective Friday March 18, 2016.
Jackson timely filed this suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County
on

February

Whistleblower

17,

2017,

Act,

alleging

First

violations

Amendment

of

the

retaliation,

Illinois

breach

of

contract, and tortious interference with contract. Defendants
removed the matter to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
II.
Defendants move for summary judgment because they contend
that

Jackson

is

not

a

whistleblower

under

the

IWA,

was

not

retaliated against for his political beliefs, and did not have a
valid

employment

agreement

with

HPD.

Summary

judgment

is

appropriate when, viewing all facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

According to Kisha McCaskill, Jackson stopped reporting to work
after she delivered the news of his demotion, so she considered
his departure a voluntary termination. But, as Jackson points out,
his paystubs and his ultimate termination letter do not reflect
this.
7
4

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir.
2006). If a reasonable jury could, on the evidence presented,
return a verdict for the non-moving party, a genuine dispute
exists, and summary judgment is unwarranted. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A. Retaliation claims under the Illinois Whistleblower Act
Jackson

charges

HPD

and

the

individual

defendants

with

retaliating against him in violation of the IWA for calling police
about the rumors of drug dealing on HPD property. The IWA protects
employees who disclose information about suspected wrongdoing to
a government agency. Larsen v. Provena Hosp., 27 N.E.3d 1033, 1043
(Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2015); Brame v. City of N. Chicago, 955
N.E.2d 1269, 1271 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2011). The law is
intended to encourage reporting of illegality by eliminating the
threat of retaliation. See Coffey v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 145
F. Supp. 3d 771, 777 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Section 15(b) of the Act
provides:
An employer may not retaliate against an employee for
disclosing
information
to
a
government
or
law
enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable
cause to believe that the information discloses a
violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.
740 ILCS 174/15(b). Thus, to secure relief under this section, an
employee must demonstrate that he (1) reported information to a
government agency (2) about activity that he reasonably believed
8

to be unlawful and (3) suffered an adverse action by his employer5
because of that disclosure. See Sweeney v. City of Decatur, 79
N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2017).
Defendants assert that Jackson’s IWA claims cannot stand
because there is no evidence that Jackson reasonably believed he
was reporting unlawful activity at the time he made the police
report in question. I agree. The IWA does not protect employees
just because they contact a government agency. If this were the
case, any employee seeking to avoid termination would simply pick
up the phone and dial his local police department to gain the IWA’s
protection. To prevent false reporting and misuse of the statute,
IWA protection is limited to those employees who have “reasonable
cause to believe” that they are disclosing information about “a
violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation”—i.e.,
bona fide whistleblowers. 740 ILCS 174/15(b). It does not matter
whether the employee is correct in his belief that wrongdoing has
occurred, but his belief does need to be objectively reasonable.
Coffey, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 778; see also Lang v. Nw. Univ., 472

The private cause of action created by section 15 can be wielded
against any “employer,” which the IWA defines as “an individual,
sole proprietorship, partnership, firm, corporation, association,
and any other entity that has one or more employees in this State,
including a political subdivision of the State; a unit of local
government; ... any authority including a department, division,
bureau, board, commission, or other agency of these entities; and
any person acting within the scope of his or her authority express
or implied on behalf of those entities in dealing with its
employees.” 740 ILCS 174/5.
9
5

F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff asserting retaliation
under the False Claims Act and Illinois common law needed to have
a “reasonable objective basis” for her belief that her employer
was “cooking the books”—rumor was not enough); Belline v. K-Mart
Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 187-88 (7th Cir. 1991) (tort of retaliatory
discharge protects “employees who reasonably believe that crimes
have been committed” and “should not turn on the happenstance of
whether the irregular conduct [an employee] reports is actually
criminal”).
The record in this case reveals that, when Jackson called the
police in October 2015, he did not have reasonable cause to believe
that there was unlawful activity occurring on Harvey Park District
property. In fact, by his own admissions, he did not believe that
the rumors about drug trafficking were true. As he explained during
his deposition, when commissioner Thompson called him to discuss
the rumor, he told her that “there’s nobody selling any drugs at
the maintenance garage because nobody was ever at the maintenance
garage.” Jackson Dep. at 45. He later told police that “he checked
the garage and all of the vehicles on the property” and found “no
signs of drugs.” Harvey Police Report, Doc. No. 42-14; Jackson
Dep. at 47. Jackson called the police to the scene not because he
wanted to stop suspected wrongdoing, but because he wanted to
verify what he already knew: that the HPD maintenance garage was
not a hotbed for narcotics. Instead, Jackson’s “whole purpose” for
10

calling the police and making a report was to protect himself and
his coworkers from being set up. Jackson Dep. at 45, 65. Asking
police to dispel rumors is not equivalent to reporting suspected
lawbreaking.
Likely recognizing that his deposition testimony about his
motivation for calling the police was damaging to his IWA claims,
Jackson subsequently submitted a declaration with his Local Rule
56.1(b)(3) statement explaining that he had other reasons—civic
duty

and

community

protection—for

making

his

police

report.

