Raymond Willoughby et al v. Village of Fox Lake et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 12/4/2018: The motions to dismiss defendants Brad Schroeder 158 , Luis Rivera 178 , and Atha Hunt 193 are denied. [For further details see Background.] Mailed notice(is, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RAYMOND WILLOUGHBY and
DAMIEN WARD,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VILLAGE OF FOX LAKE,
OFFICERS ATHA HUNT #9640
and THOMAS JONITES,
INVESTIGATORS BRAD SCHROEDER
and LUIS RIVERA, SERGEANT THOMAS,
LIEUTENANT NIELSEN, and
JOHN DOES,
Defendants.
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No. 17 CV 2800
Judge Ronald A. Guzmán
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons explained below, the motions to dismiss defendants Brad Schroeder, Luis
Rivera, and Atha Hunt are denied.
BACKGROUND
In this action, plaintiffs allege that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
they were arrested and detained in conjunction with the investigation that occurred after the
death of Charles Joseph Gliniewicz, who was a police lieutenant for the Village of Fox Lake,
Illinois (the “Village”). It was later revealed that Gliniewicz had staged his suicide to look like a
homicide. It is alleged that prior to taking his own life, Gliniewicz sent a radio transmission to
the Village police department in which he falsely stated that he was pursuing three individuals,
two “male whites” and one “male black.” (ECF No. 205, 6th Am. Compl. ¶ 11.)
The Court
assumes familiarity with its previous opinions and orders and the facts and procedural history of
this case.
Defendants Brad Schroeder, Luis Rivera, and Atha Hunt move separately under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the § 1983 claims asserted against them on the
ground that they are barred by the statute of limitations. On July 26, 2018, plaintiffs filed a
Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in which Schroeder, Rivera, and Hunt were named as
defendants for the first time in this action. Plaintiffs subsequently amended their pleadings to
assert the same claims previously asserted, dropping and adding certain defendants who are not
pertinent to this opinion and order.
LEGAL STANDARDS
When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court construes the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts as true all well-pleaded facts therein, and draws all
reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 946
(7th Cir. 2013). A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
While the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and a plaintiff need not affirmatively
plead timeliness, dismissal is appropriate where it is clear from the face of the complaint that it is
“hopelessly time-barred.” Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d 671,
674-75 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Cannon v. Newport, 850 F.3d 303, 306 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen
a complaint reveals that the action is untimely, the court can dismiss it.”).
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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Raymond Willoughby alleges that, on the day of Gliniewicz’s suicide, he was
falsely arrested by Officer Hunt and transported to the Round Lake Police Department, where he
was interrogated by Investigators Schroeder and Rivera. Willoughby requested and tried to
leave but was told he could not do so because he was in custody. He was released after several
hours. (6th Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38-42.)
Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois are subject to its two-year limitations period for
personal-injury claims. Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017). Schroeder, Rivera,
and Hunt contend that Willoughby’s claims against them are untimely because the alleged false
arrest occurred on September 1, 2015 (and Willoughby was released on the same date), and
Willoughby did not assert the claims until July 26, 2018, over two years later. Unless the
limitations period was tolled or the FAC relates back to the original complaint (which was timely
filed on April 13, 2017), the claims against Schroeder, Rivera, and Hunt are untimely.
In response to defendants’ motions, Willoughby contends that, because this action was
originally filed as a class action, the statute of limitations was tolled from April 13, 2017 until
June 6, 2018, the date the Court entered an order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification. Willoughby says that 19 months passed between his arrest and the filing of the
complaint; the statute of limitations was then tolled until June 2018, which would leave about 5
months until the expiration of the limitations period in November 2018; and the July 2018
amendment adding the new defendants was therefore within the limitations period. In support of
his argument, Willoughby cites American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538
(1974), in which the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations is suspended during the
period between the timely filing of a class-action complaint and the denial of a motion for class
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certification, for members of the putative class who make timely motions to intervene after the
denial, and Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), in which the Supreme Court
clarified that its ruling in American Pipe also protects putative class members who decline to
intervene in the class action but instead seek to bring their own individual suit after class
certification is denied. Willoughby also cites the Seventh Circuit’s observation that, “[w]hen a
plaintiff files a complaint on behalf of a proposed class, the statute of limitations for the claim is
tolled for each member of the class,” and “[t]he tolling continues until the case is stripped of its
character as a class action.” Collins v. Vill. of Palatine, 875 F.3d 839, 840 (7th Cir. 2017)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2014 (2018).
