Sibert v. Des Plaines School District 62

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 7/28/2017: Mailed notice (mw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL SIBERT,
Plaintiff,
v.
DES PLAINES SCHOOL DISTRICT 62
Defendant.

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No. 17 C 2645

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Des Plaines School District 62's
(District) motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is
granted.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael Sibert (Sibert) was allegedly employed by the District as a
teacher at Chippewa Middle School (School). Leah Kimmelman (Kimmelman) was
allegedly the principal at the School, and Paul Hertel (Hertel) was allegedly the
Associate Superintendent for Human Resources. Sibert contends that Kimmelman
created a hostile work environment to employees who reported to her, especially
male employees. In the Spring of 2015, Kimmelman allegedly removed Sibert from

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the teacher position at the School. Sibert contends that he then suffered a nervous
breakdown. In November 2015, Sibert allegedly contacted Ellen Swanson
(Swanson), Assistant Superintendent for Student Services, indicating his intent to file
a complaint against the District relating to his alleged treatment by Kimmelman.
Subsequently, the District allegedly informed Sibert that an investigation was being
conducted regarding his allegations. Sibert contends that the investigation caused
him additional stress and caused his mental state to deteriorate further. Sibert
brought the instant action and includes in his complaint claims brought under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. alleging
gender discrimination and a hostile work environment (Count I), and a claim brought
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. alleging
a hostile work environment. The District now moves to dismiss all claims.

LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)), the court must draw all reasonable inferences
that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in
the complaint. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th
Cir. 2012); Thompson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.
2002). A plaintiff is required to include allegations in the complaint that “plausibly
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a
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‘speculative level’” and “if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.”
E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.
2007)(quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007));
see also Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d at 622 (stating that “[t]o survive
a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and that “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged”)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009))(internal quotations
omitted).

DISCUSSION
The District argues that the Title VII claims are untimely and that Sibert fails
to state a valid ADA claim.

I. Title VII Claims (Count I)
The District contends that Sibert’s Title VII claims are time-barred. In order
to bring a Title VII claim in Illinois, the plaintiff must first “file a charge with the
EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.” Boston v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 816 F.3d 455, 463 (7th Cir. 2016)(citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e–5(e)(1)). In the instant action, Sibert alleges that he was harassed by
Kimmelman. Sibert further alleges that in the Spring of 2015 he was removed from
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his teaching position. (Compl. Par. 19). The District contends that Sibert was in fact
transferred to a new school in June 2015. Sibert’s own allegations bear out such a
conclusion since the complaint contains no allegations of interactions with
Kimmelman after the end of the 2014/15 school year. Sibert’s own allegations
indicate that he was not working at the School and that Kimmelman was not acting
as his supervisor after the 2014/15 school year. In regard to Hertel, the complaint is
devoid of any specific allegations indicating that he did anything wrong, other than a
conclusory allegation that there was also a “hostile work environment created by”
him. (Compl. Par. 23). The EEOC Charge, which is attached to the complaint,
indicates that it was filed on September, 2016, far beyond the 300-day limit. In
response to the instant motion, Sibert now asserts that even though he no longer
worked for Kimmelman, the alleged harassment and discrimination was
somehow”carried out further under the guise of a purported investigation. . . .”
(Resp. 5). Sibert, however, cannot amend his complaint in his response and such
allegations are not in his complaint. Also, even if Sibert disliked the investigation or
found it stressful, the complaint fails to contain allegations that would plausibly
suggest that the investigation created a hostile work environment or could support a
gender discrimination claim. Nor has Sibert presented allegations plausibly
suggesting that any conduct was related to his gender. In addition, Sibert has not
shown that the equitable tolling doctrines are applicable in this case. Therefore, the
District’s motion to dismiss the Title VII claims (Count I) is granted.

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II. ADA Claims (Count II)
The District contends that Sibert has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a
valid ADA claim. Sibert has asserted an ADA hostile work environment claim. The
Seventh Circuit has not recognized such a cause of action, and this court declines to
recognize such a novel legal theory. See Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 803
(7th Cir. 1999)(stating that “[t]his circuit has not recognized explicitly an ADA claim
based on hostile environment or harassment”). In addition, regardless, the facts in
this case are insufficient to plausibly suggest a hostile work environment. Sibert’s
own facts suggest that he was on leave from work addressing his alleged mental
health issues during the pertinent period. It is difficult to conceive how Sibert could
have been working in a hostile work environment when he was on leave and not at
work. In addition, although Sibert indicates in the complaint that he disagreed with
the manner in which the investigation was conducted, he fails to allege facts that
would indicate any conduct that could conceivably rise to the level of a hostile work
environment. For example, Sibert complains that during the investigation he was
questioned, “forcing him to relive and retell the events that led to his breakdown,
even though he had already detailed the many incidents to Swanson and Hertel.”
(Compl. Par. 32). There would have been nothing improper if an investigator,
investigating Sibert’s complaints, asked Sibert himself to recount his version of the
facts. Although Sibert asserts that he “suffered a great amount of anxiety involving
the process of the investigation” and was “worrying,” his subjective feelings are not
dispositive in regard to determining whether he was subjected to a hostile work
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environment. (Compl Par. 31, 34); see also Passananti v. Cook Cty., 689 F.3d 655,
667-68 (7th Cir. 2012)(stating that the hostile work environment “assessment must
be made from both subjective and objective viewpoints”); Racicot v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 414 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2005)(stating that “[a] hostile work
environment is one that is both objectively and subjectively offensive”). Sibert also
contended that he was subjected to “anxiety and stress” during the “process of
retelling his story. . . .” (Compl Par. 39). However, as part of a proper thorough
investigation, initiated by a complaint from Sibert himself, it may have been
appropriate to question Sibert on multiple occasions. Sibert fails to allege facts to
plausibly suggest that any retelling of his story was part of an effort to harass him.
Sibert also contends that he believed at one point that the investigators were not
interested in his alleged treatment at the School and were more interested in
“attacking him about mental health issues.” (Compl. Par. 41). Again, while Sibert
may have subjectively had such paranoia, he has not alleged specific facts to
plausibly suggest that to be the case. Sibert fails to allege any specific conduct by
the investigators that would constitute improper conduct. Sibert’s mere
dissatisfaction with the investigator’s ultimate findings is not sufficient to establish
any wrongful conduct on the part of the investigators. While Sibert clearly alleges
that he subjectively believed he was being harassed and subjected to a hostile work
environment, the allegations in his complaint are insufficient to plausibly suggest any
such legal determination. Therefore, the District’s motion to dismiss the hostile work
environment claim (Count II) is granted.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the District’s motion to dismiss is granted.

___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: July 28, 2017

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