Jackson Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4. This is at odds with the explanation that
Jackson provided at his deposition, and such contradictory postdeposition declarations are routinely afforded little, if any,
evidentiary weight at summary judgment. See Holloway v. Delaware
Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1075 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] party
cannot create an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit whose
conclusions contradict prior deposition or other sworn testimony.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Russell v. AcmeEvans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67–68 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Where deposition
and affidavit are in conflict, the affidavit is to be disregarded
unless it is demonstrable that the statement in the deposition was
mistaken....”). Jackson’s declaration does not create a genuine
dispute of fact as to his motivation for calling the police.
Because Jackson did not actually suspect that any unlawful activity

11

was afoot, his report to police did not make him a whistleblower.
He therefore cannot prevail on his IWA claims.
B. First Amendment retaliation claim
In Jackson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment retaliation
claim,

he

asserts

that

defendants

HPD

and

the

McCaskills

individually6 retaliated against him for his political affiliation
with and support for Anthony McCaskill’s political rivals. To
prevail on this retaliation claim, Jackson must make a prima facie
showing that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First
Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter
First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment
activity was at least a motivating factor in [defendants’] decision
to take the retaliatory action.” Novoselsky v. Brown, 822 F.3d
342, 354 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859,
866 (7th Cir. 2012)); see also Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975,
977-80 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing causation in § 1983 First
Amendment cases). If Jackson can demonstrate that an improper
purpose

was

a

motivating

factor,

the

burden

then

shifts

to

defendants to show that they would have made the same decision

Jackson also lodges this claim against defendant Patterson, but
now admits that he has no information about Patterson retaliating
against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Jackson
Dep. at 104. To hold the individual defendants liable for
retaliation, Jackson must be able to demonstrate that they were
personally involved in the constitutional deprivation. See Minix
v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2010). For this reason,
he cannot maintain this claim against Patterson.
12
6

despite Jackson’s First Amendment activity. Zellner v. Herrick,
639 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Massey v. Johnson, 457
F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2006)). If defendants make that showing,
Jackson

“must

then

demonstrate

that

[defendants’]

proffered

reasons for the decision were pretextual and that retaliatory
animus was the real reason for the decision.” Id.
Defendants do not contest that Jackson meets the first two
prima facie requirements. It is undisputed, for instance, that
Jackson supported Anthony McCaskill’s opponent in the 2015 Harvey
mayoral race and that Jackson was politically affiliated with
alderman Keith Price. Because Jackson was not a policymaking or
confidential employee, the First Amendment protected his political
affiliations. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, N.J., 136 S. Ct.
1412, 1417 (2016); Carlson v. Gorecki, 374 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir.
2004); Hall v. Babb, 389 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 2004) (nonpolicymaking

public

employees

are

“entitled

to

be

treated

apolitically”). It is also undisputed that Jackson’s demotion and
termination in early 2016 were adverse actions that could deter a
person from engaging in First Amendment activity.
The third prima facie element is where the parties’ agreement
ends.

Defendants

contend

that

Jackson

cannot

show

a

causal

relationship between his political affiliation and his termination
for several reasons. First, they argue that the McCaskills were
unaware of Jackson’s political affiliations and therefore could
13

not have retaliated against him on this basis. In determining
causation,

defendants’

knowledge

of

the

alleged

protected

activities is a “threshold question.” Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d
582, 585 (7th Cir. 2009). Although the McCaskills testified that
they

did

not

know

about

testimony

is

strongly

Jackson’s

contradicted

political
by

loyalties,

testimony

from

this
other

witnesses, who remembered hearing Anthony McCaskill repeatedly
referring to Jackson as “Price’s boy,” see, e.g., Clark Dep. at
26-32, 35-36; Owens Dep. at 51-54; Thompson Dep. at 18-20, and, in
some instances, remembered McCaskill stating that “he was going to
get” Jackson, Clark Dep. at 31-32, 35-36; see also Wade Decl. ¶ 5.
Additionally, Jackson testified that he knew Anthony McCaskill was
aware of his political affiliations because in 2014 he overheard
McCaskill telling then-HPD director Cooper that he did not trust
Jackson because he was “friends with the other side”—i.e. alderman
Keith Price—and was sharing information with them. Jackson Dep. at
55-63. Jackson also testified that, leading up to the spring 2015
election, he displayed campaign signs for Keith Price and Eric
Kellogg in his car, and that, on at least one occasion, Anthony
McCaskill, who was running against Kellogg in the mayoral race,
saw Jackson’s signs and gave him “a look.” Jackson Dep. at 66-68.
Although Jackson admits he never discussed politics with Kisha
McCaskill, Jackson Dep. at 85-86, one of his former coworkers
stated in an affidavit that Kisha McCaskill told her that “there
14