Defendants, in reply, direct the Court to decisions in which courts held that a putative
class action against one defendant does not toll the statute of limitations on claims against a
different defendant. For example, in Wyser-Pratte Management Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d
553, 567-68 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit considered whether, under Ohio law as predicted
by the court, American Pipe tolling applied to suspend the limitations period for claims against
one defendant that could have been, but were not, brought in an earlier class action against other
defendants. The Sixth Circuit first stated that it looked to federal class-action principles for
guidance, given the parties’ reliance on United States Supreme Court decisions and the dearth of
Ohio state-court decisions. The court then explained that the “first principle of significance” in
its tolling analysis was that “the class action must afford the defendant with adequate notice.”
Id. at 567. Ultimately, the court concluded that class-action tolling does not apply to claims
against a defendant not named in the class-action complaint. Id. at 568.
It is important to note that American Pipe and Crown “involve the tolling of federal
statutes of limitations in class actions filed in federal courts, not the tolling of state statutes of
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limitations in class actions filed in federal courts.” In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. Cheese
Antitrust Litig., No. 09 CV 3690, 2015 WL 3988488, at *30 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2015). When
state law supplies the limitations period, as it does here, it also supplies the tolling rules.
Hemenway v. Peabody Coal Co., 159 F.3d 255, 265 (7th Cir. 1998). Illinois recognizes the
American Pipe tolling doctrine, with certain limitations that are not relevant here. Steinberg v.
Chi. Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 645 (Ill. 1977); Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 1102,
1103 (Ill. 1998). But, as far as the Court can tell, neither the Seventh Circuit nor Illinois courts
have addressed the precise issue before this Court: whether, under Illinois law, American Pipe
tolling applies to claims against defendants that were not part of the original complaint. Illinois
courts have held, however, that such tolling questions should be determined on a case-by-case
basis, with the court weighing the interests that could be served by the application of the tolling
rule against the potential for “abuse.” Regnery v. Meyers, 679 N.E.2d 74, 81 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997); Hess v. I.R.E. Real Estate Income Fund, Ltd., 629 N.E.2d 520, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of Wyser-Pratte, in which the Sixth Circuit was
chiefly concerned with the issue of notice to the defendant, citing Justice Powell’s concurrence
in Crown. 413 F.3d at 567. Justice Powell explained therein:
The tolling rule of American Pipe is a generous one, inviting abuse. It preserves
for class members a range of options pending a decision on class certification.
The rule should not be read, however, as leaving a plaintiff free to raise different
or peripheral claims following denial of class status.
In American Pipe we noted that a class suit “notifies the defendants not
only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number
and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who participate in the judgment.
Within the period set by the statute of limitations, the defendants have the
essential information necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of
the prospective litigation.” [414 U.S.] at 555. When thus notified, the defendant
normally is not prejudiced by tolling of the statute of limitations. It is important
to make certain, however, that American Pipe is not abused by the assertion of
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claims that differ from those raised in the original class suit. . . . Claims as to
which the defendant was not fairly placed on notice by the class suit are not
protected under American Pipe and are barred by the statute of limitations.
462 U.S. at 354-55 (Powell, J., concurring). Here, tolling would not serve to promote the kinds
of class-action policy interests discussed in American Pipe. Moreover, it would be a significant
abuse of American Pipe to hold that the statute of limitations was tolled as to the claims that
were first asserted against Schroeder, Rivera, and Hunt in July 2018, because they were not
placed on notice of the class’s claims when this class-action suit was filed. The Court therefore
declines to apply American Pipe tolling. See Vodak v. City of Chi., No. 03 CV 2463, 2006 WL
1049736, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2006) (“Plaintiffs’ original complaint did not put the added
Defendants on notice of any claims against them. Because the added Defendants were not
named in the original class complaint, the statute of limitations against them was not tolled by its
filing.”); Dairy Farmers, 2015 WL 3988488, at *30 (“American Pipe does not apply to toll new
claims. . . . Because these three claims did not appear in the [first-filed] complaint, they are time
barred, and American Pipe tolling cannot save them.”).
Willoughby also argues that, even if the limitations period is not tolled, the addition of
these defendants relates back to the date of the original complaint. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c) provides that an amended complaint relates back to the date of the original
pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original
pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in
by amendment:
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(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). Thus, whether the FAC relates back to the original complaint depends
on whether Illinois law allows relation back, or, because the FAC changes the parties, whether
the newly-added defendants had such notice of this suit that they would not be prejudiced in
defending it and they knew or should have known that they would have been timely named but
for a mistake about their identities. “Illinois’ relation-back doctrine is, in all material respects,
identical to the federal rule.” In re Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 585 F.3d 326, 331 (7th Cir. 2009).