was going to be a problem” so long as she and Jackson were allied
with Keith Price. Wade Decl. ¶ 3. Moreover, the formal complaint
that Jackson sent to Kisha McCaskill and the HPD Board in December
2015 informed them that he believed he was being targeted because
of a perceived association with “a local alderman and the Mayor of
Harvey.” A reasonable jury could conclude from these facts that
defendants were aware of Jackson’s affiliations.
Second, defendants argue that Jackson is unable to show
causation because his protected political activities, which they
limit to his display of campaign signs during the 2015 election,
occurred long before his eventual termination. It is true that
Jackson wasn’t terminated until nearly a year after the 2015
mayoral election ended, but this temporal distance between his
visible political engagement and the adverse action does not doom
his claim. See Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.
2017) (long gap between protected activity and adverse action will
not “undermine a causal connection that is otherwise supported by
sufficient circumstantial evidence”). Jackson’s political beliefs
did not disappear after the 2015 election, and, according to
several

witnesses,

Anthony

McCaskill’s

memory

of

them

didn’t

either. According to HPD’s former attorney Chris Clark, Anthony
McCaskill continued to refer to Jackson as “Price’s boy” in the
six months preceding Jackson’s termination. Clark Dep. at 34-36.
Every

time

McCaskill

saw

Jackson
15

during

this

period,

Clark

testified, McCaskill said that “he was going to get” him. Id.
Jackson’s former coworker Vanessa Wade similarly recalled hearing
Anthony McCaskill tell Kisha McCaskill “that this ‘MF’ has to go,”
after Jackson complained at an HPD Board meeting in the fall of
2015.

Wade

Decl.

¶

5.

This

testimony

from

other

former

HPD

employees that Anthony McCaskill wanted to get rid of Jackson, who
he viewed as his political opponent’s “boy,” supports an inference
of causation. See Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1168 (7th
Cir. 1981). Other evidence—including testimony from three HPD
commissioners that Kisha McCaskill’s firing of Jackson without a
vote from the Board was a departure from prior HPD practice, Owens
Dep. at 40-41, 59; Moore Dep. at 37-38; Thompson Dep. at 23, even
if it was not an explicit violation of HPD policies, see Hobgood
v.

Illinois

Gaming

Bd.,

731

F.3d

635,

645

(7th

Cir.

2013)

(departures from policies or practices can serve as circumstantial
evidence

of

defendant’s

motive),

and

testimony

that

Kisha

McCaskill hired political supporters after Jackson was fired,
Jackson Dep. at 110; K. McCaskill Dep. at 61-62; McClain Decl. ¶
5—similarly supports such an inference. When viewed in the light
most favorable to Jackson, this evidence is sufficient to make a
prima facie showing.
That Jackson can meet his prima facie burden does not end the
retaliation inquiry however. Defendants assert that they had a
legitimate,

non-retaliatory

reason
16

for

Jackson’s

termination:

budgetary woes caused by a changing economy. If true, this would
mean that Jackson’s political allegiances were not a necessary
condition for his termination, as required for defendants to be
held liable, because he would have been terminated anyway. See
Greene,

660

F.3d

at

980.

Jackson,

however,

contends

that

defendants’ budgetary explanation was pretextual. He points to the
District’s corporate fund budget for fiscal year 2016, which shows
the fund’s balance increasing by nearly $300,000 over the course
of the year, as evidence that HPD was not actually facing a
financial

crunch

when

it

decided

to

fire

him.