Therefore, the Court’s inquiry boils down to whether the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(B) and
(c)(1)(C) are satisfied. Only subsection (c)(1)(C) is at issue.
Defendants focus on Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), which refers to a “mistake” in determining the
proper defendant’s identity. For many years, the Seventh Circuit adhered to the “John Doe rule,”
pursuant to which a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge about a defendant’s identity was not
considered a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c) such that a plaintiff could amend his
complaint and take advantage of the relation-back doctrine. See, e.g., Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry., 469
F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2006). But the relation-back landscape shifted in 2010, when the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538. As the
Seventh Circuit later explained, Krupski changed what it and other courts had understood to be
the proper standard for deciding whether an amended complaint relates back to the date of the
filing of the original complaint. Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Techs. Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 555,
559 (7th Cir. 2011). Post-Krupski, courts focus on the defendant’s knowledge. The question is
what the defendants knew or should have known during the Rule 4(m) period for service, not
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what Willoughby knew or should have known when he filed the original complaint.
See
Krupski, 560 U.S. at 548. “The only two inquiries that the district court is now permitted to
make in deciding whether an amended complaint relates back to the date of the original one are,
first, whether the defendant who is sought to be added by the amendment knew or should have
known that the plaintiff, had it not been for a mistake, would have sued him instead or in
addition to suing the named defendant; and second, whether, even if so, the delay in the
plaintiff’s discovering his mistake impaired the new defendant’s ability to defend himself.”
Joseph, 638 F.3d at 559-60.
The Seventh Circuit has not expressly addressed whether the John Doe rule survived
Krupski, and courts in this district are divided. See McWilliams v. Cook Cty., No. 15 CV 53,
2018 WL 3970145, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2018) (citing cases). This Court is among those
who have concluded that it did not survive Krupski. Moore v. Cuomo, No. 14 CV 9313, 2018
WL 4095101, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2018). Under subsection (ii) of Rule 15(c)(1)(C), the
Court considers whether the newly-added defendants understood or reasonably should have
understood that Willoughby intended in the original complaint to sue them. See Krupski, 560
U.S. at 553-54; Haroon v. Talbott, No. 16 CV 4720, 2017 WL 4280980, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27,
2017) (“In John Doe cases under Krupski, a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge neither automatically
bars the plaintiff from the shelter of the relation-back doctrine, nor compels the court to find that
an amended complaint relates back to the original complaint. Instead, this Court must ascertain
whether there is any basis in the record for saying that Talbott could have legitimately believed
that the limitations period had passed without any attempt by Haroon to sue him.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
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In the original complaint, plaintiffs complained that they had been wrongfully arrested
and detained in conjunction with the Gliniewicz investigation, and they named John Doe police
officers as defendants. (ECF No. 1, Compl.) In Count I, plaintiffs alleged that there was no
probable cause to arrest or detain them and that they suffered damages “[b]y reason of the
above-described acts of the Defendant Officers.” (Id. at 13-14.) The acts of which Willoughby
complained were that John Doe Police Officers arrested him and held him on the scene for one
or two hours; transported him to the Round Lake Police Department, where he was held for
several more hours; and, when he requested and tried to leave, told him that he could not do so
because he was in custody. (Id. ¶¶ 40-44.)
It appears from the original complaint that Willoughby intended to sue the officers who
were involved in arresting him, taking him into custody, and holding him at the Round Lake
Police Department. Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), the proper inquiry is whether the newly-added
defendants knew or should have known that but for Willoughby’s inability to discover their
identities, they would have been named as defendants. On the current record, the Court is unable
to resolve this issue in defendants’ favor. See, e.g., Clair v. Cook Cty., No. 16 C 1334, 2017 WL
1355879, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2017) (“Because the complaint does not speak to what the
newly added defendants knew or should have known about this lawsuit, the court cannot resolve
the Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) issue in their favor on a motion to dismiss.”).
The Court denies
defendants’ motions without prejudice to the issue being raised later in the proceedings after the
record has been developed.
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CONCLUSION
The motions to dismiss Brad Schroeder [158], Luis Rivera [178], and Atha Hunt [193]
are denied.
DATE: December 4, 2018
____________________________________
Ronald A. Guzmán
United States District Judge
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