In

response,

defendants contend that this is only one fund and that other HPD
funds were running large deficits at the time. How these different
funds relate to one another is not clear from the record though.
Nor is it clear which fund provided Jackson’s salary. In further
support of his pretext argument, Jackson points to the testimony
of

one

HPD

commissioner

who,

despite

acknowledging

that

the

District faced “some issues with budget and money” in 2016, did
not think the budget was the reason for the director’s employment
decisions. Owens Dep. at 61-63. Weighing this evidence against the
evidence of defendants’ political motivations, I am satisfied that
there is a genuine dispute as to whether the real reason for
Jackson’s termination was budgetary. See Valentino v. Vill. of S.
Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Often, the
same evidence used to establish the prima facie case is sufficient
17

to allow a jury to determine that a defendant's stated reason for
terminating a plaintiff was a mere front for an ulterior, unlawful
motive.”). Summary judgment on this claim is therefore denied.
C. Breach of contract and tortious interference claims
Jackson’s final two claims—Count IV for breach of contract
against HPD and Count V for tortious interference with contract
against Anthony and Kisha McCaskill—both depend on one central
question: did Jackson have a valid and enforceable individual
employment contract with HPD? Defendants say no and urge summary
judgment on both counts accordingly. Although they acknowledge
that Jackson has a 2013 agreement signed by the former president
of the Board and the former executive director, they submit that
the agreement has no legal force because there is no record that
it was ever approved by the full HPD Board. I agree.
The Illinois Park District Code, which governs HPD, imposes
strict limitations on the manner in which park districts can incur
debts and obligations. Section 4–6 of the Code reads:
No member of the board of any park district, nor any
person, whether in the employ of said board or otherwise,
shall have power to create any debt, obligation, claim
or liability, for or on account of said park district,
or the monies or property of the same, except with the
express authority of said board conferred at a meeting
thereof and duly recorded in a record of its proceedings.
70 ILCS 1205/4-6 (emphasis added). Illinois courts, as well as
federal courts interpreting Illinois law, have held that contracts
undertaken on behalf of a park district without board approval are
18

void. E.g., D.C. Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Batavia Park Dist.,
492 N.E.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1986) (“[W]hen an
employee

of

a

municipal

corporation

purports

to

bind

the

corporation by contract without prior approval, in violation of an
applicable statute, such a contract is utterly void.”); Kelley v.
Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 308 (7th Cir. 2011) (individual
board members “cannot unilaterally bind [a park district] to a
contract without express [b]oard approval”); see also City of
Belleville v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council,
732 N.E.2d 592, 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 2000) (addendum to a
collective bargaining agreement that mayor agreed to without city
council approval was void).
Jackson does not deny that this is the law in Illinois but
instead offers evidence that, in his view, establishes that his
contract was approved by the HPD Board. He cites to executive
session minutes that show the Board, and specifically Anthony
McCaskill,

discussing

the

prospect

of

offering

individual

contracts to Jackson and other employees to avoid unionization.
Although these minutes show that the Board contemplated employment
agreements, they do not reveal any vote on the issue. In addition
to the executive session minutes, Jackson offers the testimony of
commissioner

Barbara

Moore

and

former

commissioner

Brenda

Thompson. Moore, one of the two people to sign the purported
contract on HPD’s behalf, initially testified that she voted on
19

the contract, but ultimately conceded that she did not remember.
She testified, “All I know is that it was, the contract was, []
presented to us. I don't remember if we did or we didn't [vote to
approve it].” Moore Dep. at 49. Thompson testified that she
remembered giving her permission to approve Jackson’s contract but
that she did not recall when the vote occurred or whether she ever
saw minutes reflecting the vote. Thompson Dep. at 47-48. Finally,
Jackson offers testimony from other HPD employees who said that
they were aware of his contract and correspondence from Anthony
McCaskill referencing Jackson’s employment agreement.
Although this evidence supports Jackson’s recollection of how
his purported contract came into existence and contradicts Anthony
McCaskill’s alternative telling, it is not enough to establish
that

Jackson’s

contract

is

valid

under

Illinois

law.

Absent

evidence that the HPD Board expressly approved the contract at one
of its meetings and duly recorded its approval, Jackson cannot
show that either Moore or Cooper had power to bind HPD to such an
obligation.

See

70

ILCS

1205/4-6.

And

if

they

lacked

such

authority, the contract is void. D.C. Consulting, 492 N.E.2d at
1002-03; Kelley, 635 F.3d at 308. Jackson cannot prevail on his
breach of contract and tortious interference claims without a valid
contract. See Hickox v. Bell, 552 N.E.2d 1133, 1143 (Ill. 1990)
(breach of contract claim requires “the existence of a valid and
enforceable contract”); HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon
20

Hosp., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ill. 1989) (tortious interference
claim

requires

“the

existence

of

a

valid

and

enforceable

contract”). Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment
on these claims.
III.
For

the

reasons

outlined

above,

defendants’

motion

for

summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Judgment
shall be entered in defendants’ favor on Counts I, II, IV, and V,
and in defendant Eric Patterson’s favor on Count III. The motion
is otherwise denied.
ENTER ORDER:

Dated: March 26, 2019

_____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge

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